

In from the margins

A contribution to the debate on culture and
development in Europe

The European Task Force on Culture and Development

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Foreword

After a long period of divide, Europe is looking to make choices which will determine its future dynamics and stability. It is facing crucial decisions concerning the depth of economic and social integration, the nature of its political institutions, and the contours of its new security system, while trying to sharpen itself for economic and technological competition.

However, this intensive search for new political and economic paradigms may well overshadow the need also to reconsider long-term developmental objectives in the domain of "immaterial" well-being. This danger has been widely recognised; while much work has been carried out at international level in fields pertaining to environment, human rights and social exclusion, the field of culture has yet to be thoroughly tilled.

In from the margins seeks to fill this gap. It addresses culture (which unlike education is difficult to harness to immediate economic returns) from a wider developmental point of view and offers the Council of Europe and its member states an opportunity to reflect on the importance they attach to culture from a new, integrated and comprehensive perspective.

As the authors put it, the report's central themes are "two interlocking priorities: to bring the millions of dispossessed and disadvantaged Europeans in from the margins of society, and cultural policy in from the margins of governance". A new alliance between culture and development should enable this change to occur.

The new paths explored by the authors to balance developmental efforts and preservation of cultural diversity may help cultural policy to become more centrally rooted and more pervasively constructive, favouring a harmonious empowerment of people as well as an equitable distribution of life chances. Failure to understand this might well mean jeopardising any developmental effort.

As a political scientist, reading *In from the margins* has given me great pleasure; for the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, it is a challenge. The report is a complex whole combining descriptions of European and global cultural developments with astute policy evaluations; it shows great respect both for the common roots of European culture and for the maintenance of the cultural diversity which provides us with our intellectual strength; it looks into the past, probes the future and succeeds in welding all components together within a single frame.

The initiative for the report came from the World Commission on Culture and Development, which, after the preparatory work by Unesco and the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, was appointed in 1992 to write a world report on culture and development. The Council of Europe decided to support this effort by providing its contribution in the form of a parallel report exploring the relations between culture and developmental efforts on the continent. The task of preparing the report was given to a small independent task force. The task force's remit was to submit its unmoderated conclusions, both as a basis for a wider global debate on culture and sustainable development, and as a stand-alone document on issues specific to Europe.

The World Commission's report, *Our creative diversity* is to be discussed at an Intergovernmental Conference on Culture and Media Policies for Development, to be held in Stockholm in March 1998. The Council of Europe's *In from the margins* will be a major regional contribution to the conference.

I wish to thank the European Task Force on Culture and Development for their excellent work, as well as governments, organisations and persons who have assisted them both intellectually and materially.¹

Daniel Tarschys
Secretary General

1. Direct Financial contributions were made by Austria, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Unesco and the European Commission.

Executive summary

This report, produced by an independent group of policy makers, researchers and cultural managers for the Council of Europe, is a contribution to the debate on culture and development which the World Commission on Culture and Development initiated and should be read as a complement to its own report, *Our creative diversity*. It seeks to advise the Council of Europe on some of the key issues facing policy makers in Europe today and offers suggestions on how best to address the complex cultural challenges and development issues of a continent in transition. At the same time, it is hoped that the report's findings will also be of value to member states and public authorities.

Its central themes are two interlocking priorities – to bring the millions of dispossessed and disadvantaged Europeans in from the margins of society and cultural policy in from the margins of governance.

There is a growing acknowledgement that, if culture – whether understood as the “whole life of the people” and its values or, more narrowly, as artistic activity of all kinds – is left out of account, sustainable development is likely to fail. A range of cultural transformations is contributing to social, economic and political change in Europe. Globalisation is weakening, or at least testing, national identities. At the same time, a regional and civic renaissance, often led by cultural policy, is under way. The new technologies are not only revolutionising commerce and industry, but are inflecting daily life with an avalanche of images. Individualism and moral relativism are replacing traditional beliefs. Many European societies are riven by exclusion and unemployment and for many millions of Europeans the promised “good life” is as far from reach as ever.

The cultural policy responses to such issues have been, in the main, ineffectual. In their search for new orientations to cultural policies, some governments are motivated by short-term economic interests. Too little attention is paid to an explicit definition of basic policy premises, the grounds for intervention and the setting of explicit policy directions and strategies for their implementation. Vision in policy making is noticeably lacking.

Policy makers are not helped by the fact that cultural responsibilities are often insufficiently delineated between the different tiers of government and, as a result, policies are fragmented. Strategies that recognise the interconnectedness of culture with development are not easy to implement because, commonly, civil servants are used to working in hierarchical departments and not encouraged or equipped to think laterally. Moreover, the key principles that have served cultural policy makers for forty years or so – identity, diversity, creativity and participation in cultural life – may no longer be adequate to meet the challenges of the second half of the 1990s and beyond.

At intergovernmental level, countless declarations, resolutions and recommendations have been agreed, sometimes after years of preparation, but to uncertain effect. In part this is because of the huge gulf in awareness within the cultural sector and the public sectors at large of the international commitments which their governments have endorsed. But it may also be due to a fundamental flaw in the thinking at international level which gives the impression of always striving for “European” solutions when there is not a single Europe. A common European home may be a desirable goal, but it is not yet a reality. Europe is at best a collection of countries, Nordic, Mediterranean, Mittel European and so forth, with as many different goals and agendas as common interests.

In a report with more than fifty recommendations and at least as many ideas for consideration, several broad ways forward are suggested. First, culture will have to be brought into the heart of public administration if it is to become more than what it is now – a partial and spasmodically effective instrument of policy. There is hardly a department of government that does not intervene in culture or whose decisions do not have a cultural impact. We should end the isolation of ministries of culture by establishing formal interdepartmental structures which would enable governments to make the most of the multiple interactions between culture and aspects of economic and social development. The interface between cultural planning and educational policy is of especial importance. The principle enunciated at a European level in Article 128 of the Treaty of Maastricht, requiring the European Union to take into account the cultural consequences of its actions, should equally apply to actions at national, regional and local government levels. Only by adopting this approach will it be possible to address the endemic failures of cultural policy.

Secondly, both governments and the cultural sector face an uncomfortable paradox if a higher priority is accorded to culture. Looking for an effective instrument of policy, governments may try to control or manage it. In the search for resources, the cultural sector may consent to justifications of support on non-cultural grounds (for example economics, job creation, tourism, etc.). However, experience suggests that the utilitarian exploitation of culture will only succeed if, at the level of individual creativity, it is allowed to function outside state control. Freedom of expression is a crucial principle and cultural policies should establish a general framework within which individuals and institutions can work rather than intervene closely in what they do or say. But more than that there is a need for a consistent theory of cultural policy which accepts that culture has its instrumental uses, but also recognises the limits to which this can be applied without endangering it.

Thirdly, Europe’s most valuable resource is its human capital. In many ways, this is not being exploited to its full – a failure which can be as damaging to economic prosperity as it is to the life of the imagination and the pursuit of happiness. Cultural policy needs to be carefully targeted, reviewing the relation between demand and supply and being sensitive to changing demographic realities. The report cites measures to address the problem of exclusion, to invest in human capital and to implement the cultural rights of a

variety of marginalised groups – among them, elderly people, disabled people, those in closed institutions and those excluded by poverty. Cultural minorities, whether indigenous or non-European in origin, should be given the opportunity for self-expression and awarded an equality of esteem by mainstream society. The requirements of young people as well as the imperatives of gender equality should also be taken into account. The report suggests that a new social ethic, obliging cultural organisations to adopt inclusive rather than exclusive policies, would help to ensure access to, and participation in, culture for all.

Fourthly, the tendency to place more emphasis on equipping students with skills for a competitive jobs market is often being conducted at the expense of pushing the arts into a more marginal position in school curricula. Yet this is to ignore the fact that the arts are important both intrinsically and for their contribution in motivating young people, deepening their understanding, creativity and interpersonal skills, as well as preparing them for adult life. A more holistic approach to education is needed by transforming schools into culture-centred environments and enabling them to become foci of cultural life in their local communities. This will necessitate a fundamental reappraisal of teacher-training policies.

Fifthly, the new technologies are multiplying opportunities for creative expression and blurring the boundaries between the professional and the amateur, and between participation and consumption. The arts, broadly defined to include mass popular culture and the entertainment industries, take up a growing share of economic production. It is time to restore the natural links between the arts and sciences, which were broken in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Centres of technological innovation would help to heal the long-standing schism in the industrial world between the so-called “two cultures”. However, there is a danger that a dominant class will emerge, well equipped and at ease with the new technologies, but consigning all those restricted by poverty and lack of training to the role of passive consumers, rather than full and active members of the communication society. This can only be avoided by a substantial technological investment in formal education and the availability throughout adult life of retraining opportunities.

Sixth, cultural policy should foster unity while, at the same time, welcoming diversity. For good or ill, culture is a powerful promoter of identity. By emphasising one set of values against another, culture can be divisive and contribute to conflict rather than social harmony and mutual tolerance. It is essential that the development of the arts and the conservation and exploitation of the heritage not only assert the commonality of European values, but also reflect the multicultural variousness which is characteristic both of Europe as a whole and of individual nation states. Europe is a culture of cultures, but xenophobia and intolerance are the greatest threats to its stability. The preconditions for a democratic and united Europe must include freedom to identify with the cultural and linguistic communities of one's choice while respecting the diversity of other cultures. Sadly, cultural rights and freedoms, and the value commitments their implementation presupposes, have remained in the European *realpolitik* for too long as empty words despite the honourable intentions and

actions of the Council of Europe and other agencies. While recognising the difficulties some governments have in agreeing standard-setting instruments in the field of cultural rights, the need at least for a European Declaration on Cultural Rights appears stronger now than ever. Access to culture and the free exercise of cultural rights will not solve, but may mitigate, social divisions and help to strengthen the institutions of civil society.

Seventh, the role of the heritage in identity building for Europe, nation states, area-based and minority cultures needs to be acknowledged and a new ethical approach to the heritage is called for which recognises the destruction of one community's heritage is a loss to Europe as a whole. Europe confronts a huge task of reconstruction, preservation and restoration of the built heritage on a scale not seen since the second world war. This requires a major international effort. The creation of a European Heritage Bank, funded by public and private contributions and devoted to financing capital investments and providing loans, should be explored to help communities where the burden is greatest.

Eighth, Europe's prosperity and stability depends on its civil institutions. Here culture has an important role to play, for it is the cement of the social and civic bond. An appropriate balance needs to be struck between the power of the state and, increasingly, multinational corporations and the freedoms of the individual. One means of achieving this is the establishment and maintenance of a healthy "third sector" of voluntary associations and communities of interest which enable individuals to negotiate with one another and with public authorities. An interest in culture and, more especially the arts, the heritage and the environment, are among the most common motives that lead to the formation of such groups. Public acknowledgement of their status and worth, and sometimes funding, can make a major contribution to a thriving civil society.

One of the biggest challenges facing Europe in general, and smaller countries in particular, comes from economic and cultural globalisation and the increasing domination of cultural product by global corporations. Governments, especially those of European Union countries, would do well to avoid creating a "Fortress Europe" mentality as a reaction, but it is logical to seek measures, sometimes short term, to ensure that there is a "level playing field" of opportunity for European cultural producers. At the same time, governments should note the growth in the celebration of the "local", which is a natural response to globalisation and is often driven by the apparent cultural renaissance of image-conscious cities. The nurturing of creativity is essential if this is to be sustained – cities do not regenerate themselves spontaneously or at the behest of politicians.

Finally, the danger of Europe and more particularly the European Union closing in on itself should be avoided and culture can play a crucial role in this. Transnational networking and cultural exchange should be encouraged. This calls, first, for recognition by the international agencies that their programmes of support should be re-oriented from the current lottery of one-off projects towards schemes which promote more sustainable cultural relationships.

Secondly, it suggests that national governments need to review their international cultural policies to reflect more adequately contemporary cultural practice and the changed political environment in Europe.

Since the second world war, Europe has witnessed an astonishing expansion of creative activity of all kinds. Its problems are as much those of success as of failure. The Council of Europe has played an important role as a forum for debate on a wide range of cultural and developmental issues: the task it faces in partnership with the other European institutions, national governments and regional and local authorities is to ensure that culture makes its rightful contribution to the processes of sustainable economic and social development.

1 Introduction

“There are two things which I am confident I can do very well: one is an introduction to any literary work, stating what it is to contain, and how it should be executed in the most perfect manner; the other is a conclusion, showing from various causes why the execution has not been equal to what the author promised to himself and to the public.”

Samuel Johnson, from James Boswell's Life of Johnson.

1.1 Why a report on culture and development?

1.1.1 Policy makers all over the world are recognising that culture has a larger place in the governance of human communities than they had thought. Political decisions, economic and financial initiatives and social reforms are all more likely to achieve their purposes if their cultural impact is taken into account and if the concerns and aspirations of the individual in society are addressed from a cultural perspective.

1.1.2 It was with this in mind that the General Conference of Unesco, at its 26th session in 1991, created an independent World Commission on Culture and Development. Its task was to prepare a world report on culture and development and proposals for both urgent and long-term action to meet cultural needs in the context of development. The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the proposal and a twelve member commission, chaired by the former UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was appointed by the Director General of Unesco and the UN Secretary General then in post.

1.1.3 The parameters of the World Commission's investigation were set by the General Conference of Unesco in 1991. This recommended that it concentrate primarily on identifying, describing and assessing the issues and challenges posed by:

- the cultural and socio-cultural factors that affect development;
- the impact of social and economic development on culture;
- the interrelatedness of culture and models of development;
- the ways in which cultural development, and not only economic conditions, influence individual and collective well-being;
- the cultural sector as such and as an important area for development and for international co-operation.

1.1.4 The report that the commission produced, *Our creative diversity*, was submitted to the Unesco General Conference in Paris on 2 November 1995 and to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 27 November the same year. It was based on information and trend analysis gleaned from every world region. The commission hopes it will be of real, practical value to national governments and intergovernmental bodies – and, further, that it will attract the interest of the general public and stimulate a wider debate, when it is publicly available, culminating in a major world summit of heads of state and government.

1.2 A European contribution to a global debate

1.2.1 In the course of its work, the World Commission sought evidence from each Unesco region – Africa, Asia/Pacific, Central and South America, North America and Europe – in the form of hearings and/or reports. As the European contribution, the Council of Europe at the beginning of 1994 commissioned its own review of culture and development in its region and the document which follows is the outcome.

1.2.2 The Council of Europe set itself the following aims:

- to establish the symbiotic relationship between culture and development in Europe;
- to draw attention to innovative policy responses by governments to European trends in culture and development;
- to provide an insight into likely future scenarios and challenges that will confront decision makers into the next millennium;
- to contribute to the production of a set of cultural policy indicators matched to specific concerns in the development process, as a guide to intervention by governments;
- to provide a framework for future European political debate;
- to suggest mechanisms for policy implementation and review;
- to make recommendations for follow up.

1.2.3 A small, independent task force of experts was appointed by the Council of Europe to conduct the review. Its remit was not to represent Council of Europe policy, but to submit its own unmoderated conclusions, both as a contribution to the wider global debate and as a stand-alone document on the issues which are specific to Europe. In the event, the world commission report was completed before this report; however, background papers commissioned by the task force or written by its members, together with proposals for a future policy agenda, were shared with the world commission to assist in its deliberations. This meant that the task force had the benefit of seeing *Our creative diversity* at a late stage of its own work. There is much in it

which the task force finds it can endorse, in particular its commitment to the centrality of culture in development; its analysis from a global perspective is interesting and challenging. The two reports share common elements and a number of recommendations follow the same lines of thought. That said, the task force was concerned not to be unduly influenced by the World Commission's proposals. The commission had a world-wide brief and those of its concerns that are relevant to developing countries are not necessarily all shared by European countries. Also, wishing not to anticipate the views of governments in the World Commission's post-publication consultation process, the task force has avoided offering its own comments. Nevertheless, it believes that its conclusions complement those produced by the World Commission and, where there is a convergence of ideas on action these are reflected in Chapter 13: Follow up – the case for urgent action.

1.3 Parameters and working procedures

1.3.1 The European Task Force has met on nine occasions as a group between July 1994 and February 1996 and prepared its report on the basis of specially commissioned background papers; three seminars attended by artists and intellectuals, cultural researchers and senior policy makers; the records of relevant European conferences and seminars, and existing publications, as well as the individual and collective experience of its members and assistants. Useful guidance was given at a seminar of European Ministers of Culture at Bratislava, specially convened in June 1995 to consider key themes of the report. The task force was led by Rod Fisher from the United Kingdom and the report was written by Professor Anthony Everitt also of the UK. Ritva Mitchell represented the Council of Europe and, as an adviser, played a full part in the deliberations of the task force, whose other members were Eduard Delgado from Spain, Professor Ilkka Heiskanen from Finland who also provided the statistical appendix, Professor Carl-Johan Kleberg from Sweden, Professor Kirill Razlogov from the Russian Federation, and Jacques Renard from France. Their expertise lies variously in academic or cultural research and cultural administration and policy-making and most of them have been involved with the Council of Europe's Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. They received additional assistance from Danielle Cliche and Isabelle Schwarz (for further details about the members of the task force and its work see Appendix III).

1.3.2 The European report is, we believe, the first ever attempt to survey the European cultural scene in the context of development. Recognition of the crucial relationship between culture and development is not new, of course. In a report presented to the Third Conference of European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs in 1981, one of the trends foreseen for the 1980s was a greater emphasis on the centrality of culture and cultural values in national economic and social development plans, and hence the need to define more exactly the role of cultural aims in overall development.¹ It is safe

1. "European cultural co-operation: achievements and prospects": report presented by the Committee of Senior Officials to the Council of Europe's 3rd Conference of European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs. Council of Europe, 1981.

to say that the prediction was not realised to anything like the extent expected and, perhaps as a consequence, the need is more urgent than it was some fifteen years ago.

1.3.3 Unfortunately, limited time and financial resources have meant that the task force's report is not nearly as comprehensive as its authors would have liked. It has been written at a time of flux. A great deal of cultural information has been published in the last twenty years, including the Council of Europe's continuing programme of reviews of national cultural policies, initiated in 1985. However, the statistical material contained in these documents and elsewhere is seldom comparable because of varying bases of analysis and multifarious definitions of terms and classifications, and this is something we return to later in the text. Moreover, the brief which had been set was so wide and the potential literature so extensive, that it was beyond the capacity of a small, part-time group of individuals to tackle in the depth the issues demanded. The task force was under no illusions; its remit was not only to look at cultural policy in the context of macro development issues, but to seek innovative policy solutions to questions that had consistently frustrated decision makers for many years.

1.3.4 The task force had to decide its approach. Should it be selective and problem-oriented, as in the Brundtland Report on the environment and development, *Our common future*, or should it adopt a more sophisticated methodology and seek new solutions to notoriously difficult methodological problems?

1.3.5 Any account of sustainable development should consider, as is argued in Chapter 2, questions of human as well as economic growth. This entails a complex two-way process: first, an assessment of the contributions which the arts and culture make to human growth and to economic, social and political life, and, secondly, an assessment of all relevant policies and developmental projects in respect of their "second-order" cultural effects and the way these effects feed back to overall development. Experience in other fields (for example, technology and the environment) suggests that complex evaluations of this kind are difficult to carry out. The results are usually too general and inconclusive, or too specific and narrow in scope, to help with real-life policy decisions. However, some useful lessons can be learned from recent ecological analyses and consumer studies.

1.3.6 The first lesson derives from "life-cycle analysis" (LCA) as pioneered in environmental studies. This traces the environmental impacts of a complete cycle of industrial production, including the extraction of raw materials, the manufacturing process itself, transport and packaging and the final disposal of the product after use. If this were translated into cultural terms, it would be possible to review (say) a cultural festival by looking at all stages of its life-cycle – the "extraction" of artistic talent, its economic and social costs and benefits, the effects on public awareness and the "legacy" value (that is the contribution to the cultural heritage and the creativity of future generations).

1.3.7 The second lesson is provided by the attempts which have been made to standardise procedures for assessing environmental, cultural and/or social side-effects of development projects. As early as the 1970s, criteria and related evaluation methods were recommended by the International Development Association as a means of testing the “social soundness” of proposed projects; some international bodies (among them, the European Commission) use a structured questionnaire to ascertain the impact of development projects on social organisation and cohesion, on family structure and the maintenance of indigenous cultures. Although early optimism about the value of this type of standardisation faded in the 1980s, it has recently revived, in large part as a result of the work of the International Standardisation Organisation. Inventories, impact assessment and evaluation in relation to political targets are being standardised in a way that facilitates specific comparisons. It should be possible to aspire to this level of methodological sophistication in the evaluation of cultural policy and the establishment of reliable cultural statistics and indicators.

1.3.8 The third lesson can be learned from recent consumer studies that emphasise the need to involve consumers in *ex ante* evaluation – that is, participation in product design and development. This approach reflects new thinking on the active nature of consumption, but is in glaring contrast to most kinds of cultural production where the idea of involving customers/audiences in product design and evaluation is still highly unusual – if we discount polls which measure consumer approval. Active participation of this sort has been more common in the amateur and community arts and sometimes in the development of public cultural services.

1.3.9 Since the mid-1970s the analysis of overall economic and social macro-trends has been extended to cover more systematically the “side-domains” of unintended consequences and negative or positive externalities. As a result of ecological concerns and the dedicated work of expert networks such as the Club of Rome, methods of assessing and forecasting macro-developments in the side-domain of the environment have evolved rapidly. The growth of interest in economic impact studies of culture in the 1980s has drawn attention to the economic importance of the arts and related activities and led to some tentative attempts to assess their role in overall development. Since then, as the statistical documents of the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Environment Programme bear witness, progress has been made both in improving the methods of general economic and social trend analysis and in macro-analyses of these two side-domains as complex systems with internal dynamics of their own.

1.3.10 Unfortunately, general analyses of this kind, such as the recent, excellent *Human development report* (United Nations Development Programme, 1994 and 1995) only see culture and the environment as secondary components of social development, and more detailed reviews, including the above-mentioned impact studies, have only managed incidentally to relate their findings to broader economic and social macro-contexts.

1.3.11 The trouble with all these approaches is that they suffer from similar weaknesses to their predecessors. They give important information about policy practices, but usually pay too little attention to the larger context and the contribution which given projects make to it. Also, they too readily assume that decision makers will adopt rational grounds for policy over and above ideological and other constraints or vested interests.

1.3.12 For these reasons as well as the pressures of its deadline, the task force, while making use of earlier impact studies, has adopted a more holistic approach, which is policy based and oriented to the future. It relies on a multi-level analysis of current trends and scrutinises the capacity of policy makers and other institutional players to react to them. Aiming to bring culture more to the centre of the stage, the task force decided on a strategy which assesses the economic, social and political contexts from a cultural perspective, identifies some relevant trends in cultural policy and examines in detail how cultural activities and general economic and social policies interact with, and support, each other.

1.3.13 This strategy falls into the following stages:

i. The report considers cultural policy developments in post-war Europe and draws out the key policy principles that underpin them – promotion of creativity and cultural identity, support for cultural participation and the diversity of people's cultural identities, in the context of a general commitment to freedom of expression, cultural rights and the development of democratic civil society.

ii. The analysis of mutual conflicts or contradictions among these principles reveals a number of unresolved policy dilemmas which flow from them and which continue to face decision makers.

iii. Discussion of these issues is followed by a description of the current economic, social and political context of European cultural development and cultural policies. This covers the changing geopolitics of culture, the revolution of information and communications systems, the fast-evolving landscape of exclusion and inclusion and the changes taking place in value systems and civil society. There is then a more specific analysis of the transformations which are shaping the European arts, media, cultural industries and heritage.

iv. This account of how things are now is projected into the future through a set of scenarios. Besides venturing some predictions, they provide an opportunity to draw some initial conclusions about the relationship between culture and development. They illustrate the importance of broadening the cultural policy perspective to take this relationship into account.

v. The task force goes on to suggest how culture can, and does, make an impact on, or is "transmitted" to, economic, social and political development. The role of the arts and culture in other policy sectors is submitted to closer scrutiny: actual and potential effects on development are

identified and an assessment is made of these impacts to advance the policy agenda. The four key principles (namely identity, creativity, diversity and participation) are again deployed as criteria to link these analyses to cultural planning and decision-making.

vi. The analysis and assessments of stages iv and v reveal omissions in the scope and effectiveness of cultural policy making and suggests that the key principles should be redefined or refocused. The practical consequences of this redefinition are then spelt out in the context of the realities of existing policies and implementation mechanisms and are crystallised into an agenda for strategic policy actions, which is designed to be read on its own, if necessary.

vii. Finally, we provide some suggestions for follow-up action which governments and international agencies might be willing to consider.

viii. In the text we endeavour to link our ideas on culture to three major aspects of development: their contribution to the sum of human knowledge and understanding; their economic and social outcomes; and their potential for harnessing human resources as a medium for empowerment and entitlement.

1.3.14 The task force does not pretend to have solved the methodological problems inherent in its work. It will be for the reader to decide whether our approach has been productive. For our part, by distilling a mass of documentation and oral evidence, we believe we have identified a number of key trends and challenges. Above all, we argue that the task of government is to reposition culture at the heart of decision-making. This will entail a profound shift in political attitudes. However, there appear to be distinct limits to what national and international policies can be expected to achieve. Cultural policies may help to solve, or at least alleviate, a number of problems – but they will not work miracles; nor should they be treated as palliatives to mitigate misguided economic, social or other policies. Some developments, indeed, may not be responsive to political action at all – the global impact of technological advance is a possible example. If history in general, and cultural history in particular, is a movement of waves, it cannot be flattened or altered in its direction; policy makers, like surfers, can only try to ride it skilfully and harness its energy to their own ends.

1.3.15 We have encountered a difficult terminological problem which we have been unable to resolve to our satisfaction. In Chapter 2.3 we examine the various meanings of “culture” and opt for a definition which encompasses the arts in the widest possible sense, including design and entertainment. However, that is not how things are in common parlance, where culture can denote creative activity for which “art” or “arts” is not appropriate or idiomatic (for example “popular culture” and “cultural activity”). So, as the attentive reader will observe, we do not always adhere strictly to the definition of culture we have chosen. We felt we had no alternative and only hope the context makes the sense clear.

1.3.16 Part one of this report, "Cultural policies on trial", is essentially descriptive and analytical; so is Part two, "Europe in transition", but this section also begins to identify possible responses to cultural problems and challenges in Europe; so, in an effort to simplify the reader's task, these chapters conclude with a series of points for consideration. The most important are highlighted and reappear in Chapter 12: Towards a new policy agenda, at the end of the report. If the points for consideration and the recommendations at the end of the report appear prescriptive, this is not our intention. The aim is no more than to offer ideas which we hope interested parties will find useful. But we feel that qualifications and periphrases would, if universally applied, reduce the clarity and increase the length of an already substantial text.

Part one: Cultural policies on trial

2 Questions of meaning

“... we can begin to form an idea of culture, above all a protest. A protest against the insane constriction imposed on the idea of culture by reducing it to a kind of incredible Pantheon ... A protest against our idea of a separate culture, as if there were culture on the one hand and life on the other, as if true culture were not a rarified way of understanding and exercising life.”

Antonin Artaud, The theatre and its double

2.1 Terms of debate

2.1.1 Before entering a debate, it is as well to be clear about the words we use. This is never truer than in the cultural field where the terms of discussion are often cloudy and ambiguous. The World Commission's brief (as summarised in 1.1.3 above) is an illustration, being open to a variety of interpretations. “Europe”, “culture” and “development” will signify different things to different readers. Our starting point is to seek out some definitions, not simply because it will enable us to be sure about what we are saying, but because we believe the exercise will demonstrate the value of culture, both intrinsically and as a means of helping a traumatised continent to come to terms with itself and its future – and indeed of civilising the otherwise heartless pursuit of economic growth.

2.2 The idea of Europe and the Europe of ideas

2.2.1 There are many Europes, whether viewed from a historical perspective or in terms of contemporary practicalities. The origins of the European idea go back to the Roman Empire which, at its greatest extent, ran from the frontiers of Parthia to the island of Britannia. It was coterminous with the catchment of Christendom. The division of the Empire into two parts, one based in Rome and the other in Byzantium, found a later echo in the ninth century schism of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches.

2.2.2 The word itself, Europe, first appeared in the eighth century at the time of the Carolingian attempt to reconstruct the fragmented Western Empire. The rise of Islam and the Ottoman Empire threat lent colour to the notion of a collective continental interest. From time to time during the succeeding centuries, thinkers or statesmen proposed political integration, but the Napoleonic adventure was the first initiative since Charlemagne to try to put these ideas into practice.

2.2.3 This relatively tight definition was complemented in due course, but not superseded, by two larger ones. The first of them entailed a reintegration, if only cartographically, of Byzantium and Rome: the mantle of the former

was assumed by expansionist Russian rulers and, gradually, maps which had once placed Moscow in Asia, pushed the European frontier further and further east until it abutted against the Urals.

2.2.4 Secondly, the mercantile and imperial diaspora of the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French and the British, created “European” societies in the Americas and Australasia, and to a lesser extent in Asia and Africa. In this way, Europe’s distinctive technology and culture have been absorbed in varying degrees by other civilisations – and (as suggested below) have become the engine of contemporary globalisation.

2.2.5 Today all these Europes have found their own institutional expressions. The European Union at its present stage of development occupies much the same territory as Napoleon’s conquests, and the wider membership of the Council of Europe that of the Europe of culturally assimilated, but politically distinct, nation states, as it was understood in the age of the Enlightenment; it is perhaps no accident that, with its commitment to democracy and rights, the Council of Europe seems to “prolong in some way the political heritage of [that] period”.¹ Nato and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe reflect in partial degrees the world-wide Europe, as indeed do multinational corporations and telecommunications enterprises in the marketplace.

2.2.6 As well as ideas of Europe, there is too a Europe of ideas, transcending geography. From its Graeco-Judaic origins, transmitted through the Roman Empire and the triumph of Christianity, a sceptical individualism emerged between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. It was accompanied by revolutionary technological advances, among them the invention of the compass and the printing machine. In the Age of Reason during the eighteenth century, this culminated in a set of scientific and philosophical concepts (democracy, a progressive theory of history, human rights) and methods (rational enquiry, the industrial revolution). Although Europe has its roots in Christendom, its modern characteristics are predominantly pragmatic, materialist and secular. The scene was set for an intellectual and cultural hegemony which has challenged the assumptions and traditions of other civilisations. Western thinkers have led the way in the disciplines of physics, biology and chemistry, of anthropology, sociology and psychology, of political and economic theory. It is from these foundations that today’s globalisation of economics and culture have sprung.

2.2.7 Because of its cultural, political and ideological fluctuations, Europe has no agreed geographical boundary, nor for that matter a readily-summarised overall culture. More seriously, the religious and ethnic divisions in the former Yugoslavia not only show that ancient political fault lines retain their vitality, but also that cultural conflicts with other neighbouring civilisations can have lethal consequences.

2.2.8 At a cultural level, the different Europes jostle against each other. The global Europe, with its control over mass communications, appears to threat-

1. Foucher, Michel (ed.), *Fragments d’Europe*. Fayard, 1993.

en the settled societies of western Europe. Fiercely particular local cultures (say, of old Russia or the Celtic renaissance in the British Isles and the continental littoral) feel oppressed by the uniformities which the post-Enlightenment nation states enforce. There is an extraordinary range of linguistic diversity, but many countries are alarmed by the pervasiveness of the English language.

2.2.9 In sum, if we say that a Cossack, an Albanian Muslim, a fisherman on Lake Van and an Andalusian farmer are all European, we may know what we mean in a general way, but we would be hard put to explain ourselves if challenged. It is perhaps best to see Europeanness as a set of variably shared assumptions in societies which happen to occupy part of the same land mass, and have the same historic roots and interests. As Martin Kettle puts it: "To expect Europe to become a single warm cultural bath is simply to mistake the nature of the European, and indeed any other, identity: to be European means utterly different things according to history and circumstance. In France it means to think globally about a French-led political Europe which will challenge the power of Japan and America. In Germany it is to commit yourself against nationalistic ambitions. But to be European in Lithuania or Scotland is to assert your nationality and the wish to get Moscow or London off your back. To be European in Italy is a logical extension of what is already assumed to be one's 'natural' multiple identity within a family, a city, a region and a nation. To be European in southern England, though, is to make a political statement against Thatcherism, philistinism and English insularity. We should beware, therefore, of projecting our own sense of Europeanism on to others whose sense, no less strong, is very different indeed."¹ The cultural chapter of the Treaty of Maastricht renounces any attempt to assert an overall European culture. This is wise, for it is hard to see what such a thing might be if not the international entertainments and communications industry, which needs no public help to thrive and for many is already over-mighty. The issue that presents itself to governments may be, rather, how to protect individual national and minority cultures from the perceived threat which this ubiquitous electronic Europe presents.

2.2.10 For the authors of this report, then, Europe is provisional, complex and plural. At an ideological level it stands for western modernity, and, for practical purposes, signifies the geographical space between the Atlantic and the Urals, where values held in common are balanced, and sometimes even contradicted, by others which are not, and where much is shared with other societies in the world.

2.3 Concepts of culture

2.3.1 Culture is a slippery term with traps for the unwary. Most definitions vary along two dimensions. The first contrasts aesthetic and/or scientific-cognitive values and practices (culture with a capital C) with the anthropological idea of culture as the values and practices that underly all forms of human

1. Kettle, Martin, "A continent with an identity crisis", in *Citizenship* (ed. Geoff Andrews), Lawrence and Wishart. London, 1991.

behaviour: the second juxtaposes the symbolic world (representations and interpretations) and the material world (commodities, systems of production, infrastructure and related techniques and technologies). There have been attempts to overcome these contrasts by devising an all-embracing definition. At its most extensive, this catches in its net the totality of a community's learned experience - its conventions and values - economic, legal, political, religious, moral, familial, technological, scientific and aesthetic. In the words of the Declaration of Mondiacult (World Conference on Cultural Policies, organised under the auspices of Unesco in 1982 at Mexico City): "In its widest sense, culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs..."¹ This totality is, in T.S. Eliot's succinct phrase, the "whole life of the people."² Later in this report we will be considering conflicts between cultures; for the time being it is enough to note that culture is not simply the expression of ideas about the world, but also the will to maintain or change it - or, even, dominate it.

2.3.2 However, there is a difficulty. Because this sociological or anthropological definition is so all-inclusive, it is a tricky tool of analysis. If culture embraces more or less everything that is "human" or "social", how can it be related to human and social development, without falling into tautology? It may be more useful to work with a limited definition of aspects of some overall, aggregate culture. This is why the task force decided to pay special attention to the arts and related activities, but seen in a wider cultural framework than is usual. At the same time this is not a report on the arts and development, but on culture and development.

2.3.3 When it offered its definition, the 1982 World Conference on Cultural Policies sought to show that culture was a leading source of intellectual renewal and human growth. "It is culture that gives man the ability to reflect upon himself. It is culture that makes specifically human, rational beings, endowed with a critical judgement and a sense of moral commitment. It is through culture that man expresses himself, becomes aware of himself, recognises his incompleteness, questions his own achievements, seeks untiringly for new meanings and creates works through which he transcends his limitations."³ The task force sees the arts and related activities in the spirit of this quotation; they embrace all kinds of creative activity, not only the traditional, or "high" arts but popular mass culture (for example, pop and rock music, fashion, photography, graffiti, circus and the amateur arts). They are a source of creativity, reflection, morals and social criticism. They are not simply a rational instrument, but also a potential seedbed of contradictions, conflicts and irrationalities which more often than not characterise all reflective and creative processes. Reflection is an important concept, for it distinguish-

1. *Unesco, World Conference on Cultural Policies (Mexico City, 1982), Final report.* Unesco. Paris, 1982.

2. Eliot, T.S., *Notes towards the definition of culture*, Faber and Faber. London, 1948.

3. *Unesco, World Conference on Cultural Policies (Mexico City, 1982), Final report.* op. cit.

es some cultural activities from others – namely, the arts, sciences and religion from the everyday practices of “lived culture”. It generates new, sometimes profound, often surprising meanings, which contribute directly or indirectly to economic and social development.

2.3.4 Art can be “low” or “high” and one of our purposes is to attribute value to both. Paul Willis put the point well, when defining his terms of reference in a report on the cultural activities of young people. “We have deliberately retrieved the term ‘aesthetic’ from its conventional stronghold [...] We’ll use it to reframe and represent ‘mundane’, ‘degraded’ or ‘commercial’ materials from the point of view of their creative use in human activity. This may, of course, outrage those who wish reverentially to reserve the term for the careful handling of the special, heightened and precious within safe artistic temples. But other societies, earlier civilisations, ‘less developed’ cultures have also revelled in rumbustious, robust and profane vesting and testing of aesthetics in the everyday. So does ours if only we will look.”¹

2.3.5 This is why the European arts, media and heritage should not be seen as a separate sphere of activity, but as a nexus of interactions which reaches from its creative and reflective core into people’s everyday life. This nexus also relates individuals to their cultural heritage and provides links between the generations; it offers, at least in principle, a forum for continuous dialogue with other forms of reflective culture, especially science and technology.

2.3.6 The arts in this broad sense are a critical and balancing force in intellectual development and human growth. In the post war years the need to maintain a balance between different cultural values and achieve a reconciliation between science and the humanities has been forcefully argued. “The science of the industrial revolution,” as Joseph Schwartz notes, “is a Romantic trajectory [...] a celebration of the human spirit, not in opposition to the machine, but in sympathy with the machine.”² For the Romantic poets, on the other hand, the machine was the antithesis of this; it dehumanised the individual and enslaved the human spirit. The result was the increasing marginalisation of the arts and artists to a point where they became, in Schwartz’s words, “the Romantic movement of the bourgeois opposition [while] science and scientists moved to the centre to become the Romantic movement of the bourgeois establishment.”³ The arts pursued separate notions of “ideal beauty” and “intellectual dignity” without the taint of association with science or profit. Today the need is just as great to assert the importance of the “arts and letters” as a countervailing force to the ever-accelerating progress of science and technology in collaboration with powerful commercial interests. But the arts also have to reclaim the close association with science they enjoyed before eighteenth century rationalism and nineteenth century positivism cre-

1. Willis, Paul, *Moving culture: an enquiry into the cultural activities of young people*. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. London, 1990.

2. Schwartz, Joseph, *The creative moment: how science made itself alien to modern culture*. Jonathan Cape. London, 1992.

3. Ibid.

ated the cleavage which has disfigured western society ever since. Science may lead us to the right answers, but the arts enable us to pose the right questions.

2.3.7 Culture is not an intrinsic good; totalitarian regimes have used it systematically for their own purposes and racist groups today deploy music, clothes and cultural symbols to further their destructive ends. The task force senses a tendency, both in Europe and other parts of the world, to overemphasise the significance of culture and to confer on it transcendent and almost mystical qualities. This sometimes expresses itself in a rejection of the economic rationalism underpinning the rise of global culture, which some argue leads to dehumanisation, uniformity and vulgarisation. At a political level the same tendency has appeared in the guise of a search for ethnic, linguistic or religious identity; and, in some parts of the world, has been translated into fundamentalist and nationalist movements which have bred ethnic conflicts and wars. In setting cultural policy goals, therefore, it seems difficult to contest the argument that they ought to be based on agreed democratic and ethical principles.

2.3.8 The schism between rationalism and “mysticism” is a dangerous development. The arts can offer a third way, mediating between the two extremes. They are often cosmopolitan by nature and provide a common language for people from different cultures and ethnic or religious backgrounds. At the same time, they are closely linked to the specificities of “lived culture”, especially as they appear in everyday ways of living, folklore and popular forms of creative expression.

2.4 How culture relates to sustainable development

2.4.1 Since the period of post-war reconstruction and decolonisation, development has, in its simplest sense, denoted successful investment in economic growth. During the cold war sustained economic growth became the key measure of success in the competition between the capitalist and socialist systems and was used for more than three decades as the main indicator of the standard of living in the North and of modernisation in the South.¹ This emphasis on economic growth ignored the holistic idea of cultural ecology, namely, an awareness that the future of any civilised community depends on a recognition of the interrelatedness of different actions within a larger environment, whether physical, cognitive or cultural.

2.4.2 Comprehensive development projects were considered the main instrument of this quantitative approach to development. In the last two decades or so, one-off development projects have been phased out by major international agencies as the main means to deliver growth in the less developed countries and regions. Instead, those receiving economic aid and debt reliefs are expected to commit themselves to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which presuppose the total reform of their economic poli-

1. “North” and “South” are used here as a geographical metaphor expressing industrial/rural tensions.

cies and administration. In various forms this policy underlies the root-and-branch attempts to reconstruct the economies of the post-communist countries. Although the cultural and other impacts of the earlier development projects were seldom assessed in practice, the SAPs could have perilous cultural and social repercussions which may in the long run undermine the objective of sustained economic growth.

2.4.3 Unsurprisingly, alternative approaches have steadily been gaining ground. The disparate criticisms which point to undesirable ecological, social and cultural side-effects of economic growth have been replaced by systematic strategies which demand, for example, the inclusion of social and environmental costs in the System of Economic Accounts. A host of new methods for assessing these side-effects has been devised (cf. sections 1.3.4 to 1.3.13 above). They usually incorporate the idea of sustainable development – that is, investment in economic growth and development in ways that do not endanger outcomes in the long term and/or living standards, opportunities and options for future generations.

2.4.4 However, it seems to be difficult to find a place for culture, whether as a society's way of life or its arts and media, in the philosophy of sustainable development. One can, of course, argue that cultural considerations lead automatically to a "soft" approach which, in addition to sheer economic growth, assesses such aspects of the quality of life as security, equality, human rights and negative or positive changes to value systems and the mutual relations between people (what we call "civil society"). This is true, but not quite good enough; one of the leitmotifs of this report is that, in development planning and processes, culture is also "hard" – being both an objective factor of production and an asset for, and an indicator of, positive human growth defined in qualitative, but measurable, terms (for example access to opportunities, positive self-definition, the ability to participate in social activity and intellectual and cognitive capacities).

2.4.5 We will return to a more detailed examination of the various roles of culture in development. It suffices here to list three major aspects.

i. Its contribution to the accumulation of human knowledge and understanding ("human growth"). If judged as an accumulation of knowledge, changing views of the world and practical innovations, the arts and related activities are an intellectual resource on a par with science and technology. Special importance needs to be placed on its power of replenishment (sustainability) in two respects: first, the maintenance of a proper balance between these "humanist" resources and others (for example science and technology, religion) and inter-generational equity (the supply of "new heritage" and cultural options for future generations).

ii. Its economic and social outcomes in the medium and long term (with special reference to any changes in value systems). What contribution do the positive and negative externalities of the arts make to economic, political and social life, the Gross Domestic Product, employment, the balance of imports and exports, satisfaction with the social environment, the increase or

decrease of intolerance, people's orientation to consumption and leisure activities? In a more general and longer term view, what are their educative and civilising effects, with particular reference to positive and negative changes in people's value systems (morals, democratic processes, orientations to work, attitudes to people of other nationalities, religions, colours and so forth)?

iii. Its function as human capital and as a means of empowerment and entitlement. The arts and related activities should be seen not only as a social resource or as an instrument of governance, but also as the actual or potential human capital of individuals. They affect people's capacity to deal with the challenges of everyday life and to react to sudden changes in their social and physical environment. It is generally accepted that the arts and culture enhance and diversify their overall cognitive and intellectual abilities, as provided by education and experience, and help to make their use more flexible and adaptive to new circumstances. From a practical perspective, this assumption implies that we should explore how the arts and culture can be used to empower disadvantaged groups by opening up new opportunities.

2.4.6 These approaches extend traditional ideas of culture and development, for they assert that cultural preconditions and impacts of social and economic projects and policies must be fully taken into account by development planners. As Perri 6 of the British thinktank, Demos, remarks: "The wider culture is now the centre of the agenda for government reform, because we now know from the findings of a wide range of recent research that culture is perhaps the most important determinant of a combination of long run economic success and social cohesion. The mistake of both statist Left and *laissez-faire* Right was to ignore this fact."¹ Neglect of this truth does not simply endanger the cultural heritage, cultural traditions and intrinsic aesthetic values; it may, and in all likelihood does, undermine the very objectives of economic growth and the fundamental principles of sustainable development. Any attempt to foster development which does not consider the need to enlist wider social forces will probably fail outright, or at best bring in its train unpredictable and often unwelcome consequences. The evidence is all around us in today's Europe.

Summary

Europe is a multiple concept. In this report its key meanings are, first, the land between the Atlantic and the Urals and, secondly, a collection of ideas based on rational enquiry, democracy, a progressive notion of history and human rights. Culture is both the totality of a society's values and customs and their distillation in artistic production. Development used to be too exclusively oriented to economic growth; if it is to be sustainable, it must incorporate cultural priorities at its heart.

1. Perri 6, "Governing by cultures", *Demos Quarterly*, Issue 7. London, 1995.

3 Culture as a policy domain

“The arts are forms of intelligence, ways of knowing the human condition and repositories of human experience symbolised in word, sound, movement and image ... the neglect of the arts is the promotion of ignorance.”¹

3.1 Culture and democracy

3.1.1 European rulers from Pericles to Goebbels have understood the value of state investment in the arts. If we leave aside whatever intrinsic (or aesthetic) value they may have seen in them, their motives were to glorify their regimes and to develop an iconography of power with which to impress their subjects or their neighbours. Likewise, the Christian churches exploited the arts *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*. With a few exceptions, it was not until the outpouring of social idealism that followed the second world war that politicians and political thinkers began to think seriously about the part culture could play in the establishment or the maintenance of democratic societies, and of the arts as a plank of social, as opposed to state, policy.

3.1.2 At the risk of over-simplification, it is clear that there have been two main strands in the post-war development of cultural policy (if we set aside the abandoned communist experiments in central and eastern Europe).² The first has been the repeated assertion by intergovernmental agencies of the importance of the democratisation of culture and cultural democracy, human rights and cultural rights and the second has been the gradual convergence of the cultural policies of European governments and international agencies around certain key principles. Both strands (which are related) have been severely tested in recent years by economic recession and political upheavals. This chapter looks briefly and selectively at aspects of the history of cultural policy as an issue in Europe, both at international and national levels, and at four key principles that have underpinned these policies.

3.2 The international agenda

3.2.1 A post-war spirit of reconciliation led to the establishment of international organisations, which have issued a series of cultural declarations to which national governments have signed up. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which member states of the United Nations recognised in 1948, asserts the right to participate in cultural life as being among those con-

1. *The Arts Council and education*, Arts Council of Ireland. Dublin, 1989.

2. We define cultural policy as the overall framework of public measures in the cultural field. They may be taken by national governments and regional and local authorities, or their agencies. A policy requires explicitly defined goals. In order to realise these goals, there need to be mechanisms to enable planning, implementation and evaluation.

ditions that are “necessary for human survival, integrity and human dignity”. This was confirmed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which guarantees participation in cultural life and protects the rights of all to benefit from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which they are the authors. States are bound by the covenant to avoid discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

3.2.2 Of special importance is the Convention on Children’s Rights (United Nations, 1985), which asserts in Article 31.2 that states “shall respect and promote the right of the child to participate fully in cultural and artistic life and shall encourage provision for cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity.”¹ The convention goes on to outline practical machinery for implementation and follow-up.

3.2.3 Europe is one of the five “regions” that make up Unesco’s map of the world: of 185 member states only forty-seven are European and it was inevitable that Unesco’s interests should extend well beyond our continent. Nevertheless, during the cold war it maintained contact not only with governments and ministries in central and eastern Europe, but also with unofficial or dissident artists and intellectuals as part of its mission to promote peace, understanding, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Its initial involvement in cultural policies and cultural development in the 1960s was very much driven by Europeans. This culminated in the epoch-making International Conference on Institutional, Administrative and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policy, held in Venice in 1970. Referring to “cultural policies” in his conference address, René Maheu, Unesco Director General at the time, observed: “Who would have thought ten, even five years ago, that this provocative term – interpreted and applied in different ways certainly, and not everywhere carrying the same degree of support – would one day come to stand for a set of ideas and practices sufficiently world-wide to provide the topic for so large a meeting as this? In this respect, there has undoubtedly been a very remarkable change of mind [...] moving away from the incompatibility traditionally postulated in regard to culture between government intervention and intellectual freedom, towards a recognition, in theory and practice, of the state’s responsibilities to the cultural life of the nation.”²

3.2.4 The gathering in Venice signalled attitudinal changes on the part of governments, as well as drawing attention to the cultural dimension of development. Among the recommendations that followed was one on the status of the artist (1980), albeit notable more for its symbolic nature than its practical effects.³ The task of Unesco’s World Conference on Cultural Policies, held in Mexico City in 1982, was to assess the experience gained in cultural poli-

1. United Nations *Convention on Children’s Rights*, 1985.

2. *Unesco Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional, Administrative and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policies*. Unesco. Venice, 1970.

3. *Unesco, Recommendation concerning the status of the artist, General Conference of Unesco*. Unesco. Belgrade, 1980.

cy studies and to elaborate new guidelines for cultural development. The 136-point Mexico City Declaration affirmed that cultural development was both the starting point and the ultimate goal of socio-economic development.¹ More recently Unesco established the World Decade for Cultural Development (1988-97), from which the idea of the World Report on Culture and Development was derived. The aims of the World Decade are essentially the same as those that have guided Unesco's work: encouraging governments to acknowledge the cultural dimension of development; affirming and enriching cultural identities; broadening participation in cultural life; and promoting international co-operation.

3.2.5 The other major aspect of Unesco's contribution to international intellectual co-operation has been its work in the moveable and immoveable heritage. Three important conventions can be cited by way of example: first, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (the Hague Convention, 1954); that of 1970 on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property; and the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, which established a list of world heritage sites, many of them in Europe.

3.2.6 Another UN agency, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), is responsible for the promotion of the protection of intellectual property, in relation both to industrial property and designs and to copyright and neighbouring rights (for example in literary, artistic and musical works, in films, in performance and in recordings). WIPO administers various international treaties, including the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. By their action or inaction in honouring rights or preventing piracy, European countries can be both sinned against and sinners.

3.2.7 The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 on the basis of the principles of democracy, human rights and the pre-eminence of the rule of law. In 1954 a European Cultural Convention was signed by fourteen European countries and remains the key instrument for cultural co-operation in the larger Europe. It offers a practical and philosophical framework for the new democracies of the former Soviet bloc and provides a legal basis for common human rights in Europe. In 1958 a cultural fund was established and a Council for Cultural Co-operation came into being in 1962.

3.2.8 From the Cultural Convention until today, as Etienne Grosjean points out in his survey of the Council of Europe's work in the field of cultural co-operation,² there have been five phases: first came a period of reconciliation where the aims were to make Europeans aware of belonging to a common civilisation and to avert a resurgence of fanatical nationalism. Special atten-

1. *Unesco, World Conference on Cultural Policies (Mexico City, 1982), Final report.* op. cit.

2. Grosjean, Etienne, *European Cultural Convention 1954-94, Reference document providing an overview of forty years of cultural co-operation, Council for Cultural Co-operation.* Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1994.

tion was paid to the teaching of history and geography and to agree on the Europe-wide equivalence of higher education qualifications. The second phase concerned mutual knowledge and recognition. With the transfer in 1960 of the Western European Union's cultural and educational activities, the Council of Europe's remit covered all aspects of culture and education as well as youth and the audiovisual media. The third phase centred on the creation of a common philosophy based on the concepts of cultural development, permanent education, cultural democracy and "threshold levels" in language learning. No longer were questions confined to technical or structural improvement, but extended to the purposes of cultural action.

3.2.9 The fourth phase coincided with growing doubts about European cultural identity and the Council of Europe's future role in the light of the growing importance of the European Community; key themes were the economics of culture and sponsorship, the education and cultural development of migrants, and education as a preparation for life and as a means of promoting human rights and the regional dynamics of cultural development. This was the period when programmes such as the review of national cultural policies and cultural routes were introduced. An important step was the Declaration agreed at the Council of Europe's Vienna Summit of Heads of State and Government in 1993. This spoke of "equality before the law, non-discrimination, equality of opportunities, rights of association and meeting as well as participation in public life." The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1994) was drafted subsequently. The fifth and current phase is likely to emphasise joint action in the fields of information and training and the promotion of networks.

3.2.10 Some of the key issues that have pre-occupied the Council for Cultural Co-operation are reflected in the themes of the Conferences of European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs. The debate about cultural democracy and socio-cultural animation, and the experience of local cultural policies dominated the agenda of the first conference in Oslo in 1976. These themes were picked up again in Athens two years later, when, interestingly, ministers initiated discussions on the cultural dimension of development. The role of cultural aims in social and economic development was also on the agenda of Luxembourg in 1981, when it was agreed to draft a European charter of cultural objectives. This charter – by now a declaration – was formally agreed three years later when the ministers met in Berlin. By 1987 and the conference in Sintra, the issue of financing culture and sponsorship was increasingly interesting ministers. Key issues at Palermo in 1990 were cultural diversity and the multicultural dimension, while at Paris in 1992, the ministers addressed the issues of books and publishing and the cultural rights of minorities.

3.2.11 The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe concerned itself with cultural co-operation from 1975 and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference made reference to information exchange and the "distribution of cultural goods"; "contacts and co-operation by people engaging in cultural activity" and, finally, to "new domains and forms" which this co-operation could take. In 1990 the Charter of Paris reinforced these accords. The estab-

lishment of the Helsinki Watch groups in eastern and central Europe boosted the process of democratisation in the countries concerned.

3.2.12 The European Union only included culture within its competence and as a field in its own right at the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Until then, it was seen primarily from an economic point of view and was subject to the general rules which discouraged restrictions of the free movement of people and goods and forbade all kinds of protectionism. Its specific interventions were limited – among them, the preservation of architectural heritage, support for schemes such as the European Cities of Culture and European Months of Culture, and, above all, projects to support the audiovisual industries (for example, the 1989 directive, on television without frontiers, and the Media programmes). Although culture was a “grey” area, it did not prevent cultural issues (for example harmonisation of copyright or discrimination against other European Community nationals in the award of state subsidies) from appearing on the agendas of European Commission directorates with non-cultural responsibilities.

3.2.13 Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty asserts that “the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bring the common heritage to the fore”. In other words, the treaty enabled the European Union to engage in cultural actions. However, the principle of subsidiarity is applied to culture and the European Union is only empowered to intervene “if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.” Moreover, because it requires decisions to be taken unanimously, Article 128 is widely regarded as much a device to control commission activity in this sector as to encourage it, some countries believing that cultural action at a European level could threaten the independence of national cultural policies. The potentially important Clause 4 of the treaty, which requires the commission to take into account the cultural dimension of its actions, has yet to be tested for its practical effects. The treaty is to be reviewed at the intergovernmental conference in 1996 and 1997 and there is pressure, not least from the European Parliament, to make changes or improvements; however, the signals suggest that the commission and the Council of Ministers would prefer to leave it until such time as its impact can be properly assessed.

3.2.14 The advent of Article 128 may not have resulted in the marked increase in cultural activity that had been expected in some quarters – as the task force was nearing completion of this report, the Council of Ministers were still struggling to reach consensus on the content and funding of three cultural programmes (Kaleidoscope for cultural co-operation, Raphael for the heritage and Ariane for books and translation). Nevertheless, it is significant that a number of European Commission directorates in other sectors have begun to recognise the cultural sector as important in meeting their non-cultural objectives and, in some cases, have discrete budgets in this regard.

3.3 Culture in the Welfare State

3.3.1 *The arts for all.* After 1945 it seemed logical for governments to lend their support to the process of rebuilding and regenerating their war-ravaged countries. In western Europe the public was hungry for culture after years of submission to the authority of the state and of the subordination of every other concern to the exigencies of war. In central and eastern Europe one form of ideologically imposed culture was traded for another – less terrible than what preceded it, certainly, but in many respects equally unappealing. For all that, the communist state and party apparatus conferred a very high official status on culture and made substantial public funding available, selectively distributed maybe, but guaranteed. One way or another, governments across the continent responded to the new appetite for the arts.

3.3.2 A key aim of governments in western Europe was to safeguard the quality and diversity of cultural life. In Sweden, cultural equality was declared to be as important as economic equality. To meet social welfare objectives, the Swedes, in common with other Nordic countries, wanted to offer every citizen the chance to develop his or her creativity. Specific cultural measures interacted with social, educational and town planning laws. Special emphasis was placed on ensuring that children had contact with the arts – as is illustrated by the remarkable fact that in 1994-95, 48% of all performances by state-subsidised theatre companies and orchestras were given for school-children and pre-school children. Children and young people constituted a third of all attendances. One consequence of audience-building at an early age is a widespread enthusiasm for taking part in amateur arts activities.

3.3.3 State intervention in the last fifty years falls into a number of broad phases, although they were not necessarily simultaneous across the continent, nor sequential. Generally, governments turned their attention first of all to the preservation and conservation of heritage (Italy led the field in this respect). Their basic motive, the development of national identity, can be traced back to the pre-history of European cultural policy. For example, Sweden passed its first cultural law as long ago as 1666 with a view to protecting graves, stone circles, fortresses and buildings, which were felt to represent the country's cultural identity. What was true then is still the case today. Communities which are not nation states, such as Catalonia, also invest heavily in culture and heritage to assert a strong sense of distinctive values rooted in a common past.

3.3.4 The promotion of cultural identity has an international as well as a domestic dimension and many countries have encouraged international exchange: funds have been set aside for the purpose, often from foreign office rather than cultural budgets, and in some cases special agencies and cultural institutes abroad have been set up. These official initiatives have been increasingly complemented over the years by self-initiated exchanges by individuals and arts groups.

3.3.5 Many states have devoted a large percentage of their cultural budgets to identity promotion, especially in the fields of heritage, support for lit-

erature and aspects of theatre and music production. They have passed legislation to protect the cultural environment and heritage; provide direct financial assistance; and establish or develop such institutions as archives and museums. Sometimes they have enabled the Churches to restore their cathedrals and other ecclesiastical buildings – less on religious grounds than to celebrate history. Planning regulations have been introduced to prevent the demolition of old buildings and the erection of new ones in historically important or beautiful settings.

3.3.6 In parts of southern Europe, expenditure on heritage has been unusually high, especially in Italy and Greece where there is an extraordinary amount of historic architecture, archaeological remains and works of art from past centuries. With 40% of Unesco's World Cultural Heritage Sites, a *laissez-faire* approach was never an option for the Italians. Even today the Italian Government spends most of its cultural budget on managing, or, more accurately, struggling to manage, the huge legacy bequeathed by the Roman Empire and the Renaissance. The cultural priorities of successive Greek governments have been similarly exercised by their position as guardians of countless temples and archaeological sites, revered in myth and story-telling. This has placed a considerable strain on these countries' cultural budgets as they seek to preserve the physical remains of Europe's common inheritance and the inspiration for much of its intellectual life.

3.3.7 Former communist states made impressive efforts to replace what had been destroyed in the second world war (for example, the restoration of the "old town" in Warsaw). Unfortunately, in the Soviet Union, the post-war renovation of monuments from the Tsarist regime came too late to remedy the wholesale pre-war destruction of old churches and other buildings.

3.3.8 Intergovernmental organisations such as Unesco and the Council of Europe have been active in the promotion of heritage, contributing through conventions and reports to the identification of best research and conservation practice and the listing of important monuments.

3.3.9 The second broad development was the provision of a contemporary cultural infrastructure, such as new theatres, concert halls, museums and art galleries. Sometimes the aim was merely to rebuild war-damaged facilities and at others to decentralise and democratise culture during a time of economic growth. A civic theatre building boom ran from the 1950s to the early 1970s, notably in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Cultural "flagships" were seen as an enhancement of national prestige. In the Soviet Union and the rest of central and eastern Europe, an official policy aimed at the general distribution of cultural goods and activities not only led to a rebuilding of the heritage, but to the construction of a new infrastructure for cultural activities in towns and the countryside as well as in big cities. André Malraux's grand and unrealised vision of *maisons de la culture* in every large city was the French version of the same trend. A further major investment in capital projects took place in Finland, France and Spain in the 1980s – in the latter case, driven by the surge of energy which followed the end of the Franco regime.

3.3.10 Political commitment to the geographical spread of arts provision was not confined to buildings. Measures to support the touring of arts companies were introduced in many European countries, especially those with large territories and scattered populations.

3.3.11 These strategies, both in the east and the west, went hand in hand with a desire to make cultural experiences available to everyone, whatever their social class. Governments saw the widening of access to the arts as one of their responsibilities and both geographical spread and social reach were integral to their aspirations for the democratisation of culture. They tried to ensure that the arts were not the preserve of an educated and affluent minority. In practice, this entailed measures to provide education in and about the arts, and to keep ticket prices or admission charges artificially low through the use of subsidy, so enabling citizens on low incomes to attend events they would not otherwise be able to afford. This remains the policy of many countries.

3.3.12 Governments in western Europe, committed to freedom of expression (a principle actually enshrined in the Federal Republic of Germany's constitution) recognised the importance of assisting the work and protecting the rights of artists, composers, writers and performers. However, support for the living artist only forms a small part of state subsidies and its extent seems often to depend on the degree to which governments see new work as contributing to the assertion of national identity. Most of those who make a living from their art do so in areas where the state does not intervene financially or where its support is relatively small – popular music, film and video, broadcasting, journalism and books.

3.3.13 The Nordic countries provide comparatively generous stipends, often for a period of years. This is to some degree an attempt to compensate for the effects of a small consumer base. It also reflects higher public interest in new art than in some other countries. Finland and Norway both offer generous long term grants for established artists, writers, composers, etc. In Ireland, senior artists can qualify for tax-free state stipends through appointment to a highly-respected "academy", the Aosdana. The picture is bleaker in the United Kingdom where comparatively little money is given directly to individual artists and where audience demand for their work is limited.

3.3.14 In addition to grants, there are a number of other ways by which states help artists. These include the provision of higher education opportunities at conservatoires, art colleges and drama and dance schools; copyright legislation to safeguard the intellectual and moral rights of creators and performers and, sometimes, tax concessions and social welfare rights.

3.3.15 Following the political watershed of 1968, cultural policies were questioned by community workers, educationalists and artists with a social conscience, who formed common cause under the banner of socio-cultural animation and pressed for cultural democracy – a much misunderstood term. What was fundamental to the idea was the stimulation of individual creativity and, consequently, participation in process took precedence over the cre-

ation of an end product. The flame of the animation, or community arts, movement flickered briefly for a few years, but despite being warmly embraced at an intergovernmental level in the 1970s by the Council of Europe and Unesco, was never adequately resourced. However, although it was eventually overtaken by new concerns for the financing of culture, its fundamental principles have entered the mainstream of cultural thinking.

3.3.16 A new feature of cultural policy in the 1970s was a recognition of the role of the cultural industries. It began to be evident that technological advance was overlapping with artistic development. Often the ministers responsible for arguing the case for state intervention were less preoccupied by cultural concerns than with trade and industrial issues. As a result the cultural industries have usually been judged from an economic or technical viewpoint with little consideration being given to the value of their cultural contribution. Governments entered the field by offering financial or regulatory support for ailing film production and, in countries like Finland with limited domestic markets, book or music publishing industries.

3.3.17 By the 1970s the state, directly or indirectly, was intervening in almost every aspect of its citizens' lives, but the arts still had to join a long queue to the door of the Exchequer, behind education, health, social services and other high-spending departments of state. With a few notable exceptions, cultural budgets were less than 1% of total government expenditure (a ceiling of symbolic significance among arts communities). However, they rose annually in real terms in most countries until the 1980s, when attention turned to the search for new sources of income. Against a background of boom and bust and the radical politics of the new Right, the economic impact of culture and business sponsorship of the arts assumed a new importance everywhere – even in countries such as France where a spectacular growth in state investment went against the European trend.

3.3.18 In the last decade, policy makers have been seeking new ways of dealing with diminishing resources (at least in real terms). In western Europe and even in one or two central and eastern European countries, levels of funding have been maintained and here and there are still rising, but it is clear that the era of growing cultural budgets has come to an end. In most former communist countries there has been a general collapse of subsidy. The drive toward monetary union in the European Union is likely to be another decisive factor in restraining public expenditure during the coming years. Some governments have also taken a more interdisciplinary approach to arts provision. Financial shortages are being addressed through mechanisms such as multi-year funding deals, targeted business plans and national lotteries.

3.3.19 *Decentralisation.* In so far as the arts have been a useful means of asserting national identities, it is not surprising that states have tended to keep control of cultural policy in their own hands. Capital cities which are the headquarters of government receive the lion's share of investment. They are also magnets for artists and the cultural industries. Distribution of arts products, for example through touring, has been managed as a rule from the centre, although in democratic societies the development of built facilities has often

been the outcome of local initiative. The communist regimes combined central decision-making with ambitious programmes to establish institutions and cultural centres throughout their territories.

3.3.20 However, there has long been another tradition, which has resisted the overweening power of the state and holds that culture should rise from below rather than be imposed from above. Germany's federal constitution concentrates authority in the *Länder* and municipalities and Bonn has few official cultural responsibilities. Decentralised decision-making has always been a feature of cultural administration in Sweden. From the 1980s the French Ministry of Culture began a process of decentralisation while making sure to retain overall financial and strategic control. With the rise of autonomous regions in Spain, the influence of the Ministry of Culture is increasingly restricted to support for national institutions. A commitment to detailed and lengthy consultation among all sectors of the community limits the power of the Dutch government to intervene.

3.3.21 Decentralisation is a preoccupation of the post-communist democracies, although the situation on the ground varies considerably from countries such as the Czech Republic, where the state's responsibilities are being reduced, to Romania where the central government is holding on to its powers.

3.3.22 However, in most European countries the balance between the centre and the periphery is a key issue and regions and cities are increasing their commitment to cultural support and development. Of the three layers of government – national, regional and local – the last is closest to the people whom they serve and is well-placed to assess and foster grassroots cultural needs. In many countries, including France, the Netherlands and Sweden, local councils are assuming a larger share of total public support for the arts, although (once again) the overall picture across Europe is mixed.

3.3.23 Municipalities have increased their efforts to promote culture on their own initiative and often from their own resources. They have built or restored facilities and set up administrative structures. They have devised cultural policies, often within a wider context of strategies for economic development and guided by national cultural policies. In many instances, the arts have risen up the political agenda and are accepted as a distinct category to set alongside education and social services.

3.3.24 Regions have also expanded their cultural input, especially where they are co-terminous with an ethnic community. There are often tensions between local and regional government, but the latter tends to concentrate on projects which are beyond local means and on the creation of regional networks and strategies.

3.3.25 Local and regional authorities have benefited from transfers of responsibility from central government. In their search for financial savings, governments do not always hand over the necessary financial resources to enable municipalities to fulfil their new duties. This is especially problematic

in countries where local government cannot raise its own taxes or are given maxima, and where (as is usually the case) there is no overall financial estimate of cultural need. Decentralisation can sometimes be a policy instrument chosen by central government when it wishes to disengage from support for a particular sector. Moreover, problems of co-ordination between different tiers of government can be acute when they are administered by different political parties.

3.3.26 *A cultural dimension to education.* States have long understood that education is an essential dimension of cultural development. A school curriculum is a selection from the knowledge, skills and traditions of a given culture. Compulsory education is an initiation into those aspects of its own culture that a society values most. Throughout Europe, education systems are being restructured to take account of the need to exploit the continent's diverse character and to create forms of education and training that might equip citizens for the next century. In the words of one government's chief adviser on education: "Education is not only concerned with equipping students with the knowledge and skills they need to earn a living. It must help our young people to use leisure time creatively, have respect for other people, other cultures and beliefs; become good citizens; think things out for themselves; pursue a healthy life-style; and not least, value themselves and their achievements. It should develop an appreciation of the richness of our cultural heritage and of the spiritual and moral dimension of life. It must, moreover, be concerned to serve all our children well whatever their background, sex, ethnicity or talent."¹ Similar statements can be found underpinning the changing educational policies of most European governments. The emphasis on culture is both typical and significant.

3.3.27 European countries have very different education systems, but many are undergoing profound changes as states respond to the political, economic and cultural challenges they face – and, more particularly, try to reduce the call on fiscal resources and demand greater accountability from the education professions. Common trends include the marriage of accountability with devolution of management; a sharper emphasis on imparting the skills needed in business; a recognition that education depends on partnership with agencies and interests in the outside world (especially with industry and commerce); more specialisation in the upper secondary school; an ever-widening range of types of examination and qualification; and the provision of opportunities for continuing education and training.

3.3.28 There is a danger here that the pursuit of accountability, measurement and vocational skills will not do justice to the many-sidedness of human intelligence. It will also mean that many young people leave school or college undervalued and disheartened. As Ken Robinson observes: "Conceptions of intelligence are dominated by conceptions of academic ability. The concern with academic standards is not wrong in itself [...] The difficulty is that academic ability in particular is often confused with intellectual ability in general

1. Dearing, R., *The National Curriculum*, School Curriculum and Assessment Authority. London, 1994.

[... It] involves the capacity for logico-deductive reason and for propositional knowledge. These are important abilities, but ... there is more to intelligence than these alone. Young people who are academically able may have many other sorts of intellectual ability as well: those who do not show particular academic abilities may have other equally significant intellectual abilities. The prevalence of academicism is evident in everyday assumptions of there being two types of children: the academic and the non-academic. Significantly these are often described as able and less-able children."¹

3.3.29 In one form or another, the arts are included in the compulsory curricula of most European countries. Usually there is an emphasis on the visual arts and music. Drama and dance are seldom included as separate subjects. Where it is taught, dance is often included within physical education or gymnastics. Drama is increasingly seen as an important medium for teaching a wide range of other subjects. Literature is usually associated with the teaching of the national language.

3.3.30 There are significant national variations in conceptions of the arts in schools. In many countries, fine art teaching is strongly based on drawing. Sometimes it is linked to the crafts; elsewhere, art includes both fine art and design and, on occasion, design is linked with technology. In the Scandinavian countries the crafts have a high profile. In Germany, art education in some *Länder* includes media, advertising, architecture and film as well as design. Finland incorporates media education, craft skills, drama and children's circus. In Norway, there is no concept which is directly synonymous with the English idea of art. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Education: "There is a common recognition that 'art' includes a variety of practices, disciplines and media, for example music, drama, dance and ... arts and crafts."²

3.3.31 In most countries the arts are part of the curriculum for children up to the age of 12, but there are examples of more generous provision. In France, art and music are compulsory to 15 and become optional for the *baccalauréat*. In Sweden, pupils have compulsory lessons across the discipline at first level, develop their work in one discipline at the second level and pursue specialist and vocational options at the third. The Dutch include two arts subjects in a compulsory curriculum of fifteen areas, but they are optional in secondary schools. The United Kingdom's new curriculum incorporates art and music, but, although once compulsory, they (together with dance) are now optional after the age of 14.

3.3.32 Thus the arts and culture permeate European education: they are an integral – although often not very highly esteemed – element in primary and secondary school curricula education. They have their own institutions of lower and secondary professional training and, in higher education, arts universities and institutes maintain an important role in undergraduate training

1. Robinson, Ken, "Education in/and culture", a background paper commissioned by the European Task Force. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

2. *Arts education in Norway*, Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research. Oslo, 1990.

and in the humanities departments of “science-based” universities. At the same time, many arts organisations have integrated educational work into their overall strategies.

3.3.33 Even if there is explicit commitment to the arts in schools, in practice they are accorded a low priority (excluding special schools), with the result that they are often given few resources and little time in the teaching schedules. The tendency to decentralise curriculum planning and supervision also leaves more leeway to school administrations and teachers to decide how important they really consider arts subjects to be – which as often as not leads to their relegation down the list of priorities. A further reason for the relative ineffectiveness of arts education is that the interests and talents of students vary greatly and those with artistic talent can, and often do, take up voluntary artistic activities outside the regular curriculum and school hours (in some countries, as in Finland, the providers of the extra-curricular art education and training receive public subsidies).

3.3.34 A recent French study on arts education argues that although considerable progress has been made in recent years in promoting arts education in schools, offering young people experience of a wide variety of cultural subjects including drama, dance, audiovisual activity, photography, circus and heritage studies, the education system remains strongly resistant to the arts. Reason and logic are given priority over creativity and sensitivity. This damaging preference is evident, to one degree or another, throughout the continent.

3.4 The keys to cultural policy

3.4.1 When we examine the historical record, four broad aims underlie cultural policy in most European countries – the promotion of cultural identity, cultural diversity, creativity and participation. They have also guided the Council for Cultural Co-operation of the Council of Europe in its thinking over the past twenty-five years or more.

3.4.2 *Promoting cultural identity.* Cultural identity is a fluid, volatile concept. In this report, we take the term to signify the use of coded, expressive modes of behaviour or communication, including language, dress, traditional kinship patterns, institutions, religion and the arts. They are the common currency of daily life, are special to their users and express continuity over a number of generations. The definition takes in local or regional cultures, and linguistic or religious groupings. In exceptional cases it also covers long-established, non-territorial social groups – for instance, the gender, sexual liberation and disability movements. In its essence, our cultural identity is what makes us feel we belong, in a deep and permanent way, to a group, a community – and even a project, an ideal or an aspiration.

3.4.3 Identity is plural, not singular, for everyone has a wide variety of allegiances, actual or potential. They include the individual and his or her immediate environment of friends and family; the local community of neighbours where the first ethnic, social or local loyalties are forged; the national homeland; and, finally, an identity which is still under construction – that of Europe.

It is precisely because, at all these different levels, so many people feel ill at ease with themselves that they engage in a desperate search for new points of reference and new systems of values. In eastern and central Europe, the transition to democracy has been far more painful than expected and a nationalist fervour has often replaced the old utopian certainties of communism. In western Europe, the crisis of the Welfare State, unemployment and "exclusion" are fracturing societies which can no longer rely on an external political threat to maintain a patriotic community spirit. In addition, the accelerating avalanche of changes set in motion by the new technologies and economic globalisation is testing the adaptive powers of individuals, groups and nations to their limits. How can one stay true to oneself, when every landmark is shifting or disappearing from view?

3.4.4 More than ever, the question of identity is bound up with that of development. Development used to be something that was done to other people, to under-privileged minorities, but is now agreed to be relevant to every sector of society. Even if seen from a strictly quantitative point of view, it simply will not succeed without leading to serious crises and violent tensions if change is imposed rather than "owned", if established reference points and patterns of living are doomed to disappear and if traditional cultures are repudiated, repressed and driven out of existence.

3.4.5 One of the purposes of cultural policy is to foster the (re)discovery or (re)assertion of identities. To avoid any misunderstanding in this regard, Europe's new fratricidal wars are not the result of too full a sense of identity, but of too little. Although identity is the ideology of difference, it cannot be reduced to ethnicity or tribalism; the turning in on oneself, the shutting off of one community from another is evidence of identity loss, or at least crisis. A refusal to acknowledge the rights of others and aggression towards them are no more than attempts to make up for this loss, to fill the void it has left behind. On the other hand, a self-confident sense of belonging reinforces the values and certainties which make up a community; this in turn encourages an openness towards the rest of the world, an acceptance of difference and a lively curiosity about foreign cultures.

3.4.6 *Promoting cultural diversity.* As we have seen, many different cultures have developed in Europe over the centuries. Each one is bound together by various ties – social, economic and sometimes political. Unfortunately, the debate on cultural pluralism has been muddied by the confused and ambiguous use of terms such as "cultural diversity", "multiculturalism", "cultural identity" and so forth. These misunderstandings underlie a climate of discrimination and intolerance. Cultural pluralism, in this context, is not a side-issue relevant only to "ethnic minorities" and their "problems". What is at stake is the achievement and maintenance of harmonious relations among all sections of society to the benefit of all its members. If this ideal is ever to be attained, what seem to us to be the myths associated with the notion of minorities as well as majorities ought to be recognised and exposed for what they are. The dualism inherent in these apparent opposites only too easily takes on an ideological form and obscures the more complex truths of a culturally diversified Europe.

3.4.7 Europe's diversity is a fact of life, although not one which has always been welcomed by the rulers of nation states and empires. However, the past fifty years have seen a contrary consensus emerge; most democratic politicians now argue that the protection, even the promotion, of diversity, both in terms of different ways of life as well as of artistic expression, achieves two significant and desirable objectives. The first of these is a recognition of the right to be different. Cultures have their own heritage, traditions, languages and contemporary forms of expression and are entitled to exist on their own terms irrespective of their geographical importance or the size of their populations. However, this principle of equality and non-discrimination does not imply a complete cultural relativism, or that cultures should be exempt from critical examination. Examples both from the past and the present (for instance, nazi Germany and the Balkan wars) show that cultures can become deviant or even pathological. The potential of diversity to induce conflict remains a challenge that democracy has to confront.

3.4.8 The second objective concerns the relevance of cultural diversity to development. The notion is that the imposition of a single cultural model would be a break on European development rather than a spur. A pluralist approach fosters exchange and interaction between cultures; acceptance of variety will enrich the continent while repression of difference will impoverish it. In today's world there are many pressures, within Europe and outside it, towards standardisation. Arguably, only if we whole-heartedly welcome our multicultural richness will we be able to recruit all our creative vitality and place it at the service of development.

3.4.9 From this perspective, perhaps diversity policies should do more than guarantee due respect for minorities. Would it not be logical for them to be available to every kind of cultural grouping, large or small, each of which has a legitimate interest in promoting subsidiarity and counteracting centralisation? In fact, it is worth questioning the relevance of the terms, "majority" and "minority": belonging to a minority implies being marginal, being exiled in an enclave, whereas all cultures are, in a sense, central and deserve to be seen as such, whatever the political consequences.

3.4.10 Just as the application of universal rights should not be taken to imply standardisation, so a programme of separate development does not follow from a commitment to promote diversity. The defence of cultural pluralism goes hand in hand with cultural exchange, or "interculturalism". By interculturalism, we mean that the co-existence of different cultures entails dialogue, not confrontation. It is not a matter of delimiting, but of opening up. The circulation of people, ideas and projects allows cultures to "breathe". It is through this kind of interpenetration that cultures are able to feed off one another, and so contribute positively to development.

3.4.11 In other words, the politics of diversity cannot be reduced simply to positive discrimination for reasons of equity. The issue is, rather, one of developing new relationships between cultures and increasing contacts to the point (even) of hybridisation – in a word, of finding new ways of embodying the idea of difference in every aspect of our lives.

3.4.12 *Promoting creativity.* A culture may be nourished by its past, but renews itself through its contemporary creativity. The heritage is only the foundation of identity. It is the forge of memory and sets human activity in a framework of continuity, but it is creativity that inspires us to invent new artistic forms and so come to terms with the future as it bears down on the present. New works of art fashion today's aesthetics; they stimulate renewal, questioning and testing, both in the strictly artistic field and in society at large. Like scientists and intellectuals, artists issue challenges to their communities – a function that is essential to the equilibrium of the social system, which benefits from self-criticism and the forecasting of necessary change.

3.4.13 Art is disorderly. It resists pigeon-holing into artistic disciplines, administrative barriers and territorial frontiers, and speaks across cultures and societies. However, it depends for its vitality on certain pre-conditions; the first is freedom of expression. Any kind of censorship on ideological or political grounds is unacceptable. This does not mean that artists have no duties; should they not recognise, for instance, that living in a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-faith Europe obliges them to be sensitive to actions or words which cause real offence to some minorities or citizens? This is a highly charged question, for artists should not be afraid to express their opinions in their work – there is no place for *fatwas* in twentieth century Europe. At present, creative freedom is widespread throughout Europe following the fall of the authoritarian communist regimes. But there is another more subtle censorship at work which limits this freedom, if not in law then in fact – namely, economic censorship. Lack of resources, the pressure for instant profitability and a general obsession with money tends to constrain the unrestricted exercise of creative expression.

3.4.14 The second pre-condition is access for artists and cultural workers to the appropriate means of production and distribution. To be an artist implies the possession of individual talent, but he or she is often a working professional who makes a living from the practice of art, or expects to do so. The social rights and status of the artist are important matters which for the most part are not being well handled.

3.4.15 The third pre-condition is public support for creativity, whether through directly financial, or legal and fiscal, provision. A wise state values the concept of artistic risk (for certain types of new work will not finance themselves), welcomes the opportunity to discover and promote new talent and accepts the need to provide high quality artistic training.

3.4.16 Creativity is, of course, a faculty that extends far beyond the arts and in this wider meaning can make a crucial contribution to sustainable development. In the first place, the crisis facing many European countries may well be economic and social, but it is also a crisis of values: that is to say, the values associated with the workplace, the rejection of institutions, the decline of belief, and poor management of the social consequences of technological change. If economic and social systems are losing credibility and legitimacy, it is an illusion to suppose that this can be put right by new economic regulations or dependence on advanced technologies. Seeing that it was initiated

by changing values, the crisis will only be resolved by the creation of new socio-cultural structures – a task calling for ingenuity and imagination.

3.4.17 Nowadays, economic analysis tends to play down the quantitative importance of production, capital and labour factors in the models it uses to explain growth. More and more emphasis is laid on the qualitative validation of these factors through research, education and training and the part played by organisational factors (for example the efficacy of socio-economic structures and the social climate). A flood of innovations is nourished by the creative imagination in alliance with professional skills. In other words, human intelligence is our most valuable raw material, and indeed the one most readily available in Europe. Unfortunately it is not sufficiently exploited by the leaders of our economic and social life.

3.4.18 In this context, artists have a contribution to make in much the same way as other creative people – engineers, researchers and entrepreneurs. The famous economist, Kenneth Galbraith, makes the point with characteristic directness that the artist plays an important role in economic life. He cites the example of Italian design, attributing the rapid growth of Italian manufacture to the superior aesthetic quality of its goods. He wrote: “We must cease to suppose that science and resulting technological achievement are the only edge of industrial advance. Beyond science and engineering is the artist; willingly or unwillingly, he or she is vital for industrial progress in the modern industrial world.”¹

3.4.19 Creativity, innovation, research and education – these are the motors of development. That is why to invest in culture is to invest in the economy. Culture is not a panacea or the source of daily miracles, but every corner of society should be impregnated with creative energy. In this sense, culture is not the end-purpose of development, nor its qualitative dimension, but rather its essence.

3.4.20 *Promoting participation.* Participation is one of the key objects of cultural policy. According to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, Covenant 15, it is a fundamental human right and encompasses all those activities which open culture to as many people as possible. The division between those who use it and those who make and distribute it should be eliminated; culture should belong to everybody, not just a social elite or a circle of specialists. Participation means that the public should have a real opportunity to benefit from cultural activity through being actively involved in the creative process and the distribution of cultural goods and services.

3.4.21 Consumption is a form of participation in that watching a play or a film, or reading a book, is an intellectually and emotionally demanding process. Just as it supports creativity, the state has a duty to subsidise distribution so that consumption is not restricted to a minority of the population and that geographical and social barriers are lifted. So far as the commercial sec-

1. Galbraith, Kenneth, *Economics and the arts*, the W.E. Williams Memorial Lecture. Arts Council of Great Britain. London, 1983.

tor is concerned, it can regulate or correct the operation of the free market if public access is restricted. However, it should be noted that some special difficulties have arisen following the sudden expansion of cultural markets caused by new means of communication (cable and satellite and multimedia); on the face of it they offer huge opportunities for involvement, but in fact new barriers may be emerging. Access may be limited by the ability to master new skills, by the cost of equipment and (for non-Anglophones) by lack of familiarity with the dominant language employed by the communications industries.

3.4.22 Of course, participation does not only, or even chiefly, refer to the consumption of art made by others. It also signifies bringing people into the process of making on the assumption that everybody has creative ability; this is not to say that everyone can become a professional artist, but that everyone should have the opportunity to express themselves artistically. Artistic activity allows people to engage with their social environment, enhances their powers of self-assertion and increases their sense of independence. The widespread potential for direct creative participation is well illustrated by the popularity of the amateur arts.

3.4.23 The involvement of professional artists in this undervalued process of participation in cultural life, and more generally the issue of their social responsibility, are delicate questions. What role should they play in the participative arts? To what extent should they help ordinary people to express themselves creatively? The promotion of socio-cultural animators as intermediaries in the process of stimulating participation became a plank of public policy in many countries until the political and economic environment of the late 1980s and 1990s established other priorities.

3.4.24 The Council of Europe did much to advance the debate on socio-cultural animation – defined by J.A. Simpson as: “that stimulus to the mental, physical and affective life in a given area or community which moves people to undertake a range of experiences through which they find a greater degree of self-realisation, self-expression and awareness of belonging to a society over which they can exercise an influence, and in the affairs of which they are impelled to participate.”¹ Thus participation has a “political” dimension in that it entails involvement in cultural decision-making as well as in creative practice. It is an instrument of active citizenship. The richness of our cultural life does not simply depend on creative artists, but also on the numerous groups and associations, often with charitable purposes, which are active in the cultural field. They are a key element in a civil society which is diverse, thriving, demanding and enterprising.

Summary

Culture has long been an instrument for state propaganda; in recent decades it has been seen, more disinterestedly, as a component of the Welfare State,

1. Simpson, J.A., in the foreword to Jor, Finn, *The demystification of culture*, Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1976.

a bulwark of democracy and an entitlement for all citizens. International agencies, such as the United Nations, Unesco, the Council of Europe and the European Union have sought to give this role a solid legal basis in a series of conventions and declarations. National governments have devoted increasing resources to the development of the arts and the protection of heritage. In recent years they have decentralised some cultural responsibilities to regional and local authorities. They have invested in the arts in education, but sometimes without conviction. Most countries have steered their cultural policies according to four key principles: promoting cultural identity, cultural diversity, creativity and participation.

4 Conflicts of principles

“The arts are essential, if one only knew what for.”

Jean Cocteau, attrib.

4.1 Painful choices

4.1.1 Financial pressures are compelling decision makers to look more carefully than in the past at practical questions of policy implementation. In doing so, they face some painful choices. The dilemmas they have to resolve are much as they have always been, but old questions, concerning the relationship between art and society and the role of the state *vis-à-vis* that of the consumer, now need new answers.

4.2 At the service of the state?

4.2.1 Should the arts serve other causes than their own? Should they be expected to help the state fulfil its wider aims? These are not academic questions. In the former communist states, culture had an ideological role and in western Europe political commitment was for many years an important issue for artists and intellectuals. Nowadays concerns throughout the continent tend to be economic and social rather than political. Culture is believed to further a country's economic development – by stimulating inward investment, creating jobs, helping exports, and in a word encouraging international competitiveness.

4.2.2 Politicians have also come to regard culture as a factor in social cohesion – in eastern Europe where people are struggling to come to terms with a whirlwind of change and in western Europe where supposedly affluent societies have lost sight of vanished certainties. According to this view, the arts can make a useful contribution to the social integration of immigrant or minority communities and the disadvantaged; they can be a component of youth policies; and they can foster equality of opportunities for women, increased cultural access for old people and cultural provision for and by disabled people as well as those in closed institutions such as hospitals and prisons. By the same token, the arts can help to promote social harmony, improve the quality of rural life and renew urban areas where old industries have been lost.

4.2.3 Some arts practitioners sympathise with this approach. Culture is a distinct sector, but it has imprecise and changing boundaries which are increasingly overlapping with the concerns of everyday life. The traditional definition of the fine arts has expanded to take in such forms as photography and video. Artists in various fields are giving new weight to the social dimension of their work, as in community arts, some culturally diverse arts, popular entertainment and arts in cities.

4.2.4 This utilitarian approach ignores an essential point. Since the nineteenth century (at least) aesthetic theory has argued that the value of art is that it is, first and foremost, art – and not life. Although art cannot be entirely separated from the context in which it is produced, it is not the same thing as political or social action. If it is exclusively determined by other, “external” criteria, experience shows that the results may be less than satisfying.

4.2.5 There is no obvious way out of this contradiction. As soon as the state intervenes it becomes sensitive to the relationship between art and society. Governments, ministries of culture and the like are, quite reasonably, extremely interested in how far the public makes use of works of art and, more generally, takes part in cultural activity. They want value for their money. In the English axiom, there is no such thing as a “free lunch”.

4.2.6 This attitude has a number of practical consequences. If culture is a major stakeholder in society at large, it will have to be linked explicitly with other fields of state intervention. It is becoming clear that national ministries or agencies in charge of culture will have to approach decisions on (say) the social status of artists, taxation and the cultural industries from an interdepartmental point of view and that integrated strategies call for co-operation among a variety of public services concerned with education, housing, urban regeneration, health and employment. Much the same is true at the local level.

4.2.7 The danger is that this “socialisation” of culture could emasculate it. Subsidy is a poisoned chalice. The arts are useful because they are irresponsible. They test received ideas, arrive at consensus through dissent and often criticise the established order of things. The artist, at least to begin with, is in a minority of one – and rightly so.

4.2.8 If the arts are to be understood as utilitarian instruments, perhaps it should only be in the sense that they help people to discover a new sense of direction, to find new values or bring old ones back to life, especially in societies which have become inward-looking, exclusive and xenophobic? Likewise, where the free market rules and money has increasingly become the measure of social relations, culture can be a free space for critical debate and the assertion of other kinds of value.

4.2.9 The dilemma facing policy makers is all too clear. How are they to make the most of the social and economic contribution the arts can make while at the same time preserving their proper independence? If they fail to do so, their investment will be worth little. If they succeed, they will be creating trouble for themselves in the short run and, by virtue of the fact that in the last resort the values which art expresses are subjective and qualitative, will find it hard to measure the quantitative outcome of their intervention.

4.3 Balancing old and new

4.3.1 The opposition between ancient and modern is intrinsic to art. Established institutions celebrate old insights and attitudes, which are then disputed by new, subversive currents of thought. The past is forced into a dialogue

with the present, which then matures and itself becomes the established order of things. It is not for ministries or arts councils to arbitrate, but to give each side a fair chance to have its say.

4.3.2 In the public sector this quarrel tends to be conducted by two different kinds of organisation – large institutions with generous grants and up-to-date facilities and small groups or individuals with few resources. In just the same way, the private sector is divided into great corporations in the recording, publishing and audiovisual industries and small independent businesses. Inevitably, the larger an organisation is, the more conservative its behaviour and, the smaller it is, the more flexible and willing to take risks. What should be the balance of state investment or intervention between the two sectors? And what links between them should be fostered? To what extent should large institutions open themselves up to new work and new audiences? In the cultural industries, which face fierce international competition, how can room be found for those who want, in effect, to run laboratories for research and development?

4.3.3 For some years the public sector has begun to take account of unofficial forms of artistic expression which used to receive little or nothing from the public purse – rock, variety, jazz, graphic design and puppetry. In Scandinavia and France, this openness is an accepted part of the cultural scene, but elsewhere, as in the United Kingdom, it has led to a hostile reaction in some quarters where it is argued that to allow everything to be art would be confusing. It would mix up categories and make it hard to distinguish between what was truly valuable and what was optional. Is M.C. Solaar's rap really equivalent to a Beethoven symphony or graffiti on an underground train to a canvas by Raphael or Titian? What really seems to be in question is not the abolition of a hierarchy of values, but an acknowledgement of the many and various forms of expression which fertilise everyday culture, especially among the young, and which are often of high quality. Is there a role for the public sector? How can it intervene without creating yet another subsidised zone with its apparatus of rules and institutions? How can one help creativity without needlessly distorting the market?

4.3.4 We live in an age of technical inventiveness which is offering artists new media of expression and of distribution. Also, changing aesthetic philosophies have encouraged them to invent new genres and abandon conventional modes of presentation and, for that matter, venues for performance and exhibition. By and large, the state has paid little attention, preferring to concentrate on traditional forms and styles, on the arts as heritage. One exception is the growing popularity of subsidised art commissions in public places.

4.3.5 Although some artists are happy to work in the relative security of established institutions and are suspicious of projects which do not carry with them the promise of continuity, others want to break down the compartmentalisation of cultural life (into networks, institutions, financial structures, publics and styles) and the authorities are in a position to lend assistance. A multidisciplinary approach would encourage new work. The present regula-

tory and financial systems of cultural support are often a hindrance, both actual and psychological. In what practical ways can a multidisciplinary approach be made to enable free experiment? Is it appropriate for theatres to work with the visual arts, performing groups with libraries, museum curators with contemporary arts centres?

4.3.6 Traditional spaces – theatres, concert halls, museums, exhibition galleries – may continue to receive the lion's share of subsidy, but often the most exciting and innovative arts work is taking place in new informal spaces – dis-used factories and warehouses, industrial wasteland – or in adapted venues such as *cafés-musique* or multi-purpose centres.

4.3.7 Perhaps too little attention is given to the need to break down barriers between all kinds of artistic expression and all kinds of creative practice? As a result we could be missing out on a wealth of unexpected and fruitful encounters, of interdisciplinary paradoxes generating new meanings, of ideas which challenge orthodoxies. Cultural policy may have to adapt itself to these new realities, by shifting its emphasis from the maintenance of institutions to the support of projects.

4.4 The resurgence of consumer power

4.4.1 Cultural policy has traditionally concentrated on expanding supply rather than responding to demand. The arts organisations which have been established and maintained in most European countries at national, regional and local levels – theatres, concert halls, opera houses, museums, libraries, historic monuments and contemporary arts centres – have been the foundation for government strategies to encourage artistic production, distribution and access. The assumption has been that the provision of opportunities for enjoying the arts would be enough to satisfy the public's needs, actual or potential, and that that justified the investment.

4.4.2 There are many explanations for this prioritisation of supply. They include the long tradition of royal or princely patronage; influential artists' lobbies pressing the case for subsidy; and in recent times, a heightened interest by local authorities in culture as a part of local infrastructures and city imaging.

4.4.3 Questions are now being raised about the wisdom of pursuing this supply-led approach and governments are shifting their ground. There are three main reasons for the change of emphasis. First and foremost, the social profile of audiences has not greatly altered over the years and is still dominated by the wealthier and better-educated socio-economic groups. Secondly, financial constraints have persuaded policy makers to look for quantifiable outcomes with which to justify their expenditures. Thirdly, the peer group system of evaluation is attracting criticism from those who suspect it encourages self-interested allocations of grant.

4.4.4 Finally, it is claimed that supply-side policies have led to overproduction and overspending. It is said that there are too many professional artists

and too much emphasis on experiment rather than the satisfaction of public taste. This line of thought needs to be treated with caution, for it is not easy to identify a simple equation between demand and supply in the arts. Nevertheless, the climate of opinion is changing and more attention is being paid to audience needs than to artists' wishes. One possible way forward for policy makers would be to turn existing policy on its head and let public subsidy follow the audience rather than the artist, but the result could well be art that is undemanding, avoids risk and is only driven by commercial impulses. Much of the point of subsidy is lost if it does not foster innovation.

4.4.5 Another, more limited option would be to adjust (rather than reverse) the balance between supply and demand and look for ways of engaging the public without abandoning the artist to the whims of the marketplace. This second course of action, which would open the prospect of a new concordat between the arts and the citizen, would recognise the nature of today's society – fragmented, diverse, mobile and harder to please than before. The growth of leisure, the changing relationship between work and free time, the dislocation between workplace and domestic environment offer new challenges. In the light of these changes, it is reasonable to ask arts organisations to look again at what they produce and how they market it.

4.5 The dangerous cult of “excellence”?

4.5.1 Supply-led policies have depended on an idea of artistic excellence – high aesthetic quality, high production values and the professionalisation of artistic practice. But does excellence militate against the objective of widening public access and reaching social groups that do not make use of the arts? Does it over-privilege consumption at the expense of participation?

4.5.2 This is a familiar debate. In order to attract all sections of the public, the argument goes, support should be given to less original but more accessible work; to regional or local artists who may not be very talented, but are involved in the life of their communities; and, even, to amateurs at the expense of professionals. Across the artforms, contemporary practice is said to be difficult to understand and upsetting, except in the eyes of a small band of connoisseurs and followers of fashion. As proof of the analysis, runs the argument, just look at the small audiences which this kind of work attracts.

4.5.3 Public distaste for certain forms of expression is an indisputable fact: in many countries, “serious” contemporary music, for example, has never found a real audience in spite of occasional successes and there is an evident imbalance between the expensive means employed and the negligible outcome (judged by the number of listeners or record-buyers).

4.5.4 One attempt to square the circle has been a trend for spectacular arts projects in city centres which has emerged in recent years throughout western Europe. They include ambitious international festivals, expensive productions featuring world stars, splendid new facilities designed by famous architects, the refurbishment of historic urban centres and aggressive marketing policies. These *grands projets* have not been unsuccessful (at least in the con-

text of civic and national promotion), but have they made a long-term contribution to audience development? Or has their impact been cosmetic in comparison with that of community-based and grass-roots activity? Is the stimulation of high culture good for the health of local culture?

4.5.5 However, it does not follow from all of this that standards should be abandoned. If art is complex and obscure, perhaps this has something to do with the complexity of today's world. Even if new work does not immediately set off a public response, history suggests that it will do so later and that avant-garde art may in due course influence more popular artists and designers. Also, the idea that the general public should be given easier fare than the intelligentsia is hardly calculated to heal social divisions, which is one of the objects of public policy.

4.5.6 All of this is true enough, but there is more than one kind of standard or, to be more precise, standards do not imply a single hierarchy of value. In an important sense, excellence is a product of fitness for purpose. There are many kinds of arts with many kinds of purpose. The danger of too much investment in *grands projets* is not that it may jeopardise the latest generation of "high" arts, but that it devalues popular, traditional or folk arts and the encouragement of participation. It has little chance of touching disadvantaged groups, such as the long term unemployed, nor the majority of teenagers. On the other hand, community artists and *animators* have shown how to stimulate creativity of high quality which is not imported but "owned" by local people.

4.5.7 The challenge of reconciling the difficulty of art with popular taste lies at the heart of cultural policy. It comes into especially sharp focus in relation to commercial youth culture – a potent fusion of pop music, lifestyle fashions, drugs, American movies and (more recently) video games – which gives many young people a strong sense of identity and empowerment and is in conscious opposition to the state-endorsed and subsidised mainstream arts. It is part of an anti-adult lifestyle, which receives the ironic authorisation of official distaste. There is no obvious satisfactory response, especially when money is short. The solution may lie in the prioritisation – and funding – of two essential tasks. The first concerns arts education which is given far less weight than production and distribution. Secondly, before the authorities decide their spending plans, they need to determine strategies, at local and regional as well as national levels, which do not favour particular forms of expression but respond to the full range of cultural activity in their communities.

4.6 The enterprise culture

4.6.1 Cultural policy touches the market in two ways: in some cases it seeks to correct market distortions, and in others it reflects market principles. In the first case, although governments had supposed that the cultural industries could look after themselves without any help, they have now changed their minds. Both the European Union, the Council of Europe and individual states believe it is necessary to protect national film industries from the chal-

lence of Hollywood by protectionist regulations and judicious programmes of investment in production and distribution. Countries with small populations are doing more than in the past to assist their rock and pop industries. Measures are being taken at national and European levels to support the literatures of linguistic minorities (especially through translation schemes).

4.6.2 In the second case, arts organisations are being encouraged to behave as if they are commercial businesses. Where they used to fall squarely within the public sector and were sometimes directly managed by the state, increasingly they are being made operationally independent with separate boards of management (for example, museums in the Netherlands), albeit strictly accountable for their funding; the ratio of public grant in relation to earnings is falling and business sponsorship has to be solicited. Administrators are expected to acquire entrepreneurial skills.

4.6.3 All over Europe the once relatively sharp distinction between public and private sectors is becoming blurred. The internationalisation of the economy, technological advances and a desire to protect national industries have led governments to assist their commercial cultural industries and to regulate the free market in various ways. This has meant direct or indirect financial support, tax concessions, the establishment of investment funds and regulation. Despite the heavy hand of bureaucracy, the communist system in central and eastern Europe gave artists (or, rather, favoured artists) and cultural institutions financial security and this sometimes had the advantage of producing excellent artistic results (for instance, theatre and literature in the former East Germany). The collapse of state culture created a gap rapidly filled by an uncontrolled free market. "[...] the international trends of a western art 'system' are bringing about a catastrophe for art – far greater perhaps than that which occurred under communism."¹ An avalanche of western products is endangering the health of national cultures. Many arts organisations have gone out of business or drastically reduced their output; in some areas, including publishing and the recording industry, new enterprises have come into being (for example, in Estonia there are now some 300 private enterprises).

4.6.4 In western Europe, policy makers and subsidised arts organisations find themselves in a double bind. In the first place, regular funding used to encourage complacency and a degree of inefficiency. There was limited incentive to seek out new audiences. Financial pressures have led to a new emphasis on fund-raising, business sponsorship and an "enterprise culture". Unfortunately while the profit motive has had some beneficial consequences, it runs the risk of distorting the real mission both of organisations and individuals. It threatens the essential "right to fail" which artists need to have if they are to produce exciting new work.

4.6.5 One way or another, then, economic recession in the west has created new difficulties and the discrediting of the command economy has led to a grave financial crisis for the arts in central and eastern Europe. The issue

1. McKay, Ian, "Czech arts today: on the death of Czech culture", in *New Art from Eastern Europe: Identity and Conflict*, *Art and Design Magazine*. London, 1994.

facing cultural planners is not simply how to make the best use of limited resources, but to find a way of ensuring that culture remains a political priority (as it has done in France). This in turn leads to another question. Should the private sector shoulder the responsibility of funding the arts whether in whole or in part? Artists fear such a prospect, but if a mixed economy is inevitable, how should the state and the private patron co-operate most effectively – and in particular ensure that some artforms do not suffer to the advantage of others?

4.7 The transatlantic challenge

4.7.1 Just as Europe is becoming aware of the virtues of diversity, it is falling victim to standardisation. This tendency is marked by two characteristics – merchandising, which is an outcome of the ruthless exploitation of productive forces, and an Americanisation supported by the energy of US culture and its commercial power. Every aspect of life is affected – social behaviour, fashions in clothes, eating habits and so on, not to mention film and television. There is nothing new about this development in itself. What is different is its acceleration, caused in part by the opening up of the countries of eastern Europe and in part by the new communications technologies – in the last decade cable and satellite, and latterly the “electronic superhighway”. If the legacy of the 1980s was the shift from selling products to selling their image, the 1990s is the age of information overload. Some artists are seriously alarmed by a surfeit of information or, in the words of the Russian film maker Andrei Konchalovsky, a “diarrhoea of images”.¹

4.7.2 The multicultural richness of European life seems to be at risk. But perhaps the threat is exaggerated. Our different cultures have considerable powers of resistance; they pick and choose what they want to import from elsewhere. Rock music is an international phenomenon, but it is interesting to observe that continental bands do not slavishly copy their Anglo-Saxon models, but take the best from their national musics to produce new and innovative work. However, if one examines the record of European cinema, it is evident that the threat can be real enough. Measures taken to counteract the effects of the market may not have stemmed the rising tide of audiences for American movies, but they have at least sustained a minimum level of European production. Is there a strong case for common European and national action to protect film and television and, if so, what measures should be taken?

4.7.3 Countries with small populations and language groups face special difficulties. However lively their national cultures are, there are too few consumers to support artistic production without state aid. Where, for example, would Finnish literature be without the active involvement of arts councils, artists' stipends, public lending right payments and so forth? Such cultures are little known outside their frontiers and are likely to remain marginalised. The key issues for them are the encouragement of translation, cultural exchanges

1. Spoken at a round table between the European Task Force and artists and intellectuals on the future of the arts in Europe. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

and international co-operation as well as of opening up cultures with larger populations to other forms of expression than their own.

4.7.4 Finally, the English language continues to grow more and more dominant. Should it be opposed on the grounds that it exactly exemplifies the twin challenges of standardisation and Americanisation? Or, without seriously endangering other languages, should we accept the situation, seeing that it eases communications between the countries of Europe? These questions bring to the fore the status of other leading European languages – French, German, Spanish, Italian and Russian – and their long term role. The measures taken by the French government to protect the French language at least have the merit of raising the debate.

4.7.5 To sum up, culture is at one and the same time rooted in place and nomadic. It is fruitless to resist foreign influences; in fact, Europeans have always known how to take the best from other civilisations. Young people, in tune with the spirit of the age, do not take kindly to obstacles and frontiers; they have open minds and are eager to know what is happening in other parts of the world. But at the same time, we ought not to abandon our heritage. Without a sense of where we come from it is hard to know where we are going.

4.8 Europe: a culture of cultures

4.8.1 Cultural pluralism is one the principles which underpin the work of Unesco and the Council of Europe. As we have seen, difference is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve a free and equal interchange among cultures. The problem is how to realise this ideal in practice. These are questions of general European relevance, but there will be no universal panacea. Different societies with their own traditions and institutions will have to reach their own solutions. What works in Germany may not suit the French. The difference between the French policy of assimilation and the pragmatic approach of the United Kingdom is striking. But are these old solutions still valid in changing circumstances? Perhaps the time has come for the different parties to learn from each others' experiences.

4.8.2 Policy makers have been slow to recognise the need to foster cultural pluralism. In central and eastern Europe the priority was to bolster the authority of a unitary state and the dominance of the Communist Party. The new, impoverished democracies are struggling to cope with the demands of indigenous minorities and as often as not the debate is conducted at a political – and sadly even military – level. Cultural measures, even if they could be afforded, would not be enough.

4.8.3 Indigenous minorities in western Europe are gradually attaining greater autonomy and a fair share of national resources (for example, the Samis in Finland, the Scots and the Welsh). But this is not yet the case so far as minority communities are concerned whose origins lie in the former colonies. Here the issues are to do with status as well as with money, and with the interrelationship between Eurocentric cultures and those from elsewhere

in the world. Despite various measures, involving education programmes and quotas of support, they have not been brought to a happy resolution.

4.8.4 Similar problems arise at the pan-European level. Seeing that it is neither feasible nor desirable to abandon individual national identities, how can we reconcile these with the idea of an overall European identity? Is it possible to “belong” both to a country and to a continent? The European Union’s current position is to construct a neutral European space inside which its constituent national cultures can work together co-operatively. However, a more ambitious approach has its followers. There are many in eastern Europe – notably, writers and artists – who assert a European identity and often seem more aware of a common European “destiny” than their western counterparts. So is there a chance to build an authentic European idea alongside the collectivity of individual national cultures?

4.9 The new professionals

4.9.1 Culture has its own skills, whether they be artistic, technical or administrative and recent years have witnessed its growing professionalisation. As Mitchell and Fisher have argued in the context of arts management: “In modern society there cannot be legitimacy without a certain degree of professionalism”.¹ While this is in many ways a welcome development, it has had consequences for other partners in the cultural process – notably, the elected representatives of local or regional government and indeed members of the public who are active in arts associations or other representative bodies. Arts technocrats tend to brush past them and arrogate decisions to themselves, or so it is suspected. These fears may or may not be justified, but they do suggest that some clarification of powers would be in order.

4.9.2 The emergence of the arts professions has spawned a large number of training opportunities with the result that more trained personnel are coming onto the market than there are jobs for them. Again some tricky questions arise. Should a limit be placed on the number of student or trainee places? But if so, would this not contradict the widely perceived need to enhance arts training? Furthermore, is it right to subordinate the aspirations of young people who wish to acquire an arts training to professional constraints? On the other hand, is it reasonable to encourage young people to take up a profession where there is an evident mismatch between training and work opportunities?

4.9.3 What is certain is that the authorities would be wise to make well-researched estimates of arts employment trends in the medium and long terms. Analysis of future trends is essential to predict the new kinds of job likely to be established and any consequential imbalance in training provision – for example, in cultural tourism, preservation and animation of the heritage

1. Mitchell, Ritva, and Fisher, Rod, *Professional managers for the arts and culture? Training of cultural administrators and arts managers in Europe: trends and perspectives*, Circle Publication No. 4. Arts Council of Finland-Council of Europe. Helsinki, 1992.

and so forth. To our critique of culture we must add a critique of training opportunities.

4.10 Economic arguments for and against arts subsidy

4.10.1 The state's role in culture may seem to be firmly established, but as long ago as the 1960s doubt was cast on whether the state should be directly involved in the arts at all. The social objectives of making the arts available to all were not being convincingly attained; indeed, they remained the preserve of the affluent and the well educated. The debate took on a sharp political relevance with the rise of neo-liberal economic policies in Europe. State-owned industries were privatised, industrial subsidies reduced or abolished and monopolies (for example broadcasting and telecommunications) deregulated. Support for the "high" arts was maintained, but a more commercial approach to fund-raising and management was encouraged.

4.10.2 Some research (for example, by the American economist, Fritz Machlup) has sought to show that the arts and related cultural activities contributed substantially to the gross national product. Economic arguments have been influential in regional and local government; however, they often depend on very broad definitions of culture and optimistic assumptions about multiplier effects. Other less obviously "committed" studies hold that the beneficial surplus effects of subsidy are so small that they are of little use to politicians trying to decide whether to raise, lower or abandon state investment in the arts. In effect, decision makers have been left with a free rein.

4.10.3 Similar problems arise when governments include "cultural exceptions" in free trade agreements to protect national cultural, and especially film and television, production. Economic analyses have assessed relative costs and benefits and the differential efficiency of various protective measures (for example special tariffs, quotas, latent barriers and production or distribution subsidies). They show that there is a risk of disguising investment and management failure and discouraging sensitivity to changing market demands. A consensus among economists in favour of deregulation and against subsidy has emerged. However, some recent work based on industrial organisational theory suggests that, under certain conditions, import quotas can be helpful both to foreign and domestic producers as well as to the consumer. Similarly, there are cases where production and export subsidies have contributed to competitive efficiency, at least in respect of domestic markets. The audiovisual industries are a case in point. Quotas have done something to compensate for the huge advantage which the American domestic market confers on US exporters, allowing them to sell their programmes for as little as a tenth of the cost of their European equivalents. As a countermeasure, state production investment in France has quadrupled since its establishment.

4.10.4 The point is that the "first mover advantage" of the American audiovisual cultural industries is so formidable that a "fortress" policy often seems to remain the only option. Furthermore, it is argued that there is more to culture than economics: the maintenance of creativity is intrinsically so important that subsidy must be added to restriction. A recent commentator

remarks: "It may well be the case that only non-economic arguments can rationalise the popularity of cultural protectionism. In that case, the economist's job is to guide policy makers to the less inefficient of the various protectionist options."¹

4.10.5 Sadly, little authoritative guidance is yet available. What there is falls into two potentially useful categories. First, it is argued that certain kinds of artistic work should be seen as a collective good. If a distinction can be drawn between art which is valued according to consumer demand and that which acquires a significance through critical appraisal, intellectual property rights and the interests of collectors, "real" highly priced works of art become a collective good unconstrained by consumers' subjective likings or preferences. Such arguments can help to justify public support for maintaining the "collective" cultural heritage and for seeing the arts as reservoir for exploitation (educationally, say, or commercially) by future generations. A difficulty with this line of thought is that it subordinates intrinsic artistic values to various utilitarian considerations.

4.10.6 A second approach is simply to take the arts out of the economic arena altogether. In the same way that it finances the police or the military or education for some larger purpose, the state may simply decide to see the arts as a merit good for which a direct or indirect economic justification is superfluous. It is a line of thought that may only be politically sustainable in the long run if this valuation of the arts is endorsed by the public at large.

4.10.7 In the absence of a general agreement on the economic justification of subsidy, all that can be said with certainty is that neo-liberal market policies, combined with a perception that the Welfare State as at present defined can no longer be afforded, have weakened political commitment to public investment in culture in some countries.

Summary

It is more easily said than done to implement the four key principles underlying cultural policy, for decision makers face a range of obstacles, contradictions and dilemmas. Should the arts serve utilitarian purposes or does their importance lie only in their intrinsic worth? Keeping a balance between old and new – the "heritage" arts and often controversial innovations – is difficult and in many countries perhaps too much weight is given to the former. Cultural policies have tended to be supply-led, but governments would now like more attention given to consumer preferences. Traditional ideas of artistic excellence have inhibited support for new forms of expression; how is one to find standards of judgement which cover the entire spectrum of creative activity? In the arts as elsewhere, the distinction between the public and private sectors is becoming blurred; if one or other is over-dominant, damage can be done to artistic production. Americanised global culture and the dom-

1. Seaman, Bruce A., "Considerations in adopting industrial organisational theory to the international trade in cultural goods", in Towse, Ruth, and Khakee, Abdul, (eds.) *Cultural economics*. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992.

inance of the English language endanger the multicultural richness of the European arts; but do quotas and restrictions work? Despite a widespread commitment to support for cultural diversity, policy makers have not yet succeeded in redressing the balance between mainstream and minority cultures. A new profession of arts administrators is emerging; but are they sufficiently accountable? A new liberal economics is challenging the fundamental tenets of arts subsidy; is cultural intervention effective?

Part two: Europe in transition

5 The geopolitics of culture

“We are at the beginning of a new era, characterised by great insecurity, permanent crisis and the absence of any kind of status quo ... We must realise that we find ourselves in one of those crises in world history which Jakob Burckhardt described. It is no less significant than the one after 1945, even if the initial conditions for surmounting it seem better today. There are no victors and no defeated powers today, not even in eastern Europe.”

99 Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis
M. Stürmer

5.1 Europe: a “theatre of concerns where diversity brings tensions”

5.1.1 We are witnessing the third great attempt in modern times to unite Europe. What Napoleon and Hitler failed to achieve by ruthless empire-building, the European Union is pursuing through a gradual policy of integration, built on hopes of peace and prosperity. At the end of the second world war, in addition to reconstruction and political stabilisation, battle-weary politicians devised economic means – the Coal and Steel Community – to bind the states of continental Europe, and more particularly France and West Germany, so closely together that a resumption of hostilities that had lasted most of the century would become impossible. The experiment was a success. It coincided with the extraordinary economic “miracle” which, to its general surprise, the west as a whole found itself enjoying in the post-war years. The process of integration, the stages of which included a customs union, the Europe of Sixes and Sevens, the Single European Act and the European Economic Area, led to the emergence of new institutional structures with ever-expanding memberships – the European Economic Community, later the European Community and later still the European Union. Early attempts to create a European “political community” failed, but economic aims have gradually spilled over into the more ambitious project of European integration. However, while science, technology and higher education were recognised as having a crucial part to play in this project, little attention was paid to European intellectual life and culture.

5.1.2 During the late 1980s and the 1990s a number of obstacles have obstructed the way forward. A long-lasting recession and neo-liberal awareness of the rising costs of welfare provision have impeded economic convergence among EU members, the necessary precondition for closer ties. The intention to move to European monetary union is entailing difficult economic measures as states seek to meet the strict entry criteria. Although the detailed mapping of the implications of the Treaty of Maastricht and the creation of the European Single Market involve many variables, anxieties about loss of sovereignty at the national level have resurfaced, despite assurances about the principle of subsidiarity. At present a limited set of criteria (the so-

called European monetary union criteria) define which countries will qualify to join the core of deepened integration. On the other hand, more general conditions are used to determine eligibility for new members. Although economic factors, such as economic stability, potential for growth and the availability of trained and cheap labour are key factors, geopolitical factors reflecting basic cultural differences will have – and already have had – a crucial role in specific membership decisions.

5.1.3 Meanwhile, the collapse of communism has raised the interesting but difficult question of a further massive expansion of membership eastwards; this has met with resistance from some states within the Community, especially in southern Europe, while at the same time the new democracies in central and eastern Europe are re-opening the Pandora's Box of nationalism. The centripetal process of integration has collided with local ambitions, which are opening the door to centrifugal forces and fragmentation.

5.1.4 The upheavals of the "Velvet Revolution", as exhilarating as they were unexpected, are only the latest stage in the creation of an "extended family" of democratic societies. At the turn of the century there were nineteen European states where, today, there are almost fifty. This multiplication is by no means the result of steady accumulation. The number of independent states in Europe fell during and after the second world war and was stable during the cold war. The process of European integration, while it has not diminished the number of independent states, has had a limiting effect on their power to act as free agents. The western part of the continent is now seen as an expanding superpower in economic competition with the United States and Japan. The new Single Market is already "more populous than America's and more valuable than China's".¹

5.1.5 The opening up of the former Soviet bloc has altered the rules of the European unification game. The new enlarged Germany has to conduct a balancing act, where commitment to political and monetary union dispels any doubts its western neighbours may have about the expansion of its economic interests in central and eastern Europe. The European Union's possible expansion of membership is a key issue here: if political stability, the introduction of the market economy and the continuation of democratisation can be guaranteed, the integration of central and eastern European countries into the EU could be easier than for parts of southern Europe and Mediterranean countries.

5.1.6 The general hope, then, among integrationists is for a gradual waning in the powers of the nation state. However, this development is overshadowed by the splintering of central and eastern Europe under the pressure of resurgent nationalism and ethnic conflicts. The inability of the European Union to intervene effectively in the most devastating of these conflicts, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, is a reminder of the limits on the authority of the new, supposed superpower.

1. *Economist survey*, 10 October 1994.

5.1.7 The Europe that is unfolding, as the Irish President Mary Robinson has observed, “will not be a place of tidy assumptions or quiet acceptances. Instead it is a theatre of concerns where diversity brings tensions and where tensions can lead [...] to the enrichment of mutual understanding”.¹ So they can, but not necessarily. Although grand alliances, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, have achieved great things, the new territorial states have no independent mechanism for determining their borders or defining their social structures. The road to the future is mined.

5.1.8 For states which were already federal and multi-ethnic, a movement towards decentralisation has given birth to internal conflicts, migrations and separatist movements, of which the leading examples are the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. In these societies “nationality” is understood to mean one’s ethnic origins, not one’s citizenship.

5.1.9 What is at issue here is that people’s sense of themselves as communities, of what gives them their cultural identities, is in a state of flux. New loyalties are competing with old. It is very difficult to make generalisations about this process, and even more so to offer value judgements. Cultural self-recognition is a major force in Europe and has acquired a particular importance since the 1980s. The states in the former Soviet bloc have set a high value on the assertion of distinctive identities and see freedom of cultural expression as a signpost to social renewal. In western Europe, regions and cities believe that the distinctive cultural traits of their communities are essential elements in their bid for autonomy from national governments. But nation states themselves have also developed policies designed to identify, highlight and protect national cultures – notably their heritages and languages.

5.1.10 Some countries in eastern and central Europe have begun to realise that there is no culture without tradition and no tradition without the thread of continuity. That is why they are seeking to reclaim their symbols, their cultures and their myths, sometimes not recognising that the passage of fifty – or in Russia’s case nearly eighty – years, makes this a testing task, as the world is vastly different at the end of the twentieth century to what it was at the beginning. For overtly political reasons, some countries involved in the ethnic conflict of Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia are reinventing, often through the appropriation and manipulation of folk and popular music, a history they may never have had in the form in which it is now conceived. For them, the policy challenge must be to look forward while respecting the traditions of the past, but not to make the history of the past a burden on the future.

5.1.11 Constructive outcomes of such a process include the enhancement of community awareness and solidarity; the release of new creative energies and resources for artistic and cultural exchange; preference for local “hand-made” cultures as against the anonymity of the mass media; more respect for the variousness of world cultures and of the growing number of mixed or “hybrid” cultures; and the revelation of the economic potential of culture.

1. Quoted in an interview in the *European* newspaper, 15-18 July 1993.

5.1.12 On the other hand, cultural differences have been a pretext for social strife, masking economic and political rivalries. They have elicited fears about the adequacy of one's own culture and, in a bitter causal link, hatred of that of others. Cultural symbols are often used as targets or talismans in times of war. Elsewhere their commercial exploitation by the publicity and entertainment industries have trivialised their meanings.

5.1.13 The re-emergence of linguistic, religious and ethnic divisions, migration and population growth is stimulating xenophobia and intolerance. Anti-Semitism has old roots, but still flourishes even in areas where persecution and emigration have led to the virtual disappearance of Jewish communities. Regional conflicts may well increase in number and scope as the struggle for resources intensifies.¹ Ethnic and linguistic minorities find themselves on the wrong side of frontiers. The nomadic Rom or Gypsies have no "sponsor" state and tend to face discrimination wherever they find themselves.

5.1.14 In the last fifty years, European politicians have forgotten about distinctions, long familiar to historians and social scientists. Some disputes, driven by political and economic causes, are exacerbated by religious divisions. This is illustrated by conflicts between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. The crises in Northern Ireland, Chechnya, in Algeria (with severe resonances in France) are variants of the same syndrome. central and eastern Europe has become an ethnic cauldron, epitomised by the war in the Balkans with its terrible list of civilian casualties. "Sarajevo, like Andalusia before, like all of Europe's border zones past and present, is a site of cultural mixing. What is taking place is a massacre of mixed identities in the name of ethnic purity".² What has also been taking place is a war against culture.

5.1.15 In response, states in central and eastern Europe have, on the initiative of the European Council, signed a "Stability Pact", a treaty designed to ensure respect for ethnic minorities and existing frontiers. It will be restricted to nine countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia – all of which are currently under consideration for membership of the European Union. This is an important step in view of the tensions that have surfaced in the Baltic States over the substantial Russian-speaking minorities and between Romania and Slovakia on the one hand and their Hungarian minorities on the other.

5.1.16 Old disputes breeding violence can be found elsewhere in the continent. During their formative years, states tended to erase regional differences in the interests of central control (more so in France and less in Germany), but now they are confronted by unprecedented challenges to their authority. The United Kingdom has not yet negotiated a settlement in Northern Ireland and worries about separatist movements in Scotland and, less strongly, in Wales; the opposition of the Flemish and Walloon communities

1. Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for the twenty-first century*. Fontana Press. London, 1994.

2. Conference on cultural pluralism in Europe. Discussion document prepared by the organisation Cultural Co-operation on behalf of the Circle network. London, March 1995.

divides Belgium; France faces nationalist movements in Corsica and the Basque country; in Spain, the Basque problem is even more serious and the Catalans are pressing successfully for greater and greater autonomy; in Italy, there is a fierce antagonism between the north and the south of the country; and even in the far north the expansion of the cultural autonomy of the Sami people has revealed traditional ethnic tensions and induced a backlash from the other residents of Lapland.

5.1.17 In sum, the integration of the European polities is proving to be a slow and difficult task. The achievement of political union is still a matter of anguished debate. A survey of national/European affiliation and attitudes towards foreigners in 1994 in *Eurobarometer* 42 (see Appendix I, Table 23 of this report) is revealing, with a mere 4% of those surveyed regarding themselves as Europeans only, compared with 47% considering themselves as nationals only. Despite the progress that has been made in the years following the second world war, Europe is still an aspiration rather than a fact of life.

5.2 Culture beyond frontiers

5.2.1 *The triumph of "American culture"*. There are axes of power in culture as in other fields of human endeavour. Throughout the age of empire, European culture was exported to the colonies (and former colonies, such as the United States); first, Vienna and then Paris, were widely agreed to be the cultural capital of Europe and in due course Moscow established itself as an alternative centre of attraction in communist circles.

5.2.2 As the twentieth century proceeded, the impact of American popular culture began to make itself felt and it was Europe's turn to be influenced. After the second world war, the process of decolonisation and the establishment of world bodies, such as the United Nations and its subsidiaries introduced the new notion of multiculturalism. The Soviet bloc continued to nourish intellectual opposition to capitalism. In this, it was followed, and partly superseded, by China, Cuba and North Vietnam.

5.2.3 Generally speaking, though, the United States sets the tune; in the traditional, especially visual arts, the focus has moved since the 1950s from Paris to New York. For the cultural industries, especially film and video, the centre of reference has been, and still is, Los Angeles.

5.2.4 The fall of communism and the moves towards integration of western Europe seemed, among other things, to herald the end of cultural divisions across the continent. However, this has proved to be an illusion. The fundamental values of different nations and groups have sometimes proved to be incompatible and the disappearance of the gridlock of the cold war has revealed what Samuel Huntington called "a clash of civilisations".¹ These difficulties have been exacerbated, or perhaps even superseded, by the growing dominance of American, or Americanised, popular culture.

1. Huntington, Samuel, "The clash of civilisations?", *Foreign Affairs*, USA, summer 1993.

5.2.5 The West is a complex economic, political and cultural entity, bringing together western Europe, the North and South Americas as well as Australasia and South and East Asia. Israel, Japan and South Africa are “associate” members of the club. It is this club which is both the engine of, and the market for, the mass electronic culture which is so all-powerful and all-pervasive that it looks set fair to render disputes between local, regional and national cultures irrelevant. Yet in recent years there has been an upsurge of local cultures in two senses. First, the demand for local supply has not decreased but increased in the face of globalisation; and, secondly, large business enterprises, when establishing themselves in a given place, have become aware that understanding the local culture and integrating it in their structures and activities is a *sine qua non* for efficiency and success.

5.2.6 Continental Europe and the United States are not only economic, but also cultural competitors. To many Europeans, Americanisation is a major danger to national cultures; many sympathised with Jack Lang, former French Minister for Culture, when he referred in 1982 to the “financial and intellectual imperialism that no longer grabs territory, but grabs consciousness, ways of thinking, ways of living.”¹ In fact, the picture is not a simple one of an alien invasion, in two senses. First, it is interesting to note that *émigrés* from the Old World created the culture of the New – not the American Indians nor, at least at the outset, African Americans. A particular version of European culture came into being, free from the traditional constraints imposed by European monarchies and aristocracies. In due course it recrossed the Atlantic and conquered the now enfranchised masses whom the market had endowed with freedom of choice and real economic influence over cultural production. Secondly, “Americanisation” has transcended its own national origins and cultural “elites” and community leaders in the United States see it as posing as great a threat to authenticity and identity as do Europeans.

5.2.7 In exactly the same way, the Russian Federation and central and eastern Europe have imported the cultural ethos of McDonalds and Coca-Cola, courtesy of the free market. American images, products and ideas travel well. In fact, the search for a pan-European culture can lead to an uncomfortable conclusion: it is American culture which unites Europeans – or, to put it more accurately, American-style culture, for it is still at least in part produced and developed by Europeans. For most of this century, Hollywood has recruited Europeans to its cause, from Billy Wilder to Arnold Schwarzenegger. Rock music emerged from African American roots, but in the United Kingdom it acquired a particular authenticity and international appeal. The globalisation of the “American dream” is reflected in the fact that its economic motor is not exclusively American or Anglo-American, as is commonly supposed. It is based on transnational corporations operating from the Far East and Europe as well as the United States. Indeed, nine of the world’s top twenty multimedia conglomerates (that is, groups involved in at least two branches of broadcasting, cinema, press, publishing, recording and video) are European, with Philips and Bertelsmann strategically placed. The internationalisation of the

1. Jack Lang was speaking at the Unesco World Conference on Cultural Policies in Mexico City in 1982.

entertainment industry, sometimes with European participation, can be seen in the continuing global shifts of ownership.

5.2.8 For all that, fears of an American, or “Anglo-Saxon”, cultural hegemony are not altogether without foundation, as can be seen if we turn to questions of language and the rise to prominence of English as a new lingua franca.

5.2.9 *Speaking with tongues.*¹ Linguistic and cultural identities are closely related. In some societies, especially those seeking national status or revival, language is at the heart of cultural policy. It is a symbol of independence, tradition and authenticity. A glance at the situation in Latvia, Wales, Catalonia or the Alto Adige in Italy (to choose a few examples at random) demonstrates the political and cultural importance given to people’s native tongues. The purity of a language and its capacity to resist infiltration by others is keenly felt. It is also often a battleground between the generations and neologisms are often perceived as emblems of social decline and of the age-old struggle between young and old, between conservatives and reformers. Subcultures invent or hijack words as an exclusive entry code and as a means of distinguishing themselves from the rest of society.

5.2.10 This is not simply an issue arousing strong emotions among minorities. Speakers of majority languages show similar concerns, as is witnessed by the French Government’s attempts to protect French and the invasion of foreign words by legislation. In fact, there is a European linguistic crisis which stems from two main causes. It is an unsurprising consequence of the push for European integration that there is a competition for the continent’s main language of business and diplomacy. More threateningly for the non-native English speaking world, the emergence of a global, apparently Americanised, culture has been accompanied by the growing popularity of English.

5.2.11 There are about twelve supranational languages in the world which not only function as the first language within their national frontiers but have a wider regional and global significance as second languages. Many of them became dominant through the sheer weight of numbers in the national territories (for example Chinese) together with their post war economic muscle (as in the case of German). Others (for example Spanish, French and Portuguese) gained importance as a result of colonisation. Malay, long a trading language in the Indonesian archipelago, received a powerful boost when it was adopted, with minor variations, as the national language of the Indonesian Republic and Kiswahili has become the common tongue of East Africa. However, all these languages now have to compete with English, which out of the United Kingdom’s imperial past and the political and economic power of the United States has become the language of global communication in science and technology, diplomacy and entertainment.

1. This section is indebted to two articles by Abram de Swaan: “The emergent world language system: an introduction” and “The evolving European language system: a theory of communication potential and language competition”, in *International Political Science Review*, Volume 14, No. 3, July 1993. Butterworth-Heinemann for the International Political Science Association.

5.2.12 Research suggests that whatever the origin of a given language's success, its continuing popularity has an inertia of its own, resting largely on individual preferences as parents and students decide for themselves the languages in which they will need to be fluent for economic or academic success and for leisure purposes. Ease of learning, particularly at a preliminary stage, is one factor that is often taken into account. "People learn a language because they expect it will help them to communicate with others and they make anticipatory calculations about the best medium to adopt for themselves or for their children. Into these calculations enter their expectations or the expectations of others, which may result in a highly unstable situation, in which quite suddenly a 'tipping point' is reached and preferences switch towards an alternative second language. Something similar seems to be occurring in contemporary eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union [...] Russian as the central language is now being abandoned in favour of other supranational languages."¹ What we see in the former communist countries is, of course, a confluence of causes – that is to say, their response to freedom from an old imperial yoke coincided with the ready availability of linguistic rivals to Russian to create the "tipping point".

5.2.13 A pattern of continuous supersession has marked the history of Europe. From the Roman Empire until the eighteenth century, Latin, the language of western Christendom, was the leading medium of international communication. It then gave way to French among literate elites, at the same time as individual nation states confirmed and stabilised their own languages for internal purposes. For many centuries language has been an important mechanism which has enabled absolutist rulers to assert central political control. Sub-national languages (for example Catalan or Gaelic) survived with difficulty and often suffered discrimination.

5.2.14 The post-war process of European integration found French still in a privileged position. It was the sole official language of the Coal and Steel Community and although, with the formation of the European Economic Community, the number of official languages increased to the four of the original six members, it retained pride of place. In the years that followed the situation changed and English has grown in importance. This was for three reasons; first, the Germans have been willing to use English when abroad. Secondly, the rise of American influence and of the globalisation of the world economy has meant that English has become more widespread than ever as an international language. Thirdly, the accession of the United Kingdom to the EC and later the Nordic countries, together with the expansion of the number of German-speakers following the unification of West and East Germany, may have shifted the European balance of linguistic influence away from French.

5.2.15 In central and eastern Europe, German used to be the first foreign language until it yielded to Russian. With the disappearance of communism, German is competitively placed to regain its dominance. But the likelihood is that, as in the former Soviet Union, English will assume the lead. Looking

1. Ibid.

ahead, most observers predict that diglossia will ultimately prevail across the continent; that is, Europeans will speak their own national languages and choose English as their preferred second language for international communication. The maintenance of an equilibrium between them (and, where relevant, with sub-national tongues), will depend on the vigour with which national and regional authorities continue to support and promote their linguistic identities. Unfortunately, a balance of this kind would entail a substantial "demotion" of French and German with their long history as international languages. Is there some way in which a leading role for them could be maintained? It is hard to find a ready answer to this question, but it is in everyone's interest to search for it. The cause of European unity will not be furthered by continuing linguistic resentment.

5.2.16 It may be that the emergence of a *lingua anglica* is irreversible, but because languages are a key component of national and local identities and integral to cultural policies, they need to be protected from discrimination or desuetude. The European Union has established a European Bureau for Lesser Known Languages and a modest fund to promote translations from such languages. For its part, in 1992 the Council of Europe adopted a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and opened it for signature; unfortunately, as few countries have ratified the charter it remains a dead letter. It seeks to gain support for territorial minority languages as a cultural resource, to promote their teaching and to encourage their use in public or private life, in the media and the arts, and in the courts. The charter does not cover the languages of non-European migrant communities. This is an important gap, which merits examination by the Council of Europe.

5.2.17 By the same token Europe will not be economically competitive with the rest of the world and European integration and cultural understanding will be delayed if its citizens are not linguistically proficient. The teaching of second languages, whether English, intra-European or extra-European should be given a higher priority than it is in many countries, and the long term impact assessed from the perspective of cultural policies as well as educational ones.

5.2.18 *Free trade in culture?* It was highly significant that the dispute over Europe's film industries in the face of America's near-monopoly of global markets nearly sabotaged the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations on GATT. The GATT negotiations revealed the conflict of interest between the might of the US audiovisual industries and a Europe concerned with national cultural identity and diversity, but split between support for protectionist measures or an open market with limited safeguards for European and national products. It should be noted that the issue has not so much been American culture in itself, as the economic and financial means which support it. Control of production is far more international than is sometimes realised and, as Hans Mommaas notes, while some grieve "over the presumed loss of national patrimony and identity, others celebrate the alleged heterogeneity and the presumed proliferation of choice, freedom and creativity."¹ Likewise,

1. Mommaas, Hans, "The politics of culture and world trade", in Van Hemel, Annemoon; Mommaas, Hans; and Smithuijsen, Cas; *Trading culture: GATT, European cultural policies and the transatlantic market*. Boekmansstichting. Amsterdam, 1996.

neither the Internet nor communication satellites are objects of criticism in themselves, but are resented for the predominantly “Anglo-Saxon” character of their contents.

5.2.19 The American film industry has been hugely successful in collecting net revenues from other countries, including Europe. It has been estimated that in 1992 the revenue outflow from Europe (including TV programmes) was more than US\$ 3.7 thousand million, whereas revenues from the United States into Europe only amounted to US\$ 290 million. Recent agreements between Gaumont and Buena Vista and UGC and Fox in France suggest that, despite European Community or government action, a takeover of the European film and television industries is still on the cards. Moreover, the US film industry has surmounted existing European protectionist measures via “quota quickies” – that is, American producers have made low budget films in Europe utilising European actors, directors, technicians, etc. to obtain quota import certificates.

5.2.20 However, some commentators, such as William Uricchio, maintain that the terms of the GATT debate have obscured more important policy issues for future years: “Not only are corporate identities increasingly difficult to tag with national labels, but their products exist more as textual networks (films, videos, CDs, comic books, tee-shirts) than as simple movies ... the new distribution and delivery systems now in development pose an even more fundamental challenge to the vision of the medium discussed in GATT. At a moment when ‘video on demand’ looms large on the horizon, discussions of quotas ... constitute an absurdity.”¹

5.2.21 No wonder, then, that two major European studies concern themselves with the information and audiovisual industries. The first, a European Commission green paper, reviews the audiovisual cultural industries (*Strategy option to strengthen the European programme industry in the context of the audiovisual policy of the European Union*, April 1994, the “Pinheiro Report”). The second document looks at the telecommunication and global information infrastructure (*Europe and the global information society*, Recommendations to the European Council, May 1994, the “Bangemann Report”). They both offer similar diagnoses and strategies: Europe has the capacity to be a world competitor, but will not succeed without reform of institutional and production structures. An integrated European “space” for the information industries must be established, the telecommunication markets deregulated and the international competitive edge of producers enhanced. This appraisal has been echoed in the European Commission’s latest communication on *Stimulating dynamic growth in the European programme industry* (1995).

5.2.22 While the European Commission and national governments believe they should mainly content themselves with being facilitators, the reports took restrictive European practices (television quotas and so forth) as regret-

1. Uricchio, William, “Displacing culture: transnational culture, regional elites and the challenge to national cinema”, in Van Hemel, Annemoon; Mommaas, Hans; and Smithuijsen, Cas; op. cit.

table necessities. Some economists suspect that such practices are ineffective, and that they may be imposed as much for “political” as functional reasons. Others point out that, as in France, they stimulate increased investment for an industry faced with the “dumping” of American cultural products in the European market. The trend of discussion, as Schlesinger and Doyle point out in relation to the Pinheiro Report, is to prioritise “the economic over the socio-cultural. The most crucial suggestion is that European film and television production be stimulated by levies on cinema tickets, broadcasting revenues and video rentals. This marks a retreat from the use of quotas in anticipation of the advent of the information superhighway, a communications economy in which quotas would be unenforceable.”¹ Similarly, the review process in respect of the 1989 Television Without Frontiers directive has revealed resistance within the Council of Ministers to French proposals for a reinforcement of compulsory quotas, though they attracted substantial support inside the European Parliament.

5.2.23 It is depressing to observe that, among their long lists of recommendations, the Bangemann and Pinheiro reports paid little attention to three important areas – the maintenance of cultural creativity; the use of the European cultural heritage (excepting films) as a resource in audiovisual production; and support to the new democracies in central and eastern Europe. These omissions may be understandable in the light of the cultural chapter in the Maastricht Treaty (with its stress on subsidiarity in cultural affairs), but it draws attention by its absence to a fundamental question. What are the synergies between the information industries and cultural production? And how can they be exploited to the mutual benefit of both sides? These questions and others are now being addressed by the European Union’s Information Society Forum – a 125-member committee of representatives from the public and private sectors which was set up in July 1995 to explore the social and cultural dimensions of the information society. Its agenda includes the information society’s impact on the economy and employment; basic social and democratic values in the “virtual community”; the impact of the new technologies on public services; education and training in the information society; sustainable development of technology and its infrastructure; the cultural dimension of the information superhighway and the future of the media; and cultural and linguistic diversity.

5.2.24 In the publishing arena, the European Commission’s continuing opposition to the fixed pricing of books on the basis that it infringed competition rules in the Single Market, has not prevented publishers in some European countries from maintaining voluntary agreements. However, some of these agreements appear to be tenuous and, indeed, the price maintenance system in the United Kingdom, the Net Book Agreement, collapsed in 1995. Will uncontrolled price competition benefit the consumer in the short term, but at the expense of the closure of small bookshops and the reduction of choice in the long term? So far, the evidence is inconclusive; for example, in

1. Schlesinger, Philip, and Doyle, Gillian, “Contradictions of economy and culture: the European Union and the information society” *The European Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol. 2, No. 1. Harwood Academic Publishers. The Netherlands, 1995.

Finland, where a system of fixed prices was abolished in 1970, some voices still call for its return, but major publishers see no reason to agree. Initial findings from the United Kingdom suggest that deregulation may not have damaged smaller bookshops in the way predicted – nor, incidentally, has it led to significant increases in book sales after an early surge. The impacts of any relaxation in fixed book pricing, together with the effect of VAT on books needs to be monitored.

5.2.25 *The challenge from the Orient.* The 1980s saw the industrial coming of age of the Far East and South-east Asia, with far-reaching economic and cultural consequences. The triumph of the Japanese manufacturing industries, focused on cars, the electronic industries and computers, and the universality of Japanese foreign investment have been quickly followed by the growth of the South Korean and Taiwanese economies and the beginnings of a challenge from mainland China, spear-headed by Hong Kong. Evidence of the confidence of the Far Eastern and South-east Asian economies is not simply manifested in the erection of the world's tallest buildings in Kuala Lumpur and Shanghai, but in the planned completion of the world's largest cultural complex in Singapore before the millennium.

5.2.26 Following the second world war an Asian diaspora has introduced the west to aspects of eastern life-styles (for example, in catering). California, the world's entertainments capital, has witnessed the most substantial "invasion", doubtless because of its location on the edge of the Pacific ocean: people of Asian descent now account for 30% of the population and whites have lost their numerical majority. This has been accompanied by significant investment, from Japanese companies in particular, in the audiovisual and music industries.

5.2.27 While Asian culture has been increasingly westernised and western expertise in some areas remains highly valued (Japanese companies go to considerable efforts to recruit European designers), there are signs that a reverse process is gaining ground. The popularity of martial arts films from the beginning of the 1970s, and the Chinese and Taiwanese 'new wave' of film makers since, as well as computer games and Asian food, suggest that eastern cultural products and attitudes may assume a new importance in the future.

5.2.28 *The invasion of central and eastern Europe.* The main challenge facing cultural policy makers in central and eastern Europe centres on the balance between continuity and change. The Russian film maker, Nikita Mikhalkov, has pointed to the contradiction between "wild capitalism", which is running riot, and Russia's fundamental cultural values.¹ Although the countries in the former Soviet bloc have their own individual problems which make generalisations risky, this appears to be typical of the region as a whole. While happy to have emerged from the era of communist rule, many artists

1. Spoken at an international conference, convened for the World Commission on Culture and Development and the European Task Force by the Russian Ministry of Culture, *Culture and development in the countries in transition* (Moscow, 19-20 June 1995).

and intellectuals do not wish to see this episode in their history to be entirely forgotten and argue that its achievements, notably the high official value which was given to culture, should be built on rather than set aside. As W.L. Webb observed of those countries that used to be under the Soviet umbrella: "The last five years have been a great learning experience, in which people have emerged from confusing times with clearer heads: not without some nostalgia for the stodgy stability and simple educational and welfare benefits of the old regime, but rejecting, nevertheless, any idea of returning to a system that had been imposed on them from the east, from not-Europe."¹ Two years on from that observation can we be so confident that there is not growing support for a return to a system which at least offered a sense of security and full employment?

5.2.29 Economic liberalisation has not immediately fulfilled the promise of a better life. "[...] people counted on obtaining quite basic things without any delay: economic recovery and the freedom to travel. Because of widespread scepticism towards communist propaganda people also refused to believe its claims that something like a recession was possible in the West. At the same time, many people imagined [...] that if only you have a new state you would be given a passport and be able to travel to the west."²

5.2.30 Disillusion quickly set in. The arrival of the free market has exacerbated intercommunal tensions. As Professor William Paterson has observed, "liberal democratic ideas which were so potent in delegitimising communist regimes are much less powerful in creating and sustaining liberal democratic regimes in states unsupported by civil society and tortured by communal and ethnic division."³ Democracy would have a greater chance of success if the wealthy west accepted a greater degree of responsibility for helping eastern European societies and was able to respond more generously and sensitively than it does to their needs.

5.2.31 Release from a long period of ideological and political control has re-invigorated ethnic minorities. Some of them find themselves on the wrong side of national frontiers, which, as among Magyars in southern Slovakia or (catastrophically) in the former Yugoslavia, they would like to see redrawn. Some communities look back to their pre-industrial roots and link ecological with cultural concerns, as in the northern regions of the Russian Federation. Under communist rule, indigenous peoples were subjected to "economic modernisation" and, despite the Soviet Union's ostensible promotion of "folk cultures", to linguistic and cultural discrimination. Their spokespersons, referring to the draft United Nations declaration of indigenous rights, have appealed to international organisations and world opinion, seeking compensation for the past and prevention of present and future damage at the hands of "rampant capitalism". For them, environmental concerns and the "ecology" of human growth transcend the claims of ever increasing productivity. It

1. Webb, W.L., *Media, market and democracy*, Index on Censorship 6, London, 1994.

2. Livingstone, R., (trans.) "Back to the future", published in *Polityka*. Poland, 1994.

3. Paterson, William E., "Europe undivided: from spring in winter to winter of despair", in *A window on Europe*, edited by Geraldine Prince. Canongate Press. Edinburgh, 1993.

is customary to argue that the preservation of indigenous cultures is important because they are repositories of accumulated traditional knowledge which links us all to our ancient origins. However, there is ample evidence (for example in the cases of the Sami people of Scandinavia and the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation) that it enriches present-day intercultural and avant-garde artistic creativity.

5.2.32 In eastern and southern parts of the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, majority cultures are Islamic rather than European and for their new governments access to western influence and alliances does not simply raise the issue of independence within the "common European house", but whether or not they belong to Europe at all. As a half-way house, perhaps the creation of a Eurasian "cultural space" would be a way forward, although what this might mean in practice is not so clear and would call for thoughtful debate.

5.2.33 The role of artists and intellectuals in the downfall of the communist system is well known. They were the inheritors of a dissident tradition that goes back as far as Pushkin and the Decembrists in Russia. Some explicitly saw themselves as representative of historic values, whether they were the exiled Solzhenitsyn or an Estonian intelligentsia which looked back admiringly to its forbears in the nineteenth century, Herderian cultural nationalists. Others, headed by Václav Havel, were internationalist liberals inspired by the ferment of the 1960s in the West.

5.2.34 In a certain sense, they won a pyrrhic victory. Central control by Ministries of Culture and censorship has been largely abandoned, at least on the surface. Decision-making is being devolved to regional and local authorities, or to quasi-independent public "foundations" – although sometimes without the necessary resources. But with all of this their central role has faded. The need for an unofficial opposition has disappeared and art no longer has the direct political function it used to. Also, the high status which the state conferred on "official" artists has become a thing of the past.

5.2.35 The situation in Estonia is not untypical of a general decline in the value given to culture. According to the Council of Europe's *Cultural policy in Estonia*, "since independence was restored, the arts and culture have no longer been the main lever of political interests or a prime mover in political and social development. Some content analyses of the Estonian press suggest that people's interest in the cultural debate and in the arts themselves has been waning. These observations have been interpreted as signs that brute political and economic forces have taken over the public scene and that political and economic interests instead of intellectual ones are increasingly guiding people's thoughts and actions."¹

5.2.36 The dismantling of the old arrangements is by no means proceeding at an even pace. Thus the intellectual communities in some European coun-

1. *Cultural policy in Estonia*, report by a European panel of examiners, European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. Council of Europe Publishing. Strasbourg, 1997.

tries argue that governing regimes are in essence new versions of the old and that freedom of expression is still at risk. Thus, writing of Serbia, Milena Dragicević-Sesić observes: "Culture and cultural policy in Serbian society today are still deeply dependent on the old models of cultural policy and organisation of the institutional system on the one hand, and on the other, on the demands of certain intellectuals, oriented mostly towards the national question and national culture [...]. The belief in the possibility of reforming cultural life, especially within the institutional system of cultural life, such as appears in post-totalitarian societies, is dangerous, since it is based on the notion that the entire state and cultural apparatus, accustomed to working, thinking and behaving in accordance with the rigid norms of totalitarians, can be painlessly and efficiently changed overnight, by accepting the rhetoric of 'new' post-totalitarian, but hardly democratic society."¹

5.2.37 Serbia is, of course, by no means representative of the region as a whole, but it is not alone in finding the transition to democracy a bumpy ride; the essential reason being that democratic norms are being incorporated into cultural life by the old administrative and cultural apparatus of the state, inherited from totalitarianism. A heavily nationalistic bias is emerging. "[The] space for freedom is opened selectively, in accordance with the politics and cultural policy of the cultural and political bureaucracy. Replacing texts about the partisan war, communism and revolution by others on the battle of Kosovo or St Sava, only shows the limits of the space for freedom in post-totalitarian society."²

5.2.38 In most former socialist countries the move to free market economics has been extremely painful. Production has fallen, currencies have collapsed and the standard of living has nose-dived. Often cultural spending as a proportion of overall public expenditure has remained stable, but has declined sharply in real terms (in some countries external financial support has been helpfully provided by the Soros Foundation, the brainchild of the Hungarian-born financier George Soros). The situation is not helped by the understandable preoccupation of governments with infrastructural problems, nor by the evident decline in discretionary income (for instance, the intelligentsia and other consumers of books cannot afford the prices which publishers in free market conditions are forced to charge). Arts organisations are closing down or restricting their activities. Bulgaria offers an example of what is happening; according to official figures, its GDP fell by 9.1% in 1990, a further 16.7% in 1991 and 12.6% in the first half of 1992, although, unusually, it has succeeded in maintaining the real value of its cultural subsidies. The purchasing power of the population has dropped by more than 30%. Between 1987 and 1992 the number of theatre performances decreased by 40% and the annual number of cinema attendances per capita from nine to two. There is some irony in the fact that the cultural sector is being forced, on the one hand, to be more independent in raising revenue from non-public sources, yet, on the other, is becoming more depen-

1. Dragicević-Sesić, Milena, *Cultural policy, the institutional system and art trends*. Institute of Social Sciences, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 1995.

2. *Ibid.*

dent on governments subsidies and, in effect, *de facto* government institutions.

5.2.39 The decline in attendances is as alarming as the financial problems, as well as being a contributory factor. According to Jacek Sieradzki, Polish theatre critic: "The myth of the big cultivated audiences in our countries, was one of the most successful achievements of communist propaganda. They pulled it off by keeping theatre tickets [...] low – and, of course, by packing the house with groups from factories and schools".¹

5.2.40 At the same time, the impact of globalisation has made itself felt in central and eastern Europe and imports of cultural goods of all kinds from the west have risen. A small, but telling, indicator comes from Timisoara in Romania, where, apparently, the average consumption of Coca-Cola is higher than anywhere else in Europe – nearly 200 bottles of Coke a year for every inhabitant.² Imre Borbely, a local member of parliament, commented: "This is not the democracy we fought for. This is mass western culture that washes away all the region's character."

5.2.41 To choose another instance, cinema-going in Estonia, as elsewhere, has fallen sharply, but the previous dominance of the screens by Soviet product has been replaced by Hollywood movies which take up 93% of all imported films. For both artists and rulers, who sought freedom on a nationalist platform, the irony is bitter. An Estonian commentator writes of the incompatibility of tradition and the free market: "In most political dinner-table speeches one tries to unite both [extremes], at first singing praise to the free market without any restrictions, and capitalist competition, and then shedding a few tears about the disappearance of the feeling of national unity, strong family ties and the emergence of a moral crisis. Unfortunately social scientists find connections between these two phenomena."³ The desire to preserve traditional values, sometimes in the form of a kind of national mysticism, is powerful in countries such as Latvia, where the overthrow of Russian rule is nicknamed the "Singing Revolution" because demonstrating crowds chanted folk songs. However, it is not clear that traditionalism is any longer a viable political and cultural option. As one Latvian cultural expert observed at a recent conference on culture and development: "By idealising it, we are living our past again. It is to be hoped we will soon get over it and look to the future."⁴

5.2.42 The invasion of western culture represents a very considerable challenge to societies in flux and without the public resources for the time being to mount a convincing response. It feeds the revival of irredentist nationalism

1. Quoted in Sullivan, Scott, "Artistic freedom", *Newsweek*, USA, 3 April 1995.

2. "Romania tastes the American dream", the *European* newspaper, 31 August-6 September 1995, London.

3. *Cultural policy in Estonia*. National report, European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 1997.

4. Via Virtmane at the international conference on "Culture and development in the countries in transition" (Moscow, 19-20 June 1995), *op. cit.*

and in the long term could threaten the cause of European integration and co-operation.

5.2.43 *Cross-border traffic.* Nationality, territory and language may define the arts, but it has rarely been able to confine them. Intellectually speaking, most artists dispensed with continental frontiers long ago. Germany, once its rich musical, operatic and theatrical infrastructure had been rebuilt, proved a magnet for talented young performers unable to find work experience in their own countries. London nurtured disaffected theatre practitioners in the 1960s, who were a catalyst for a new radical theatre and a surge of theatre writing, while more seasoned theatre directors – among them, Peter Brook, Giorgio Strehler and Lluís Pasqual – found the embrace of a cosmopolitan and well-funded Paris hard to resist in subsequent years.

5.2.44 Today, the arts continue to be enriched by international contacts. However, as we have seen, the scope and pace with which global media developments are taking place and the implementation of world-wide marketing strategies, have added a new dimension to the internationalisation of the arts. These developments pose a challenge to the policies of European countries, especially the smaller ones, which (as we have seen) face being overwhelmed by industries that have the power to disseminate cultural messages on a vast scale and threaten to erode the distinctiveness of national and regional identities.

5.2.45 Perhaps in reaction, a new fascination with the local and with “difference” has emerged. It is complemented by a trend known as “glocalisation”. This is less a reaction against globalisation than a realisation by the multinational companies and other major international players that strategies for a global market must at one and the same time be international and local. This point is also well understood by European institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union, which balance the principle of harmonisation across the continent with subsidiarity and the encouragement of local and regional networking.

5.2.46 In this new climate, the dynamics of international cultural co-operation are undergoing fundamental change. From being government-sponsored and controlled from above, exchanges are becoming more and more direct or horizontal – artist to artist, producer to producer, arts organisation to arts organisation and city to city. There has been a shift, especially in theatre and dance, from ready-made product to joint explorations, experimentation and co-productions. Until the late 1980s, drama, dance and opera productions were rarely conceived in international terms and as a result such collaboration as did exist was often beset by practical problems.

5.2.47 Today, cross-frontier traffic in the arts in Europe has been transformed and the reasons for this are not hard to find. Co-productions and joint exhibitions facilitate cost-sharing and transnational touring enables companies to achieve economies of scale and to penetrate new markets. Partnerships stimulate the mutual exchange of ideas and comparison of practice, and so create subtle impulses for artistic development. The exposure of artists to

new audiences and critics contributes to their professional development and enriches the enjoyment of audiences, as well as adding the programme variety at venues and festivals. The increased mobility of performers has resulted in a mushrooming of training and research opportunities through workshops and masterclasses.

5.2.48 Unsurprisingly, a range of Europe-wide networks has come into being to facilitate the exchange of information, people and artistic product. At present, depending on definitions used, there are upwards of 100 active transnational European networks in the arts and heritage field and the number is likely to grow. According to a recent survey, "there are networks of textile artists, of cultural centres in historic monuments, of jazz programmers, of multidisciplinary centres in old industrial sites, of residential centres for artists, of poetry translation centres, of performing arts professionals, of cultural management training centres, of asylum cities which offer refuge to persecuted writers and artists and many, many more."¹

5.2.49 These constructive developments are not taking place uniformly across the continent and this may bring into being a cultural version of the "two-speed" Europe which some predict in the monetary field. It may be resisted by the further encouragement of Europe-wide networks of arts practitioners and promoters which can disseminate the advantages of good practice, including schemes that facilitate job "shadowing" such as Seeding a Network, which enables theatre practitioners from eastern and central Europe to gain direct experience of the work of their counterparts in the UK. Unfortunately, networks are prone to financial insecurity and, unless they can be properly resourced, they risk either becoming electronic databases because their members cannot afford to meet, or "elite clubs" of those who can.² Indeed there is ample evidence to suggest this is already happening.

5.2.50 The shift of emphasis towards a freer networking by individuals and groups has not yet been fully recognised by governments, whose international strategies were designed for a different time and different geo-political realities. Their approach, whether driven by foreign ministries or mediated through cultural institutes, generally remains inextricably linked to the requirements of diplomacy, is essentially concerned with the presentation abroad of positive images of a nation state and is the servant of political priorities. It is true that in recent years some international cultural agencies (for example, the Goethe Institute and the British Council) have directed their efforts more precisely at "cultural relations", which are intended to promote understanding and co-operation rather than to win a one-sided advantage and so are more neutral in their impact. This is an important distinction, but it remains difficult to disentangle policies for international co-operation from ambitions to enhance a country's influence in the world or its trading potential. Moreover, the 1990s have seen budgetary cutbacks in the work of many cultural institutes and the emergence of new political imperatives. If real

1. Staines, Judith, *Working groups, network solutions for cultural co-operation in Europe*. European Forum for the Arts and Heritage. Brussels, 1996.

2. Ibid.

mobility of arts practitioners is to be achieved, it is time for governments to re-examine their international cultural policies, so that they encourage and support unofficial and independent exchanges which more adequately reflect contemporary arts practice and the new political environment in Europe.

5.2.51 Programme policies at supranational and intergovernmental levels have singularly failed to meet the new demand for cultural interaction. Their impact has been weakened by a concentration on one-off project grants as distinct from the provision of multi-year funding that would facilitate the development of more permanent cultural partnerships. Arguably, the European Commission's relative lack of response so far to Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty is not just a missed opportunity to "contribute to the flowering of cultures of member states", but also marks a failure on the part of the Council of Ministers to understand that marginal resources will only produce marginal outcomes. For its part, the Council of Europe, through its Council for Cultural Co-operation, has been a valuable reference point for the exchange of information and policy ideas, but while the exponential growth of its membership since 1989 has been universally welcomed, its already fragile budget has not been correspondingly raised.

5.2.52 *The Mediterranean rim: a new cultural dynamic.* A new and significant space for cultural co-operation is emerging as a result of recent Euro-Mediterranean agreements at a supranational and intergovernmental level. The southern rim of the Mediterranean is regarded by many Europeans as a source of unresolved problems, of arrested development, uncontrolled migration and fundamentalism. Yet the Mediterranean rim is being revealed as a rich, and until recently, untapped resource for European co-operation. This process is being led by a new approach to cultural relations and networking.

5.2.53 The framework for Euro-Mediterranean co-operation was established by European Union programmes such as Med-urbs (which promotes collaboration between local authorities in Mediterranean rim countries through economic development, social stability, management of the environment and quality of life), Med-media (which supports networking and projects between media professionals and public and private media institutions) and Med-campus in the field of university exchange. The cultural dimension was strengthened when Ministers for Culture from more than twenty countries met in Bologna in April 1996, to translate partnerships into action on cultural heritage, including the exchange of experience, skills training and promotion of heritage. This has since been transformed into a pilot European Commission support programme.

5.2.54 Literature has also been a focus for co-operation, with such initiatives as the *Mémoires de la Méditerranée* to encourage the translation of contemporary Arabic writers into European languages, the work of the Toledo School of Translators and the creation of a Mediterranean Booksellers Network with the support of the Fondation Seydoux pour la Méditerranée and the European Cultural Foundation. The *Mare Nostrum* is not only the home of the great originators of European civilisation, but in today's world is a meet-

ing point for three continents all in the throes of change – Africa, Asia and Europe. The countries on the Mediterranean's northern shores have a leading role to play not only within their own continent but on the international stage.

5.3 The renaissance of regions and cities

5.3.1 *Culture and regional aspirations.* As the world becomes more homogenous, it is natural to try to differentiate one's own experiences from those of others. This motive may have prompted the unfolding of regionalism in the 1970s and 1980s (for example in Flanders, the French regions, Lombardy, Scotland and Wallonia), but there are other powerful economic and political explanations for the phenomenon. Economies of scale are making way for what one might call economies of scope – where size is not the prime organisational criterion so much as an ability to select partners for strategic alliances. This is why both commercial companies and governments are opting for structures in which small, strong units operate flexibly inside a large overall organisation and/or outside it as sub-contractors. Denis de Rougemont predicted this development in his *Open letter to Europeans*: "In the Europe of tomorrow [...] the regions will very quickly form, organise and assert themselves. And, since they will be young and flexible, full of vitality and open to the world, they will enter into exchange relationships as frequently and extensively as possible. They will tend to group together according to their affinities and complementarities, and according to the new realities which have formed them [...] It is on the regions that we shall build Europe [...] The policy of European union must now be to efface our divisions and give free play to our diversities."¹

5.3.2 Regions – at least those comparable in size and development with small and medium-sized nations – are showing themselves to be adept at operating in the new global economy, especially through the medium of partnership with other regions. Their sense of identity can rest on a shared heritage or history, a particular natural environment, or a major economic enterprise. Michel Bassand points out: "There is no incompatibility between regional identity and awareness of the world – on the contrary greater open-mindedness means that regional identity must be strong and shared. A region will be more of a dynamic and authentic partner of the other regions of Europe and the rest of the world if its identity is living."² If it can muster a consensus among its various constituencies – politicians, trade unionists, industrialists, banks, intellectuals and the media – it is in a position to assemble enough power to make them effective players on the European scene. The shift of power from nation states to supranational bodies, such as the European Union, has coincided with devolution to regions and localities; regions have the advantage of being comparatively new and so less encumbered with responsibilities and bureaucracies than local authorities and inherently more flexible in their approach.

1. de Rougemont, Denis, *Lettre ouverte aux Européens*. A. Michel. Paris, 1970.

2. Bassand, Michel, *Culture and regions of Europe*. Council of Europe Press. Strasbourg, 1993.

5.3.3 The main European regions are often a mixed bunch of territories ranging from “national” communities with considerable internal ethnic and cultural cohesion (for example Lombardy and Catalonia) to zones of administrative convenience. In the former case, they are sometimes over-preoccupied with a nostalgia for past glories. Nevertheless many regions are proving to be the fulcrum of some of the most imaginative socio-economic ideas to have emerged in recent times.

5.3.4 It is difficult to establish a definitive count of the number of European regions. The Assembly of European Regions is an independent association of 269 member regions (1994), mostly drawn from western Europe. The Council of European Municipalities and Regions is made up of national federations of local, provincial and regional authorities and has a membership of some 100 000. The forty member states of the Council of Europe send local and regional representatives to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe which has important consultative powers. Since 1994 the Committee of the Regions (COR), a statutory body of the European Union, also plays a consultative role. At present the COR is responsible to the Social and Economic Committee, but it is expected that when the Maastricht Treaty is revised the COR will become a free-standing Community institution.

5.3.5 In terms of expenditure and resources, European regions are as various as their demographic profiles and political status. However, where they have political and executive powers, they usually show higher rates of spending than nation states (although somewhat lower ones than local authorities). They tend to be areas where economic development and cultural development are correlated and sustainable development is a characteristic of regional dynamics. They often have a large urban centre at their heart and are a cultural counterweight to a powerful metropolis.

5.3.6 Decentralisation has stimulated much potential for synergy between culture and the arts and the needs of regional and/or local government. Regional heritage policies have a high profile in historic territories with their own unique characteristics – for example, in architecture, food and landscape. Regions and large regional urban centres are well suited to effective cultural distribution both from the point of view of touring events and audience travel times. Newspapers and television and radio stations often have regional catchments and populations are large enough to justify substantial financial investment and the full range of marketing opportunities. Arts associations of various kinds increasingly look beyond cities and towns to regional aggregates.

5.3.7 Regions of an average or slightly above average size (and major cities) are able to offer a full range of university education, including education in the arts and arts training. Library networks are large enough to justify the expense of sophisticated central service and planning units. The wealthier the economy, the smaller is the viable catchment area: in the Nordic countries, for example, well-resourced library systems are managed by the municipalities.

5.3.8 Inter-regional, and indeed inter-urban, co-operation is a growing force in Europe. The Council of Europe has had an enthusiastic response to its scheme to encourage this kind of collaboration. Regions which cross national frontiers have begun putting forward common programmes and regions of all kinds are working with partners across Europe and further afield. Cities are also networking across the continent, entering into twinning arrangements and through consultative fora are building a stock of shared experience. Unfortunately little systematic data has been gathered to measure these developments.

5.3.9 *Can cities be renewed without culture?* Another way of looking at Europe is as a network of cities. Cities have long been centres for all the talents and promoted cultural opportunities and freedom. In many European countries (for example, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), they spend far more on culture than regions, especially those which do not have authentic ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities that mark them out as distinct from their neighbours. Great conurbations such as Lyon, Birmingham or Frankfurt, are as wealthy and populous as small states and boast substantial cultural programmes; Moscow has a larger cultural budget than the Ministry of Culture for the Russian Federation. But even market towns and medium-sized cities are proud of their local traditions and appear happy to invest in culture and the arts.

5.3.10 The city has been one of the beneficiaries of the weakening of the nation state as a unit for social and political integration.¹ The roots of medieval urban autonomy and of the city state as a base for a “republic” have been revived and have inspired contemporary urban strategies. The search for civic identity has become all the more urgent in the light of the many factors that tend to segmentation and alienation, including social mobility and migration, a wider range of consumer goods leading to multiple niche markets, the arrival of a global culture, deregulation of housing and the real estate market and cutbacks in welfare provision. The suburbanisation and modernisation of cities in the 1950s and 1960s led to the decline of their centres: historical sites were torn down to make room for an urban landscape, dominated by the car, large office spaces, mass-oriented shopping malls and high modernist architecture which celebrated “instrumentality rather than aesthetic distraction or spatial security”.²

5.3.11 In many European cities, the gap between the poor and the rich has been widening. Absolute poverty still exists, even in corners of the richest societies, but, defined in relative terms, it is widespread, creating an under-class of *exclus* – people who watch affluence and the political process from a disempowering distance. In many western countries, the middle classes are leaving city centres or outlying suburbs with poor quality housing for residential neighbourhoods, and the retail trades are following suit.

1. This section is indebted to Corijn, Eric, and Mommaas, Hans, “Urban cultural policies in Europe”, a background paper commissioned by the European Task Force. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

2. Ibid.

5.3.12 Urban planners are emerging from a long period of post-war, modernist reconstruction (whether market-oriented or driven by western social democrats or eastern command socialists). Conservation of heritage and the environment have become live issues. However, few know how to address the management of cities in ways that will moderate adverse social trends and civilise market distortions. In many megalopolises, inadequate public transport and the tyranny of the car have created as yet unsolved problems. The well-meaning but misplaced policies of the 1950s and 1960s have resulted in a built environment which is not conducive to social or cultural interaction. They have all too often destroyed old communities and replaced them with soulless public housing which have become zones of deprivation and disorder.

5.3.13 Inner cities or certain suburbs have become breeding grounds of crime, drug problems and social unrest. Some local authorities are beginning to apply cultural policies as one response to the traumatic transition from industrial to post-industrial societies. Such policies are seen to have a contribution to make to the provision of a secure environment for citizens and to the reduction of street crime among young people. In that case, there is a good argument for non-cultural, domestic security budgets to contribute to support for the arts. An innovative example of this approach was the decision by the probation department of Birmingham City Council to fund an arts centre, the Cave, to cater for disenfranchised and sometimes criminal young black people.

5.3.14 Municipal authorities have recognised the role culture plays in economic revitalisation, in addressing today's multi-ethnic, multicultural realities, in the contribution it can make to social integration and emancipation and in the reassertion of the city centre as forum of public social life. At the local level it is acknowledged that culture can play a role in job creation. Although arts advocates have on occasion exaggerated this effect, there is clearly potential to be realised provided that there is effective co-operation between cultural and employment departments at every tier of government. These ideas went hand in hand with a recognition that cultural policy entailed supporting more than the "high" arts and local government began to interest itself in popular and youth cultures and in the cultural industries. This trend was heralded by the now abolished Greater London Council between 1981 and 1986.

5.3.15 In addition to its contribution to community life and the solution of social problems, culture is increasingly seen as an instrument to transform a city's image (for example development of flagship projects such as the Antigone district in Montpellier, and Centenary Square in Birmingham) or to regenerate inner city areas by creating new 'cultural' quarters, such as Frankfurt's new museums area, Sheffield's cultural industries quarter or Dublin's artists' quarter at Templebar, or to restore life and confidence to city centres at night, as in the *Estate Romana* (Roman Summer) festivities between 1976 and 1985. Traditional businesses (bookshops, record shops, independent cinemas, etc.) can be preserved and up-dated and new ones can be created (recording studios, crafts and design workshops, multimedia companies, etc.), so creating employment for cultural workers. The cultural industries are

important generators of employment and, in recent years, the number of small and often under-capitalised enterprises (SMEs), both creative and technological, has mushroomed, especially in the audiovisual and music industries. The growth of “cultural quarters” in cities has been noted by the Council of Europe’s Culture and Neighbourhoods project.

5.3.16 Experience of best practice suggests that there could be a role for local and regional authorities, within a national framework, to establish development strategies for cultural industries that build alliances between business and culture to their mutual benefit. These strategies would promote productive relationships between the cultural and corporate sectors and the cross-fertilisation of skills and resources, in particular the strengthening of business acumen, the promotion of export marketing opportunities and integrating the arts and cultural industries more closely with trade and business development. Practical measures could be adopted, such as the use for cultural purposes of redundant or empty premises. It is especially important to preserve and transform traditional businesses (bookshops, record shops, independent cinemas, etc.) whose disappearance impoverishes cities, as well as stimulating the development of new ones (for example recording studios, crafts and design workshops, multi-media, etc.), which create employment for young cultural workers.

5.3.17 A vibrant cultural life has become an accepted signal to indicate other creative potential (for example in technology or social innovation). It received a symbolic *imprimatur* when the European Union established its series of European Cities of Culture from 1985. Their political importance now is evident from the extent to which cities compete for the title. The former Arts Council of Great Britain launched a national scheme to nominate annually a city or region of culture in the United Kingdom, specialising in a different art form (for example Birmingham City of Music in 1992, East Midlands Region of Dance 1993, Manchester City of Drama 1995) to run until the millennium, which has not only encouraged significantly increased local spending on the arts, both by public authorities and the private sector, but has had some success in identifying and publicising examples of good policy practice and, in particular, the establishment of integrated strategies. This may provide a useful model for other governments which wish to encourage decentralised cultural development and raise awareness of culture.

5.3.18 An important feature of cultural policy is the changing relation between culture and the market. The market was once thought to disrupt the free development of the aesthetic process, but contemporary urban strategies have blurred the boundaries between the logic of artistic representation and the imperatives of competitive production. From one point of view this is likely to stimulate cultural innovation by encouraging a continuous search for new audiences. This will not necessarily mean mass audiences, for, given the increase in cultural opportunities, the cultural market embraces a multiplicity of niche markets, serving an ever-widening variety of audiences.

5.3.19 In many ways local government has been more imaginative and innovative in the cultural field than national ministries and arts councils; cities

have scored some resounding successes. Large sums of money have been invested. Commerce and industry have played a part too in partnership with the public sector; the system of “planning gain” in the United Kingdom, through which commercial land and property developers are given planning permission on condition that they also finance a desirable public cultural or community project, either as part of their development or elsewhere in the locality, has produced useful results despite pressure by developers to abandon it. Public authorities elsewhere might wish to consider adopting a similar approach.

5.3.20 However, some observers look at all these developments dismissively. Instead of a move towards diversity and creativity, they see cultural uniformity and the victory of the commonplace. Too often they find urban public space dominated by the banalities of high-profile global architecture. For them the rise of “international modernism” (that is, the increasing interdependence of urban cultures and transnational economies), prestigious architectural projects, festival agendas and other features of cultural regeneration have meant that megalopolises have begun to resemble one another more and more closely.

5.3.21 Culture-led revitalisation strategies have, indeed, often focused on civic image-building and inter-urban competition at the expense of support for local cultural infrastructures and resources. Cities are competing in the international beauty parade in the hope that they can attract industry and investment from large or multinational companies. They have offered an invitation to consume, either in terms of the actual purchase of products or of the enjoyment of vistas and spectacles. While there is no doubt that such strategies have attracted new consumer groups and stimulated inner-city “sociability”, they run the risk of overlooking the indigenous cultural production and training infrastructure, and of fragmenting local social and political cohesion.

5.3.22 Four issues arise from an internationally competitive, image-based approach to urban renewal. There is the risk of widening the gap between glamorous city centres and marginalised urban minorities. Cities become increasingly dependent on imported culture, weakening the local creative base. They are then in danger of losing local, social and political support. Finally, high-profile inner-city cultural “packages” are often unrelated to the rest of the urban fabric.

5.3.23 While cultural quarters are economically valuable and add to a city’s public liveliness, they can lead to gentrification, displace local residents and facilities and set off sharp rises in land values, rents and local costs of living that drive out artists and artists’ studios and workshops. These consequences often follow the physical reconstruction of parts of a city (for example the Frankfurt Museums Quarter, the Centre Pompidou and the Opéra Bastille in Paris). Meanwhile, other districts witness a concentration of multiple deprivation (for example unemployment, poverty, social stress, low education levels, poor health, a bleak external environment, lack of facilities and social isolation). Restoring public life in these neighbourhoods cannot be achieved through city centre-oriented cultural policies. Successful strategies for city

centres (for example Glasgow and Antwerp) did not solve the problems of the urban periphery. By contrast, the examples of Hamburg, which established a system of neighbourhood cultural centres used by about half a million people a year, and Bologna, whose Youth Programme, launched in 1981, re-equipped and renovated the city's neighbourhood youth centres and stimulated thriving enterprises in electronic music, video, computer graphics and other cultural activities, demonstrate convincingly that alternative cultural policies can be highly successful.¹

5.3.24 It is clear that a monocultural approach to urban planning is inadequate to the kaleidoscopic and often conflictual nature of today's city. Integrated strategies are called for which balance neighbourhood and city centre needs and are based not on a fixed identity to be reproduced through traditional practices, but on difference and change. They should aim at developing an image of the cultural identity of a city with which different communities can identify from the different perspectives. Local production of culture is an important priority as is an openness to world cultures (bearing in mind that some non-European communities do not find their social or cultural "elites" locally but on other continents). As Corijn and Mommaas observe: "The idea of an urban forum, a platform for cultural interaction, an open-ended cultural policy, is better adapted to reality than the defence of one cultural form against another. This requires great tolerance, especially by the dominant groups, ... and a great emphasis on the importance of multicultural education."²

5.3.25 A further weakness of some civic developments in the past has been an unwillingness to put confidence in artists themselves. In fact, painters and sculptors have often been found to have a useful contribution to make throughout the planning process when their work is fully incorporated in new developments rather than (as is sometimes the case) installed as an afterthought. The case for the arts, media and heritage to be included as essential elements in programmes of town planning, transport, the environment and economic, social and tourism development is a strong one, as is the desirability of involving artists in decision-making at the earliest possible stage. This cultural planning approach would mean that, when urban development strategies were being formulated, a cultural perspective would be at the heart, rather than a peripheral consideration.

5.3.26 Contemporary issues demand creative solutions and a recognition that there is a coalition of concerns. As Franco Bianchini argues, hitherto "planners and policy makers have regarded culture simply as a resource to be exploited, rather than a critical and creative force that questions established ways of thinking and working and [which] could inspire a fresh approach to urban planning and policy."³ A "culture of creativity" needs to be injected

1. For a fuller discussion, see *Culture and neighbourhoods, Volume 1, Concepts and references*. Council of Europe Publishing. Strasbourg, 1995.

2. Corijn, Eric, and Mommaas, Hans, "Urban cultural policies in Europe", a background paper commissioned by the European Task Force. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

3. Bianchini, Franco, "Towards the creative city", in *International Arts Manager* magazine. London, April 1996.

into policy-making at city level which facilitates co-operation between artists and architects, planners and the public, for without a cultural dimension can a city be revitalised?

5.3.27 *Crisis in the countryside.* While many cities are undergoing revival, the old patterns of life in the countryside have long been in decline. Farming has been industrialised with a huge loss of jobs and sometimes environmental despoliation. Intensive forestry has irreversibly changed the landscape. Urban middle classes, commuting to their neighbouring towns and cities, have settled there in growing numbers and, to reverse the Latin tag, have created *urbs in rure*. In the countryside traditions die hard and there is a sharp contradiction between centuries old habits of mind and the intrusions of modernity. However, many villages have lost much of their traditional sense of community and in some parts of western Europe rural culture has all but disappeared and in much of central and eastern Europe totally collapsed. Cultural centres previously maintained by collective farms and food processing industries have been closed down and daily life has become almost intolerable.

5.3.28 Agriculture has become a major policy area both at national and international level (arousing strong passions among French farmers and others during the GATT negotiations). However, it has been considered mainly from the perspective of economic and trade interests. Changes in food production methods are leading to a decline in the numbers who earn a living from rural occupations. One unpredicted consequence of the information revolution is the repopulation of the countryside with small service businesses. It is gradually being recognised that farming policy also has to address the larger issue of maintaining a viable rural social environment and related traditions.

5.3.29 This was recognised by Unesco when it devoted a year of its World Decade for Cultural Development to culture and agriculture. The Council of Europe's Rural Habitat Cultural Routes programme is based on the recognition that "cultural heritage does not consist solely of castles and churches. It also encompasses farms and simpler dwellings, as well as everyday objects which reflect local history and bear witness to developments shaped by the way people actually live. Such initiatives can help inculcate respect for the richness of the rural environment and an appreciation of the commonplace. Moreover, affirming a rural, distinct and varied cultural identity, when this involves protecting and preserving that culture's special features and bringing in new patterns of "green" tourism, contributes to social and economic stability."¹ Sculptors can help to crystallise sensitivities about the rural landscape and liberate the imagination through sculpture parks, forest trails and crafts

1. *Cultural routes – Rural habitat*, a brochure published by the Council of Europe Cultural Routes, Strasbourg. What action should be taken to face this challenge has been suggested by the Council of Europe's Steering Committee for the Conservation and Management of the Environment and Natural Habitats. See also Giorgis, Sébastien, *Rural landscapes in Europe: principles for creation and management*, Steering Committee for the Conservation and Management of the Environment and Natural Habitats, Planning and Management Series, No. 3. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1995.

workshops. In sum, there appears to be a need for a general agricultural reform, from the perspective of rural cultural development and not simply of the economics of farming.

5.3.30 Defining the sustainable development of the countryside implies a comprehensive, concerted and coherent approach to ecological, cultural as well as economic needs, as Sebastian Giorgis indicates.¹ The convergence of interests between environmental, heritage and cultural policies ought to be recognised; as things stand, these areas are addressed separately with the result that priorities sometimes conflict with one another (for example tourism with lifestyles and recreation with farming) and the opportunity for comprehensive and overall development is missed. Similarly, artists and craftspeople could be encouraged to live and work in the countryside. Regional crafts development and marketing and arts elements in rural enhancement are increasingly recognised as employment and training projects qualifying for support under the European Commission's Structural Funds programmes for Objective 5b regions, though more could be done to promote this. In addition, new technologies could enhance cultural provision in the countryside if schools, libraries, churches and other local agencies were linked to larger electronic networks.

5.3.31 *Tourism: a two-edged sword.* Tourism is a key aspect of most plans to regenerate regions, cities and the countryside, although it can be a two-edged sword: it creates jobs, but it can also degrade the heritage and the environment in the process. The urge to travel, whether for education, adventure, rest or recuperation, is deeply rooted in the human psyche. Nevertheless, for hundreds of years travel for pleasure or enlightenment was primarily restricted to those of higher income or education. The twentieth century in general and its second half in particular, with the advent of the jet engine and package holidays, has brought tourism within the reach of all but the poorest members of society. As Angus Stirling, formerly Director of the United Kingdom's National Trust, has observed, travel has come to be regarded "as one of the fundamental rights, a touchstone of a free society, just as to be forbidden to travel is a hallmark of living under a tyranny."² Tourism is a massive and growing industry, being the world's leading economic contributor, producing 10.2% of the world's gross "national" product, employing 204 million people and paying US\$ 665 thousand million in tax revenues.

5.3.32 The European share of this colossal market is significant; at present tourism is more of a western European phenomenon, but the growth of interest in eastern Europe as a tourist destination is likely to continue, bringing much needed hard currency to those countries. Tourism accounted for 5.5% of Gross Domestic Product in the European Union alone, 8% of private consumer spending, 4.5% of total foreign currency earnings and 4% of foreign

1. Ibid.

2. Stirling, Angus, quoted in "Today's arts, tomorrow's tourists", report of a seminar on arts and tourism, organised by the Arts Council of Great Britain in association with the Museums and Galleries Commission (Birmingham 1991). Arts Council of Great Britain. London, 1991.

currency outgoings.¹ In the early 1990s, about 250 million tourists were visiting Europe, compared with 25 million in 1950.² Projections suggest this will rise to 476 million people annually by 2010.³ An OECD study reports that Europe attracts more international tourism than any other continent, valued at about US\$ 100 thousand million. However, the latest World Tourism Organisation figures suggest that as the numbers of tourists increase worldwide, Europe's share of the market will decline.⁴ The tourism industry employs close to 9 million people in Europe – approximately 6% of the European Union's job market before the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.⁵ In Spain, it represents 9.3% of total employment, in Portugal 8.6%, in Greece 7.2%, in France 6.9% and in Ireland 6.3%. As an economic and cultural sector, tourism has “an increasingly important role in the post-industrial scenery of tertiary sector growth”⁶.

5.3.33 With an ageing population and more young people without families, it is possible that mass tourism within Europe will continue to increase in the coming years, perhaps with a greater emphasis on cultural tourism, but in the process putting huge pressures on the most popular heritage sites. The decision facing policy makers is how to limit the negative consequences of a pursuit which may play a major part not only in breaking down East-West barriers, but also in assisting economic reconstruction.

5.3.34 According to World Tourism Organisation Statistics, 53% of tourists now opt for cultural destinations. In many respects this is an admirable development which enriches the lives of millions: many people are particularly open to new ideas and experiences when travelling on holiday and the proliferation of cultural festivals throughout the continent combine the pleasures of social exchange with aesthetic experience. Some countries run elaborate programmes, such as France's *Culture au soleil*. However, one of the consequences of mass tourism, especially in countries with an abundant heritage, is damage to local environments and to cultural heritage sites, inflation of land prices, high levels of consumption and waste and distortions of traditional lifestyles and cultural identity.

5.3.35 It is evident that the tourism juggernaut cannot, indeed, should not, be halted. This is not just for economic and commercial reasons, but also because it would infringe the individual's right to freedom of movement. Also, tourism confers many cultural benefits. But there are some useful measures that deserve consideration: first, planning authorities would be prudent to incorporate their tourism strategies into their cultural, environmental and her-

1. *Eurotourism: culture and the countryside*, DG XXIII Tourism Unit. European Commission. 1994.

2. Davidson, Rob, *Tourism in Europe*, Pitman/Technipus. London, 1992.

3. World Tourism Organisations figures quoted in “Tourism fights an identity crisis”, the *European newspaper*. London, 5-11 May 1995.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Tourism policy in the EU*, Background Report. European Commission. December 1994.

6. *The challenges facing European society with the approach of the year 2000 Strategies for sustainable quality tourism*. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1994.

itage policies so that an appropriate, interactive balance can be found between development and conservation. Secondly, there is a case for a hypothecated tax on commercial operators (for example travel agents, restaurants, transport operators and hotels), the proceeds of which would be devoted to cultural, environmental and heritage priorities. This combination of taxation and regulation would make it easier to prevent tourists from killing the thing they love.

5.3.36 *Devolving power – an insoluble contradiction?* The revival of regions and cities and the growing acceptance of the principle of subsidiarity is placing considerable strains on political structures. Who speaks for the people? There are conflicting claims. National governments, elected by universal suffrage usually on higher turnouts than in local polls, believe that they have the overriding mandate. They raise most if not all the taxes and where regions or cities do have tax-raising powers these are often circumscribed by the state. Above all, national governments pass laws.

5.3.37 By contrast, regional and local authorities, although they are also elective, are seldom legislative assemblies and many only exercise devolved executive powers, on a franchise from “above”. The position varies widely from country to country. In Germany the government is relatively “weak” and the *Länder* have a substantial degree of independence, reflecting their previous status before the unification of Germany in the nineteenth century. Since the death of Franco, Madrid has handed over many of its powers to autonomous regions, some of which have aspirations to national status (for example Catalonia and the Basque country). In the United Kingdom the main political parties accept the need for giving further powers (in varying degrees) to Scotland and Wales. Even France, with its tradition of rule from Paris has attempted an ambitious, if carefully controlled, programme of decentralisation.

5.3.38 The post-communist democracies in central and eastern Europe, in reaction to the old totalitarian centralism, are mostly formally committed to devolution. However, in practice the record has been patchy; lack of financial resources is one reason, but it may also be that bureaucracies, often still staffed by the officials who managed the *anciens régimes*, are putting a break on the process. Also politicians are coming to see, with the passage of time, the advantages of a degree of continuity with the rejected past.

5.3.39 Underneath this confused and uneasy scene lies something which looks very much like an insoluble contradiction. Everyone acknowledges the administrative and in some sense democratic benefits of decisions being taken as close as possible to those affected by them. There is little doubt too of the energy and popularity of the resurgent regions and cities and the disillusion that many people feel for the national political process. At the same time there are historic traditions and political realities which make it most unlikely that the day of the nation state is, or should be, over. It is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.

5.3.40 The trouble is that national, regional and local governments patrol the same territory and it has proved difficult in many cases to avoid an over-

lap of responsibilities and powers. However, they do not necessarily see eye to eye on policy. Thus, a national government of one political persuasion may adopt a very different cultural strategy from that of a major city administration governed by an opposition party or parties. Or, simply, the national interest may be perceived to conflict with the local interest.

5.3.41 There are a number of possible solutions to the conundrum. According to one line of thought, culture should be local and that responsibility for its management should be devolved. At most, national governments should restrict their competence to international cultural exchange, although some argue that even that is unnecessary. Regions and cities, they point out, have already established Europe-wide networks which are more effective than national cultural agreements and politically inspired exchanges.

5.3.42 A disadvantage with this approach is that, if access to culture is to be assured for all citizens, complete devolution will inevitably lead to varying levels of service throughout a country, an inequitable outcome. Furthermore, local cultures can be provincial and sometimes out of sympathy with new artistic developments. Those who take this view believe that cultural strategy is best established and funded centrally and that a national policy framework is necessary.

5.3.43 It has been suggested that it might be ill advised to be too tidy-minded. If all levels of government have cultural competence, there may be conflicts, overlaps and inefficiencies, but there can also be agreement and joint endeavour, if effective and systematic mechanisms for co-ordination are instituted. A problem in several countries is that cultural responsibilities are not clearly delineated between the various tiers of government. Universal standards of provision could be generally assured if all levels of government had legal obligations to support culture.

5.3.44 A riposte from the Nordic countries or the Netherlands might be that there are more synergies in planning for consensus than tolerating disagreement. National governments in the Nordic countries have learned to limit their responsibilities to designing and endorsing overall strategies, but after the most thorough consultation and debate. They now tend to steer clear of detailed interventions. At the same time other tiers of government and agencies have substantial freedom to develop and implement their own policies. The arrangement works because of the goodwill that flows from a careful distinction being drawn between overall strategy and day-to-day management and from the thorough implementation of the consultative principle.

5.3.45 This model would probably not be so successful in more fissile societies where culture is part of larger political programmes and conflicting nationalist agendas. In fact, there appears to be no one solution to the question of cultural devolution and each European country will have to work out its own approach according to its circumstances and prevailing political realities.

5.3.46 Experience in the Nordic countries suggests a number of broad principles which decision makers further afield might care to bear in mind. First, where there are overlapping competences, there is advantage in national governments restricting themselves to a high level strategic role. Secondly, national strategies should only be prepared after comprehensive discussion with regions and municipalities as well as the arts communities. Thirdly, nothing is more likely to give offence than when national governments transfer cultural responsibilities without the appropriate financial resources. Fourthly, and this is a more contentious point, a legal obligation on all tiers of government to support culture may appear to have its attractions, especially in those parts of Europe where lower tiers appear to be disengaging from cultural responsibilities. Nevertheless, rather than using coercion, it may be more appropriate for national or regional governments to be sufficiently convinced of the benefits of investing in culture that they will impart such convictions, with encouragement and incentives where necessary, to lower administrative tiers.

Summary

As an accumulation of knowledge and values, culture can help to unite Europe as well as maintain its diversity, but it also contributes to exclusive assertions of social, national and ethnic identities. The arrival of an all-encompassing, Americanised, global culture threatens local European cultures, although the danger can be exaggerated, and has made considerable incursions into central and eastern Europe. What passes for “American” is often multinational in any case. Nevertheless, there is a significant imbalance in audiovisual trade between Europe and the United States. The global domination of English ought not to be achieved at the expense of other European languages. All levels of government have come to acknowledge the economic significance of culture, but, making the most of a trend towards the devolution of national powers, regions and city authorities lead the way in exploiting this potential. In so doing, however, some of them have fallen into the trap of placing too little emphasis on culture as an instrument of empowering people and achieving social reconciliation. This is exemplified by the restoration of city centres at the expense of neighbourhoods and a ruthless encouragement of tourism to the point where it distorts local patterns of life and damages heritage. Changes in transnational cultural co-operation need to be addressed with new policies.

Points for consideration

Contribution to human knowledge and understanding

- i. The role of language policy needs to be fully recognised; pan-European organisations have initiated many programmes advocating the teaching of second languages, the promotion of translation and the enhancement of the status of minority languages. The outcomes of these programmes should be fully recognised in cultural policy and decision-making.

ii. Governments which have not already done so should seriously consider ratifying and enforcing the Council of Europe's Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

iii. The inherited languages of the European communities of non-European origin would be protected by the addition of a protocol to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

Economic and social outcomes

iv. In countries where there is no fixed price maintenance for books or where such agreements have been abandoned or VAT has been introduced, the position of small bookshops and publishers needs to be monitored to ensure there is no reduction of consumer choice in the long term.

v. Every encouragement should be given to central and eastern European governments to ensure that cultural budgets are maintained at a level that would allow them to mount a convincing response to the invasion of western culture through film, satellite television, books and music recordings.

vi. Local authorities should consider raising resources in new ways for cultural, environmental and heritage activities; for example, through hypothecated tourism taxes and "planning gain", through which property developers finance a public cultural building project in return for planning permission.

vii. Every encouragement should be given to local authorities to establish integrated cultural strategies, incorporating the arts and media, the environment, the heritage and tourism and linked to their programmes of economic, social and educational development. Care needs to be taken to ensure coherence and balance between national priorities and regional and local concerns. Municipalities should balance city centre and neighbourhood priorities with great care.

viii. Consideration should be given to a European pilot scheme involving "model" cities of culture which would test innovative and integrated policies and practices. At the same time, governments should consider adopting national schemes to raise the public profile of culture, such as nominating annual Cities or Regions of Culture.

ix. Public authorities should acknowledge the contribution the arts can make to a secure urban environment. They should monitor good practice and explore the feasibility of obtaining financial contributions for culture from domestic security budgets.

x. There is a role for local and regional authorities, within a national framework, to establish development strategies for cultural industries that

build alliances between business and culture for their mutual benefit. These strategies should promote productive relationships between the cultural and corporate sectors and the cross fertilisation of skills and resources, in particular the strengthening of business acumen, the promotion of export marketing opportunities and integrating the arts and cultural industries more closely with trade and business development. The conversion of redundant buildings as work space for artists, craftspeople, etc., and the development of cultural industries quarters to revitalise inner cities should be encouraged, but longer term effects on affordable living and working space for creators need to be monitored to ensure they are not disadvantaged.

xi. If overlaps and conflicting policies in the cultural field between national, regional and local governments are to be minimised, consideration should be given to restricting national responsibilities to high level strategy, to ensuring maximum consultation during the policy-making process and to avoiding decentralisation of responsibilities without adequate financial resources.

Harnessing human resources

xii. All joint European policy initiatives in the field of the European audiovisual industries should more fully reflect the need to implement extant measures and actions which seek to renew the existing pool of creative talent and to support more effectively – through finance and access to practical expertise – training, production and distribution in the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.

xiii. If real mobility of arts practitioners is to be achieved, governments need to re-examine their international cultural policies to relate them more closely to contemporary cultural practice in international co-operation between arts organisations – providing adequate support mechanisms, but not steering the process.

xiv. Supranational and intergovernmental agencies should re-orient their cultural exchange policies away from one-off projects towards schemes which promote the establishment of more permanent relations between arts organisations in Europe, co-operation via networks and work experience exchange.

xv. Sustainable rural development requires a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to environmental, cultural and economic needs. Artists and craftspeople should be encouraged to live and work in the countryside and the new technologies could be deployed through schools and libraries to enhance cultural provision to marginalised rural communities. Crafts development projects and arts in rural environments are legitimate areas for assistance under the European Commission's Structural Funds support for rural regions and need to be promoted as such.

6 The economics and management of the digital revolution

"CD-Rom and CD-i are mostly based on computer logic, which is a very rational process. For games or for educational and training purposes, it is perfect. It represents a real revolution – having access to the British Museum or the Louvre Collection is amazing and will change the way people have access to knowledge. But creativity usually doesn't follow the same logical path. Creativity is all about intuition and being irrational. So far I haven't seen anything that would allow people to get into a multimedia product in a totally irrational and non-logical way."

Jean-Michel Jarre ¹

"Marshall McLuhan prophesied the end of the Gutenberg galaxy of print-based culture in the technological global village. What seems more likely to be true is that the new technology culture simply embraces and digests the old – the artist or the book – and takes its own functioning place as one more mechanism in a world of ever-multiplying communications, in which the transmission of narratives has little to do with the continuity of cultural values, or the presentation of classics or canons, but is simply one more element in the world of competing hyper-realities."

Malcolm Bradbury ²

6.1 The "electric blanket"

6.1.1 The globalisation processes of the world economy escalated in the mid 1980s as a result of the radical structural changes of the previous decade. During the 1970s, European and Japanese firms began to mount an effective challenge to American global economic hegemony – a factor which contributed to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement. This was followed more recently by the rise of the South-east Asian economies, as sites of transnational production based on low labour costs and favourable investment conditions. At the same time, the Latin American and Caribbean region is undergoing rapid development with all the associated risks of heightened instability, while sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are experiencing a further disconnection of their economies from mainstream global economic activity. All these changes have in effect narrowed down the geog-

1. Jarre, Jean-Michel, quoted in Short, David, "Jarre breaks the spell", in the *European* newspaper. 20-26 January 1995.

2. Bradbury, Malcolm, "Let's do the Pomomo a-go-go". The *Guardian* newspaper. London, 9 December 1995.

raphy of the global economy, shifting it from a North-South to a much stronger East-West axis.

6.1.2 While world trade in the 1950s was still dominated by raw materials, primary goods and resource-based manufacturing, by the 1980s the balance had tilted towards trade in finance and specialised services. At the same time the well-documented growth of Foreign Direct Investments (with Europe being the largest recipient of FDI in services in the 1980s) and of transnational companies is also evidence of globalisation. At stake is the restructuring of the world economy from a predominantly multinational to a transnational geography, entailing the dispersal of various parts of the production process from developed to developing economies. Transnational "spaces" for economic activity have been formed, such as export processing zones and enterprise zones, off-shore banking centres and new global electronic financial markets. These developments have been made possible by new transport and communications technologies, and by relatively low energy costs (for example, oil prices). The need for international communication in real time and for massive data transfers has led to the evolution of a global information infrastructure, the development of which has become one of the fastest expanding sectors of the international economy. Routine jobs, in manufacturing as well as in services, are exported to low-wage peripheries, while high level professional and managerial jobs remain concentrated in knowledge- and infrastructure- intensive economic centres.

6.1.3 Something fundamental has changed in the relationship between economics and the nation state, to the disadvantage of the latter. Although particular aspects of economic activity are, by the nature of things, located in sovereign territories, national governments have lost the power they used to hold in the days of conventional international trade and play a minimal part in their management and control. The organisation of production has become less dependent on "fixed" natural resources and more on "soft" and "flexible" resources, such as a region's linkages with technological and transport infrastructures, the conditions of the labour market, available human skills and cultural orientations. A deconcentration of corporate power and capital has taken place, with the result that the economic geography of global production matches less and less closely the political geography of nation states. In this context, European economies have experienced an increase in intra- and extra-European competition, and a shift from manufacturing industries to the finance and services sectors; both these factors, in addition to their economic importance, have become "sensors" of a globalised world economy. Messages sent by the international financial markets shape the policies of national governments – and also the fates of their cabinets and leaders.

6.1.4 *The control of risk.* The market economy and industrial production have traditionally been based on uncertainty and the taking of calculated risks. Scientific and technological progress has followed similar principles, producing "developmental breaks" from time to time, ushering in new phases such as the "industrial revolution", "mature capitalism", the "post-industrial society" and the "information society". In the past, financial institutions and manufacturers coped with uncertainty by developing methods of acceptable

risk-taking. They engaged in an unremitting search for new production techniques and high-profit products, ever more flexible managerial methods and the diversification of business activities. Governments encouraged them along this road and did their best to maintain overall economic stability and national competitiveness.

6.1.5 It is tempting to be over-impressed by the triumphs of technology and to make exaggerated and ill-founded predictions of their future impact. Bernhard Serexhe, for instance, argues that the new technologies will not lead to more jobs, more democracy and more individual freedom, but to monopolisation, social segmentation and a standardisation of all cultures.¹ Nevertheless, the speed with which information, images and sounds are now transmitted around the world has permeated traditional political, economic and social structures and is transforming both the culture of business and the business of culture. Such is the complexity and pace of events and the scale of investment demanded from transnational corporations that it has become necessary to exercise a greater control over the management of risk than formerly.

6.1.6 One way of doing this has been by altering the relationship between science, technology and society in the sense that the business world no longer sees science and technology as a random, or at least unmanageable, sequence of scientific discoveries. Uncertainty has to be eliminated so far as possible and there are now systematic expectations of particular types of innovation, backed up by highly targeted investment and research efforts. These expectations rely on a circular dialogue between researchers who devise new products and those who use them: inventions are publicised in the mass media and the resulting consumer demand ricochets back to the technologists via corporate managers (or this is what is intended, for it is sometimes easier said than done to predict a completely new product's market potential: as a leading businessman in the field observed recently: "You have all of these organisations doing truly stupid things in anticipation of markets that don't currently exist").² Information and communications technology plays a special role in this process; along with space research and biotechnology, it is one of the key high-tech areas which are universally believed to guarantee economic and social development. It has given rise to the notion that information is a factor of production which can supplant energy and manpower.

6.1.7 Risk is also diminished through acquisitions and mergers, with mega-corporations moving themselves into positions where they control as many different facets of hardware, software and creative production as possible. This makes a good deal of sense if one looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the key players. For example, in the cultural industries, the telephone

1. Serexhe, Bernhard, in the summary of his paper "Globalisation. Deregulation. The loss of cultural diversity?" in *Arts and media: A new challenge for the artists in Europe*, European Council of Artists. Copenhagen, 1996.

2. See Scaife, John, "Vorsprung durch Technik – The relationship between technology and the arts", report on a conference on *The economy and the arts*. Dublin, December 1994.

companies and cable operators have deep pockets and good delivery systems, but little access to creative content; the content providers (for example, Hollywood) are well endowed with creative power, but are weaker when it comes to delivery. The multimedia/computer game producers possess abundant creativity, but offer little in the way of original content and have relatively limited financial resources.¹ It follows that synergy and, thence, profits are created by bringing these different wings of the communications industries into unified companies which have a foot in every camp.

6.1.8 New computer technology has made it cheaper to buy into many areas of the print media, and cable and satellite have opened broadcasting to increased competition. Another factor which has fuelled the momentum to ever larger conglomerates is technical “convergence” of computing, telecommunications and media into an emerging digital format. The difference between a news broadcast and an online service is soon going to be very difficult to define. National governments look askance at a growing concentration of ownership, but simply to resist it seems not to be a viable option considering the massive investments required, so massive that very few companies have the resources to afford them. Politicians face a dilemma; either they can let the market rule and so encourage international competitiveness at the cost of European diversity and national identities, or they can try to limit the size of media conglomerates (probably concentrating their attention on audience numbers or revenues rather than the number of channels or newspaper titles owned), but at the risk of accelerating American and Asian penetration of the European market. The way forward may be to establish a system of regulation which ensures a “level playing field” for European commercial competitors and transparency about who owns what, and which protects consumer interests, rather than to limit monopolies directly.

6.1.9 *The second information and media revolution.* While it had once been supposed that the industrialisation of information would simply result in incremental improvements of existing products, by the late 1980s a change in degree had become a change in kind. Technology began to focus on speed of transmission, multimedia outlets and interactivity; on the linking of computers, telecommunications through digitalisation and broadband transmission into global, integrated communications networks. The novel feature of these developments is that they have enabled interaction between one individual and another, allowing them to order or shape their information exactly as they please.

6.1.10 The development of network communications, as in the Internet, has freed information exchange from state supervision and enabled individuals to converse with each other on any topic unhindered. This may make life easier for criminals, pornographers and terrorists, but it also strikes a mighty blow for freedom from censorship and has an obvious potential for cultural and social participation. Governments are showing signs of growing nervousness about a communications system which they are unable to supervise and man-

1. See John Scaife, p. 105.

age. The advent of cheap encryption is preventing them from asserting effective control. CompuServe's decision in late 1995 to ban certain Internet newsgroups dealing with sexual subject matter at the behest of the Bavarian Government did not seriously prevent the technically adept from finding other routes to what they are looking for. Perhaps the only foolproof way of controlling the Internet is by shutting down the telephone lines required to transmit data, as AT & T did in Venezuela when that country failed to settle its account with the company. This is too drastic a step to be a practical course of action in most cases.

6.1.11 A glance at the history of the Internet, the single most remarkable feature of the information revolution, and its characteristics demonstrates its potential political, economic, social and cultural significance. Its development is now a familiar story. Devised for the Pentagon to protect military information exchange, the Internet first emerged from a decentralised, computer-mediated communications system to be the main means for inter-university communication. After the incorporation of the hypertext principle in Gopher and World Wide Web, it became a global communications vehicle which links millions of servers and sites and tens of millions of subscribers. Its management has remained non-hierarchical, but, as such, is falling prey to commercial communications, advertising and sales efforts. It is now recognised as the most comprehensive of reference systems and a source of information of all kinds and, for some, is the greatest hope for democratic, interactive communication. At the same time, the Internet has a number of weakness – in particular, the concentration of the most prolific sites in America (more than 40% of the most visited sites are in California) and the congestion of electronic traffic. Its future will depend on the speed with which new methods of data compression and network navigation are devised and adopted.

6.1.12 Technical advances are taking place on every front and business managers see the greatest potential in the following areas:

- Console video games, CD-Rom, multimedia PCs, CD-i and other variants of piecemeal multimedia already form a market sector of their own and are a training ground for those expecting the advent of a global information infrastructure; the software stock of multimedia discs is expanding, but still lacks an “exciting core of contents” with mass appeal;

- “Intelligent on-line nets” are well-established, but serve mainly as communications channels and providers of technical and commercial services;

- The application of Asynchronous Transfer Mode technology and other data compression and transfer devices needed for multimedia broadband communication are still mainly installed by commercial companies which are expanding the capacity of their own nets and getting them ready for the time when telecommunications carriers start to offer broadband services;

- Mobile computing, information processing, and network communications are expanding rapidly; this is based on a new generation of portable

PCs which can be linked to home base computer systems and nets with modems and fixed or wireless communications links;

– The applications of virtual reality technology are progressing, although as yet (outside industrial versions) they mainly seem to offer consumers solipsistic versions of home and arcade video game experiences.

6.1.13 In general, technological development is proceeding in a stop-go, evolutionary way, the reasons for which are related, as we have seen, to the complex dynamics which underpin supply, demand and audience development. At present the most productive mass market is thought to be some version of video-on-demand. The confidence of the network operators in the exploitation of video-on-demand is primarily due to the fact that the on-line market would simply replace an existing market for video rental. As they see it, the big advantage compared to regular broadcasting is the opportunity for users to determine what they want to see individually. In that case, the competition will be to control the wire carrying the service; or the technical standards of the systems involved; or the devices which encode or decode encrypted services; or the systems that manage payment.

6.1.14 In Europe the information revolution has taken a slower pace than in the United States. In the latter half of the 1980s, joint European efforts concentrated mainly on TV broadcasting and related programme production (including film). The aim was to create a genuine European market through regulation and the integration of technical systems. Time, energy and money were spent – not always productively – on the establishment of standards (for example, High Definition TV, transmission formatting, digital video broadcasting, encryption, etc.), the agreement of TV programme quotas (stipulating the proportion of “European” content and the place and time of TV commercials), setting up rules for transborder broadcasting, the creation and maintenance of support systems and the negotiation of coherent copyright and neighbouring rights arrangements.

6.1.15 The real significance of the information revolution only started to dawn on European decision-makers in the early 1990s. The planned deregulation of national telecommunications systems by the European Union deadline of January 1998 has stimulated competitive forces. Even if the contents of electronic information exchange is hard to control, a Europe-wide regulatory regime is required which will guarantee consumer choice and be based on fair and open pricing. There is also an opportunity here for the supranational and intergovernmental agencies to encourage the creation of a sufficient stock (“back catalogues”) of European audiovisual products and their distribution, both by traditional and new means, on the grounds that “once products can be easily accessible to consumers, there will be more opportunities for expression of the multiplicity of cultures and languages in which Europe abounds.”¹

1. “Europe and the global information society: Recommendations to the European Council”, a report by a group of prominent persons. Brussels, 26 May 1994.

6.1.16 As well as their economic impact, a number of significant social consequences flow from the advent of the new technologies. The global information superstructure can be compared to an electric blanket spread over the post-industrial world, fastened down by scientific and technological pegs on one side and economic and legal ones on the other. “Warmth” for users is the ease with which they can carry on their business both locally and globally. But the “blanket” metaphor suggests that sleepers enjoy more than warmth: they dream of other realities. The travelling bytes of the blanket carry all kinds of content – scientific knowledge and ideological utopias, news and gossip, educational material and entertainment, works of art and popular culture. To what extent does the information blanket define and delimit our dreams over and above the immediate purposes of its users? Is a new global individualism threatening cultural diversity and local, regional and national structures?

6.1.17 The most important question of all is whether a schism is being created between low income groups, exiled in the old TV-based entertainment system, and wealthier, “information-oriented” classes. There is certainly a risk of this, and public authorities – in partnership with the private sector where appropriate – should try to ensure through the education system and vocational training that the new technologies are genuinely available to all. They should not condone communications systems which lead to new forms of exclusion. Groups already suffering disadvantage in various ways, for example in eastern and central Europe, may find themselves left still further behind. Some sociologists have suggested that, in the emerging “semiotic society” there will only be two social classes – cognitive middle-class and the rest. The former will establish their identity and assess the significance of their lives through a continuous search for knowledge, while the latter will do so through submersion into imaginary collectives, mediated by the audiovisual media.

6.1.18 It is probably better to see this division as one of role rather than class, between which many people (except the poorest) will be able to alternate at will. Another way of looking at it is to borrow a concept from some audience analyses, which suggests that there are two kinds of interaction between a programme and its user – participative and contemplative. The former requires repetitive actions and derives its appeal from striking, technologically induced effects, while the latter is a creative interpretation of a fixed cultural product.

6.1.19 In any event, one thing is clear. There is little to support the cliché that the increase in the number of media channels and opportunities for people to shop, play, learn and communicate from their homes will automatically turn audiences into “couch potatoes” or that they will tend to standardise cultural attitudes. The strategy of video on demand may or may not turn out to be mistaken, but it depends on users making multiple choices and not on the concept of a homogenous mass audience. It will also be dependent on the perception that the home-centred communication and entertainment products offer some distinct advantages. Although the picture is still clouded and it is true that in some countries a multiplicity of channels offers little or

no programming variety, it is conceivable that the information revolution will gradually continue to diversify supply and that both the state and commercial interests will be compelled to move from mass to niche information provision and marketing. Obviously, this will have profound political and social consequences, for governments and manufacturers will no longer be able to persuade their publics to accept single messages. If this is what the future holds, it follows that from the point of view of individual choice, if not of the protection of national and community identities, fears about the impact of the concentration of media ownership may be exaggerated.

6.1.20 Networks of computers and databases are already in existence which allow access to public services (for example, libraries), the sale of products or services (for example, tele-shopping), electronic mail, banking services and so forth. Communicators have at least the illusion of operating in a kind of alternative dimension – cyberspace. It is easy to see the benefits which these applications bring: they include more effective distribution, a speeding-up of the translation of research into industrial production and computer-assisted design. It is even possible that they will enhance democracy (“electronic democracy”) and transform education methods. On the other hand, there are those outside the information and image industries who would argue that, in the event of their progressive monopolisation, the new technologies may also turn out to be an instrument for the worst of totalitarianisms – that of a “ ‘brave new world’ in which everyone will be content, well informed of all he or she should know in order to play a useful role, but ignorant of the rest, which need not be known, and amused permanently.”¹

6.1.21 There is more for governments, intergovernmental and supranational agencies to do than encourage and regulate the private sector. The new technologies already offer rich opportunities to enhance citizens’ lives. Recent research suggests that international regimes only protect freedom of expression in the technical sense of ensuring open channels of communication; little attention is paid to human and cultural rights, although journalistic freedom, intellectual property rights and the protection of privacy are explicitly recognised.

6.1.22 The new media have been experimentally deployed in some countries to enhance political communication between the governments and the governed. The dangers of rule by electronic referendum are well understood, but interactive, on-line acquisition of information has worked effectively at local and regional levels. Examples include Cleveland’s Freenet in the United States and, in Europe, Bologna’s CityCard system, which uses the Internet to give citizens free access to city officials. If such kinds of scheme are to be more widely adopted, there are some questions that need answering. First, which lanes of the superhighway can be allocated to political and public interaction? Secondly, will it be feasible to draw a distinction between administrative and political issues? And, thirdly, how can responsible communication practices at

1. Foresta, Don; Mergier, Alain; and Serexhe, Bernhard; *The new space of communication: the interface with culture and artistic creativity*. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

a supranational level be guaranteed? There are no quick solutions and careful research and discussion will be needed in the coming years.

6.1.23 At this stage, it is appropriate to insert a caveat. For the moment, what has been said fits more accurately the situation in western than in eastern and central Europe, whose societies are deregulated and to varying degrees market-led, but still too poor to create more than a rich information elite. As in the developing world, the first impact of the new technology may be divisive. Also, the pirating of cultural goods is widespread, as is the sale of countries' audiovisual heritage to foreign interests. Optimists may be right to argue that in the long run the new technology will "[...] promote equal opportunity to the citizens" of the new democracies and "diversity of contents, including cultural and linguistic diversity" – but, it seems, not yet.

6.2 Technology: the artist's new playground?

6.2.1 The arts derive much of their economic importance as material for the cultural industries – and in that sense are "risky" activities. It is hard to predict whether a film or a song will be a hit or a miss, although it is possible to monitor popular trends, styles or topics. Success, when it comes, can lead to large profits. After the unstable 1950s and 1960s, the cultural industries have gradually adopted the standards of risk reduction of other industries, experimenting systematically with new lines and formats, enhanced advertising and marketing and the creation of internal promotional product chains and multiple "windows" for popular products. Expansion has been guided by predictable technological development – first, television broadcasting, cable and satellite distribution, video, cheaper and cheaper generations of consumer entertainment equipment and, most recently, by the advent of the "information age".

6.2.2 The results have been the segmentation of audiences in broadcasting and music, and a retreat into reliably successful middle-of-the-road products. Technical progress has encouraged high production values and a taste for spectacular effects, for example, in stage musicals or the presentation of opera in sports stadiums. The need for very high levels of investment has fostered business integration with hardware manufacturers moving into programme production. This has added another twist to the spiralling costs of programme production.

6.2.3 Primary producers in the arts have found these changes hard to stomach, for they have less opportunity than they once had to experiment – and sometimes to fail. Audience demand for safe, "spectacular" and often international arts has risen, with little advantage flowing to national or experimental activity. At the same time (and surely not by coincidence), state cultural policies now require the subsidised arts to operate in a more commercial manner.

6.2.4 In the long history of the relationship between technology and the arts, more thought has been given to how artists can exploit technology than how they can influence it themselves. From time to time, since the emergence

of the Art and Technology Movement of the 1960s in the United States, artists, scientists and engineers have explored the synergies between their different cultures, although with few lasting results. However, an astute commentator has noted that the art/technology interaction has not all gone in one direction. "What is important from the cultural point of view is that we continue to have and, indeed, augment and extend, a situation in which artists [...] have an opportunity to explore the possible uses of new technology. Such opportunity allows the true potential of such technologies to become apparent, as they are used to convey depths of experience and meaning which are beyond the scope of information use and corporate propaganda."¹

6.2.5 To what extent is this true today? Audiovisual technology has been driven by the private sector and commercial imperatives and expectations. In music, hardware and software development and the provision of fully-equipped recording studios are commercially financed for the benefit of rock and pop musicians. It is only in recent years that schools and colleges have begun to purchase facilities for electro-acoustic music composition and production. Ircam (Institut de recherche et de coordination acoustique-musique) in Paris is the largest, publicly funded institution in the field which offers opportunities for research, training, composition and performance; although studios are emerging in other countries, it provides a Europe-wide service. At the same time reductions in the prices of instruments and software for computer-aided composition and music production have combined with computer-mediated co-operation and marketing to stimulate private production by small groups, individuals and companies.

6.2.6 The arrival of video and cheaper and more flexible film-making equipment coincided with that of an independent film and video movement in the 1970s whose members wanted to be free of the constraints imposed by the feature film and broadcasting industries. In the United Kingdom, the government enabled these young artists to thrive by breaking down the monopoly of monolithic broadcasting institutions and establishing a television channel, Channel Four, with a remit to commission product rather than to generate its own. Graphic design, both in terms of print and of the moving image, has been transformed by new computer software. Desk top publishing is turning the printing industry upside down and has created the potential for writers and composers to publish their own work. Moreover, the non-hierarchical nature of the Internet offers users the potential to become publishers and distributors.

6.2.7 The new technologies have considerable cultural potential. Thus, European money has enabled the Arthouse Multimedia Centre for the Arts in Dublin to develop a visual computerised catalogue of contemporary Irish artwork, a networked information service and a reference library of art catalogues, audio, video and multimedia artworks. Another project, Lamda (Local applications of multimedia broadband developments) seeks to provide resi-

1. Hayward, Philip, (ed.), introduction, *Culture, technology and creativity in the late twentieth century*. John Libby. London, 1990.

dents in rural areas in four countries with access to libraries, museum archives and other cultural information through terminals linked to home computers. Surfers on the Internet can already access some of Europe's great museum collections at the push of a button.

6.2.8 If the embrace of the digital revolution is real enough, there is a risk that commercial interests are benefiting from it at the expense of content. The French government is worried that museums and galleries are being exploited by foreign CD-Rom manufacturers "who buy up their heritage, then sell it back to them with an American sheen."¹ This is not a view universally shared in Europe, it has to be said, but the debate about multimedia that has ensued has tended to obscure the fact that what is being considered as "culture on the Net" is often in reality *about* culture and *not* creativity itself. In fact, technical advance offers exciting possibilities for artists, designers, animators, composers and choreographers, which some are beginning to exploit. Thus, a CD-Rom available at the Tate Gallery in London was produced by a group of deaf photographers who created a work which enables deaf visitors, through photographs and British Sign Language, to explore exhibits in an interactive way. Bedford Interactive's innovatory work on interactive videos for dance has considerable potential for transforming dance teaching. These and similar initiatives in which artists are using the new technologies need monitoring.

6.2.9 A lot of work by artists today is unsuitable for museums and galleries. It has little meaning beyond the place and occasion for which it was created. Some artists have found in on-line nets a new channel for transmitting – or at least advertising – their works. Visual artists have their own home pages on the Internet and there are between 15 000 to 20 000 references to theatre on the World Wide Web. Virtual reality models are used in theatre and concert hall architecture and stage design. CD-Roms are replacing videos in performance recording and advertising and in 1996 there will be an Internet World Exposition, analogous to the Venice Biennale, with national pavilions and the like exhibited on-line.² Many international artists' organisations have moved their work, especially that which seeks to mediate between artistic creation and audiences, to on-line nets (for example, Art 3000 in France and Artist on Line (founded in 1990) which established the Electronic Cafe-International).

6.2.10 For the time being the book and magazine publishing industries have been little affected by the new technologies (except in the field of printing). Reading words on a screen is less convenient than in hard copy. However, academic publishing is being revolutionised by desk top publishing and distributing on-line via the Internet. It is now possible for professors to design customised course books which can be printed for students on demand in college or university bookshops. CD-Roms offer a wide range of multimedia products. Works of reference, whether the Encyclopaedia Britannica now

1. Jones, Cliff. "The rights and Roms of culture", in the *European Magazine*, 3-9 March 1995.

2. Staples, David, "Virtual performance", in *International Arts Manager* magazine. London, October 1995.

available on the Internet in abridged form or access to a complete European telephone list (soon to be available), have been the first to meet the challenge of change.

6.2.11 However, some artists have remained disenchanted and see computer networks as a chaos of “meaningless communication” and interactive media as “glorified computer games”. Researchers have pointed out the danger that the expansion of support systems such as interactive digital audio-recording and the digitalised manipulation of photographs and other visual images leads to “[...] cannibalisation, reanimation, and exhaustion of imagery.” Works of art are becoming the material from which other works of art are made. These fears, justified or not, underline the major changes in the economics of culture and, even more fundamentally, the nature of the creative process itself. How do we square the notion of the work of art as the unique product of a single mind when it can now be expressed or reproduced in a multiplicity of different forms or as part of a chain of products? This question is especially pertinent in the audiovisual industries where (say) a feature film can be distributed in different versions for theatric, video and television distribution, can be turned – or returned – to book format and have its characters marketed as toys or figures in computer games. These “partial” uses will become more and more widespread and while they will benefit artists financially they will challenge existing copyright regulations, both in the field of moral rights (which deal with questions of alteration and distortion) and of fair compensation. The European Union is in the process of revising and implementing legislation to take account of such issues, but copyright laws must be extended to the whole of Europe and not just the EU and European Economic Area countries. The growth of piracy and forgery is making copyright harder to enforce. Not only are copyrighted works, whether recorded, filmed or printed, reproduced illegally in their thousands, but a new market in fake Russian “impressionist” paintings, supposedly dating from the cold war days of the Soviet Union, but really painted “to order” in the west, now competes with fake ikons for the buyer’s attention. The challenge can only be met by common action.

6.2.12 Multimedia audiovisual technology is now so advanced that it appears to be possible to invent synthetic live performers; experience shows that record companies can seek out four suitably attractive young men without artistic talent and manufacture them into a successful pop group, even though they may not be able to sing or dance. The public seems willing to collude with this ersatz alternative to genuine creativity.

6.2.13 There have been attempts to rebalance the relation between art and technology by invigorating the role of “live” creation. As a form of counter-action, theatre and music events are sometimes presented in ways that emphasise their un-recordable uniqueness as occasions. Alternatively, performing artists have fought fire with fire by enriching their presentations with audiovisual technology.

6.2.14 But could more be done to encourage cross-fertilisation between the two areas? This may be difficult. In today’s financial climate it is hard to imag-

ine public, or for that matter private, funds supporting more ventures along the lines of Ircam. Investment in new technology in universities may enhance the value of arts and media courses, schools and centres. The Arts and Education Training Initiative pilot project of the European Commission Directorate for Education, Training and Youth (DG XXII) has revealed the innovative possibilities of the use of the new technologies in arts training and the socio-economic importance and employment potential of the sector. Artists in every discipline would benefit from an introduction to the new technologies and the chance to work creatively with them and training opportunities should be available to those in mid-career as well as students at the outset of theirs. But by itself this will not be enough. A more viable, affordable and fundamental option would be to make use of the new electronic technologies and to establish a Europe-wide network of communication and co-operation between arts departments in universities, higher and further education colleges, museums and multimedia arts centres with funding for the encouragement of artistic research and development. If such a network were accessible to the general public, it could be a counter-balance to the proliferating commercial systems of communication and broadcasting.

6.2.15 The arts and sciences have long gone their separate ways, perhaps to their mutual disadvantage. An academic database could be usefully complemented by the creation of centres for advanced cultural production, islands of innovation, where artistic innovators, technologists and scientists could meet for debate and collaboration. The purpose would be to foster experiment by bringing together people from different state-of-the-art disciplines, modelled on institutions such as Ircam or the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London. There could be a related role for the Council of Europe in supporting the mapping of the European institutional situation in selected artistic fields to define the role of the new technologies in defence of cultural diversity and as tools for contemporary artistic production.

Summary

Never before has so much knowledge been so readily and so instantaneously available and had the potential to empower so many. The move from mass to niche information provision and marketing could have profound political, social and cultural consequences. The economics of the information revolution are leading to the management of technological advance according to commercial imperatives. Electronic methods of communication offer new creative opportunities to artists and other cultural producers, but at the same time their commercial exploitation may be at the expense of innovation. Moreover, the nature of the creative process and the notion of a single work of art has changed now that it can be reproduced in a multiplicity of forms, challenging existing copyright regulations in the process. It is possible that many ordinary people will find themselves excluded from access to the new communications systems except as passive, disempowered consumers. This new information underclass will be especially evident in central and eastern Europe. There are limits to the measures open to public authorities, but they could mend the schism between science and arts, create an alternative to the

powerful media corporations and, through the new technologies, improve the employment prospects of artists and make government more transparent and accountable to the individual citizen.

Points for consideration

Contribution to human knowledge and understanding

i. The international agencies could explore the feasibility of establishing a Europe-wide network of communications and co-operation between departments of universities and higher and further education colleges, museums, and multimedia centres, with funding for artistic research and development. The general public should have access to such a network.

Economic and social outcomes

ii. The Council of Europe and the European Union could take steps to map and encourage the use of the stock, or “back catalogues”, of European audiovisual products and their distribution and make sure that their exploitation is to the best advantage of European artists and the future of the European audiovisual industries.

iii. Public cultural policy organs should make more active use of the new information facilities afforded by on-line computer-mediated communications systems. They should also learn to co-ordinate and integrate the information they themselves offer with that available from these sources. The Council of Europe could play a useful part by assessing current schemes of this kind, including projects that facilitate democratic participation (for example, Cleveland’s FreeNet in the United States and in Europe Bologna’s CityCard), and if necessary setting up pilot projects with a view to identifying models of good practice.

iv. National governments and the international community should consider adopting a system of regulation which would ensure more of a “level playing field” for European competitors and protect consumer interests, peoples’ moral and religious convictions and privacy without recourse to direct censorship.

v. The audiovisual and multimedia industries have considerable socio-economic potential for artists. Training opportunities should be developed by those working in new arts professions – for instance, the creation of software for video games, CD-Roms dealing with cultural subjects and interactive arts. Artists working in traditional ways and those in midcareer should be trained to enable them to exploit the new technologies. There is a need for an overall mapping and monitoring of the extent to which artists use the new technologies and on-line nets, and any special needs for investments, training, information systems or archivelinks in any specific field of artistic activity.

Harnessing human resources as a means of empowerment

vi. We would encourage the Council of Europe to support a pilot project to map the European institutional situation in selected artistic fields (for example, theatre, visual arts, photography, contemporary music, modern dance) to define the role of the new technologies in defence of cultural diversity and as tools for contemporary artistic production. It should seek to identify cultural "islands of innovation" (that is institutions for advanced research or experiment) analogous to those in the fields of scientific research, technology and development. Special attention should be paid to the possibility of singling out for special support arts, science and technology centres where artists, researchers, product planners and designers could carry out joint experimental projects.

vii. Education in the use of the new media is not only important to combat the emergence of a permanently excluded underclass, but is also a precondition for creating a generation of critical and sophisticated consumers. Governments, alone or in collaboration with the private sector, should seek to make access to the huge potential offered by new applications of communications technologies open to all through their education systems and vocational training. This is of special importance in the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.

7 The demography of exclusion

“Those who are excluded do not exist. It is not a question of being above and below, it is a question of being inside. If you are outside you do not exist, you are nothing. And herein lies the very problem of the excluded: irreversibility. As an excluded person, one is excluded definitively.”

*José Vidal Beneyto*¹

“The multidimensional character of exclusion requires an equally multidimensional approach to integration. Encouraging integration does not just mean providing accommodation, ensuring social cover and allowing access to a job: it means all that and much more besides. The mechanisms of integration must promote at the same time civil integration, economic integration, and personal, educational and cultural integration.”

*Marcelino Oreja*²

7.1 From a culture of contentment to a culture of containment

7.1.1 *Europe's changing profile.* Demographers have long known that the link between economic development and population change is not simply a function of objective factors such as advances in medical science, health care and social services or levels of knowledge brought about by education and training. Cultural considerations and related subjective factors (for example economic and social aspirations; conceptions of life, love and parental responsibilities) also play an important part. This awareness has not been shared by cultural policy makers, who have seldom shown concern for the effects their decisions will have on population change – or the shifts in cultural needs and demands to which it may give rise.

7.1.2 Improvement in the quality of life was one of the most unexpected features of the post-war period in most western European countries. Although a rather ambiguous concept, it generally refers, not simply to material gain but to subjective aspects of lifestyles. The *UNDP Human development report* recognised cultural influences as measurable indicators of social activity. According to this index, the quality of life for many Europeans has improved significantly in the last twenty-five years – according to the Human Development Index, no less than thirteen of the top twenty countries of the

1. Opening speech to the European Colloquium on the Role of Culture in Combating Poverty in “Culture and human activity for overcoming poverty”, report of the European Commission and the International Movement ATD Fourth World. Brussels, 1995.

2. Foreword to “Culture and human activity for overcoming poverty”, *ibid.*

world are in western Europe, where the population is well educated and the literacy rate in 1992 was 96.5%. In many ways, then, some of us have never had it so good. The story in central and eastern Europe is a very different one. The failure of central planning and the subsequent move to the free market have led to catastrophic, but (it is to be hoped) temporary, falls in the overall standard of living.

7.1.3 In 1995 the population of Europe was estimated at 727 million,¹ of whom 390 million are from eastern Europe. There are 12 million immigrants and (as estimated in 1992) 8 million Gypsies.² Population growth is lower than in other parts of the world: for example, by the year 2000 the population of southern European states is likely to rise by five million as compared with 108 million in the Maghreb. Among Council of Europe member states, the rate of natural population increase in 1994 was over 1% in only two countries (Ireland and Turkey); in twenty-three the rates were slightly above the norm and in nine they were below it. The number of marriages in a year, as compared with the number of inhabitants, is falling (from between seven and ten marriages per thousand average population in 1970 to between four and seven per thousand in 1993).

7.1.4 Population concentration in cities is expected to accelerate in line with the global trend, though not on the same scale. Population density and urbanisation are two factors which crucially shape the conditions for cultural development.

7.1.5 Europeans are living longer. Their average life expectancy rate has risen from 66.2 years in 1960 to 74.2 years in 1992 (cf. the respective world rates of 53.4 years and 65.6 years).³ At the same time, fertility rates are falling in many regions of Europe. This decline is especially marked in Spain, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands, where, ironically, rates used to be higher than average.⁴ According to the European Union, "within the last twenty years, most member states will have reached a situation where generational replacement is no longer possible". The proportion of people over the age of 50 is growing rapidly; more than 30% of Italians will be aged 50 or more by 2020. The "greying" of Europe threatens to place ever heavier demands on the welfare services.

7.1.6 Although standards of health have been steadily rising throughout the continent, progress in improving the conditions of life for people with disabilities has been more modest. It is estimated that at least one-tenth of Europe's population suffers from a disability, a figure that will rise with the proportion of old people. The majority are patronised, marginalised or ignored. Many disabilities are hidden in the sense that they are not immedi-

1. *Recent demographic developments in Europe 1995*. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

2. Bailey, Joe, (ed.) *Social Europe*. Longman. London, 1992.

3. *Human development report 1994*, UN Development Programme. Oxford University Press, 1994.

4. *Social Europe 1/94: The European Union and the family*. Directorate General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs. European Commission. Luxembourg, 1994.

ately obvious – epilepsy, for instance, or heart conditions or serious lung ailments such as asthma (the incidence of which is rising at a disturbing rate in some countries). Some progress has been made in integrating disabled people into daily life and enabling them to make useful economic, social and cultural contributions, but all too often this major human resource remains neglected.

7.1.7 *Structural unemployment and the changing nature of work.* Optimists used to dream of a world of satisfying work, increased leisure and affluence, but the globalisation and restructuring of the world economy, the world recession, the rise of the free market and the impact of technological advance on industry's labour needs have led to high levels of unemployment. The 1980s were a decade when "social Darwinism" (that is the survival of the fittest in economic terms) was embraced as a mercantile *modus vivendi*. What is more, faced with radically new patterns and rhythms of employment and unemployment, even those people who are in work face a lifetime of job insecurity, continuous retraining and enforced mobility. In the name of efficiency euphemisms such as "down-sizing" have been imported from North America by management consultants and adopted with what appears at times to be an almost indecent enthusiasm by commerce, industry and governments. As a consequence every worker is now vulnerable. This is probably a structural trend and economic revival is not expected to bring all these lost jobs back. Wealthier societies are no more immune than poorer ones and neither national governments nor weakened trade union movements have been able to reverse it. In 1994, 18 million persons in the European Union were out of work, representing 10% of the population. This is a higher rate than that of Japan, the United States and some European countries such as Switzerland and Norway. We have moved from what J.K. Galbraith once called a "culture of contentment" to a culture of risk.

7.1.8 Technological advances and the drive to achieve economies of scale are changing the nature and pace of work. Twenty years ago, as Charles Handy notes, 90% of employees in the United Kingdom worked in an organisation. As we approach the millennium the figure could be nearer 50%, broadly in line with what it was at the beginning of the twentieth century. Jobs for life are being reinvented as short-term contracts. As Handy remarks: "Instead of keeping a pool of slightly surplus labour and skills inside the organisation [...] (companies) are pushing those skills outside and pulling them in when necessary."¹ For those with the required skills regular employment is being traded for a portfolio lifestyle of short term jobs or projects for different "clients". A Demos report on employment in Europe suggests that the 18 to 34 age group is far less committed to the idea of a steady job than their parents' generation.² But what of the smaller numbers of people who are left to do core jobs in slimmed down organisations? Forecasts suggest that organisations will demand ever greater commitment and much longer work-

1. Handy, Charles, *The empty raincoat – making sense of the future*, Hutchinson. London, 1994.

2. Cannon, David, *Generation X and the new work ethic*, a working paper for The Seven Million Project. Demos. London, 1995.

ing hours from them, leaving little time for family and leisure. For them, the sixty to seventy hour working week may become the norm.¹

7.1.9 With the present relatively low rate of economic growth together with rising productivity (especially in commodity production), Europe is unable to stimulate the necessary increase in demand for goods and services that will draw the unemployed back to work in significant numbers. It has been suggested that the only way forward is to find new areas of production that could act as engines of economic growth. The information and communication technologies are often cited as one such area via value-added services; and proposals have been advanced to accelerate "qualitative growth" in such fields as culture, the care of the environment and highly specialised social services.

7.1.10 Unemployment affects young people and women more than it does men, as does underemployment where people with good higher education qualifications find themselves forced into unrewarding and poorly rewarded jobs. Young women seem to suffer disproportionately; in France, for example it is estimated that 30% of those under the age of 25 are unemployed, compared with 19% of men in the same age group. More generally, fifty-three out of every 100 Europeans out of work are women and in 1989 they accounted for only 39% of the work force, mainly in the service industries and part-time. Characteristically they are under-represented in higher positions of management and earn less than men in equivalent jobs. Unemployment is also proportionately higher among migrant communities and people of colour.

7.1.11 Only one in every six jobs is held by someone under the age of 25 and in 1991-92 unemployment rates for the 15 to 24 age group were 18.7% in the European Union, 15.4% in the Nordic countries, 31.2% in southern Europe (in comparison to 14.1% in North America and 4.4% in Japan). A major challenge for education systems is to equip young people with the knowledge and skills they need to make their way in the increasingly complex world of financial interdependence and competition. Europe has a more severe skills mismatch problem than either Japan or the United States. In 1992, the UK-based Institute of Employment Research estimated that by the year 2000 "[...] 70% of all jobs in Europe will require people with professional skills [...] 90% of all new jobs that will be created in the United Kingdom in the eight years to 2000 will require people of graduate level. Only 30% of jobs overall will require skills at below that level. Few jobs will require manual skills. Such work is disappearing fast and is now less than 13% of all jobs in the United Kingdom."²

7.1.12 There is an evident need for employment strategies at appropriate levels of government to exploit the potential of job creation in the cultural

1. See Handy, Charles, *Beyond certainty: the changing worlds of organisations*, Hutchinson. London, 1995.

2. Toombs, I. "Education, culture and the arts: the relevance to industry" in Worsdale, A. (ed.) *Arts, culture and education*, National Foundation for Arts Education. Oxford, 1992.

sector. At the same time the arts can be a vehicle for the social integration of unemployed people, as an instrument of retraining as well as providing a community focus, for example cultural services for elderly and infirm people, work with young people, conservation of the heritage, etc.

7.1.13 *Filling the margins: migrants, refugees and displaced persons.* A feature tending to fragment Europe's population is a local variation of the worldwide schism between the rich North and the poor South. Various factors – cultural, economic and political – led to a Northern dominance which the Industrial and French Revolutions set in motion. It should be noted that similar distinctions can be found both between and inside nation states – Italy being a notable example. However, parts of northern Europe have been experiencing problems of adjustment to the economic recession as severe as problems of development faced by the South.

7.1.14 North/South schisms – global, continental and internal – have stimulated massive shifts of population. Large numbers of individuals have been migrating in an attempt to escape poverty, overpopulation, political crisis, falling standards of living and unemployment. Europe used to be a region of emigration in the days when Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal colonised the known world. Between 1880 and 1914, some one million people a year left their mother countries for various destinations, especially the United States.¹

7.1.15 In central and eastern Europe there is still a prevalence of emigration over immigration where political re-adjustments have created substantial outflows of job-seekers. But in western Europe the situation has gone into reverse and since 1945 immigration has become a major social and political issue. Displacements, mainly from the developing South to the industrial North, have been caused by many factors – increased job mobility; the post-war political settlements and subsequent unrest; population explosions in North Africa and poverty on the South Asian sub-continent, Turkey and in the Caribbean; a rising tide of illegal immigration (in 1992, the number of illegal immigrants to western Europe was estimated to stand at 250 000);² the return of colonial expatriates; and the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia. Much of the inflow was linked to the industrialised countries' need for low qualified and cheap labour. In 1992 there were 558 600 applicants for asylum in the European Union, of whom 500 000 travelled to Germany primarily because its immigration laws at the time were perceived to be more liberal than those of many other countries. As a consequence the social profile of cities such as London, Berlin and Paris is changing.

7.1.16 Migrants – often labelled as “economic refugees” by western governments – are popularly regarded as unfair competitors in the labour market and, when they are unemployed and supported by welfare benefits, are the

1. *Our global neighbourhood.* The report of the Commission on World Governance. Oxford University Press. London, 1995.

2. Collinson, S., *Beyond borders: west European migration policy towards the 21st century.* Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, 1993.

objects of resentment and hostility. Governments have reacted in different ways. The French have attempted to apply their long-standing policy of assimilation. Germany (and formerly West Germany) has not resisted the trend, but treats immigrants as foreigners or resident aliens. The United Kingdom has encouraged tolerance while at the same time tightening immigration rules. Sweden and the Netherlands have actively promoted multiculturalism.¹ Countries in southern Europe have few mechanisms in place to police their borders, but elsewhere serious efforts to discourage migrants are growing. The European Union, which is committed to the free movement of persons, goods, services and ideas, has been building external barriers against countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Albania.² Following the Schengen Accord, some European Union states have dismantled their internal borders to ensure greater mobility for their citizens, but only provided that much stricter controls are installed along the European Community's external frontiers. While in theory this will ensure greater movement by non-Community nationals within EU territories, it is increasingly perceived as one more brick in the wall of a "Fortress Europe". The latest illustration of this is the more restricted definition of refugee status agreed *in camera* by EU Interior Ministers. In future only those people genuinely fearing persecution by government or related agencies will be granted asylum. Those fleeing civil war, including victims of rape, or seeking refuge from non-state violence will be excluded. This raises fundamental questions which cannot be ignored. What is the point of a European Union, and even a Council of Europe, extolling the importance of pluralism and multiple identities in Europe if, at the same time, member states – either collectively or individually – are erecting new barriers, ostensibly in the name of maintaining social cohesion, but in reality motivated by a geopolitical cynicism that allows political and financial interests to override human rights and international conventions?

7.1.17 Unsurprisingly, central European states are also setting up immigration controls. In the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution, countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary which head the queue of applicants to join the European Union absorbed unprecedented numbers of immigrants and acted as involuntary "buffers" between the east and Fortress Europe in the west. Thus, in 1992 Poland received an estimated 290 000 immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Romania, and Hungary about 100 000 between 1988 and 1992.³

7.2 Striving for a plural Europe

7.2.1 *A permanent underclass?* In a world in which it is often difficult to escape the images of affluence and consumption generated by advertising and the media, it is disturbing that a large number of Europe's citizens suffer stigmatisation, deprivation and social exclusion as a result of poverty. Statistics issued by the Commission of the European Communities show that some

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

50 million people in EU countries live below the poverty line (as defined by the European Union). In 1994, 23% of the population of the Russian Federation was estimated to have lower per capita incomes than the subsistence minimum. France has more than half a million registered homeless persons; in the United Kingdom, it was estimated in 1994 that there were some 400 000 in London alone.¹ In the wider Europe, there are millions more people leading qualitatively impoverished lives as a result of low incomes and unemployment. A number of these will be refugees from torture and conflict, whether intra or extra-European in origin. Many are traumatised by their experiences. Yet it cannot be said in the 1990s that European countries, with a few exceptions, have been willing providers of the refuge that, by definition, refugees seek. Refugees, as the late James Cameron observed in relation to the Indo-Chinese refugees of Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s, "are part of an eerie society that has grown internationally over the years to form the multinational, multilingual community of the dispossessed, the symbol of our century."²

7.2.2 Social exclusion disempowers people. It deprives them of access to experience of the arts – when faced, as a substantial number of people in eastern Europe have been, with stark choices of survival, going to the theatre or cinema can hardly be expected to be on their list of priorities. International declarations on access to participation in cultural life are academic to those living in poverty. Yet as Jean-Claude Caillaux from ATD Fourth World in France has observed: what is the ultimate aim of cultural action if it is "conducted at the cost of abandoning the weak"?³ The arts deal in creativity and imagination, they can help to develop life skills; it is in this sense that they play a useful part in the social reintegration of unemployed people and in retraining for the world of work.

7.2.3 Social fragmentation and exclusion are growing realities in contemporary European society, whose value system assigns respectability to the market and employment. Yet, as a report by the Fourth World People's University emphasises: "Any society which allowed a permanently disadvantaged underclass to grow, to grow within us, creates groups of non-citizens who do not identify with the values on which that society is based and will eventually constitute a pool of alienated individuals wide open to organised crime and political extremism."⁴ The World Summit on Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995 proclaimed that fundamental human needs are closely linked to one another and concern nutrition, health, water, deconta-

1. *Human development report 1994*, UN Development Programme. Oxford University Press, 1994.

2. Ashworth, Georgina, *The boat people and the road people*, Quartermaine House. Sunbury, UK, 1979.

3. Fisher, Rod; Groombridge, Brian; Häusermann, Julia; and Mitchell, Ritva (eds.); "Human rights and cultural policies in a changing Europe: the right to participate in cultural life". Report of the European Round Table organised by Circle and Rights and Humanity in co-operation with the Council of Europe (Helsinki, April-May 1993). Circle Publication No. 6. Arts Council of Finland. Helsinki, 1994.

4. "The citizen's Europe", a report to the Economic and Social Committee by the Fourth World People's University, 1992.

mination, education, employment, housing and participation in cultural and social life. This was an important acknowledgement that cultural and artistic practice contributes to sustainable personal or community growth and education.

7.2.4 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has emphasised that creative activity should not be regarded as a peripheral need, but is essential if refugee children are to become responsible members of society. A number of humanitarian charities and non-governmental organisations support the arts in health, education, skills training, rehabilitation, therapy and structural development. For some aid projects, arts and crafts skills are encouraged as an income generator in the move to self-sufficiency. However, few NGOs seem to have committed themselves to comprehensive cultural strategies.

7.2.5 There is a growing number of essentially *ad hoc* and unco-ordinated projects utilising the arts in the battle against exclusion. The organisation of a European Colloquium on the Role of Culture in Combating Poverty by the European Commission and the International Movement ATD Fourth World was an important first step in exchanging information on the subject. It was also encouraging that the opening words of the European Council meeting at Essen in 1994 reaffirmed a commitment “to fight against unemployment and inequality of opportunity for men and women.” In the light of this it is surprising and frustrating that proposals by Pdraig Flynn, European Commissioner, to establish a new EU programme to combat social exclusion encountered considerable difficulties because of the lack of consensus on the size of the budget.¹

7.2.6 *A Europe of minorities.* Exclusion is not simply an objective consequence of poverty or cultural difference; it can also be a political and social project to promote a group’s sense of its identity. That is to say, it is a component, often a crucial one, of a politics of inclusion. The social cohesion of a club rests in good part on the re-assuring knowledge that there are many people outside it who are not, and never could be, members.

7.2.7 Nineteenth century nationalism did not define itself by recourse to separation. On the contrary it aimed to create an umbrella for all those who found themselves inside its boundaries. This was Massimo d’Azeglio’s point when he said after Italy’s unification: “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians.” As Eric Hobsbawm notes, the anti-colonial nationalists of this century – men such as Gandhi, Nehru, Mugabe and Mandela – did not confuse the nation with the *volk* and opposed tribalism and communalism.² Ethnicity, by contrast, is a way of asserting a group identity at the expense of out-

1. See Flynn, Pdraig, in “Culture and human activity in overcoming poverty”, a report of the conference organised by the European Commission (DG X) and the International Movement ATD Fourth World. Brussels, June 1995.

2. Hobsbawm, E.J., “Nationalism and ethnicity”, *Intermedia*, International Institute of Communications, August-September 1992, Volume 20, No. 4-5. London. Taken from a lecture to the American Anthropological Association and adapted from an article in *New Statesman and Society*, April 1992.

siders and by reference to an immemorial shared past. The elision of the nation state with ethnic and linguistic groups was given powerful expression by the peace settlement following the first world war and the collapse of the multi-ethnic Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires. The application of eugenics to nationalist politics was the basis of German National Socialism. This version of nationalism was especially dangerous because it could usually only be implemented by means of population expulsions and genocide.

7.2.8 The fall of a later empire, the Soviet Bloc, has brought these old chickens back to roost. The citizens of the former socialist system found themselves without a framework in which to place themselves. For many of them the solution has been ethnic nationalism, sometimes fortified by a return to traditional religion. "Because we live in an era when all other human relations and values are in crisis, or at least somewhere on a journey towards unknown and uncertain destinations, xenophobia looks like becoming the mass ideology of the twentieth century *fin de siècle*. What holds humanity together today is the denial of what the human race has in common."¹

7.2.9 The issue of xenophobia came to the fore when immigrants from former colonies introduced their own traditions – Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist and so on – to the west. This has led to mutually enriching cultural exchanges and a degree of "fusion", in much the same way as has been the case with autochthonous minorities down the centuries. However, indigenous nationalists, unwilling or unable to accommodate diversity, have reacted adversely to these "enemies within".

7.2.10 For all their sound and fury, the debate about a "new" Europe is demonstrating that its peoples are not a homogenous group, but an intercultural melange. In fact, the cultural identity of Europe has always been more diverse than commonly acknowledged. The vitality of its non-European cultures has existed for centuries, albeit relegated to the margins. To take just one illustration, the legacy of Islam is reflected in the palaces which the Moors left behind them in Spain, and the fact that Africa once ruled there has left its mark in Spain's contemporary descendants. Today there is a critical mass of non-Europeans in the European Union. The continent's collective identity and the source of much of its creativity is intertwined with global cultures and cannot rest simply on its indigenous origins.

7.2.11 Misrepresented and marginalised throughout European history, both economically and iconographically,² non-European cultures are now gradually being integrated within mainstream society and aesthetic representation. The strength in depth of contemporary writers of non-European origins is now recognised internationally through the works of the Nigerian-born Ben Okri, Timothy Mo from Hong Kong, Vikram Seth from India and the Japan-

1. Ibid.

2. For example, in paintings of the Adoration of the Magi, the image of the black magus was originally dignified and expressive of human equality. Later painters such as Van Dyck, however, transformed him into a diminutive figure, either standing behind his mistress or kneeling at her feet. Such symbolic emasculation is part of a recurring phenomenon of misrepresentation and marginalisation.

ese-born Kazuo Ishiguro, all based in the United Kingdom. Paris is not only becoming a centre for African francophone cinema, but also for a fusion of American, African and Arabic arts. Popular music produced by Cheb Khaled and dance crazes such as "Rai", whose roots lie in the global south, are fast becoming icons of "European" culture. Amsterdam as the centre for Surinamese and South Caribbean arts in Europe rivals London for the most exciting Black theatre, while its Indonesian community has a vibrant musical life.

7.2.12 Government departments and funding agencies have tried to tackle the challenge of pluralism, but with mixed success and perhaps with uncertain commitment. In the United Kingdom, the Arts Council of Great Britain developed an ethnic minorities action plan in the 1980s. This helped to raise the profile of the arts of minorities, especially among subsidised arts organisations – but without going far enough to satisfy the perceived needs and demands of minority artists and audiences. The Sami people, indigenous people living across Norway, Finland, Sweden and the Russian Federation, have received state funding for a Language Council, Educational Council and Trade Council as well as for a theatre group, library and radio station. Community-led projects and centres, such as the Haus der Kulturen der Welt in Berlin, the Maison des Cultures du Monde in Paris and the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam collaborate in the promotion of non-European arts and provide models of local initiatives contributing to a stable pluralist environment. In the United Kingdom, a new organisation, the Institute of International Visual Arts, combines exhibitions, publications, education and training projects and research; avoiding the trap of turning non-European contemporary art into an exotic footnote to the European mainstream, it presents work from a plurality of world cultures according to the principle of equal exchange and representation of artists previously excluded from the cultural canon.

7.2.13 It is a sad truth that efforts to defeat racism and discrimination often meet with opposition, inertia or indifference among individuals and established institutions. Continuing evidence of discrimination and hatred of minorities cannot only be found in most aspects of daily life, although often partly concealed by the effects of anti-racist legislation, but also, in extreme forms, among newsgroups on the Internet. Quotas and targets can be blunt instruments and positive discrimination (which is illegal in many countries) can have a counter-productive effect on public opinion; indeed, they are sometimes criticised by those whom they are intended to help on the grounds that they want to succeed on their own merits rather than because of preferential treatment. Experience suggests that well-meaning policy statements and projects to rectify disadvantage need to be accompanied by strict systems of monitoring and the dissemination of good practice if they are to have practical results.

7.2.14 The obvious and urgent need to respond to exclusion, ethnic cleansing, tribalism and intolerance and to work towards "the equal dignity of all human beings" has reinforced efforts by Unesco and the Council of Europe to initiate discussion and to encourage national governments to acknowledge and implement legislation on cultural, ethnic and linguistic minority rights. Recent Council of Europe initiatives include the European Charter of Region-

al or Minority Languages and an action plan to combat intolerance, racism, anti-semitism, xenophobia and nationalism in Europe. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the celebrations for the International Year of the World's Indigenous People are additional examples. In 1993 in Vienna, the heads of European states and government adopted a strongly worded declaration on countering racism, xenophobia and intolerance. Since then, several further measures have been taken – for example, the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities. In 1993 an international debate was launched on the inclusion of cultural rights in human rights legislation and conventions, with the object of establishing the principle of participation in cultural life by everyone.¹ Although these kinds of international intervention have to be considered as “soft law”, they represent a concerted move to place the challenge of pluralism on the political agenda of heads of state.

7.2.15 However, if existing “multicultural policies” are examined closely it can be seen that many of them implicitly ignore the unequal distribution of power and privilege and generate a range of self-perpetuating and self-renewing stereotypes. In their current definition, cultural diversity policies are often designed to “protect and promote” distinct cultural attributes, or various forms of “otherness”. More specifically, they encourage the preconception that within any given society there is a number of artistic styles that fit a classic aesthetic definition of culture, and endorse notions of quality consistent with the conventions of the western mainstream rather than those appropriate to their context. What is actually happening on the ground suggests that some people, especially among the young, are in advance of official opinion, for popular music from other continents are influencing European rock and pop styles and on occasion producing new hybrid forms.

7.2.16 *Disenfranchised by disability.* It is increasingly accepted that participation in creative activity is an essential right of people whose disability or circumstances isolate them from existing provision. This does not necessarily mean “special” provision, but “ordinary” provision made truly accessible. Employers and the general public should be encouraged to accept disabled people on an equal basis whether as artists, administrators or audiences. Until policy makers fully take this point on board, disabled people are caught in a double bind. That is to say, they are unable to attend arts events or take part in them as professional or amateur practitioners because of inaccessible buildings or the absence of such aids as induction loops for partially hearing people, signing for deaf people or braille signs for sight-impaired or blind people. This leads providers to conclude that there is little demand from those segments of the population and, accordingly, they make few attempts to remedy deficiencies unless compelled to do so by legislation. The end result is that few disabled people are regular arts attenders.

7.2.17 Moreover, alongside the need for greater physical access to mainstream arts provision, funding bodies have been slow to recognise the right

1. The debate was initiated by the European Round Table, “Human rights and cultural policies in a changing Europe”. op. cit.

of disabled people to use the arts to articulate their own experience. In Britain, the emergence of disability arts as a cultural form in its own right is a significant development and one which may well be replicated elsewhere.

7.2.18 Arts and disability provide a classic illustration of the importance of linking cultural policies with other sectoral responsibilities at government level. Too often support for arts and disability initiatives has been hindered because of a tendency automatically to equate arts for/by/with disabled people as therapy and therefore the province of health and welfare departments, and for the latter to see them as the province of cultural administrations. This represents a failure to understand the difference between art as an instrument for therapeutic purposes (for example in art therapy, drama therapy, music therapy) and art in hospitals or in hospices or access by disabled people to the arts on the same basis as other citizens.

7.2.19 The extent of innovative work in this area in Europe today – much of it *ad hoc*, unco-ordinated and under-resourced – is considerable. The first serious attempt to assess a national picture was the Carnegie (UK) Trust Committee of Enquiry into Arts and Disabled People 1982-84, and its report (the Attenborough Report of 1985) led to the Arts Council of Great Britain and the other United Kingdom arts councils establishing a code of practice for arts organisations together with a range of supporting measures. This signalled the arts councils' commitment to increasing access to the arts for disabled people, including the presentation of work by disabled artists and performers, and access to employment within the arts by people with disabilities. Much remains to be done.

7.2.20 *Creativity held captive*. The arts can be a significant confidence-building measure. It is surprising that they are not used more as an instrument to help those in prisons or corrective institutions to make more creative use of their time in custody and to equip them to rejoin society once their custodial sentence is over. Prison routines are usually stultifying. By their nature they repress individuality and this can lead to pent up frustration and anger, which affects security. The arts can provide a fulfilling and creative channel for inmates to express their feelings and, if correctly and sensitively handled, can reduce social tensions in prisons.

7.2.21 Drama, whether performance-based or drama therapy, can be a potent tool in engaging with prisoners and a means for them to discover paths to personal change and rehabilitation. Artists and writers in residence, music performances, short courses in creative skills training are also increasingly employed in prison settings. One professional writer, commenting on his experience, observed that his early fears about patronising and exploiting the prisoners proved groundless: "They ignore you if you patronise them and they discuss openly the ways in which we exploit each other."¹ Sensitivity training is an essential prerequisite for arts organisations and individuals involved in this kind of work to avoid unforeseen consequences that

1. Peaker, Anne, and Vincent, Jill, "Arts in prisons: towards a sense of achievement", a report for the Home Office and the Arts Council of Great Britain. London, 1991

could jeopardise their activities and alienate inmates and prison authorities alike.

7.2.22 More than 100 people from eight countries attended the first European Conference on Theatre and Prison, held in Milan in 1994. This led to the creation of a European network at the second conference, held in Manchester in 1996, to facilitate the exchange of information and best practice for theatre companies working in prison settings. Currently, arts in prisons appears to lack systematic resourcing, specialist training and sufficient research to evaluate impact. One way forward would be for national/regional prison authorities to appoint individuals with responsibility for developing and monitoring artwork in correctional establishments. If it is accepted that the arts and the creative process can contribute to the rehabilitation of offenders and the maintenance of prison security, resourcing could be shared between government departments responsible for correctional establishments and those responsible for culture.

7.2.23 *The arts cure.* Writing in *The Listener* in 1985, the British art critic, Richard Cork, said: "The medical profession is at last beginning to realise that a hospital should care for the whole person, not just the specific illness. To try curing people in surroundings which demonstrate an appalling lack of sensitivity is to betray the whole basis on which hospitals should rest. How can anyone possibly justify treating patients' ailments in a building shabby and dehumanised enough to depress them still further? Incarcerating them in such places is bound to alienate people who are already distressed and desperately need assurance. Artists can help to provide this consolation by making images which assert the stubborn vitality of the human imagination."¹

7.2.24 For many years there has been much exciting arts work in hospitals and health care centres in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and the United Kingdom and other countries, which have included the arts either as an instrument to heal sick people or as a means of improving the hospital milieu. The arts have also been employed successfully in hospices and centres caring for terminally ill people.

7.2.25 The role of the arts in health care falls broadly into three areas: a) improvement of the physical environment through decoration, murals, paintings and sculpture; b) the presentation of concerts, theatre and dance performances, exhibitions and artists and writers in residence schemes; and c) the use of specially trained art, dance, drama and music therapists. Difficulties have arisen in the past over relationships between artists and arts therapists, but their skills are complementary and their common interest is "communication" with the patient. Unfortunately such activities are among the first to be threatened by reductions in public expenditure.

7.2.26 Although the arts and healthcare have been well documented – in the United Kingdom, in particular, but also through initiatives, such as the Unesco Art in Hospitals project launched in 1990 – there remains scope for

1. Cork, Richard, "The art of healing", in the *Listener*. London, 11 July 1985.

the dissemination of experience across Europe. The key to this is the need for systematic inter-sectoral co-operation between the cultural and health sectors, not only in terms of sharing experience and evaluation of the impacts, but also in such areas as the engagement of artists at the design stage of new hospital buildings or the employment of young out-of-work artists to improve hospital environments.

7.2.27 *Pink pride*. It is little more than a century since homosexuality was recognised as a psychological concept. For most, but not all, of European history same-sex acts were punishable by law. However, there is evidence, if intermittent, of the covert existence of gay sub-cultures seeking to survive in a hostile world. Gay men and lesbians have been prominent in the arts and letters where they were sometimes able to achieve a certain, albeit often ambiguous, status (to pick a few names almost at random, they include Sappho, Plato, Virgil, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Tchaikovsky and Proust).

7.2.28 However, the attainment of individuals does not conceal age-old discrimination against gays and lesbians, which seems to have grown fiercer with the identification of homosexuality as an alleged perversion or mental disease by nineteenth century psychologists. In the last three decades attitudes in many parts of Europe have begun to change, although homosexual acts between consenting adults are still illegal in some countries. In some cases, the age of sexual consent varies between men and women. A vigorous gay liberation movement has helped to shift opinion and at the same time has created an open and self-confident community which asserts its own special culture and claims the right to freedom of expression. It played a part in the general opening-up of sexuality outside marriage from the 1960s onwards.

7.2.29 However, the onset of Aids, a disease which in the west (although not in Africa) was perceived as largely stemming from gay sexual practices, created alarm and renewed prejudice. It has struck down many figures in the arts world. Nevertheless, energetic campaigning on behalf of sufferers has aroused much sympathy and has enabled campaigners to keep the issue of gay rights in the public eye.

7.2.30 Discrimination, official and unofficial, continues to make a misery of the lives of many gays and lesbians, although they are widely accepted in the arts and media. Some interpretations of religious codes condemn gay sex and same-sex paired relationships, but unequal laws as between homosexual and heterosexual acts are hard to justify from a rational, ethical standpoint. It is to be hoped that governments and international courts will ensure that legal differentiations are eliminated. So far as cultural rights are concerned, inclusive policies should enable gays and lesbians to express themselves freely and to celebrate their cultures at will and without hindrance.

7.2.31 *In from the margins*. The challenge for the 1990s is to bring all marginalised communities into the heart of debate and strategy. Public acknowledgement confers legitimacy and vice versa, and is translated into the allocation of funds or their denial. Not unnaturally, those refused legitimacy not

only campaign for equality of treatment, but often estrange themselves from the mainstream and proclaim the purity and separateness of their own cultures. This worries some observers, particularly when it is linked to aggressive political attitudes. However, even in the best of all possible worlds, reciprocity should not be confused with assimilation, nor an integration that dilutes minority cultures. Reciprocity is not possible unless there is difference, for otherwise there would be nothing to exchange. The key to public policy is not to regard minorities as problems which need to be accommodated or fitted into a tolerant niche. Rather they are elements in a richly patterned tapestry which would be the poorer for want of any of its parts.

7.3 Overcoming gender bias: parity democracy?

7.3.1 In the past twenty years the status of European women has been changing, both for good and for ill. Due to campaigning by the feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s, it has been widely acknowledged that gender equality is an essential condition of democracy. Catherine Lalumière, former Secretary General of the Council of Europe, has compared equality to two feet: "We all have a left foot and a right foot, and we know very well that walking is much easier if the two are of the same size".¹ Ideas such as equality in parity, which take account of the different cultural contexts of men's and women's lives and experiences, have given a new impetus to attempts to review traditional notions of a social contract and expand definitions of democracy.

7.3.2 Specific new demands have been made, not without some success, for greater equity between the sexes so far as a salary and job opportunities are concerned, and for the increased representation of women at the top of professional hierarchies and, more generally, in positions of influence. In 1992, according to the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), seventeen European countries were among the thirty "most developed" societies, but when the index was corrected for gender equality, the number of European countries among the top thirty was twenty-three. However, as recently as in 1995, according to the Human Development Report 1995, only 13% of members of parliament in OECD countries were women, 15% ministers and 16% local authority members. A study carried out by the European Commission in 1993 showed that only 15% of the members of the governing bodies of the twenty-one public broadcasting organisations in eleven EC member countries studied were female, while two thirds of the organisations studied had appointed no women at all at that level. As for senior management, on average only 10% of employees were women. No broadcasting organisation was headed by a woman at the time.

7.3.3 Such development as has taken place has relied heavily on a variety of social changes. For example, women are marrying at a later age and bearing fewer children. They are spending longer on education and training and have more time to pursue independent careers. Their growing presence in the workforce, in large part due to economic forces, has led to changes in the size

1. Quoted in *The gender perspective*. Council of Europe Publishing. Strasbourg, 1995.

of families and redistribution of power between husband and wife, mother and father. A woman's identity, which used to acquire most of its meaning in the family and through child-rearing, is now also being defined in terms of work outside the home. At the same time, the concept of parity democracy, the equality of men and women as proponents of social values, has been gaining ground.

7.3.4 However, these improvements have taken place somewhat unevenly across Europe and are helped or hindered by a given country's prevailing ideology and political system. Progress, especially in relation to career opportunities and political representation, has been most marked in highly industrialised societies with extensive welfare systems. According to the Human Development Report, Nordic countries are among the top five in the gender related HDI and in these countries more than 30% of members of parliament and ministers were women; by contrast, Belgium, Ireland, Greece and Switzerland had lower rankings than the overall HDI for these countries might lead one to expect. To quote a Finnish researcher, "[...] gender differences and inequalities between the sexes in today's Europe are multiform."¹ Overall indicators of the gender inequality tend to conceal the plurality of female social, economic and cultural experience and the different ways they have intervened in, or influenced, the world around them. For instance, it is only recently that immigrant women of non-European origin have made their political presence felt, even though they have always been intermediaries in intercultural socialisation.²

7.3.5 The battle for equal pay for equal work has not yet been won and the values and perspectives of women are inadequately represented in the mass media, especially not in respect of their ethnic and social backgrounds and cultural, religious and ethical mores. Advertising is one of the most influential agents of socialisation; it influences an increasing amount of media content and seems to play a significant role in the construction, or at least the reinforcement, of gender identity. Negative images of women are still perpetuated and reinforced at the expense of a realistic picture of women's multiple roles. Broadcasters, film-makers and advertisers still use women's bodies as sex objects and violence against women masquerades as entertainment. It is typical that only few women make it to the top in the advertising industry. For example, only 8% of managing directors in the British advertising industry are women, and most of them work in small companies.³ Perhaps there is a role for cultural policy makers in helping to change a culture which is so exploitative in its representation of women? In real life, the personal security of women is threatened and they suffer discrimination in employment. An obstacle to developing constructive intervention strategies is the inadequate

1. Julkunen, Riitta, *Hyvinvointivaltio käännekohdassa (The turning point of the Welfare State)*. Vastapaino, Tampere, 1992.

2. This emergence of immigrant women in the European political arena has been discussed under the heading "Immigrant women: out of the shadows and on the stage" in *Immigrant women and integration*, Community Relations, Directorate of Social and Economic Affairs. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

3. See "Human rights and gender: the responsibility of the media", seminar proceedings (Strasbourg, 29 June-1 July 1994). Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1994.

documentation and research on domestic violence, sexual harassment, violence against women and girls in public and private as well as in the workplace.

7.3.6 The immediate future does not give much ground for optimism. There is a clear danger that the weakening of the Welfare State in many countries will lead to a loss of achievements already won. Rising unemployment in Europe affects more women than men, in that of every 100 without a job it is estimated that fifty-three are women. Some observers argue that this trend is leading to the feminisation of poverty. In the transitional societies of eastern and central Europe, political, social and economic change has tended to have a negative impact on the position of women and, ironically, the process of democratisation has been accompanied by a sharp decline of female representation in political decision making in these countries – a process which two political activists from these countries, Slavenka Drakulic and Julia Szalai, have coined “democratisation with a male face”.¹

7.3.7 There is no denying that culture is a sector where women have gained both prestige, employment and influence. Women excel in the performing arts. They are the equals of men as professionals in many arts institutions and networks of cultural services (in public libraries, museums, archives, galleries) and often outnumber them, although the most influential positions are still mostly in the hands of their male colleagues.² Furthermore, as participants in cultural life, women have usually outnumbered men in theatre and concert audiences, as visitors to museums and art galleries and as mediators of cultural values and traditions.

7.3.8 However, the creative achievement of women is a less happy story – particularly in the visual arts, classical or new music and in film-making. As practising artists they find themselves in much the same position as in other professions. Research shows that great inequalities prevail – structural, financial as well as attitudinal. To take an example, during the three year period 1986-88, at the Museum of Modern Art and at the Museum of Twentieth Century Art in Vienna – Austria’s two most prestigious art museums – only five exhibitions were devoted to the works of female artists. At the same time, women held more than half of the country’s art degrees and formed the majority of art school students. Female artists in most European countries will surely endorse the motto used by their American counterparts: “You have to be nude to be in the Metropolitan”.³ Thought needs to be given by policy makers to ways in which cultural institutions in receipt of public subsidies could be required to implement development programmes to facilitate access by women, whether as artists or administrators.

7.3.9 Paradoxically, while the process of globalisation is threatening the gains of European women in status and security, it may also further their

1. Cited in *The gender perspective*, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 1995.

2. See Statistical Appendix, Figure 1: Career pattern of female artists – The “pyramid of success” in Germany in 1995.

3. The Guerrilla Girls, *The conscience of the art world*. New York, 1986.

cause. It has been argued that the contradictory processes of globalisation and localisation could have a positive impact too.¹ On the one hand, women are said to be more “local” than men in their attitudes – that is, more concerned about the quality of local services, environment and culture; while, on the other hand, they are more internationalist in the sense of being committed to social solidarity and humanist values. A possible indication of this interest in global concerns is that the share of women MPs at the European Parliament (18%) is presently higher than that in many national parliaments of the EU. In the words of Virginia Woolf: “As a woman I have no country, as a woman, my country is the whole world”. If these kinds of speculation are correct, women may have an increasingly influential role in these fields.

7.3.10 European gender policies have begun to respond to globalisation and changes it has brought about in the economy and in employment. A recent compendium compiled under the auspices of the Social Partners’ Agreement of the European Union, presented fifty examples of good policy practice, some of which showed a new emphasis on training women for Europe’s restructured labour markets.² It identified a special focus on hi-tech areas, such as new information technologies and on the special problems of training migrant women and women in rural and depressed areas. In each case, culture and cultural differences were taken into account and related to gender equality.

7.4 The “problem” of youth culture

7.4.1 In general, the youth of the 1990s in many European countries speak more languages, are increasingly mobile, more international in their thinking, more adaptable to change, freer than their predecessors and more interested in cultural diversity. Some have acquired wide contacts through international tourism and education exchanges. Academic qualifications are no longer seen as guaranteeing a job or career and there is growing pressure on creative arts and humanities courses in higher education as distinct from the more practical disciplines. Relatively few take up such opportunities as there are for community work, although there is evidence that those who do enjoy and benefit from it; in some countries there is still military conscription, but it seems to attract little enthusiasm.

7.4.2 According to a world-wide study by Research International published in 1996, young people between the ages of 18 and 34 take a more resigned and detached view of their circumstances than their parents did.³ In 1995, RI conducted a similar survey of teenagers which revealed even more striking trends. While the respondents, in both cases, have a “greater social consciousness”, they are unlikely to take any form of direct action. Withdrawing into themselves and focusing on small groups of friends and family,

1. See Lash, Scott and Urry, John, *Economies of sign and space*. Sage Publications. London, 1994.

2. “Education, training, youth, women and training in Europe; fifty projects which challenge our traditions”. European Union, DG XXII. Brussels, 1995.

3. “Are you talking to me? Communicating with young adults”, Research International. London, 1996.

they are strongly individualistic in the sense that they live according to personal credos and make choices guided by an eclectic set of values. Paradoxically, they combine a keen sense of themselves as individuals with an underlying desire for conformity. "Individualism is not about eccentricity for its own sake; it is no longer about making a statement by dyeing one's hair green, but is more often 'interiorised' or intrinsic. It is a state of mind, rather than a way of looking or dressing."¹ These attitudes are especially strong in northern Europe, but are also present in other parts of the developed world. RI's group director, Martine Thiesse, commented in a newspaper interview: "Young people in Europe are essentially more realistic. They are coming to terms with economic reality. But they are not complaining; instead they are simply digesting the whole bitter message [...]. They have kind of given up traditional young values. They don't show the 'want it now' mentality. They accept postponement of desires and accept that what they have now is ephemeral – work, money even relationships."²

7.4.3 Adolescents' self-awareness as a class apart has long been reinforced by their value as a coherent commercial market. Accelerating affluence in western Europe gave the post-war "baby-boomers" and their successors limited, but unprecedented, quantities of disposable income and manufacturers recognised them as significant consumers of global cultural products, through records, tapes and video imagery.³ There is some evidence that attitudes in this respect may be changing. Young people are widely believed to be fascinated by electronic communications. Contrary to expectations, the RI survey found comparatively little interest in the new communications technologies, perhaps because they are already taken for granted. Also it did not bear out "the accepted view of [young adults] as acutely image-conscious and status-oriented consumers, at least in the developed western markets, where the research points to a move away from overt consumerism."

7.4.4 This may have something to do with the fact that one in five young people in Europe (that is, from school leaving age to their early thirties) are now out of work, and their spending power, although still substantial in aggregate, has been weakened. Many live in their own enclaves, isolated from the rest of society. Some young unemployed stay on at their parental homes, disillusioned and without the initiative or morale to make their own way in the world. What does the next century hold for them? As promised opportunities fail to materialise, young people seem to have been gripped by inertia rather than the rebelliousness that characterised their parents' generation. Some young adults in their mid-twenties have never worked since leaving school in their teens, even though they are technologically more adept and have a flexible approach to their career prospects. A number of arts projects have attempted to address the prevailing social disillusionment of young people. Leader, a neighbourhood youth centre in Kyiv, in the Ukraine, for

1. Ibid.

2. "Generation X drinks to a bleak future", the *European* newspaper, 11-17 January 1996. London.

3. Hobsbawm, Eric, *The age of extremes: the short twentieth century*. Michael Joseph. London, 1994.

instance, seeks through the arts “to teach marginalised young people who do not have a say in society and who have lost their identity, strategies and behavioural patterns which will help them gain a new confidence in life”.¹ The centre is involved in artistic exchanges with others in Berlin, Barcelona and Moscow.

7.4.5 On the other hand, it cannot very well be claimed that young people are culturally deprived. But their approach to culture is both wider and more engaged than that of their elders. As Paul Willis observes: “In amongst the plethora of expressions which help to constitute the different cultural fields of the young are some which are made to ‘come alive’ to some degree: a particular pop song suddenly evoking and coming to represent an intense personal episode or experience; a dramatic situation paralleling and illuminating dilemmas and problems in the family, with friends, or at school or college; a look in a fashion magazine sparking new ideas for personal style and adornment. Such items can be symbolically appropriated to produce a cutting edge of meaning which not only reflects or repeats what exists, but creatively transforms what exists – previous personal experience and hopes for the future being reorganised, made more understandable or handleable; externally provided expressions changed by being made to signify in new personally ‘significant’ ways. Thus charged, both experience and representation can further change, interact and develop through processes of creative consumption, creative perception and re-perception.”²

7.4.6 The last fifty years have seen the arrival of a major youth arts industry, commercially driven, but reflecting their concerns and interests. Music was, and to some extent still is, a core activity, embodying social, moral and political attitudes and symbolising an oppositional stance to the “straight” world of adults and official establishments. Fashion has played a similar role. Youth culture’s leading characteristic has been the overthrow of traditional constraints in favour of a freer and open approach to sexual activity. The use of drugs is widespread, often to extend the senses (or even, on occasion to offer “spiritual” insights) and not simply as an optional adjunct to an enjoyable social life. It is a frequent feature of listening or dancing to music and music-making and has spawned its own forms of popular music (for example techno, rave and ambient). Cannabis is widely, if often illicitly, available and used and substances such as MDMA, usually marketed under the name of Ecstasy, are popular. The cultural significance of drugs is one of the reasons why the authorities find it so difficult to stamp out their use (another being the contradiction which young people see in the legal availability of other dangerous substances, such as alcohol and nicotine). If (as appears to be the case) the criminalisation of some drugs has failed to control or reduce their use, perhaps other approaches should be explored. This is a sensitive and controversial topic, but perhaps the time has come for national governments to open candid public debates with a view to finding new ways of addressing

1. See “Art as catalyst, artistic youth work in socially troubled areas”, a report to the European Cultural Foundation, 1995.

2. Willis, Paul, *Moving culture, an enquiry into the cultural activities of young people*. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. London, 1990.

the social use of drugs of all kinds. If so, there may be a role for specialist arts organisations in this process.

7.4.7 It would be wrong to suppose that there is a single, universal youth culture. In fact, there are many and plenty of young people who have less interest in music than sport, which many enjoy as participants or spectators. The situation varies from country to country and the image of an adolescent in jeans and a t-shirt and listening to a Walkman is a stereotype to which there are many exceptions. That said, the impact of the “cultural revolution”, which originated in the late 1950s when the first post-war generation was maturing, is still both attitudinally and commercially pervasive.

7.4.8 To some extent, it is policy makers who may be “the problem”, not the young. Rising generations have always had different ideas and explored opposing values to those promoted by their parents and grandparents. It is hard to imagine the human race having made such advances as it has without this continuing process of challenge and change. At the same time, alienation can go too far and some effort should be made to heal the schism between youth culture and the traditional arts, if only to make the full resources of Europe’s arts and heritage accessible to young people.

7.4.9 Education curricula and teaching methods bear much of the responsibility for the impasse. The arts are often narrowly defined and there are powerful arguments for their extension into popular culture. Students need an introduction to the sophisticated languages of the mass media. Syllabi tend to be goal-oriented and geared to passing examinations and acquiring qualifications; this is more suitable for subjects such as mathematics and the learning of languages than creative studies. The outcome can be that students emerge from school with a hearty dislike of officially approved arts.

7.4.10 Many cultural institutions have education policies and offer student concessions, but their ethos can be antipathetic. They give the impression of being run by adults for adults. Efforts to respond to young people’s needs, not only through programming and the management of ambience, but also by marketing the arts to young people “where they are” – that is, on the street or in the shopping mall or at student performance venues – are not much in evidence. It is not unreasonable to believe that partnerships between local government and the private sector could lead to the creation of a variety of facilities for disaffected teenagers (for example using empty commercial premises on a temporary basis).

7.4.11 The cultural policies of the Nordic countries have placed particular emphasis on young people, but the French government was among the first to recognise the needs of young people in a comprehensive way. During the 1980s, it endorsed the specificity and diversity of youth culture and sought to help young people to develop their own cultural practices. The Ministry of Culture subsidised local authorities and voluntary associations to help them provide new venues. These included “Zeniths”, ten large performing spaces across the country, as well as a number of middle and small scale venues for concerts, rehearsal spaces both for professionals and amateurs and about sev-

enty *cafés-musiques*, which are demand-led, cater for rock and rap and are mainly located in deprived suburbs. The principle of providing opportunities for adolescents to pursue their own cultural interests independently is one which it might be profitable for other countries to follow. In addition to building venues, attention might also be given the financing of music recording studios and access to the new information technologies.

7.5 Investing in the experience of age

7.5.1 Perhaps young people should make common cause with another marginalised group, elderly people, through a solidarity pact between the generations?¹ As we move inexorably to the time when the full impact is registered on the public services of the demographic “time bomb” caused by the post-war “baby boomers” reaching pensionable age, governments will need to think in new and creative ways. The chances are that health, welfare and economic services will be under even greater pressure than they are today, but with earlier retirement – whether voluntary or enforced – and a longer lifespan, a large proportion of Europe’s growing number of elderly people will have the potential to enjoy a more active life if they have sufficient resources. Recent studies in France, for example, reveal that at certain times and on certain days of the week, older people represent the largest percentage of museum visitors. Public policies should begin to address how this reservoir of creative interest can be fulfilled and thus challenge the conventional wisdom in society which assesses people’s worth according to their ability to do productive work. Cultural policy makers must also recognise that the nature of the tastes of the new generation will change (people of Mick Jagger’s age may not all be comfortable with tea dances and waltzes).

7.5.2 The famous Japanese artist, Hokusai, when 80 years old, remarked to a friend that he hoped he would live life a little longer as he had just learnt how to hold a paint brush. The creative abilities of many great European artists, composers and writers, as they became septuagenarians or octogenarians, were sustained or even increased. While not everyone aspires to be an artist, people need the creative experience at all ages and in all circumstances. Psychologically, the arts assist people to deal with the ageing process. They can help the individual to find purpose and understanding about the past, about the loss of youth, and provide new life-enhancing perspectives. Art, drama, music, reminiscence are commonly employed as means to engage with elderly people.

7.5.3 A network of organisations, artists, arts organisations, policy makers – ActiveAge – now exists in Europe to share and learn from models of good practice, encourage partnerships and provide opportunities for transnational projects. At its second European meeting on Older People and the Arts, held in Dublin in February 1995, ActiveAge issued a number of recommendations for action to promote the contribution of older people to the arts. The task force considers several of these to be of importance, in particular the need to:

1. The Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe recommended such a pact at its conference in Siena in October 1993.

firstly, explore and exploit the capacity for self-expression through the arts to give older people a voice and help define their role in society; secondly acknowledge and promote the value of older people's economic contribution to the arts; thirdly utilise the sociability and enjoyment factor of the arts to help to re-establish links between different sections of society; and fourthly, prepare for an active and stimulating later life by providing opportunities to develop creative interests *before* retirement.

Summary

Today's economic and political realities, xenophobia and intolerance are creating unemployment and population displacements. As a result many people are excluded from the intellectual and emotional resource which a full opportunity to take part in cultural activity confers. The poor cannot afford culture and minority communities (whether indigenous or non-European) have limited access to mainstream culture and insufficient buying power to establish and promote their own cultures. Other groups who are disenfranchised by circumstance or condition include disabled people, those in ill health and those isolated in penal institutions. Women are only now beginning to break free from their old economic and social shackles, but although their creative abilities are now widely acknowledged, they remain under-represented in senior positions in the cultural sector. Lesbians and gays are emerging from the shadows into mainstream social life. Young people have an oppositional culture of their own. Numbers of elderly people are growing, yet too often they are a disregarded force. The adoption of inclusive cultural policies will give those who face exclusion and discrimination access to self-development and empowerment and will also help to create employment.

Points for consideration

Contribution to human knowledge and understanding

i. Programmes are needed to encourage the cultural development of non-European and indigenous minorities. These should have sufficient funding at their disposal to enable minorities, where appropriate, to maintain and control their own cultural institutions. To be effective, they should be accompanied by monitoring systems and the dissemination of knowledge and good practice.

Economic and social outcomes

ii. Job creation schemes should be targeted to generate employment in the cultural sector (for example services for the elderly, "animation" of the built heritage, cultural tourism, heritage conservation, youth services, etc.).

iii. The arts should be an element in the social integration of unemployed people – for example, through retraining schemes.

iv. Drugs have become a component of youth culture, as is reflected in some of the arts it produces, and are more than simply a policing problem. There is a case for public authorities to open a debate on the subject and seek out new ways of addressing the social and cultural use of drugs. There may be a social role for specialist arts organisations to assist in this process.

v. Cultural policy makers, working with communications authorities, mass media corporations and the cultural industries, should take active steps to encourage a less exploitative representation of women in the arts and media.

Harnessing human resources

vi. The cultural sector should co-operate with development and aid agencies working in the field of social exclusion to address the needs of the large number of people in Europe who, through poverty, unemployment or displacement, are marginalised by societies whose value systems are based on economic considerations and the status conferred by employment.

vii. Public authorities and cultural agencies have an important role in ensuring that disabled people have access to culture on an equal basis with the rest of the population, whether as consumers or practitioners. Clarification of responsibility for allocation of resources at government level between the cultural and health departments is often a necessary precondition. There is much good practice in arts by/for/with disabled people in Europe, but they need to be better monitored and disseminated.

viii. Institutions in receipt of public funds should be obliged to implement active development programmes to facilitate access by women to the arts, whether as artists or administrators.

ix. National, regional and local government should take full account of the needs of elderly people in their cultural policies and enhance their active involvement in the work of voluntary cultural associations and other such bodies.

x. Local and regional authorities in partnership with the private sector should work to establish cultural facilities where young people can pursue their arts interests – for example, recording studios, performance venues and access to the new technologies. One of the further difficulties facing policy makers has been to attract young people to utilise existing facilities. Some of the more successful initiatives have been those which reach young people “where they are”. We commend any innovative ways of engaging with young people; one possible example is the idea of “drop-in” arts opportunity shops where young people can learn more about how to confront the arts. Such shops, strategically sited in shopping centres and

malls (sometimes taking advantage of short lease opportunities in commercial property) could provide a new way to introduce the arts to disadvantaged young people in urban environments.

xi. National and regional governments should promote and support networks for the arts in health care (where they do not already exist) to bring together arts administrators, artists, therapists, physicians and nurses. A necessary precondition will be intersectoral co-operation between the cultural and health sectors. These networks should organise workshops and training and should promote the incorporation of the arts as an integral component of health care by demonstrating the valuable role the arts can play in the healing process. There is scope for the wider dissemination of experience across Europe.

xii. Prison authorities should consider appointing individuals with responsibility for developing and monitoring artwork in correctional establishments.

xiii. In countries where military service for young adults is compulsory, consideration could be given to the introduction of an option to undertake community work with a strong cultural component instead. Voluntary community service in cultural development could also fulfil a useful social function and provide a means of self-expression and unlock the creative potential of young adults in countries where there is no compulsory conscription.

8 Lifestyles, liberties and the renewal of civil society

“Censorship has changed – in its form, its agents and its motives. It has been privatised, has cut loose from the state, and has become an attitude of mind that permeates entire societies. That is why the priority task for writers, artists and intellectuals today is standing up to the threat which the arts now face from that section of public opinion which has made itself the tool of the prohibitions and anathemas of the new international moral order, and creating new areas of freedom, debate and solidarity”

Christian Salmon, Secretary General of the Writers’ Parliament¹

“ [...] while the present day concept of human rights [...] takes a form which derives from the state of civilisation today, the set of values and imperatives which it reflects is rooted elsewhere: in a deeper, truly profound inner experience of the world and of humanity itself within the world.”

Vaclav Havel, at the opening of the Human Rights Building of the Council of Europe, 1996.

8.1 New lifestyles for old

8.1.1 *The dynamics of individualism.* The single most important social trend since the war has been individualisation and a corresponding weakening of social structures, controls and values. This raises difficult moral questions as some people pursue personal liberation and others mourn the onset of a new age of decadence. It also echoes the logic of market liberalism (most succinctly expressed by the UK premier, Mrs Thatcher, when she was quoted as claiming: “There is no such thing as society”). The growth of individualism is consistent with the rationale of civil society, which, as we will see, depends on a careful balance between the state and the stand-alone citizen.

8.1.2 Relations between the generations have been changing. Generational hierarchies have been challenged and parents often find that they have more to learn from young people than they thought and that youth culture has become an essential component of popular culture and its system of values. Its dynamics are governed by adaptability to continually changing social and technological contexts (which young people learn as much from the mass media as from the formal education system).

1. Quoted “Refuge for writers: Strasbourg shows the way”, *Forum*, Council of Europe. Strasbourg, September 1995.

8.1.3 Sexual behaviour has been transformed as part of a general liberalisation of moral attitudes during the twentieth century: it was given a boost by the separations and confusions of the second world war and, although some societies and religions disapprove of or forbid contraception, from the 1960s the birth control pill effectively eliminated the necessary biological connection between sex and procreation. The traditional nuclear family (that is, an earning husband, a wife who looks after the home and a child or children) is becoming less common, not only in the Nordic welfare states, but also in the core countries of the European continent.¹ Thus, in the Netherlands, as the "Social and cultural report 1994" points out, "among men with a job the number without household tasks has fallen, while among women the number of full-time housewives has dropped [...]. In comparison with individuals concentrating on a single task, those who combine tasks have a more restless pattern of activity. 'Task-combiners' are more often on the move, go out more and change their activities more frequently in their leisure hours."² More people live alone, marry or cohabit later in life, live in one-parent households, divorce or are voluntarily childless couples.

8.1.4 This general move towards individualisation is ubiquitous and it is hard to envisage it going into reverse. It is embodied in consumer products (such as convenience foods where the Americanisation of eating habits, with the aid of the deep freezer and the microwave, is reducing the significance of the communal meal), customisation of various goods and the increased personal use of the motor car for all kinds of specialised leisure activities. In mass entertainment and communications, equipment is becoming independent of fixed infrastructure (for example the walkman, mobile telephone and portable computer). Popular culture is packaged so that it can be accessed at any time and for more or less any length of time. Consumer electronics increasingly feature interactivity – a technical trend liable to develop in future years. People's daily timetables are now an *à la carte* menu rather the old familial and collective *table d'hôte*. Not unnaturally, life styles are becoming more and more diverse.

8.1.5 Although the same processes are affecting central and eastern Europe, the scale is vastly different. The economic crisis in the region means that the impact of the new communications technologies has been patchy and fewer people have access to substantial resources for spending on leisure. For many people the automatic response to the Romanian riddle from the Ceauşescu era – "Is there life before death?" – continues to be: "No, there is only survival." Moreover, high levels of stress can be detected in the patterns of daily life. The report on *Cultural policy in Estonia* makes the general point well. It is customary wisdom that "social change generates both stress and anomie. Stress is commonly due to ruptures in routines, increased uncertainty about the right patterns of action, an increased need for effort and concentration; anomie, loss of faith in values, is in turn due to the lack of clear objectives, conflicting expectations and absence of old and presence of new

1. The initial paragraphs are indebted to the analysis in "Social and cultural report 1994, *The Netherlands*". Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau. Rijswijk, February 1995.

2. Ibid.

social emblems and symbols [...]. Anomie appears both at individual and social levels. At an individual level it can appear as lack of energy, isolation or, by contrast, as aggressive behaviour. At the social level it can appear as deviance, criminality, immorality due to loss of belief in prevailing values – which often is combined with individualism and a search for self-gratification.”¹

8.1.6 *The age of leisure: myth or reality?* In pre-industrial Europe, and in countries such as Russia up to the Soviet Revolution, the concept of leisure hardly existed, except among the upper and upper middle classes. Hours of work were so extended that there was little time or resources for the mass of the population to enjoy recreational pursuits. The state’s role was principally one of legislation to maintain law and order in places of entertainment, although there was governmental involvement in prestigious events such as the Olympic Games or in the development of public libraries and museums. Leisure provision as a “legitimate” function of government in Europe emerged largely as a post-second world war development.

8.1.7 In the 1960s and 1970s sociologists announced that a post-industrial society of leisure was approaching. As Roberts notes, most of these claims were based on the “decline of the work ethic, a system of values in which work is defined as intrinsically virtuous [...] and which requires that other spheres of life be subordinated to its demands”.² Such arguments were reinforced by growing evidence of a decline in the number of hours worked and by increasing prosperity in much of western Europe. Some commentators, perhaps echoing nineteenth century British thinkers such as William Morris and John Ruskin, were convinced that society was on the verge of a new “golden age” in which work would yield greater personal satisfaction thanks to technological developments, and that individuals would seek meaningful leisure opportunities in their enhanced free time.

8.1.8 A marked increase in public policies for sport and recreation, parks, countryside, tourism, heritage, arts and entertainment followed. Intervention in Europe has been widespread, but it has also been piecemeal. Public authorities sought not only to create new leisure opportunities and to acquire and protect land – for recreational use, or because these were perceived as intrinsically worthwhile – but also to attain other objectives (for example to redress social inequality, rectify environmental decay, or to realise perceived economic benefits). Policies were primarily developed by local and regional authorities which placed particular emphasis on the provision of facilities. Few countries in western Europe, with the notable exceptions of France, the Netherlands and Germany, formulated strategic national and regional policies for leisure, though several attempted to develop national plans in different leisure sectors.

8.1.9 The predicted leisure society did not materialise in quite the way the forecasters envisaged. Escalating unemployment meant that “leisure” was

1. *Cultural policy in Estonia*, Report by a European panel of examiners, European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. Council of Europe Publishing. Strasbourg, 1997.

2. Roberts, Kenneth, *Contemporary society and the growth of leisure*, Longman. London, 1978.

imposed on a substantial percentage of Europe's population. For others fortunate enough to hold jobs and a disposable income, the hours worked actually increased – either because of additional tasks acquired as a result of company “down-sizing” or because economic considerations forced them to take second jobs in their “spare” time.

8.1.10 The leisure sector in Europe has been influenced by a range of other factors: increased interest in participatory sporting or open-air activities fuelled by health and fitness advertising, and greater environmental awareness and sensitivity; pressure on government budgets in many countries; the internationalisation of the leisure industries; and the ageing of the population.

8.1.11 The development of new leisure opportunities and rising affluence has had a major impact on people's lives. When at home, Europeans are well equipped to amuse themselves and their living rooms, furnished with television, radio and record-, cassette- or CD-players, have become electronic arts centres. While reading remains popular, especially in the north, habits are changing, with younger age groups depending less on the written word. Musically, Europeans are in tune with the rest of the world. Emerging world music and Anglo-American rock and pop are more fashionable than ever, underpinning a boom in radio listening, music videos and, outside the home, attending live musical events. While cinema attendance is generally down, going to the movies remains the most prevalent form of cultural activity when a European decides to go out. User-friendly museums and galleries are enjoying a renaissance. Holidays form a large part of people's expenditure on leisure across most social classes – in the Netherlands, for example, they consume about one-third of the average leisure budget,¹ – although the poorest members of the population still cannot afford extended breaks.

8.1.12 *New patterns of consumption.* It is important to be clear about the nature of contemporary consumption. One characteristic reading is that it is a passive and wasteful process.² According to this view, consumers are the dupes of manufacturers and the mechanisms of advertising and marketing and accept without question the values which are implicit in the packaging and sale of goods and services. However, researchers are beginning to show that this is not how people behave in the marketplace. Dick Hebdige points to the “the multi-accentuality and duration over time [...] of commodified objects and forms as they move from one dislocated point to the next, from design, through production, packaging, mediation, and distribution/retail into use where they are appropriated, transformed, adapted, treated differently by different individuals, classes, genders, ethnic groupings, invested with different degrees and types of intensity.”³

8.1.13 Consumption choices in the west in the 1970s and 1980s were dictated by a range of manufactured lifestyles, which dominated the market-

1. “Social and Cultural Report 1994: *The Netherlands*”. Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau. February 1995.

2. This section is indebted to Jackson, Peter, “Towards a cultural politics of consumption”, in Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson, Lisa Tickner (eds.) *Mapping the futures: local cultures, global change*. Routledge. London 1993.

3. Hebdige, Dick, *Hiding in the Light*, Routledge. London, 1988.

place. Countless retail outlets, selling clothing or furniture or interior design, were also commodifying lifestyles. The “designer jeans” phenomenon proved to be a brilliant marketing device that helped to individualise mass-produced goods and the concept spread as rapidly as the retail chains and shopping malls. People understand the messages they are receiving when they buy goods or services, but do not necessarily accept them. Rather, they put their “symbolic creativity” to the service of their own wishes and in so doing signal their membership of subcultures to which they may belong or their view of society and established values. Thus the old, autocratic, seasonal hierarchies of the fashion industry have been subverted by the use which young consumers have made of the second hand clothes market and their practice of alteration and customisation.

8.1.14 What is true of fashion can be applied to other forms of consumption. Everyday objects (for example safety pins) are expropriated to make aesthetic and life style statements. Since the second world war cuisine has been internationalised with the assistance of cookery writers promoting different kinds of food preparation from all parts of Europe and from Asia and the Indian sub-continent, and by the arrival of “ethnic” restaurants in cities and towns and by changing tastes fuelled by tourism. The recording industry has brought within most people’s reach a library of classical and pop music of every period, enabling them to assert a personal eclecticism against the commercial imperative of the fashion of the moment. Satellite television and video retail have made available the same opportunities in the case of feature films and television programmes. Consumers are now in a position, by means of selection from a wide range of products, to devise their own cultures and to determine (in E.M. Forster’s phrase) their particular “angle to the universe”. Audiences for mass culture are not uniformly uncritical, but interact with what they see and hear – judging, assessing and reworking products to suit their construction of their lives. Interestingly, advertisers are beginning to react to these attitudes: According to a recent world-wide Research International survey into young adults, brands which market themselves as the consumer’s friend in a bleak world, “providing encouragement and empowerment to the individual”, are successful (Nike was one example with its “Just do it” message).¹ Creating a sense of complicity or language understood only by this age group strikes a chord with disaffected young. “Commodities [...] can be pushed and pulled into the service of resistant demands and dreams. High tech in the hands of young blacks or girls making-up are not simply forms of buying into the system. They can be very effectively hijacked for cultures of resistance, reappearing as street-style cred or assertive femininity.”²

8.1.15 In sum, established cultural habits are being challenged by new, confused patterns shaped by changing demographics – especially age and ethnic background – economic realities, unemployment, globalisation of trade, the

1. “Are you talking to me? Communicating with young adults”, Research International. London, 1996.

2. Mort, F., “The politics of consumption” in Hall S. and Jacques M. (eds) *New times: the changing face of politics in the 1900s*, Lawrence and Wishart. London, 1989

bombardment of mass media images and the convergence of communication technology. The result is a scattered and complex cultural life with increased choices available to the individual (or at least the illusion of choice). It is, in fact, the new dominance of the individual and his or her tastes, as distinct from social groups, which is shaping today's new multi-doxies.

8.2 Civil society, moral markets and individual freedoms

8.2.1 *What is civil society?* This report has sketched a Europe in transition. How are we to make sense of so various a landscape? Can any general conclusions be drawn about the changing relations between the individual and collective institutions?

8.2.2 One starting point for an analysis is the model provided by the concept of "civil society". According to Salvador Giner, "civil society is an historically evolved sphere of individual rights, freedoms and voluntary associations whose politically undisturbed competition with each other in the pursuit of their respective private concerns, interests, preferences and intentions is guaranteed by a public institution, called the state. Any mature civil society exhibits at least five prominent dimensions: individualism, privacy, the market, pluralism and class."¹

8.2.3 The primacy of the individual, as has been shown above, is a hugely important and possibly irreversible development. In social behaviour, the ties of family are weakening. Patterns of employment and unemployment have left people very much on their own, unprotected by lifetime careers in the employ of stable private or public institutions. Deregulation, technological advance and the free market have opened up a competitive arena where the motto is "everyone for himself". As Giner points out: "The unhampered market allocates resources, honour, authority, as well as goods and services, through a spontaneous and ultimately anonymous process of countless individual transactions among individuals and their associations."²

8.2.4 Privacy is a precondition of individualisation if the citizen is to enjoy protection from a state which may guarantee, but can also threaten, her or his liberties. Montesquieu considered social cohesion depended on intermediary associations in civil society which guarded the individual from the potential for states to exhibit despotic tendencies. In contemporary Europe the risk is that individuals will withdraw from collective organisation, especially the popular involvement that is a prerequisite of democratic politics. As can be seen in various parts of Europe, this leaves the field open to opponents of civil society who reassert the old nationalist, ethnic or totalitarian orders. Martin Kettle writes: "The decisive question [...] is how well the new political systems of eastern Europe can build on the strand of Enlightenment thought which

1. Giner, Salvador, "Civil society and its future", in *Trial, trust and tribulation – The distribution of roles and changing nature of relations between governments and arts councils, associations and foundations*, Report of the European Round Table (Budapest, March 1994), Circle Publication No. 8. Arts Council of Finland. Helsinki, 1996.

2. Ibid.

enshrines the ideal of citizenship. Can a culture of citizen democracy, of individual rights, of a vigorous civil society form the basis of social cohesion, both within individual states and transcending their boundaries? Can it shape the 'imagined communities' of nations and states in ways that develop also a genuine European imaginary community, a viable common home of the civic, rationalist spirit beyond institutional structures? This hope of renewal has to contend with the possibility that the ousted dictatorships so mutilated the concepts and techniques of political modernity in societies, many of which had no pre-Stalinist experience of a modern civic culture, that the atavistic return of earlier, exclusionary irrationalist modes of bonding cannot but triumph."¹

8.2.5 Pluralism entails the diffusion of power throughout society, which is then vested differently in individuals and their groupings or coalitions. This fosters a degree of mutual autonomy and allows the assertion of "difference" among otherwise equal members of society. According to Bloomfield and Bianchini, new social movements have broadened contemporary citizenship "through their insistence on autonomous collective self-expression and representation rather than reliance on political parties to defend their interests and through shifting the boundaries between public and private concerns." In their view, "the emergence of self-consciously multicultural and multinational societies" has heightened the clamour for recognition of cultural specificity and regional autonomy.² In the absence of powerful systems of social (moral codes) and political (autocratic or paternalist states) structures, tolerance is essential if conflict and violence are not to follow.

8.2.6 This is all the more important seeing that economic and class distinctions are an invariable accompaniment of the rights and benefits of civil society, for free competition in an open market creates rich, successful and powerful people who will try to pass on their advantages if they can to their children. Life is a competitive game played according to generally applied rules, but the idea that the playing field can be level for everyone is utopian. The best that can be hoped for is protection for the weakest and a continuing effort through education and the rule of law to recreate equality of opportunity for each succeeding generation.

8.2.7 *Morals in the marketplace.* Unsurprisingly, moral attitudes have tended to mirror the fragmentation of old social norms. The over-arching framework of moral values, endorsed by church and state, has often given way to a vague consensus, inside which there is considerable leeway for individual choice. Surveys mapping changing values in western societies between the 1970s and 1980s identified definite trends accompanying the processes of industrialisation and "informatisation": on the one hand, materialistic hedonism and extreme individualism and, on the other, strict professionalism, corporatism, authoritarianism and submissiveness.

1. Kettle, Martin, op. cit.

2. Bloomfield, Jude, and Bianchini, Franco, "Cultural policies and the development of citizenship: observations on contemporary European experience", paper presented to "Cultural policy: state of the art" conference, Griffith University, Brisbane, June 1995.

8.2.8 The actual out-turn has given an unexpected twist to some of these predictions; recent years have seen an escalation of advertisement-driven consumerism, the rise of political intolerance and increased feelings of insecurity and alienation as a result of the economic recession and structural unemployment. The speculations of post-modernism, which came into fashion during the 1980s in the social sciences and philosophy, offered a way of looking at what was happening. They proposed a moral relativism to accompany the discrediting of old certainties and all-embracing rational explanations (“grand narratives”).

8.2.9 Postmodernist commentators have pointed to an increasing interest in culture in general (design and aesthetics, heritage culture) and urban culture in particular (prestigious architecture, local vernacular styles, cosmopolitan diversity, urban sociability). A remarkable example of this was the dominance of rock and pop in youth culture from the 1960s to the 1980s, not simply as art, but as a way of life. All of this, it is plausibly argued, marks a move away from the Modernist past, with its emphasis on universalising rationality, standardised functionality and instrumentalism; its notion of the planned society; its fixed aesthetic, ethnic and national hierarchies and its neglect of everyday life, tradition, morality and the particular. Instead, post-modern culture has embraced simulation, spectacle, pastiche and stylistic bricolage. The result has been a wider acceptance of, and aesthetic interest in, popular entertainments, advertising, electronic and commercial culture, ethnic cultural expressions, and vernacular cultural forms. This has been taken to the point where the kitsch and the banal have become the (sometimes ironic and playful) object of aesthetic display. Hierarchies of value, in sum, have become fluid and contested.

8.2.10 In this context an acceptance of absolute moral judgements is being replaced by a new concept of “moral markets”, which asserts that moral values in western societies, especially under favourable economic conditions, tend to turn into “symbolic goods”, and are bought and sold in a marketplace of ideas, particularly through the media, advertising and other cultural industries. In other words, individuals, organisations and business enterprises do not act rightly or behave in a certain way from internal conviction, but to gain external recognition or satisfy personal taste. Someone who consciously behaves in a “politically correct” manner, or a corporation advertising its environmental achievements, may be a typical customer of “moral markets”. This does not necessarily imply deception or opportunism, for “we can see a democratic tendency to let everyone participate in morality by selecting consumer items which satisfy his/her moral needs. We are dealing here with a morally agile form of consumer sovereignty. Moral intentions are revealed publicly through consumer purchases” (or, it could be added, in business-to-business interactions) “[...] and any recognition or status problems are easily solved. Recognition is granted by the publicly approved style-of-consumption groups.”¹

1. See Priddat, Birger P., “Moral markets, the cultural function of markets in modern societies. On the relation between economy, morality and accelerated culture”, a paper given to the Conference of the International Association of the Economics of Culture. Witten, Germany, August 1994.

8.2.11 One of the points to make about a market determination of morality is that it is logically no more or less “right” than the “intrinsic” justifications of classic philosophy. Its novelty (and its self-consistent rationality) is that it does not appeal to any kind of external, justifying authority beyond that of individuals negotiating with one another. It can, indeed, be argued that it is more democratic than other kinds of morality. However, its weakness is that the market is not well equipped to deal with the production of indivisible collective goods, the control of negative externalities and the provision of socially important services (for example education services and public health systems), which are available to all irrespective of their purchasing power. Moral markets are slow to respond rapidly and sensitively to new collective problems as they arise.

8.2.12 The mass media are important agents in the development of moral markets as sources of personal recognition and of people’s individually chosen values. Most critiques point out the increasing homogeneity of the media when they address major political and social issues, so the prevalent moral solutions they offer are, in the event, unlikely to be very diverse or mutually contradictory.

8.2.13 That said, there are plenty of alternative, non-commercial “products” on the market which have emerged from religious tradition and from voluntary associations and socio-political campaigns and which offer a wide range of moral choice. Radical cultural movements have produced diametrically opposed political options, from nationalism to feminism. In the last twenty years there has been rising public anxiety about the state of the environment and the health of planet Earth. This anxiety is yet another factor, as David Held, notes, that is wearing away the sense of belonging to a national community and respect for state-endorsed values. “Ecological disaster – whether in terms of pollution, damage to the ozone layer or the ‘greenhouse effect’ – does not acknowledge national boundaries and frontiers. The threat of ecological disaster creates the conditions for giving priority to the claims of humanity and its needs [...] rather than the language of the nation-state democracies.”¹ Accumulating scientific evidence of the damage which industrialisation has done to the biosphere has led to international initiatives such as the Brundtland Commission report and the Rio Summit. “Green” campaigns, initiatives and values, long practised in countries have permeated political and social structures and have had residual economic effects in the market place, including the launch of so-called environmentally friendly product lines. The notion of sustainable development, with its emphasis on human growth and the quality of life is, to a large extent, based on the ideas and the idealism of post-war generations which have benefited from technical and economic advance, but fear that it will be at the expense of posterity.

8.2.14 In a contrasting trend, social and economic insecurity seems to have introduced a new puritanism – with conservatism on the political Right and “political correctness” on the Left. Faced with the collapse of a moral con-

1. Held, David, “Between state and civil society: citizenship”, in *Citizenship* (ed. Geoff Andrews), Lawrence and Wishart. London, 1991.

sensus, public authorities have sometimes exhorted a return to traditional values and promoted the arts and heritage as a means of recreating a lost social cohesion. Defensive rhetoric of this kind has not always been very successful, although Nordic countries have shown that a constructive appeal to tradition can produce results: they see the protection of a living past as an instrument for self-confidence, especially among minority communities, and aim to combine, contradictorily in some eyes, a respect for the moral systems of others with the promotion of basic western values.

8.2.15 The moral basis for the authority of supranational agencies such as the United Nations has long rested on an absolutist assertion of human and cultural rights, of which the most important is the right to freedom of expression. *Our creative diversity*, the report by the World Commission on Culture and Development, calls for the establishment of a universal (or global) ethics, dedicated to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and diversity. Many Europeans would endorse these principles, which are preconditions for the unimpeded conduct of life in contemporary civil society. What perhaps is less clear is whether they are heeded in practice as a sufficient moral code for the guidance of individual behaviour. It is a paradox that they permit and have tended to foster contemporary relativism.

8.2.16 Before the modern era, "Western values" had a powerful guarantor in the Christian churches; organised religion provided a universal framework for public and private morality. The secularisation of Europe over the past two centuries has led to a decline in religious belief and the close links between church and state have been weakened or severed in many countries. Many Europeans would claim to have retained versions of the Christian ethic after losing their belief and still make use of church ceremonies to mark rites of passage, such as marriages and funerals. It is also true that the churches still attract millions of adherents. However, their claims to universality are no longer universally accepted nor their precepts obeyed. Religion has stalls in the moral marketplace, but no longer a monopoly over the conditions of trade.

8.2.17 That said, there is evidence today of a religious, or at least a spiritual, revival. Churches have been in institutional decline, but an English ecclesiastic commented in 1994: "We [...] are aware of a spiritual hunger which looks more and more for unorthodox forms of fulfilment." The chairman of the Conference of European Churches, the Very Rev. John Arnold, has claimed: "We may well be the first generation in history not only to belong to a post-Christian era, but also to a post-atheist era."¹ In central and eastern Europe the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches are flourishing after many years of discrimination by the communist authorities. In western protestant countries evangelical and fundamentalist movements are gaining adherents. As the year 2000 approaches there is a distinct possibility that millennarian fears and hopes will give an added stimulus to spiritual extremism. Some young people are attracted by a variety of Christian and non-Christian sects.

1. Both these quotations come from Rusama, Jaakko, "Europe and the churches", in *Finnish Institute yearbook*. London, 1994.

8.2.18 Within the Europe of Christendom there are three traditions which find territorial as well as spiritual expression – Orthodox in the east and south-east of the continent; Roman Catholic in the south and some of the middle; and Protestant in the north and some of the middle. The long reign of communism suppressed, but did not eliminate, Christianity; perhaps in the long run it strengthened it. In Poland, Russia and to a lesser extent in Hungary and the Czech Republic, the church has resumed its traditional role. Islam is a growing force not simply among the established Muslim communities of Russia, the Balkans and the Caucasus, but also in France, where it is now the second largest religion so far as regular practitioners are concerned, Germany and the United Kingdom.

8.2.19 The religious revival has sometimes bred, or accompanied, social and political intolerance in both the Christian and Muslim traditions. “The rise of fundamentalism has to be understood as a reaction to growing secularisation and multiculturalism. Fundamentalists look for a basic identity principle grounding a homogenous social order. They have an authoritarian concept of the state. Religious fundamentalism is both a public political movement and sectarian reactions by individuals.”¹ But it is also a reaction to the apparently irresistible forces of materialism and offers a lesson to those who confuse living standards with the quality of life.

8.2.20 The state’s capacity “as an organisation of morality – its definition, encouragement and execution and the prohibition of immorality, while at the same time setting codes of obedience, has changed.”² Morality, then, has become a kind of stock exchange comprising commercial and non-commercial brokers and bidders. The churches are still in the game, but no longer set the rules. Hierarchies of value have been replaced by a competitive free-for-all and, although the mass media offer homogenous messages, people can pick and choose the values they wish to adopt.

8.2.21 *The management of freedom.* In the light of this free-for-all, what is the impact of social change on the exercise of freedom of expression, with special relationship to the arts and culture? Over the last two or three decades we have witnessed a general loosening of moral and social controls over what can or cannot be said publicly – a development which is consistent with the rise of individualism, the moral market and the advance of civil society, but is less a consequence of considered reform than of commercial pressures. First of all, we should distinguish the “internal” control of the creative processes and the “external” framework which combines public controls and those exercised by public opinion and the media.

8.2.22 Peer group criticism and assessment has played a major role in directing the creative processes and professional and career aspirations of scientists and artists. It usually joins seamlessly with external mediation and gate-keep-

1. Corijn, Eric, and Mommaas, Hans, “Urban cultural policies in Europe”, a background paper commissioned by the European Task Force. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

2. Miller, Toby, *The well-tempered self: citizenship, culture and the postmodern subject*. John Hopkins University. Baltimore, 1993.

ing systems which, especially in the arts, direct creative activities and channel their results to production processes and to the awareness of consumers and audiences. The core of these mediation and gate-keeping systems consists of professional organisations, curators, artists' agencies, critics and editors of the cultural industries.

8.2.23 It has been traditionally assumed that the gatekeepers keep two functions more or less effectively in balance: first, the maintenance and renewal of the stock of creative talent and, secondly, the selection of commercially profitable ideas and works of art for the arts markets as well as the production processes of the cultural industries. Some recent American and European studies indicate that of these two commercial functions the latter has been gaining ground at the expense of the former. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that popular culture (popular music, action films, etc.) in the 1980s and 1990s has increased its share of media coverage in the cultural sections of newspapers, in cultural "journals" and commentaries on television.

8.2.24 Gate-keeping has a "protective" dimension in addition to its "promotional" function. The two areas where this mostly affects intellectual activities and cultural life are censorship of artistic and journalistic expression and the regulation of the media. Although freedom of individual expression and of the press have been ideals central to western democracy since the French Revolution, moral censorship of the contents of the arts and mass communication and politically-motivated regulation of the media have been maintained in one form or another in all western countries. This has chiefly been to protect an individual's reputation and privacy and the sanctity of ethical, moral and religious convictions.

8.2.25 The censoring of obscenity, violence and blasphemy is based on these principles, but because of the variety of people's private feelings and moral values, "average community standards" are used as a proxy. Statutory censorship is complemented by informal or self-censorship, inspired by fear of criticism and public opinion. Paradoxically, this informal censorship is common in, and usually maintained with the aid of, the mass media.

8.2.26 In the case of politically-inspired media regulation and censorship, direct control of what is said or written is managed through structural regulation. In mature modern democracies the former is limited to specific areas (for example state secrets) and structural regulation is justified in terms of the need for political impartiality (all political sides should have their opinion heard). Also it is believed that the accumulation of power through concentration of media ownership may endanger the unimpeded flow of information and the free conduct of democratic processes. Methods of enforcing structural regulation range from public ownership of the main or strategic media to the creation of regulatory bodies with powers to monitor performance and observance of the rules of impartiality.

8.2.27 In central and eastern Europe, the hidden hand of totalitarianism still sometimes operates behind the scenes. Thus Milena Dragicević-Sesić writes

about Serbia: “[...] the autocensorship of creators and editors is enormous, and the semblance of freedom still greater. In accordance with that, people write, make films, select topics for TV serials, print books, anthologies, organise performances and celebrations. Films featuring the second world war are replaced by new historical films, the book market is flooded with memoirs, anthologies of folk literature, historical novels and ‘communist’ publications [...]. The time of autocensorship has not yet passed, only the editors’ reasons for decisions and choices of issues to be engaged, have changed. Ideological censorship is concealed, sometimes even from the very person who unconsciously submits to it. In any case, the true reasons for not placing a certain text on the repertoire or not inviting a specific artist – the true ideological reasons for autocensorship – will remain hidden, while others, most often of an organisational or financial nature, will be invoked as decisive.”¹

8.2.28 Although censorship and regulation in western democracies are anchored in legislation and seem to be well established, a closer look reveals a flux of more or less continuous change in which certain underlying trends can be detected. In the case of moral censorship of artistic and journalistic expression, assessment criteria have steadily become more indulgent. It may be misleading to attribute this exclusively to increased tolerance and the liberalisation of public opinion. In fact, the main forces behind this development are probably economic. Sex and violence are topics which release people’s hidden desires and fears; as artistic themes they interest people – and they sell products.

8.2.29 An analogous process seems to apply to a specific area of privacy protection: the violation of the privacy of celebrities. Media exposure creates celebrities, their private lives interest people and media-created scandals and revelations sell media products, and the success of these media coups reinforces celebrity cults and tends to lower – at least in media practice – the threshold of privacy intrusion.

8.2.30 Liberalisation has been a feature of the last two decades, even in the politically-motivated structural regulation of the media. There has been a clear shift from comprehensive control (public ownership/monopoly) to milder forms of regulation. The “liberalisation” of European broadcasting systems in the 1980s is often presented as a model case. The trend is, however, multifarious both in its forms and motives and includes deconcentration (for example an increase in the number of channels, the opening of regional and local “windows”, decentralisation), the economically-motivated divestment of public ownership, deregulation (increasing market competition by breaking up or preventing monopolistic control) and political liberalisation (decreasing controls exercised for political reasons). The history of the European electronic media from the deconcentration of the French television (1974) to the deadline for the de-regulation of European national telecommunication services (January 1998) illustrates the whole gamut of these different liberalisation processes.

1. Dragicevic-Sesic, Milena, *Cultural policy, the institutional system and art trends*. Institute of Social Sciences, Forum for Ethnic Relations, Belgrade, 1995.

8.2.31 The most distinct overall trend has been the decline of political influence (the control of information by the state and political parties) and the steadily rising importance of economic considerations. There seems to be an increasing emphasis on “pure” financial and economic motives (acquisition of capital, improving profitability and competitive edge, promotion of economic growth) at the expense of more “social” motives. (maintenance of employment, improving of services and lowering of consumer prices).

8.2.32 This situation has attracted much criticism. The most poignant attack comes from intellectual circles which were influential in launching the liberalisation process in the 1960s and 1970s to support radical counter-cultures and to create more socially responsible media. Understandably, they consider what is happening now as a betrayal of their original objectives. In turn, their position has attracted fire from conservatives, who accuse them of destroying the social fibre of society by undermining the legitimacy of social institutions. The rise of the communitarian ideology in the 1980s seems to have given this criticism more verve.

8.2.33 There is passionate debate on the subject of violence on television and film, of which there are two particularly crucial dimensions – the impact of portrayed violence on children and the interconnection between male violence, real or fictional, against women and social ideas of women. It is argued that common sense dictates a causal relation between depicted violence and rising trends of criminal aggression. Some studies support this position; for example the American Psychological Association observed: “There is absolutely no doubt that high levels of viewing violence on television are correlated with increased acceptance of aggressive attitudes and increased aggressive behaviour.”¹ However, other research fails convincingly to demonstrate this link; a society like Japan has low crime figures but a high incidence of media violence. Many European countries have relatively low rates of homicide and high television coverage of violence (among them, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Hungary, Finland and the United Kingdom). In our present state of knowledge, the most reasonable position seems to be that expressed by Professor Osmo A. Wiio of Finland: “Media violence is not a general explanation of aggressive behaviour. There may exist contingencies where media violence is a contributing factor. In such cases the social system already favours violence as a solution to the problems of the individual. On the other hand, if the shared social values accept violence only as a solution of legitimised group problems, then media violence may not be a factor in the behaviour of the individual.”²

8.2.34 When the nature of a problem is unclear, so will be the means to solve it. Few governments have gone further than to impose cautious regulatory regimes to restrict children's access to unsuitable material and, more

1. “Violence and youth: psychology's response, vol. 1”, summary report of the American Psychological Association Commission on Violence and Youth. Washington DC, 1993.

2. Wiio, Osmo A., “Is television a killer? An international comparison”, *Intermedia* April/May 1995, Volume 23/ No. 2. International Institute of Communications. London, 1995.

generally, to advocate self-regulation. This is understandable; it recognises the importance of protecting freedom of expression and it acknowledges the technical difficulties involved in trying to censor the new technologies. In February 1996 the European Parliament voted for the universal introduction of an electronic device into television sets (to be phased in over ten years), which would enable parents to have excessive violence and explicit sex censored from their screens. The proposal raises interesting questions about parental responsibility, the duties of broadcasters, the role of legislation in this field and the future of existing regulations. In the meantime, many would argue that further research is required, and that as research exclusively focusing on the relation between media violence and young people's behaviour has led to no definite conclusions, it may now be more appropriate to examine television within a wider sphere of social life. There may be a case for intergovernmental institutions to form a working group of education, health, cultural and media experts which, within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, would continue the search for a definitive statement of the relation between violence on the screen and antisocial behaviour by young people. It could act as a clearing house for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information. Another possibility would be to ensure that media studies have a central place in educational curricula, to enable young people to interpret and manage media imagery. The Council of Europe Steering Committee on the Mass Media and its Steering Committee on Equality between Women and Men have initiated a dialogue on "Human rights and gender: the responsibility of the media", which could usefully be developed.¹

8.2.35 Difficult choices are raised here for governments that see their main cultural role as permitting their citizens to determine their own cultural demands. As Toby Miller says: "If cultural-capitalist societies identify themselves as *loci* of free expression, as evidenced by the absence of state control of art, what is their appropriate cultural stance? Should they adopt one at all? Cultural-capitalist societies are wont to take one of two rhetorical positions here. The first offers the market as a system for identifying and allocating public preferences in matters of culture, denying the state a role other than that of a police officer patrolling the precincts of property [...]. The second identifies certain artefacts as inalienably, transcendently, laden with value, but vulnerable to the public's inability to remain transcendental in its tastes [...]. The latter position encourages a *dirigiste* role for the state [...] it is routinely derogated by some critics for a certain cultural magistracy."²

8.2.36 If freedom of expression is a right for the citizen in society, privacy is its equivalent for the citizen as an individual. The new technologies have not just linked most people to the world at large, they have provided the state and commercial interests with almost total access to every aspect of daily life. This is not a new issue: in the late 1970s Warner Amex's two-way cable sys-

1. "Human rights and gender: the responsibility of the media", joint seminar of the Steering Committee on the Mass Media and the Steering Committee on Equality between Women and Men, Council of Europe, 29 June to 1 July 1994.

2. Miller, *op. cit.*

tem, Qube, was the first interactive television service and was tested in Columbus, Ohio. The computers kept records of what everyone watched and what everyone bought on the pay channels. Information of this kind does not simply create highly commercial assets in the form of mailing lists, it also gives an opportunity to the press and public authorities to exploit people's tastes and habits for political or other extraneous ends. One pay channel was dedicated to pornographic movies, giving an opportunity for blackmail or exposure, say, in the case of someone standing for public office. Where is the line to be drawn between the public interest and the right to privacy?

8.2.37 The talisman of electronic liberty is the Internet and it is becoming more and more evident with each day that passes that public authorities are gathering their strength to discipline it; their anxiety focuses on the use of the Internet to distribute child pornography, terrorist conspiracies and, in some cases and some countries, extreme or oppositional political opinions. What is less clear is whether these uses are the real issue or whether they are the pre-text for a more root-and-branch *rappel à l'ordre*.

8.2.38 If traditional certainties have disappeared in a cloud of moral relativity, it is hard to see what state censors, broadcasters and film-makers can do in the long run. Michael Grade, the chief executive of the United Kingdom's Channel 4, has made the point that media violence is more or less acceptable depending on its moral context; thus a long-running BBC documentary medical series was one of television's most violent programmes, depicting unblinking accounts of surgical operations, but was acceptable because of its underlying didactic motive. "This surely brings us near to the nub of the issue about television violence. If the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable TV violence is set by the moral context, what happens when there is no consensus in our society about moral values? [...] Ought we to adopt a particular moral code and try to persuade everyone else to follow it? Or should we settle for offering a forum in which different moralities can encounter each other in a spirit of tolerance?"¹ Policy makers in a democratic society will be hard put not to choose the second option, but public opinion and political pressures may demand a different response.

8.3 Towards a culture of trust

8.3.1 *The nation state under siege*. The nation state remains the fundamental mechanism for public collective activity and is the force which maintains civil society in place. However, as we have seen, the picture is changing. Notions of cultural identity used to coincide with, and reinforce, national borders and were interwoven with political imperatives. But nowadays they are as often functions of sub-state ethnic claims by regional and local communities, or supra-state claims by transnational institutions. As Robert Picht remarks: "Identities are discussed as if they were something stable, but in fact they are deeply unstable. When the issues of European diversity are discussed, and subsidiarity should help to safeguard this, we tend to forget and

1. Grade, Michael, "The James Cameron Memorial Lecture 1993". Extract in *Intermedia*, June-July 1993, published by the International Institute of Communications, London.

underestimate two fundamental forces of change which transform our societies and our personal life.”¹ On the one hand, technological modernisation, economic internationalisation and electronic communications tend to unify and standardise; on the other, “we witness a growing xenophobia, growing nationalism, growing racism, growing violence. History is back again, and history as a reaction to this kind of [standardising] dynamics of change.”²

8.3.2 Another factor which is weakening the nation state has to be borne in mind. This is the impact of international institutions which came into being after the second world war, the United Nations, the Council of Europe and particularly what is now the European Union. As a result of their work, international law and regulation together with joint political action have been assuming a new significance. Asbjørn Eide observes: “The relationship between the international and the domestic legal order is undergoing a profound change, reversing their priority. For centuries domestic law was the primary legal system, regulating without external constraints almost all matters internal to each political unit: international law had the much more marginal function of regulating matters between states.”³ This comment helps to explain the growing importance given to the principle of subsidiarity, as, for instance, in the Maastricht Treaty. The idea that decisions should be made at the lowest administrative level which is best able to deal with the issue in question is, on the face of it, a guarantee of democracy in that it brings government closer to the citizen and helps to foster that power of local organisation which is a feature of a well-running civil society. The principle of subsidiarity also gives a new legitimation to regionalism which, since the mid-1990s, has been a major trend in European political and administrative restructuring. In the post-communist societies, the same trend has taken on more extreme forms of resistance to central government through autonomous units, regions and “nationalities”, as the situation in the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States bears witness. It seems that attempts to find federalist solutions, such as the constitution of the Russian Federation, are immensely difficult to realise. So far as culture specifically is concerned, Article 128 of Maastricht Treaty seems to reinforce the principle of subsidiarity and guard against the development of a European cultural policy rather than policies for culture in Europe.

8.3.3 *The search for a new civil society.* The state in its role as a promoter of national identity may no longer be the threat to individual rights it once appeared to be, but, as an entity which encroaches on citizens’ lives through health and welfare, education, police and information services and such like, it retains considerable influence. It is joined by the growing power of national and international manufacturing, commerce and finance. In sum, as Giner

1. Picht, Robert. “Disturbed identities: social and cultural mutations in contemporary Europe”, in *Culture: building stone for Europe 2002* (ed. L. Bekemans) European Interuniversity Press. Brussels, 1994.

2. Ibid.

3. Eide, Asbjørn, “Minority and groups rights under the contemporary international order”, in *Questions de minorités en Europe*, ed. Panayotis Grigoriou. Centre Hellénique d’Etudes Européennes, Collection L’Europe Plurielle, Presses Universitaires. Brussels, 1994.

puts it, "the anonymous, rootless and formal corporate structures that now pervade society", cast a long shadow across civil society.

8.3.4 The corporatist challenge is, of course, mitigated by the widespread trend towards deregulation and dependence on market forces. To some extent, national and international corporatist forces tend to cancel each other out. Also, ironically, corporatist production is providing goods and services which in various ways (cf. the Internet) are empowering individuals and releasing them from collective control and mass markets.

8.3.5 However, in all this confusion of social and moral values something important appears to have been lost. Civil society depends on an active bond between the citizen and government. The point is well made by Perri 6 of the British thinktank, Demos: "In the long run, the societies that show the greatest economic dynamism and viable social cohesion are the ones where a culture of high trust enables individuals to create organisations readily, to take personal responsibility but also to sustain long-term co-operative relations in trading with and employing people who are strangers to them ... the most important task of government is to make it possible for a society to organise itself."¹ Today in many countries the civil bond is expressed through not much more than an instrumental relationship between the taxpayer and the state as tax farmer. The rise of one-issue movements has had the effect of sidelining political parties – coalitions of interests which used to offer a structured and effective conduit from citizen to ruler. Trade unions are another kind of coalition designed to influence the state in class-based societies from an oppositional, but constructive, standpoint and their influence too has been fading throughout much of Europe, in the face of neo-liberal economic policies and economic globalisation.

8.3.6 Western governments are not alone in their search for active, well-functioning civil societies which defend individual freedoms and support the democratic process. The same process is a feature of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe which some observers argue should not lay claim to the title before they are seen to have established vigorous civil societies.

8.3.7 Culture can play a useful part in fostering civil bonds and encouraging a creative response to social and economic issues, but only if decision-makers in the public and private sectors are sensitive to its value. However, policies pay far too little attention to working towards a consensus beyond the cultural community. There are models in a few countries which seek to influence and encourage potential decision-makers in mid-career outside the cultural sector, through seminars and debates, to recognise the role of culture as a cohesive force in society. We believe these to be worthy of emulation, and suggest that the Council of Europe monitor such initiatives and promote them to national governments.

8.3.8 What is necessary, above all, is the formation of an extensive network of voluntary associations and foundations, which in turn presupposes a

1. Perri 6., "Governing by cultures", *Demos Quarterly*, Issue 7. London, 1995.

legal framework recognising their status and tax reforms which give them the concessions they need to attract charitable donations and contributions from the private sector. These associations, which are often distributors of mutual benefits to their members and are sometimes designed to act as pressure groups, are essential components of civil society, independent as they are of public authority. They are not state-inspired and are formed by individuals who share a common concern and come together to express it. Some have charitable objectives, but the primary purpose of others is not to serve the public interest (although they may in fact do so), but a multiplicity of private concerns. So-called "third sector" associations range across the full extent of human activity and cultural and sports groups are among the most popular and widespread. Some states take the view (for example Sweden) that public authorities should do nothing that the voluntary associations can do as well or better. It is not surprising that their numbers appear to be rising in the former communist countries. For example, according to the Council of Europe's report on Cultural policy in Estonia, in 1994 there were some 3 500 non-profit associations of which about 2 000 were established after 1988; 19% of them have cultural objectives.¹

8.3.9 Civil society is not simply a national concern. A recent proposal emanating from the United Nations' World Commission on Global Governance argued that "global" civil society would be strengthened by involving the United Nations and international non-governmental organisations in a Forum of Civil Society to complement the work of the General Assembly. It is surprising that despite discussion of citizens' rights and of cultural identity in the European Union the case for a European civil society has not been further advanced. Yet, in an unplanned way, such an entity seems to be evolving at every level: new pan-European voluntary associations, networks of individuals, groups and institutions as well as new special interest groups (that is, umbrella bodies formed to enable national organisations to function more effectively within the framework of European supranational and intergovernmental agencies) have come into being.

8.3.10 Commissioner Marcelino Oreja has attempted to open up a debate on European citizenship in the context of civil society through the reflection group which has prepared a preliminary agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union. The background paper, "Citizenship in the Union", argues that such an approach would offer better guarantees for basic citizens' rights, freedom of movement, security against crime and illegal trafficking and democratic participation in, and transparency of, EU decision-making. These ideas appear to have attracted little support from member states, some of which are uneasy about any further deepening of European integration. But whether or not there is an open debate, the indications are that the "third sector" will assume considerable importance in the years to come in the cultural sector. Unfortunately, its natural growth is being impeded by serious underfunding of artistic exchange and cultural networks which bring together artists, arts educators, cultural institutions and arts and cultur-

1. *Cultural policy in Estonia*, Report by a European panel of examiners, European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. Council of Europe Publishing. Strasbourg, 1997.

al managers and enable common projects to take place on a Europe-wide scale.

8.3.11 Of course, voluntary associations are not enough in themselves to protect civil society or civil rights, because they do not fertilise the democratic political process by creating a political class and empowering the business of government. They are, in that sense, without political responsibility. The full exercise of civil rights implies a will to fulfil three main conditions: the enhancement of social cohesion and collective identities and the integration of different sensitivities; the development of specific social or economic projects with an overall community dimension; and, finally, the application of the principle of social subsidiarity – that is that wherever power is to be delegated it should be done as far as possible directly and laterally from one part of the community to another rather than indirectly and vertically from the community to the state and back again. The challenge facing the countries of Europe is that, unless these principles are adopted, civil bonds will be eroded and ineffective state authorities will confront free, but powerless, individuals.

8.4 The struggle for cultural rights

8.4.1 *Rights that are wronged.* Of course it is difficult to visualise a culture of trust when European value systems are so indeterminate. As Raymond Weber has observed: “A great wind seems to have swept everything away – ideologies, utopias, myths, systems, doctrines and dogmas. We are manifestly in a period of transition, opaque, crisis-laden, more abounding in perplexity and uncertainty than in obvious truths [...]. The post-communist ideological void on the one hand, and post modernist malaise on the other, favour irrationalism and a quest for identity leading to withdrawal into ‘one’s own’ and the rejection of others, of difference, of diversity. A disturbing rise in racism, anti-semitism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, religious fundamentalism and, more generally, of intolerance and exclusion, are the consequences.”¹

8.4.2 The post-war idea of western Europe as a refuge for the oppressed is being seriously challenged by governments who appear quite prepared to sacrifice human rights to political expediency as they close their external frontiers. European cities such as Berlin, London and Paris have a rich mix of peoples and cultures, but governments, anxious about the impact on stability, electoral sentiments and welfare resources of an influx of migrants from outside the European Union or the European Economic Area regard with apprehension any indicators which suggest that minorities are growing as a percentage of the whole.² Elsewhere, tough new citizenship laws or language legislation seem designed to discriminate against minorities. Citizenship leg-

1. Weber, Raymond, opening speech in “Democracy, human rights, minorities: educational and cultural aspects”, report of the seminar on “Specificities and universality: problems of identities” (Klingenthal, France, 1994). Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

2. Ethnic minorities will represent 28% of the population of London by 2011, up by 8% on 1991, according to the London Research Centre, but the increase will be attributable almost entirely to the natural age structure, not to higher birthrates or immigration. See Timmins, Nicholas, “London: the new melting pot of Europe”. The *Independent* newspaper. London, 13 December 1995.

isolation based on ethnicity is especially disturbing in Europe today, not least because it is being done in the guise of democracy.

8.4.3 Intolerance and discrimination against minorities undermine democracy and human rights and has given a new urgency to the international debate on cultural rights, an urgency recognised by the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe at the Vienna Summit in 1993, which called on the Committee of Ministers "to begin work on human rights in the cultural field, by provisions guaranteeing individual rights, in particular for persons belonging to national minorities."¹ The task of drafting the protocol concerning individual, universal and enforceable cultural rights was entrusted by the Committee of Ministers to the *Ad hoc* Committee for the Protection of National Minorities (CAHMIN). Subsequently the Council for Cultural Co-operation was asked by the Project Group on Human Rights and Genuine Democracy (CAHDD) to prepare, with others, a list of cultural rights concerning participation in cultural life suitable for inclusion in a declaration or similar undertakings by governments.

8.4.4 Discussion on cultural rights in recent years has focused on five principal areas: the right to identity; the right to language; the right to participate in cultural life; the right to cultural heritage; and the right to education. Of these, identity has been recognised as the prime determinant of cultural rights and also the source of the most conflict. "Cultural identity," Etienne Grosjean has noted, "is neither fixed nor monolithic [...] it is multiple in that it is determined on the basis of membership of sometimes distinct and sometimes overlapping communities and brings into play contrasting elements, namely cultural roots and participation in an enterprise mobilising all the diverse elements in society."² Many Europeans today are deprived of an identity and there is increasing recognition of the need to protect the right of the individual to choose freely to belong to a community or not, or to claim one or more identities, and the right to be respected for that choice.

8.4.5 The right of the individual to use his/her own language is directly related to identity. The importance of supporting and promoting minority languages to enhance the diversity of cultures in Europe is recognised in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The Charter requires states to eliminate discrimination against the use of regional and minority languages and to promote their use in cultural, social and public life, education and the media. Access to the latter is especially important in that the media and languages are both the products and the producers of culture.

8.4.6 Democracy and respect for human rights cannot develop without an intense cultural life within society, as the Round Table on Human Rights and Cultural Policies in a Changing Europe emphasised.³ The right to participate in cultural life and to have access to culture is an integral dimension of cul-

1. Council for Cultural Co-operation Newsletter No. 3, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1993.

2. Grosjean, Etienne, "Cultural identity: a key element of the democratic challenge" in "Democracy, human rights, minorities: educational and cultural aspects", op. cit.

3. Fisher, Rod, et al., op. cit.

tural rights and is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a number of international instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Freedom of expression is also enshrined in international law and, to some extent, is taken for granted in most western countries. The adoption by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe of a Cities of Asylum Charter – through which participating cities promise to give refuge to a writer or intellectual facing persecution – was a timely reminder of how fragile these freedoms are. At the same time, freedoms are not absolute, but contain within them the obligation to respect the freedom and dignity of others.

8.4.7 The destruction of libraries in Sarajevo or the Ottoman bridge in Mostar in the former Yugoslavia showed contempt for people's collective past or the heritage symbols which express their identity. Respect for the value accorded, collectively or individually, to cultural heritage is a precondition of any civilised society and is a legitimate aspect of cultural rights. We will return to the implications of the rape of heritage in Chapter 9. At this point, however, it is worth noting a subtle shift in emphasis from heritage law to heritage "entitlements", that is to memory and history, which constitutes a new generation of cultural rights.

8.4.8 The right to permanent education and equality of treatment in education is one of the key principles of cultural rights and is embedded in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 2). The right to education also begs the question: how best to educate young people to respect difference and diversity? The new technologies could have a role here in furthering intercultural understanding among young people and instilling such fundamental European values as concern for human rights, culture and identity, respect for heritage and living in a multicultural and multi-faith Europe. The European Union and Council of Europe, with the support of the private sector, could explore the feasibility of financing the production and distribution of a series of CD-ROMs on these and related culture and development issues for schools. Artists could be involved in the process.

8.4.9 *Obstacles to change.* Cultural rights are an underdeveloped category of human rights, lacking satisfactory definitions and legal safeguards. As an interdisciplinary human rights colloquy in Fribourg recognised, "the slowness to formally recognise cultural rights as human rights was in marked contrast to the seriousness of the daily violations of them".¹ There are several reasons for this. First, the division of human rights into two international covenants protecting civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other creates what some consider to be an artificial distinction and has led some states to argue that cultural rights are really goals or ambitions and that they should not be accorded the same legitimacy or status as human rights. Allied to this is the reluctance of some governments to endorse international agreements such as "soft law" that are not justiciable (that is, not enforceable in law). Part of the problem for enforcement is lack of clarity on terminology. One illustration of this is the Frame-

1. Council for Cultural Co-operation newsletter, No. 3, op. cit.

work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities which fails to define “national minority”. Some states argued that it should cover historical or regional minorities, others considered “new” minorities, including migrants or refugees, should be embraced by the term. But there is a paradox: the more precise the terminology the more difficult it is for intergovernmental agencies to obtain a consensus among member states.

8.4.10 Whether cultural rights should be collective or individual has also presented problems. Peter Leuprecht, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, has argued that a new protocol on cultural rights “should safeguard both individual rights [...] and rights exercised collectively” for example linguistic rights and the right of the individual to protect and express his/her cultural identity.¹ Nevertheless, he recognises that there are pitfalls as excessive emphasis on cultural identity can result in particularisation and give rise to segregation and stigmatisation or can be pursued without respect for other cultures.

8.4.11 There is also the inherent conflict between, on the one hand, the human rights values of respect for different faiths and, on the other, freedom of expression. This was illustrated most vividly by the Salman Rushdie affair. The death threat and the burning of Rushdie’s books is totally abhorrent and governments were right to condemn such intolerance, but “does living in a multicultural Europe impose new responsibilities and disciplines on artists and, if so, what will be the impact on freedom of expression and the genuine insights that flow from creativity?”²

8.4.12 We have sympathy with the view that any consideration of cultural rights requires us “to redefine the interactions between human rights, democracy, culture and development.”³ We also recognise that interculturalism should be one of the central aims of such rights. In line with the recommendations of the Helsinki Round Table it may be opportune to reassess the principles that guide the choice of objectives in the field of human rights and cultural development.⁴ As Pierre Henri-Imbert notes: “The attention we pay to rights, through declarations and conventions, may have caused us to lose sight of the very foundations of such rights and to concentrate only on affirmed rights, not on the ethical requirement implicit in such affirmation, namely respect for others.”⁵ In common with the Helsinki recommendations, more analysis is called for of the geographical and social context in which the various cultural identities take shape and assert themselves.⁶ In seeking to strengthen policies to ensure equality of access and opportunity it is important to reaffirm the value and place of creativity in the process.

1. Ibid.

2. Fisher et al., op. cit.

3. “Reflections on cultural rights: synthesis report”, Council for Cultural Co-operation, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1995.

4. Fisher et al., op. cit.

5. “Reflections on cultural rights”, op. cit.

6. Fisher et al., op. cit.

8.4.13 If aspirations for a democratic Europe in the twenty-first century are to be met it seems essential to safeguard the freedom of individuals to identify with the culture and communities of their choice, to participate in cultural life, to have the right to be taught and use their own culture and language, while, at the same time, respecting the diversity of other cultures. There is a strong case for the addition of a protocol on cultural rights to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, we recognise the difficulties some governments have in agreeing on standard setting instruments in this sector and consider, as an alternative, the Council of Europe could continue its work on the preparation of a European Declaration of Cultural Rights for ratification by governments as the minimum test of their sincerity and commitment to the principles of cultural rights. Both "new" and established minorities should be brought within the scope of such an instrument. It follows that the Council of Europe will need to promote such a Declaration widely so that the peoples of Europe are aware of the principles to which their governments subscribe. As the Helsinki Round Table concluded: "A society which encourages the development of arts and culture at the widest level through legal protection of cultural rights and appropriate cultural policies [...] should be a society of people better able to understand human rights and therefore a society with a better record of respect for human rights."¹

Summary

Culture as a contribution to human knowledge and understanding used to embody a generally accepted moral consensus. In the light of today's individualism, this is no longer so. Values are increasingly seen as relative and to be selected at will; despite evidence of a religious revival, these trends seem unlikely to be reversed in the foreseeable future. Patterns of consumption and taste are relative. Mass media constraints on freedom of expression are becoming liberalised, and leading to an authoritarian backlash on the grounds that it is imperilling the moral development of children and encouraging other antisocial attitudes. Civil society is a central feature of market-led democracy; the liberties of the individual depend on protection by the state, but also on protection from it - and from the growing power of great commercial corporations. The growth of the "third" (or voluntary) sector, in which arts and culture have an important stake, is key to the maintenance of civil society. Cultural rights, as an aspect of human rights, underpin these liberties, in as far as they assert the right to identity, the right to language, the right to participate in cultural life, the right to the cultural heritage and the right to education. The seriousness of the daily violations of cultural rights demands that the difficulties in balancing individual, collective and state rights be resolved as the basis for a civil society.

1. Fisher et al., op. cit.

Points for consideration

Contribution to human knowledge and understanding

i. Media studies are an important means of helping people to interpret and manage media imagery, and in particular fictional violence, and should be given appropriate priority in educational curricula.

ii. It is vital to instill in young people an understanding that respect for other races, creeds, the heritage and environment is a precondition for building a civilised and harmonious Europe. The new technologies provide exciting opportunities for introducing young people to European values. The European Union and the Council of Europe jointly – with support from the private sector – could explore the feasibility of financing the production and distribution of a series of CD-ROMs on culture and development for schools throughout Europe. The subjects covered could include culture and identity, culture and human rights, a multicultural/multifaith Europe, culture and the environment, Europe's cultural heritage and the role of the artist in Europe today. Major European creators could be involved in the production process.

Economic and social outcomes

iii. Acknowledging the importance of the right to freedom of speech and noting the technical difficulties of applying censorship to the new communications technologies, it might be prudent for governments and the international community to frame regulations with the limited aims of protecting children from obscene or violent material and otherwise only have recourse to legislation related to defamation and criminal activity that is not specific to the media.

iv. To foster a thriving civil society, governments should consider how they can encourage, through fiscal regulation and subsidy, the widespread development of voluntary associations as intermediaries, especially in the cultural field.

v. The need to make decision makers in the public and private sector sensitive to the importance of culture in society is self evident, yet policies pay far too little attention to working towards a consensus beyond the cultural community. Culture has a major role in encouraging a creative response to social and economic issues. We have been attracted to models in a few countries which seek to influence and encourage potential decision makers in mid-career outside the cultural sector, through seminars and debates, to recognise the role of culture as a cohesive force in society. We believe these to be worthy of emulation, and suggest that the Council of Europe monitor such initiatives and promote them to national governments.

vi. The international agencies, building on work already started, should consider establishing a working party of education, health, cultural and media experts to lead further research into the relation between violence as portrayed by the media and antisocial behaviour among the young.

Harnessing human resources

vii. There is a strong case for the addition of a protocol on cultural rights to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, we recognise the difficulties some governments have in agreeing standard-setting instruments in this sector and consider, as an alternative, that the Council of Europe should continue work on the preparation of a European Declaration of Cultural Rights for ratification by governments as the minimum test of their sincerity and commitment to the principles of cultural rights. It follows that the Council of Europe will need to promote such a declaration widely so that the peoples of Europe are aware of the principles to which their governments subscribe.

9 Cultural transformations

“What is cultural development? It is the support for artistic creativity and the encouragement of the creativity of all citizens with due respect for diversity in expressions and ideas. It is a personal or collective commitment to reduce inequalities, especially cultural ones. This effort should not, however, only be applied in the intellectual or aesthetic spheres but necessarily in the social, economic and political fields. Such a transversal nature in culture is interesting since when transposed in an economic movement it becomes a vehicle for questioning global socio-economic policies.”

Jacques Rigaud, ADMICAL¹

9.1 The expansion of the arts and media

9.1.1 *The post-war arena.*² This chapter reviews a number of general trends in artistic and cultural production and distribution (that is, the visual and performing arts, architecture, the crafts and the public library system); it touches on developments in the media and policy issues in the heritage field. It makes no attempt to offer a history of the artforms or aesthetics. The last fifty years have seen a massive expansion of artistic production and distribution in Europe as well as in other regions of the world. The number of people who define themselves as creative artists has risen sharply, as have opportunities for consumption. The amateur arts and crafts attract millions of practitioners, especially in the visual arts and photography, choral singing and live drama. Thanks to modern techniques of audiovisual reproduction, there has probably never been an age in history when the arts and design have been so universally available.³ It should be observed at the outset that, despite this escalation, the social position and status of creative and performing artists have not risen correspondingly. Average artists' salaries have remained low, social security assistance in many countries is inadequate and only a handful of artists who make their way to the top receive good, and on occasion excellent, rewards for their work. Artists in central and eastern Europe have been especially disadvantaged. In some countries statutory grant systems have giv-

1. Quoted in the *Employment Cultural Initiatives* newsletter, Paris, 1996.

2. It is important to note that this section does not purport to be a general history of the arts since the second world war; rather, it seeks to identify some issues of direct relevance to cultural policy makers; rightly, they seldom intervene directly in questions of artistic practice and aesthetics, but need to be sensitive to any consequences of artistic developments that may impact on public policy.

3. There is little direct statistical evidence recording this growth in terms of the number of institutions, activities or employment. What there is includes *European symposium on the status of the artist*, Hanasaari, Finland, 31 May-2 June 1992. Final report, Publications of the Finnish National Commission for Unesco, No. 64, 1992, and the production figures and accounts of cultural enterprises in the European Audiovisual Observatory, *Statistical yearbook, 1994-95, 1995-96* and *Cinema, television and new media*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1995, 1996.

en financial security to small groups of professional artists. Also the development of national and international arrangements for safeguarding copyright and neighbouring rights' compensation have done something to improve the position of many artists.

9.1.2 The commercial entertainment industries have massively expanded, more so in some countries than others. As we have seen, a characteristic aim of modern cultural policies has been to reach as much of the general population as possible and a network of arts institutions of all kinds has been established across many countries, complemented by large numbers of independent, non-building-based groups. Government-to-government cultural agreements and exchanges have become common and performing companies, art galleries and museums have toured their work or exhibitions across the continent and further afield. However, so far as the subsidised sector is concerned, in the last two decades increasing supply has not necessarily been met by increased demand; in fact, in some cases demand has either been constant or is in decline in western Europe, while in central and eastern Europe the arts have not yet recovered from the impact of social, political and economic change. The situation in the Netherlands is an interesting case in point: while the number of concert performances increased substantially during the 1970s and 1980s, attendances for orchestral music slipped. In response to a perceived surplus of supply, the Dutch authorities took the unusual step of reducing the number of publicly funded regional orchestras. More generally, they fear that they may have inadvertently fostered a rather introverted and self-referential arts scene; in their "Policy document on culture 1993-96" it is noted that in advising on cultural policy a larger place will be allotted in future to the "involved participant" or ordinary member of the public in order to counteract over-specialisation.¹

9.1.3 It is difficult to generalise across the continent as a whole, but some governments are beginning to readdress the issue of creative participation in the arts and are asking questions about the possible oversupply of professional artistic presentation. The concept of the individual's right to participation in cultural life is at least as old as the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights and is the indisputable basis for state intervention: but while the need to widen participation has been explicitly recognised in most cultural policies, in practice it remains secondary to expenditure on supply-oriented strategies. However, the publicly funded institutional infrastructures are proving extremely expensive to maintain. The ratio between capital and operational building costs and the resources available for artistic activity has become skewed in favour of the former. Considerable sums of money are required to run arts buildings. In Finland many cultural centres were constructed in the 1980s, but from 1989 a recession largely arising from the crisis afflicting its major trading partner, the former Soviet Union, meant that the public authorities have sometimes experienced difficulty in their operation and programming. This is a special example, but pressure on state finances is affecting many countries and those which have invested heavily in infrastructure in the

1. "Investing in culture, Netherlands policy document on culture 1993-96", Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, Rijswijk, 1992.

last decade, such as France, Spain and the United Kingdom (now embarking on many capital projects, financed by the new National Lottery) may find themselves facing similar problems in the future. In eastern and central European countries, the struggle to maintain the existing infrastructure is absorbing virtually all of their cultural budgets, leaving no money for anything else; indeed there are barely sufficient resources to sustain the infrastructure effectively. Adjustments to the balance of public investment are not necessarily an unmixed evil; although they are difficult to make, some room for manoeuvre will have to be created if new demands and needs are to be satisfied within existing resources. Where this is not done, the outcome is likely to be cultural sclerosis and paralysis.

9.1.4 Music has become a ubiquitous and highly diversified feature of everyday life. Amateur and semi-amateur music making and the commercial music industry represent huge sectors, and publicly subsidised activity (mainly classical) occupies a relatively small part of the larger scene. Europe is a major exporter of musical instruments; in 1993 its share of the world market was about 26% (worth US\$ 732 million, nearly two thirds being earned from intra-European trade) whereas the United States' share was nearly half that. The global leader was Japan, which, with its dominance of electronic instrument-making, commanded nearly 40% of exports. European world imports were about 40% of the world total, with more than two thirds coming from outside Europe. In 1993 Europe commanded close to 40% of world phonogram exports (close to 21 thousand million dollars, but with "home markets" remaining the chief targets), with Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom being the largest individual exporters. The United States and Japan took up 25% and 12% of the world market respectively. Once again Europe imported more than it exported (54% in 1993). European and American exports have been steadily rising since 1985, but Japan's have been in decline.¹

9.1.5 Classical western music, through recordings and radio, and indirectly through its use in television commercials and recorded music in public places, reaches the mass of the population; live concerts, although important, have a much narrower reach and, in some countries, declining attendances. Since the fall of communism, central and eastern European orchestras have offered stiff commercial competition to those of western Europe. Opera is enjoying an unprecedented boom in some countries and leading opera singers are promoted like rock stars. Contemporary classical music, however, is a minority interest (with some notable exceptions such as Gorecki, Glass and Taverner whose more accessible work has been vigorously marketed). However, Nordic countries have done much through funding and energetic distribution to build audiences both at home and abroad for living composers. Technical innovation in electro-acoustic music has been led by the private sector, but publicly funded music studios have appeared in some countries (for example, France and Finland).

1. Von Euler, My, "Flow of cultural goods", a background paper commissioned by the European Task Force. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

9.1.6 The new musics which have gained mass appeal, especially among the young for whom it has become an essential ingredient of their life-style, are twentieth century popular forms – pop and rock music and to a lesser extent jazz. Many young people want to make music themselves, but often do not have access to the expensive equipment, studios and rehearsal facilities required. The recording industry has its own commercial imperatives and pays comparatively little attention to this bedrock of musical production. Country and western attracts considerable interest, especially in Germany and the United Kingdom. Folk retains a certain appeal in western Europe, although it has a greater importance in societies concerned with the recovery of cultural identity throughout the continent.

9.1.7 World music (that is, music from non-European cultures) attained quite a wide popularity from the mid-1980s, although it was by no means unknown before. As Peter Pannke points out, it is an example of the beneficent effect of new technology: “Ultimately, it was the invention and development of the media, the intercultural circulation of sounds on LPs and cassettes, which functioned as a kind of compass and enabled musicians from different cultures to find each other.”¹ In the last few years, new forms of popular musical expression have emerged – in France, for example, “*les musiques amplifiées*” and “*les musiques urbaines*” – which are much sought after by young people and originate from suburbs and the outskirts of major conurbations. They often attain high artistic standards and attract the interest of recording companies. Rap is one case of a new music which has won large audiences.

9.1.8 In publicly subsidised theatre in Europe, one can observe two broad systems. The first, which is particularly well developed in Austria, Germany, the Nordic countries, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, is a network of substantial institutions employing permanent administrative and artistic staffs. This was also the case in most central and eastern European countries until readjustment to the new economic realities put permanent employment in the theatre in jeopardy. Many theatres there cannot afford to employ new actors. The second, more common in southern Europe and France, depends on a multitude of independent companies, although there are of course a number of permanent building-based ensembles but with fewer permanent contracts for actors than in the past. Thus, in France more than 600 independent companies are supported by the Ministry of Culture together with thirty designated national companies. In most cases they do not have a fixed base. Independent companies often complain of their precarious situation. Subsidised theatre, including a small-scale experimental wing, consumes a large part of state cultural budgets and is widely available, with a commercial sector operating mainly in large cities and on tour. Costs have continually risen over the years, in part because competition with film and television has led to audience expectations of higher production values.

9.1.9 In those parts of Europe with a tradition of permanent acting ensembles, there is a demand for greater employment flexibility; on the other hand,

1. Pannke, Peter, *Womex festival guide*. Amsterdam, 1995.

in a country such as the United Kingdom, theatre companies regret being no longer able to hire performers for extended periods of time. From the late 1960s many small-scale *ad hoc* or touring groups came into being, offering novel approaches to drama and often not reliant on previously written texts. In many countries (for example France) their work is often more imaginative and exciting than that of the building-based companies; the problem facing policy makers is how to find the resources to give them the opportunities and security they need. Theatre for young people was another important development and theatre-in-education teams worked in schools devising shows in association with teachers and students which were relevant across the curriculum as well as for arts syllabuses; it is unfortunate that these areas have been particularly vulnerable to reductions in public expenditure in several countries.

9.1.10 In many European countries dance, and particularly new forms of dance, have been passing through an expansionary period; the mass media have sometimes contributed to this development (for example Arte, BBC2 Television and Channel 4). Ballet retains its popularity, but in the 1980s there was a remarkable growth of interest, especially among younger people, in contemporary dance (for example, in Belgium and France), both in professional presentation and amateur participation. There is evidence that this trend is now peaking. A relative lack of new choreographic talent, particularly in ballet, has been a weakness in this art form, but it is interesting to see how France and Belgium, through judicious investment, have managed to turn the situation around; although active in other ways, cultural policy makers tend only to be responsive to original artistic production, but this is a telling example of the way public intervention can directly influence the course of creativity. The French model of choreographic centres has attracted wide interest among German choreographers. It is evident in Germany that the division between "established" and "independent" dance is being eroded. This is not yet the case in Italy where, with limited main stage programming in the large public lyric theatres and a low public profile, dance is regarded as the poor relation and innovation is the province of small independent companies. Elsewhere, as in the Netherlands, the quality of choreographic work is no longer judged on whether or not it originates from within the system.¹ Because it does not depend on language, dance is well suited to international exchange. It is also well recognised as a social function linked to pop music and youth lifestyles, but as an art has not been available to the public to the same extent as music and theatre. Folk dance retains a certain popularity, although it is rarely used to assert national or political ideology in the way it once was in central and eastern Europe.

9.1.11 Central and eastern European countries have experienced a brief period of artistic revival following the changes in 1989 and the institution of freedom from censorship, with a marked growth in the numbers of small scale galleries and theatre companies. However, attendances in many places fell during the early 1990s and appear to have risen again in only a few (for exam-

1. See Servos, Norbert, "Synchronising steps", in *International Arts Manager* magazine. London, March 1996.

ple in Moscow). Many governments have done their best to sustain their investment in large, traditional theatres, but find existing resources no longer adequate. In Romania, while theatre subsidy levels remain at 80% to 90% of annual operating budgets, "high inflation rates mean that subsidies barely cover annual salaries and maintenance costs and allow little for investment in technical developments, renovation, new spaces and so on."¹ Most of the performing arts are living a simultaneous creative and administrative crisis. New and small groups, though, have appeared and disappeared, adding variety to the artistic landscape. Apart from a handful of stars, there has been a general pauperisation of the performing arts community. Colossal salary differentials has stimulated temporary or permanent emigration to the west – especially for musicians, who do not need to master a foreign language.

9.1.12 Many performing arts groups tour their productions, often – as in France – funded by guarantees offered by receiving houses. Some orchestras earn much of their living through international visits and tours. Showcasing of work has attracted increasing interest across Europe through networks such as the Informal European Theatre Meeting. In central and eastern Europe international touring (in both directions) has declined, especially in the Russian Federation, and is mostly financed by foreign co-promoters and the box office.

9.1.13 There has been a growing trend for co-productions, especially in opera and festivals, but also in drama and dance. This is often a result of financial pressures rather than artistic necessity, but co-productions have the advantage of enabling costly events to take place and to be seen in more than one theatre. Festivals continue to be a mainstay of the European cultural calendar and provide an important source of employment for performers and arts companies. Finnish festivals have capitalised on their events bonanza, mostly concentrated in a few hectic summer months, by marketing themselves collectively. New events such as the Festival of Bucharest have a symbolic importance in enabling theatre in a post-totalitarian regime to engage more with the public. As Lucy Neal, Director of the London International Festival of Theatre, observed: "The [Bucharest] Festival's link up into the City Council and [...] its emphasis on street theatre integrates the artist into society."²

9.1.14 Although there are local variations, audiences in general appear to be falling; thus in the Netherlands attendances at professional non-musical theatre performances fell from 237 per thousand inhabitants in 1988 to 213 in 1992. In Italy declining audiences have been found to coincide with a narrowing of their social composition. "The worry about ageing audience profiles for drama, drawn from too narrow a band of the social spectrum, is by no means unique to Italy. To a greater or lesser extent it has been a common European phenomenon since the 1950s with the arrival of television and

1. Vasilu, Dan, Romanian Ministry of Culture, quoted in Thorogood, Marika, "Out of the shadows", in *International Arts Manager* magazine, May 1995.

2. Thorogood, Marika, op. cit.

changing patterns of entertainment and consumption.”¹ Most people’s experience of drama is obtained from television and the cinema, which are where many of the best authors and actors make their livings. Today’s equivalents of Ionesco or Osborne or Brecht are more likely to see themselves as film makers or scriptwriters rather than playwrights. It is harder than it was to argue in the 1950s and 1960s in the west, and until the end of the 1980s in central and eastern Europe, that new writing for the live stage has a wide cultural impact (with the exception of the ubiquitous musical), at least in the short term.

9.1.15 The contemporary visual arts offer a wide variety of styles and receive differing degrees of state support across the continent. A commercial art market trades both in the latest talent and Old Masters, especially in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France and Germany (the UK has a substantial lead – almost 30% of the world market according to the Art Sales Index for 1994/95 – but this may be threatened in the long term by attempts to “approximate” VAT in the EU). However, in the 1990s Europe’s share has been falling, largely due to tax inducements (or advantages) in the United States which has almost doubled its share in recent years. The largest importers of European fine art were the United States (often for re-export), Japan, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia.² The economic status of visual artists in western Europe varies considerably; few make a living from sales of their work, but many are employed in the education sector. Some are setting up home pages or electronic “selling exhibitions” on the Internet. In the last ten years or so, there has been a resurgence of interest in commissioning public art, a remarkable development which is bringing contemporary work to universal public notice, is transforming the urban environment and reinforcing some artists’ earnings. The picture is very different in central and eastern Europe. There is no comparable mechanism to the “per cent for art” scheme. Few citizens have any purchasing power to collect art and there is no corporate tradition for art acquisitions. So, in effect, there is no market for artists’ work.

9.1.16 During the communist period in central and eastern Europe, the visual arts were relatively well resourced for those who worked in officially approved styles; there were substantial state purchasing programmes, monitored through the artists’ unions, and with additional finance from major industrial enterprises which deployed “social” funds. These arrangements have now collapsed and state acquisitions are much diminished. Visual artworks from central and eastern Europe became fashionable on the international art market in the late 1980s, but its own financial crisis at the beginning of the 1990s soon brought this to an end.

9.1.17 Art galleries and museums with historically based art or contemporary collections are attracting growing attendances in many countries (see 9.2 below *passim* for a discussion of museums from a heritage viewpoint). Some

1. *Cultural policy in Italy*, Report of a European panel of examiners by Christopher Gordon, European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

2. “Flow of cultural goods”, *op. cit.*

are making use of the new technologies to extend access to their collections and there is competition among commercial operators who are bidding for rights to exploit them (for example Bill Gates of Microsoft in the Russian Federation). Large numbers of people continue to be puzzled by, and often dismissive of, much “cutting-edge” contemporary work; but there are signs that it is attracting younger publics in large numbers (the almost unmanageable popularity of the Centre Beaubourg in Paris and increasing attendances at London’s Tate Gallery are cases in point). That said, artistic styles percolate over time into graphic design and advertising (for example, Surrealism, Op Art and Pop Art). Design, of course, can express a sense of identity and, when it is linked to the mass production of objects, it can serve, as Deyan Sudjic says, as “badges of mutual recognition”.¹ Its significance in a visually literate society is likely to increase, whether in the applied arts, industrial design, fashion or interior design. A potent mix of skills, industrial production processes, efficient distribution and good marketing have catapulted some European countries to world-wide acclaim for their design achievements. It is the sector, *par excellence*, where the interaction between culture and trade is most evident, although Italy, renowned for its variety and originality of design, is not alone in having no coherent or integrated policy to build on its achievements.

9.1.18 The crafts sector in Europe is divided into the traditional (referred to in some countries as “handicrafts”) and the contemporary. There is little interaction between them even when they are funded by the same agencies or government departments. The contemporary crafts sector, which is closely related to design and the fine arts, is growing very rapidly in much of Europe. But the situation in the traditional crafts, where skills have often been handed down from generation to generation, is not at all optimistic. Real traditional crafts survive today primarily in those European countries to which the Industrial Revolution came relatively late (for example Portugal, Poland and, to some extent, the Nordic countries). Arguably these craftspeople are the European equivalent of the Japanese “living national treasures”, but the future of their art is threatened by lack of interest among young people in learning their skills. Such interest as exists is often to be found among urban populations, although there have been some initiatives of note (in particular, in Portugal). A major difficulty is that governments often do not regard the traditional crafts as “real” culture and so do not value them, except for their potential to make a very modest contribution to the rural economy.

9.1.19 Photography is an important part of the visual arts scene and continues to have a substantial impact on visual arts theory and practice. Archives and photography galleries are being established in increasing numbers across Europe. The achievements of news and features photography have disseminated information about social and political life and illustrated the discoveries of science; in that sense, together with the moving image, the stills camera has had a profound cultural impact. It has also enabled people to record in detail their daily and domestic lives, a function which is now being taken over by video.

1. Sudjic, Deyan, “Identity by design”, *European Magazine*, 15-21 February 1996.

9.1.20 Europe has an enormous and rich architectural heritage, but at the same time vast areas with ugly and badly designed buildings. Industrial and urban expansion has led to a great increase in the numbers of new buildings. As kings and prelates in the past, today's presidents and industrial leaders use architecture to promote their policies and reputations, often to good aesthetic effect, in that they have given distinctive profiles to city centres. On the other hand many town planners, politicians and proprietors have been guided by economic interests only and an ambition to build quickly rather than well. In some countries (for example Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Norway) major action programmes for planning of a high quality have been implemented. The sometimes much criticised modernist and brutalist phase of the 1950s and 1960s has given way, after a pause, to new generations of architects often interested in pastiche and extravagant display. Domestic housing now focuses more than in the past on vernacular styles and a greater attention to human scale. The failure to recognise the cultural dimension of the built environment is one of the most serious post-war errors of public policy. The need to integrate architecture with cultural and environmental policies is essential if we are to avoid repeating some of the worst effects of planning policies.

9.1.21 Surprisingly, the reading of books has increased in many European countries by between 5% and 20% over a quarter of a century despite competition from the mass media.¹ The rise is primarily due to women who now outnumber men as readers; in France, for example, 72% of men and 68% of women read at least one book a year in 1973, but in 1989, it was 73% of men and 78% of women. Countervailing trends are that young people are reading less and that the number of heavy readers is falling (except for Norway where the proportion of very heavy readers – twenty or more books per year – doubled between 1972 and 1987). Socio-economic distinctions remain, although there has been some catching up by less advantaged groups. With the arrival of the cheap paperback, book publishing has become big business and large conglomerates have been formed. More than 400 000 of the 850 000 titles published in the world in 1995 come from western Europe and the book industry in the latter grew by just under 15% between 1991 and 1995.² Popular fiction sales are high and profits are much enhanced through exploitation by the film and television industries. However, comparatively few novels (or poetry) not written in English achieve multinational readerships, due in large part to a lack of interest in the widespread commissioning of good translations. Europe had 61% of world book exports and 52% of imports (including the sale of books between European countries) in 1993. Imports into Europe came mainly from the United States (55%), Hong Kong (14.4%), Singapore (8.2%) and Japan (5.4%). Europe's share of exports began to decline from the beginning of the 1980s in the face of sharply rising competition from Japan and Hong Kong.³

1. *Reading habits in Europe*, Moscow Round Table about Participation in Cultural Life in Europe, Circle. Paris, 1992.

2. *Publishing at the crossroads – Global trends and forecasts*, Euromonitor, 1996.

3. "Flow of cultural goods", op. cit.

9.1.22 Changing readership patterns have not coincided with book sales, which have fallen everywhere in Europe except for the United Kingdom and Sweden. The book sector is in a critical condition in many European countries outside the main language areas of English, French and German. The small size of domestic markets, competition with other media and the economic downturn is having a marked impact on the book chain, while in much of eastern Europe the network of bookshops has virtually collapsed. However, the public library, one of the great cultural inventions of the nineteenth century, has retained, and indeed enhanced, its relevance during the twentieth century. Libraries have increased their usage in most countries. In western Europe they offer a valued service to substantial sections of the population (ranging from a penetration of 65% in Denmark to 30% in the Netherlands, 20% in Ireland, 17% in France and 10% to 15% in Germany (1990)).¹ They are widespread and are often close to where people live. They are approachable and offer fewer barriers for most people than some other cultural institutions. In some countries they operate as arts centres, especially in small towns without other cultural facilities. In fact they offer many more services than the lending of books; thus, in Sweden, only 42% of library visits (1988-89) concerned book loans. The remainder involved the reading of magazines and newspapers, attendance at cultural events and borrowing or listening to CDs, records or tapes. In most countries no other institution is so extensively used by children. As Unesco's Public Library Manifesto of 1994 states, libraries are the local gateway to knowledge, providing opportunities for life-long learning, independent decision-making and the cultural development of the individuals.

9.1.23 For all their distinguished past and their general popularity, public library systems are facing the greatest threat – and at the same time the greatest challenge – in their history. The state, whether at national and local level, is finding them increasingly hard to afford. The principle of free access is being modified in some countries, with charges often being introduced for special services. In the United Kingdom and even in Sweden there have been cut-backs in opening hours and library closures. In central and eastern Europe where the public is heavily reliant on libraries for access to books, former lending networks maintained by trade unions and large companies and former distribution networks have collapsed in many places.² When governments have to make savings, libraries are among the first victims. In the Slovak Republic, for example, about 4 000 libraries have been closed out of a total of 12 000. According to a Council of Europe report, “several alarming tendencies have occurred [in the Polish library system], among them the liquidation of certain libraries, the loosening of ties between libraries within the network, the deprofessionalisation of the library service, and also insufficient financial means to meet libraries' needs.”³ Across Europe, public investment

1. *Les Bibliothèques publiques en Europe*, Collection Bibliothèques, Editions du Cercle de la Librairie. Paris, 1992.

2. “Reading, books and publishing in Europe”. Report of 7th Conference of European Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs (Paris, October 1992). Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1992.

3. Seminar on “Reforming library legislation in central Europe: Needs and expectations” (7-8 November 1994), Conclusions and background documents. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

is usually in decline as a whole and the pressure to become commercially competitive is growing. Changes in patterns of consumption in western Europe are also having an impact on demand; the availability of cheap paperbacks, on sale in supermarkets, petrol stations and motorway cafeterias as well as in bookshops, is reducing loans for some categories of book, especially fiction.

9.1.24 If, with the arrival of electronic means of storage, libraries are able to move beyond books to CD-Roms and the like, they could face a promising future as a network by which the public may access all kinds of visual and literary material, in association with museums, archives and centres of higher education. This would be enhanced if they could link up to the academic and museum databases which are emerging. As a concrete follow-up to Unesco's Public Library Manifesto, the Swedes have developed an innovative project called *Önskebiblioteket* (the library of one's wishes) in association with the Estonian authorities. One Estonian and one Swedish library are taking part and they will be joined by a Portuguese library as well as another from a developing country. The immediate object is to develop the uses of the new media, engage actively with education systems and transform the library into an information and cultural centre. In the longer run, the experiment will explore the function of libraries in the information society and as part of global communications networks.

9.1.25 In western Europe the arts of ethnic minorities are beginning (but only beginning) to attract mainstream attention and there is a greater public awareness of the arts of other world cultures. African, Afro-Caribbean and Asian music continue to feed into European popular traditions. In the visual arts and performance, European artists and audiences are adopting a more open and possibly less predatory attitude to the arts of other continents; meanwhile, artists from non-European backgrounds are feeding aesthetic traditions from other world cultures into western imagery. London's multiracial composition is one reason why, for the time being at least, it has become a leading centre of attraction for artists and dealers. All of this is having a positive effect on contemporary artistic development in general. However, the minority communities still receive less public funding than the mainstream arts of the majority communities and, in particular, usually do not have the resources to maintain large-scale building-based institutions.

9.1.26 Another relatively new trend is towards cross- or multi-media arts, drawing on visual and performing arts traditions and making use of new technologies. Its origins lie in part in the invention in the United Kingdom during the 1960s of "arts labs", or centres managed by artists and concentrating on original creative production. Although they did not last long, there are today a handful of arts centres of various kinds which are committed to the commissioning of new work and their presentation in what might be called "laboratory" conditions; examples include the Centre for Art and Media Technology (ZKM) in Karlsruhe, with five institutes (Institute for the Visual Media, Institute for Music and Acoustics, a Mediathek, a Museum of Contemporary Art and a Media Museum), and the Museo Internacional de Electrografía (MIDE) in Cuenca in Spain. Such organisations are increasingly setting up promising links with the new technologies. They offer considerable potential

for the re-integration of the different strands of contemporary culture and, even, suggest the possibility of bringing the arts and sciences into new and constructive relationships. The barriers between the art forms as conventionally defined seem to be coming down; performances take place in art galleries and other non-theatrical venues and new forms of visually-based drama are emerging. Links can be observed between visual performance and installation, and aspects of pop and rock performance, music videos (a new arrival) and with “new comedy”, an umbrella term for a new generation of anarchic, sometimes satirical and surrealistic one-person performers.

9.1.27 It is important to note that since the 1980s, public authorities at national and local levels have begun to interest themselves in forms of artistic activity which they previously knew nothing about, neglected or at best slightly acknowledged. Nowadays design, photography, rock, rap, fashion, and cooking have been recognised as artistic, or at least creative, activities in their own right. This development was pioneered in France under the influence of Jack Lang, when he was Minister of Culture, and a number of other countries have explored the same path. Different kinds of support have been offered, but always with a light touch and more flexibly than the traditional subsidy systems. Most of these newly recognised activities are commercially managed and market-sensitive: closely controlled regular subsidies, as for major cultural institutions, would be inappropriate and public authorities have tended to concentrate on offering endorsement rather than cash (for example the establishment of specialist museums), making tailor-made, one-off project grants, establishing training institutions and supporting promotions (for example festivals).

9.1.28 Other old distinctions are becoming blurred. The presence of non-European arts practice is challenging the conventional divide between professionals and amateurs, as are the community arts which mingle professionals and non-professionals and bring together the inhabitants of neighbourhoods in a shared creative endeavour. A greater emphasis is placed on the process of creation as opposed to the final artistic product, especially in education and (again) in “community arts”, or socio-cultural animation. From the 1950s onwards a youth culture has emerged where the frontier between performer and audience has lost its significance. In a rock concert the audience is part of the show. The so-called counter-culture of the late 1960s brought alternative lifestyles into mainstream culture and produced the postmodernist movements, where the status of creativity ceased to be Eurocentric and pertaining only to professional artists and became universal with no hierarchies and an emphasis on remodelling old texts (in the broad semiotic sense of the word). The democratisation of libertinism¹ and more generally of the modernist impulse drove creativity into everyday life: fashion, manners, interior decoration and eating habits became signs of changing identities.

9.1.29 *The voluntary instinct.* The popularity of the amateur arts is widespread, although more pronounced in northern Europe than elsewhere. It

1. See Bell, Daniel, *The cultural contradictions of capitalism*. Bell. New York, 1976.

attracts the involvement of large sections of the population and (with the exception of classical music that calls for large forces of players) does not depend on where people live. In the Netherlands, for example, 6 million people out of a population of 14.5 million are involved in some form or other in the amateur arts, which are relatively more popular among the lower and middle classes than attendance at concert, plays, etc.¹ A recent study in France indicates that almost half (47%) of the population has been involved at one time or another in amateur artistic activity, although there are some significant generational differences.² Interestingly, the survey suggests that young amateurs are more versatile and find it much easier to cross over from one art form to another than their older counterparts. In central and eastern Europe before 1989 amateur practitioners were often supported by the state and trades unions by a host of measures, including free training and payments in kind (for example paid time-off from other work). This was especially marked in what was claimed to be “amateur” sport. It was also a feature of the arts scene, but has now largely been withdrawn.

9.1.30 While there is much amateur arts activity in western Europe, there are marked differences in the value it is accorded, with Nordic countries, for example, seeming to give it more parity of esteem than in the United Kingdom where the term “amateur” is often used disparagingly to denote “unprofessional” and, by implication, of lower quality. Sweden’s recent review of cultural policy reinforces the state’s responsibility to foster amateur culture, one of the key points being to stimulate people’s creativity. Support for amateur activities of all kinds in that country is routed through popular education associations, state and local authorities contributing the substantial sum of 2 000 million Swedish crowns (of which about 40% is spent on the arts).

9.1.31 The relatively recent concept of cultural volunteering goes beyond that of the amateur arts. It illustrates the fact there are more ways of participating in culture than by acting in a play or painting pictures. Volunteering is any activity whereby individuals or groups help the work of an organisation, whether professional or amateur. According to the Voluntary Arts Network, which exists to promote participation in the arts throughout the United Kingdom, it is “accomplishing, or assisting with, the management, running or creation of a programme for an arts organisation for no payment”. Similar work has, of course, been done in Nordic countries by voluntary cultural associations and in the countries of southern Europe by more amorphous groups and collectivities.

9.1.32 The amateur arts are facing a number of challenges; economic recession has made it more difficult for the general public in many countries to sustain participatory arts activities from their own financial resources. Rural areas

1. “Cultural policy in the Netherlands, National report, European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews of the Council of Europe”. Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1994.

2. *Les amateurs. Enquête sur les activités artistiques des Français*. (A survey of the artistic activities of 10 000 people). La Documentation Française, 1996.

appear to be particularly badly hit in some countries (although not in Sweden, for example, where subsidy has fallen more sharply in big cities than in the countryside); this is a worrying development seeing that culture provides many of the occasions for social networking which help to combat isolation and foster community cohesion. At the same time, perhaps because of the growing attractions of home-centred entertainment, it appears to be harder to recruit audiences than it once was. In common with the professional arts, amateur activity in central and eastern Europe has been weakened by withdrawal of state support.

9.1.33 One further issue needs to be taken into account. Peer groups seem to be becoming ever more specialist and the banding of age and interest groups among those who participate in the amateur arts is narrowing. This is resulting in wide generational differences with younger people often cutting themselves off from the traditional arts and isolating themselves inside youth culture.

9.1.34 Sweden is currently establishing a national network for the heterogeneous multitude of groups in this field and there may be a case for setting up a Europe-wide equivalent, with the objects of identifying and publicising good practice and encouraging international exchange. At the same time, further thought needs to be given to the potential synergy between professional and amateur artists, which varies considerably from country to country.

9.1.35 *The artist and the mass media.* Even before the second world war, Walter Benjamin pointed out the importance for culture of the technical reproduction of art. He spoke of the end of the aura that surrounds the unique or one-off, traditional work of art and the opening of an age when art would be everyone's tool. The techniques of mass production and reproduction would democratise the art elites. His prediction did not come to pass exactly in the way he had in mind, for state subsidy preserved the traditional or "high" arts as a discrete field, while mass culture went on its own independent way, with its emphasis mainly on the provision of entertainment – and foreign entertainment at that – as US products proceeded to capture European markets.

9.1.36 A succession of technological revolutions altered social relations and individual attitudes, adapting them to the all-consuming needs of the mass media. By the 1970s the fierce competition for the public's attention between the press and radio and film and television had created a new and highly diverse cultural landscape. TV screens were in every home, mixing information, enlightenment and popular entertainment. Mainstream feature films sought more and more to anticipate rather than lead public taste. Records and audiocassettes made music available to everybody. Stars were made and unmade by popular "vote" and consent.

9.1.37 The academic world began to pay attention and media studies entered higher education curricula. The approach was socio-cultural in distinction from the aesthetic methodologies of the traditional arts. Even

today there is comparatively little exchange between the two sets of discipline.

9.1.38 The opening up of the electronic technologies brought together three areas of cultural production – print, the audiovisual media and communications. From being the exception, interchange became the rule and the differences between cultural phenomena ceased to be technologically defined. Video extended from pornography to artistic experiment, satellite and cable made closed television links possible, bestsellers co-existed with self-published poetry and academic journals. Intersectoral links made books into films, films into television series, television series into video games and vice versa.

9.1.39 Television and film are leaving those working in the traditional art-form media in a quandary. As Benjamin predicted, throughout the twentieth century we have seen how a variety of industrial techniques (for example, printing and photography) and production methods (for example, film and television) have weakened the primacy of the unique, non-reproducible work of art as a result of potentially unlimited reproduction and collective working processes. On the one hand, artists and writers of aesthetics can set themselves up as guardians of an uncompromising aesthetic authenticity in the face of a flood of commercial images, which break up the possibilities of narrative and replace a habit of serious, extended consideration of a work of art with a shorter attention span and an impatient taste for novelty. Most of those attending a consultative meeting for artists and producers which the European Task Force convened in Strasbourg saw that there would always be a place for authentic artistry and that Europe could be on the edge of another renaissance. However, some were worried that global culture was threatening the “fundamental stories” or myths on which communities and cultures depended for a sense of their identities. In addition to their communal function, the arts were a “form of resistance and rebellion, a space for freedom”.¹ This role too was at risk. They feared that the overwhelming appeal of mass culture would somehow leave them behind and that the commercialisation accompanying it would limit choice for consumers and artists. They saw with varying degrees of unease, how film and television spoke to the population as a whole, while arts’ audiences were mainly limited to affluent and well-educated social groups.

9.1.40 An alternative view expressed at the meeting was that some traditional conceptions of culture were elitist; one positive result of the new media was that people not belonging to elites were now handling aesthetic concepts. There was a danger that technologists and entrepreneurs would alone determine the content of new communications systems and that artists had no choice but to join the game themselves if they were to avoid relegation to an estranged underclass. According to the report of the seminar, “artists must be placed on an equal footing to discuss the conditions under which the emerging interactive systems could be used as a means of artistic expression ... [They] must gain a hold on television and make it an art form managed by

1. Report of a Round Table on “The future of the arts and artistic work in Europe” (Strasbourg, February 1995). Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

artists.”¹ The position of non-European artists was especially disadvantageous, particularly for those for whom global culture was less a quarrel between different ideas of western-ness than a fundamental threat to their traditions.

9.1.41 Much well-intended effort has been expended on gaining air-time for the traditional arts on radio and television. However, both these media – and especially television – have developed their own expressive vocabularies, formats and programme genres, as was the case in previous centuries with drama, dance and music. It has proved difficult to translate the visual and live arts into this new language and so attract sufficiently large audiences to justify their presence in prime time slots. “The integration [...] of the contents of modern art, the expected appeal of everyday familiarity of television, the traditional techniques of the arts and culture and the possibilities offered by the grammar and language of television – and other media and information technologies as well – is a challenge that few producers and programme planners are able or willing to face”.²

9.1.42 Few cultural policy makers have been willing to face it either. They have done little to study the inter-relationship between the traditional arts and the media or to devise strategies which exploit their mutual interdependence. Television and film rely on actors, directors, musicians and dancers who have been educated in arts schools and gained their basic experience in theatres, orchestras and dance and ballet companies. Visual artists throughout the century have pioneered new visual languages which in due course have become the stock-in-trade of television commercials and programmes and graphic design. At the same time, museums, art galleries and the performing arts need the information services provided by radio, television and the press to attract audiences and encourage critical debate among the general public. The broadcasting of concerts, such as the famous new year concert from the Vienna Opera House, can attract millions of viewers and listeners and the masterpieces of European drama and the novel can find a mass audience through television adaptations. The presentation of live opera and drama creates certain difficulties of “translation” from one medium to another and is often made prohibitively expensive because of the cost of buying out trade union restrictive practices; but it can provide an invaluable introduction for those unfamiliar with the live arts (the transmission of Patrice Chéreau’s Bayreuth Ring is a well-remembered classic of the genre). But there will be fewer opportunities for such “chance” encounters if arts programming is reduced in prime time broadcasting or shifted in its entirety to specialist channels for niche audiences.³

1. Ibid.

2. “European television and culture”, a paper commissioned by Unesco from Mediacult for a Unesco round table held in July 1995 in Paris. It is based largely on the report, “Hearing on the cultural policies of broadcasting companies” (Strasbourg, 7 November 1994), organised by the Committee of Governmental Experts on the Cultural Aspects of Communication of the Council of Europe.

3. At the beginning of the 1980s ORF, the Austrian state TV channel, broadcast an opera almost every week. By 1995 that had been reduced to seven a year, according to Dr Franz Patay, Secretary General of the International Music Centre (IMZ), Vienna (see Eccles, Jeremy, Future visions, current fusions, in *International Arts Manager* magazine. London, September 1995).

9.1.43 There is a limit to what the public authorities can do to reconcile the artist and the audiovisual media, but it is good, if belated, news that some now acknowledge the need for cultural policies to take an integrated approach and to build bridges between them. Aesthetics are not the proper business of government, but at least it should be possible to facilitate co-operation between the two opposing camps.

9.1.44 *Successes and failures of European cinema.* It has been estimated that more than 220 000 feature-length films will have been made between 1900 and the year 2000, an astonishing demonstration of the dominance of cinema in twentieth century culture.¹ The post-war period saw a downturn in cinema-going, first in the United States and then in western Europe, with the rise of television. A reversal of this trend appeared in 1990, with total ticket sales in 1994 reaching the same level as in 1986. A major contribution to rising attendances has been made by the arrival in some countries of “multiplex” cinemas which offer a more flexible approach to film exhibition and a more attractive ambience for customers than old-style cinemas. The number of films distributed over the same period has varied in different countries (far fewer in Greece, Denmark, Austria and Norway, for example, and sharp rises in Belgium, Portugal and Cyprus). One common factor can be observed, the growing dominance of US producers. As the European Audiovisual Observatory has noted: “The recovery in audience figures has only indirectly benefited European cinema [...] however tickets sales develop (sustained recovery in the United Kingdom, tending to recover in Germany, tending to fall off in France and Italy), American films are gaining a firmer hold on the market at the expense of national and non-national European films, which have all but disappeared in most countries. In the former twelve-country European Community, American films captured 20% extra market share between 1985 and 1994. The recovery in admissions since 1990 can be simply translated as a stabilisation of the European and other countries’ market share.”²

9.1.45 That said, it is a mistake to see European cinema purely in economic terms as a failed competitor with Hollywood. The achievements (say) of Italian cinema from the Neo-Realists to Pasolini and Fellini, of Russian cinema from *The cranes are flying* to Tarkovsky and Mikhalkov, of French cinema from the Nouvelle Vague onwards, of Polish cinema from Wajda to Kieslowski or of the Czechoslovak school of the late 1960s are of high distinction. They established the culture of the art-house movies, which did not achieve mass appeal if only because it did not seek it. Their masterpieces will continue to be seen – and so earn money – long after more ephemeral American hits.

9.1.46 However, despite these achievements there is another side to the story. Gilbert Adair, a well-informed newspaper columnist, wrote: “As Marx almost said, a spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of Hollywood. For Hollywood has won. These days, at the cinema, all of us see the same films, laugh

1. We are grateful for the opportunity to make use of a draft (23.10.1995) of “Economic benchmarks on the film industry in Europe”, European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg.

2. Ibid.

at the same jokes, flinch at the same violence, marvel at the same special effects [...]. What's to be done? In my opinion, nothing. I wish them well, but unlike those film makers who have voiced frequent opposition to the current hegemony of the American cinema (Wenders, Tavernier, Bertolucci, etc.), I remain a total defeatist. When European directors endeavour to emulate Hollywood, it's invariably a disaster; and when they make films that are obstinately rooted in their own national culture, fewer and fewer people bother to see them."¹

9.1.47 This account is expressed with the graphic vigour of a journalist, but is hardly an exaggeration. Is the pessimistic tone justified? In an important study of European cinema, the writer Angus Finney observes: "'Popular culture' and 'European culture' rarely win a mention in the same sentence. Europe's strong sense of history has tended to go hand in hand with notions of a 'vibrant culture', rich in literature, theatre and art. Part of Europe's somewhat elitist self-perception of its alleged strengths has also led to arrogant assumptions about America's own energetic claims to culture [...]. Only rarely does a contemporary thriller such as Luc Besson's *Nikita* burst on to the European scene, and even that remained mostly confined to the art-house market. In contrast, American 'popular' culture consists of new material and themes that are derived from contemporary realities of the modern world. Whether these are so-called 'formulaic' films such as *The fugitive* – a striking action thriller that Allied's Jake Eberts, for example, suggests contains no elements that couldn't have come from a European film-maker – or extravagant new-technology fantasies like *Terminator 2: Judgement day* and *Jurassic Park*, the fact is that far more successful American films are made about today's and tomorrow's world than any European equivalents".²

9.1.48 European film faces a number of other, less subjective problems. Although in principle a sufficiently large market, the continent is broken down into different language groups. It has been rightly said that visual images and music are the only universal world languages, but words are necessary as well. The techniques of dubbing and sub-titling are either intrusive or artistically inadequate, and filming in more than one language is expensive and often artistically damaging to the film-making process.

9.1.49 More seriously, European producers seem to pay too little attention to script development. In Hollywood, development costs are about 10% of a film's budget, whereas in Europe they average between 1% and 2%. Another reason why Europe seems to have lost the art of making box-office hits is the scarcity of "bankable" names or stars. But this is part of a larger marketing failure. A huge investment is made in advertising and promoting an American movie and its leading actors. The selling of the British film, *The crying game*, is a telling illustration of the point. Although well-received critically, it did not attract audiences in the United Kingdom until it had been most effectively promoted and distributed in the United States. Another British success,

1. Adair, Gilbert, "Scrutiny", the *Sunday Times* newspaper. London, 26 March 1995.

2. Finney, Angus, *A dose of reality – the state of European cinema*, European Film Academy and Screen International. London, 1993.

Four weddings and a funeral was initially advertised in the United Kingdom as “America’s No. 1 hit comedy.” Some British-made films are marketed in France as being from the United States.

9.1.50 Europe is also deficient in major studios. As Finney points out: “A large film studio is a place where talent clusters and works together, and where ambitious projects can win the support needed to develop them to their full potential. It is also the place where practical training initiatives can be implemented, which in turn help retain skill levels that at the moment either vanish to America or are in danger of disappearing altogether. Talent is drawn to studios.”¹

9.1.51 At the other end of the production process, the key area of distribution is highly fragmented and under-capitalised. This not only has the obvious consequence of making it more difficult to take films to audiences, but means that distributors are often not in a position to help to finance production.

9.1.52 In all these circumstances, it is not surprising that finding investors for European films can be a long, complex and frequently disappointing process. Banks find the business too risky without fully guaranteed pre-sales or guarantees from bonding companies. Special efforts have been undertaken by the Council of Europe and the European Commission to promote the European audiovisual industries by encouraging film production; in 1988 the Eurimages feature film top-up fund and two years later the European Union and the Media programme were launched. Media’s task was not to finance directly production costs, but to support measures which help to build a sound infrastructure. A new programme, Media II, has replaced it, with the same aims, but a different structure, and will focus on training, development and distribution; it may be complemented by a proposed European Audiovisual Guarantee Fund for Production. A “sound infrastructure” not only includes a thriving national audiovisual scene, but also support for regional and local production, which is often the “nursery” for up-coming creative talent. Leaving aside the various forms of state and supranational or intergovernmental subsidies and incentives, producers have been exploring the potential of European co-production. This turns out to be far easier to achieve in terms of assembling financial packages, than of artistic collaboration and, after some box-office disasters, this is the direction which events are now taking. The recently formed European Film Studio, financed by various broadcasters such as Channel 4 and Canal Plus and funding agencies, takes the principle of cross-frontier co-operation a stage further by seeking to develop production, writing and direction talent, by seeing Europe as a single market (while making due allowances for linguistic and cultural differences) and by encouraging the production of internationally oriented, commercially driven films, which recoup their investments either from Europe or globally.

9.1.53 *Broadcasting: the end of the public service ethic?* A combination of technological, political and economic pressures has transformed the European

1. Ibid.

landscape of TV and radio broadcasting. As little as fifteen years ago a handful of terrestrial broadcasters, controlled or at least guaranteed by the state, exercised a monopoly. Because of the power and universality of the electronic media, governments made them operate inside a legal framework that sought, usually at least, to ensure objectivity in news reporting and the presentation of a wide variety of points of view, and gave them a cultural and educational mission.

9.1.54 From the 1950s commercial interests were introduced into the broadcasting scene in western Europe. There still being only a small number of TV and radio channels, they too tended to be carefully regulated. The arrival of satellite and cable made state-supervised monopolies obsolete almost overnight. Satellite broadcasting allowed transmission across national frontiers and cable created the opportunity for local and community programmes. A multiplicity of channels offered, in principle if not yet in practice, a wide diversity of opinion; theoretically, channel-hopping would be like browsing in a newsagent and so it would be increasingly hard to justify imposing more severe controls than those applied to magazines and newspapers.

9.1.55 Public service broadcasters are now faced with a situation where their “natural monopoly” is vanishing and many consumers have a wide choice of programmes. From being supply-oriented radio and television are increasingly demand-led. The implications of technical advances were backed up in several European countries by a new generation of politicians who favoured the free market and opposed regulation whenever and wherever they found it. As Alfred Smudits points out: “The objective and the philosophy of deregulation were to further the interests of media enterprises, to open up new markets and to create a pluralistic broadcasting landscape in which variety is guaranteed by commercial competition and in which discriminating audiences can choose the programmes they are interested in from a multitude of channels. Any demands – minority demands included – would generate supply.”¹

9.1.56 So far at least, public service broadcasters in some countries are responsible for greater programming variety than commercial terrestrial stations, where there is usually more of a commitment to light entertainment and less investment in production. Much the same goes for satellite broadcasters, except that they offer a huge range of feature films and old television series.

9.1.57 In the wake of deregulation there is evidence that audiences are segmenting and that some social groups concentrate on particular media. One consequence is an unequal distribution of “socially and politically relevant

1. Smudits, Alfred, “The cultural and educational functions of public service broadcasting in western Europe”. A paper commissioned by Unesco from Mediacult for the International Round Table on the Cultural and Educational Functions of Public Service Broadcasting. Vienna, 1995.

2. Smudits, Alfred, *ibid.*

knowledge".² One way or another the old, monolithic national audience is a thing of the past.

9.1.58 Having led the way on deregulation, the European Union has become concerned to protect broadcasting from its results. There are two main concerns – the perceived danger of a concentration of ownership of commercial companies and the inflow of American entertainment products. In 1989 the EC directive, Television without frontiers, recommended that a channel should programme, where possible, at least 50% of its air time with works of European origin, setting aside news, advertising, talk shows and sports – incidentally all the signs are that the caveat applied to the quotas requirement is likely to remain in the proposed revision of the directive. As noted earlier, European countries, led by France and Belgium, were successful in having audiovisual products exempted from most favoured nation status in the GATT negotiations on the grounds that they were not services in the conventional sense.

9.1.59 The growing monopolisation of the audiovisual market and its integration with the communication and computer industries has created new alliances. In 1994 the European Commission took steps in different fields of the audiovisual industries and the media to discourage the tendency to concentration of ownership. It has prevented or postponed mergers which might have led to "horizontal" monopolies in Europe or in some of its major regions. While the Commission is doing what it can to discourage market domination by a handful of major commercial groups, there is no doubting the trend to ever larger multimedia corporations.

9.1.60 Public sector broadcasters face an uncertain future; both they and their government paymasters see an important role for them in stimulating diversity of programmes, promoting cultural pluralism and furthering cultural identity. However, if their ratings fall and their market share collapses, their funding (whether through a licence fee or taxation) may become politically unsustainable at current levels. It is possible that there may be other ways of maintaining the public service ethos; for example, Channel 4 in the United Kingdom is funded by advertising, but manages to combine clever "niche" programming for minority audiences with a broad cultural remit.

9.1.61 In addition, public service television has experimented with another method of promoting high quality arts programmes: the establishment of a channel devoted to culture. Arte was originally set up by the French and German governments as a joint venture of La Sept in France and ARD and ZDF in Germany, but now extends to other European countries. It is distributed through cable in Germany and by terrestrial transmission in France and it is mostly publicly financed. The difficulties of its opening years were exacerbated by the danger that cultural programmes would disappear from regular channels and be exiled to specialised ghettos. Arte has small audiences, notably in France, in comparison with other non-specialist terrestrial channels; nevertheless, it is, both for producers and its viewers, a success in a televisual landscape where the arts have only too small a share. It raises an important and as yet unanswered question: does Arte, by virtue of the high quality of

its programming, offer a model of good practice that might encourage other public service broadcasters to widen their cultural brief and improve the content of their programmes? Or does it simply illustrate a permanent split between public broadcasters with a generalist remit which are driven by need to attract mass audiences and thematic arts channels which are free from those kinds of constraint, but at the cost of "ghetto-ising" their subject matter?

9.1.62 In central and eastern Europe, commercial broadcasters, usually funded by foreign investors, are entering the scene and offer sharp competition for the public sector. Some attempt is being made to encourage local production as well as allowing the import of foreign programmes. In Romania a commercial channel, Pro TV, opened in 1995 on the basis of an initial investment by a Bermuda-based investment group, Central European Media Enterprises (CME); the programming package includes films such as *Poltergeist*, *The fly* and *Alien* and television series such as *Mash* and *The X-Files* from the United States and the British drama series, *Cracker*.¹ However, studios will also be built and personnel trained and in due course the channel will broadcast locally originated programmes. CME have also launched Pro Plus in Slovenia, which will provide programming and advertising sales to regional broadcasters, in effect creating a national network. In the Czech Republic a new commercial channel, Nova TV, the controlling stake in which is owned by a former US Ambassador in Vienna, started broadcasting early in 1995; it is estimated that 40% of programmes are domestically produced and a further 9% of airtime is devoted to Czech films. These kinds of investment depend on an optimistic view of the growth of advertising in central and eastern Europe.

9.1.63 *Monopolising the press.* The print media are living in interesting times. In many countries, readership is stable or rising (especially in countries such as Italy with a traditionally low readership base), but newspapers and periodicals are losing advertising revenue to television and free publications. This is a major reason for a continuing trend in many countries to concentration of ownership at every level, national, regional and local. In Germany, for example, the advertising market share of the traditional press fell from 46% to 40% between 1981 and 1989, while that of the free press rose from 7% to 10% and of television from 10% to 13%.² Another important factor is the "zoning" of the regional and local press, so giving publishers effective monopolies in their areas.

9.1.64 Press groups have been seeking economies of scale for regional and national advertisers by the simultaneous publication of advertisements in newspapers covering different areas. Financial concentration has also led to the growth of "horizontal" ownership, whereby groups which own local or regional papers acquire holdings in television. The most egregious case is Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation in the United Kingdom, which owns a

1. See the *European* newspaper, 7-13 December 1995 edition.

2. This section is indebted to Musso, Pierre; Sou  tre, Philippe; and Levasseur, Lionel; *The printed press and television in the regions of Europe*. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 1995.

leading quality paper, the *Times*, and the most popular tabloid, the *Sun*, as well as the satellite Sky TV channels (and much else besides). Other instances include the French-language consortium, Audiopress in Belgium, which owns an interest in RTL Tvi. However, the situation varies in different countries depending on their governments' strictness or leniency of monopoly regulation.

9.1.65 The impact of these developments in western Europe on editorial policy is not altogether clear. There appears to be a substantial public appetite for regional and local forms of expression and, taking all media into account, growing supply. But while there is much practical information published, news and editorial values and policies tend to filter down rather than up.

9.1.66 In central and eastern Europe, the privatisation of formerly state-controlled media has allowed substantial foreign investment. This has aroused a wide range of responses. While the Polish authorities sought to keep ownership in national hands, directing that privatisation "should not lead to the domination of the Polish press market by foreign capital", there was little controversy in the Czech Republic when most regional papers were sold off by cash-strapped municipalities to the Passauer-Press Group. Likewise, in Hungary, the German company Springer have bought six regional dailies, five weeklies, ten smaller local papers and forty other titles without incurring much opposition.

9.1.67 It is perhaps no surprise, then, that many newspapers and periodicals in the former communist countries support the free market and privatisation programmes. However, the press exhibits some concern, even sentiment, for the discredited past and former communists still have influence in the media. As W.L. Webb observes: "Much of the new economic elite seems to combine a self-interested enthusiasm for free market ideology with a certain loyalty, or sense of kinship with more reconstructed survivors of the old political elite."¹ Also, although censorship is usually and officially a thing of the past, there is evidence of government intervention.

9.1.68 *Copyright: challenges and opportunities.* The cultural transformations of recent years has made a review of authors' rights urgent for three reasons. First, the process of European integration argues the need for harmonisation; secondly, piracy in central and eastern Europe calls for speedy address; and, thirdly, the implications of the technological advance are creating new challenges.

9.1.69 The history of legislation to protect authors' rights goes back a number of centuries. But to all intents and purposes the present legal framework was established in the 1950s and 1960s and has been frequently modified since in the light of technological developments (television, then cable and satellite TV). The protection of literary and artistic property is one aspect of government where countries cannot act alone to any great purpose. Many European states have ratified international conventions, notably those of Bern

1. Webb, W.L., "Media, market and democracy", *Index on Censorship*. London, 1994.

(authors' rights) and of Rome (neighbouring rights) which oblige the state to give foreign authors the same rights as nationals. At the European level, the Council of Europe has not been inactive (for example, the planned convention concerning authors' and neighbouring rights). But, above all, it is the European Union's efforts to harmonise national laws that merit attention.

9.1.70 In Europe the choice has been between two different attitudes towards artists' rights: the Anglo-Saxon concept of copyright focuses on financial exploitation of the product rather than on the moral rights of its creator. Under Roman law, the continental, and notably the French, line is exactly the opposite; so far, this "personal" approach, which asserts the indissoluble link between the artist and his or her work and insists on the author's moral rights, has been the dominant principle across much of the continent. However, the global dominance of North American cultural products goes hand in hand with constant pressure for the general adoption of copyright conventions and it is essential that Europe as a whole decides which way to go.

9.1.71 In central and eastern Europe, the legal framework during the communist era was non-existent or inadequate. Today nearly all these countries are in the process of revising their legislation, which is in fact a condition of entry into the commercial, audiovisual market. Their chief concerns are the protection of their national heritage, the fostering of a national production base and the fight against piracy. In the Russian Federation and Bulgaria, and also in Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and the Ukraine, among others, new laws are being drafted or voted on. It is clear that so far as commercial agreements are concerned the United States is pressing for copyright-style arrangements; though recently adopted laws are leaning more towards the French system. However, the crucial issue is to ensure that legislation is effectively implemented and that principles are translated into reality.

9.1.72 The arrival of the information society has posed some new challenges, more especially as "copyright" appears to some legal experts and producers to allow a more flexible response than "authors' rights". Digitalisation, which multiplies channels and makes authentic-sounding/looking copying possible, and multimedia production, which bring together written, acoustic and visual images derived from many sources, create new problems which will be difficult, but not impossible, to resolve. How does one identify the authors of multimedia products, who can sometimes be counted in thousands? How does one manage moral rights and economic and exploitation rights? What is the legal definition of this kind of artistic product? How is it protected during exploitation? There is no dearth of proposals. Among the most sensible are suggestions that value assessments and authors' payments are made at the very moment when they transfer their ideas into production and distribution and, secondly, that more effective national, transnational, regional and Europe-wide co-operation between collecting societies is established.

9.1.73 It is likely that governments will tread carefully, building on their existing legal arsenal to encourage new agreements and professional practices. Existing conventions and regulations do not need to be dismantled, but

should at least be adapted to meet new circumstances. Seeking to enhance the degree of protection and also to develop a global approach, the European Union has issued directives concerning rental and loan rights, and the duration of protection. Arguably, however, Europe's cultural scene would have benefited more if the royalties that will accrue from the extension of protection from the norm of fifty years after the creator's death to seventy years had been ploughed back into support schemes for contemporary creators. Other directives in preparation include protection of rights for transmission by cable and satellite, payments for private copying, artists' moral rights and the protection of data bases.

9.1.74 This is not the place for an exhaustive review of existing laws, but it is worth drawing attention to certain key trends which mark the efforts of some states, at any rate the more determined of them, to protect their authors' rights in a changing technical environment. Authors' moral and testamentary rights have been defined and strengthened, notably in the case of transmission by cable and satellite. Neighbouring rights, relating to performers and producers, have been recognised. A system of sanctions has been sketched out, or established, to combat piracy. Payments for private copying have been instituted in a growing number of countries. Responsibility for the collection and sharing out of dues has been given, in a number of arts sectors, to representative associations or societies which set aside a proportion of their funds for bursaries, investment in production, training and distribution. Several countries have introduced levies on either blank or pre-recorded audio and video cassettes. For instance, a levy on the sale of blank cassettes was introduced in France in 1985, with a substantial part of the proceeds used for such purposes as the professional training of artists, direct aid to creation and the dissemination of live performances by the media. Austrian copyright law (1980) contains similar provisions. The Spanish Decree of March 1989 stipulates that 20% of the total income from a levy on blank cassettes has to be used for the support of young creative artists and performers.

9.1.75 The situation will have to be kept under close scrutiny, with the following principles kept carefully in mind. The first is to continue the process of legal harmonisation and establishing internationally agreed conventions which set out clearly the principles of international transmission and distribution. The second is to simplify administrative procedures which appear to be unnecessarily complicated: this could be achieved, for example, by increasing the role of representative collection societies with a view to reducing the number of parties involved, though it would not be without problems. The third principle is to establish the technical means to identify works and those who have rights in them and to control their use (identification systems and procedures to combat illegal copying have already been explored).

9.2 Memory as a commodity: a future for whose past?

9.2.1 *The heritage "experience"*. Europe is fascinated – some would say, excessively so – by its past. An important aspect of most cultural policies is heritage. By this should be understood the totality of what survives from our

cultural past – the best of European music, theatre and literature as well as the visual arts and architecture. It is one of the key means by which societies and individuals assert and celebrate their identity. To ensure the continuing performance of Racine and the reading of Dante is a part of maintaining our idea of ourselves. As we have shown, much public investment in the arts is directed to the task of keeping alive Europe's rich heritage in the performing arts – that is to say, the classics of drama, music and dance and the infrastructure including libraries, cultural centres, theatres, concert halls, etc. This chapter focuses on a narrower definition – that is, the identification, preservation, conservation, development and communication of the international, national, regional and local physical patrimony. It covers the moveable and immoveable heritage and, for our purposes, the museums sector. "The heritage," as Pierre Nora observed, "is what is still visible of a world which has become invisible."¹ One of the most remarkable developments since the end of the second world war, and even more so in the last twenty years, has been a quite unprecedented interest in almost every aspect of the preservation, interpretation and exploitation of the world's stock of individual historic buildings, cultural ensembles such as historic townscapes and cultural landscapes, museums, galleries and collections.² It is a universal phenomenon, but one example will illustrate its scale. The former Soviet Union was immensely proud of the fact that official museums increased from less than fifty at the time of the Russian Revolution to more than 1 500 by the late 1980s; a survey in 1987 showed that this seriously understated the truth, for it was discovered that there were in fact 14 000 unofficial museums, mainly established by individual enthusiasts.

9.2.2 Underlying these developments is a long-running debate on the purposes of the preservation and exploitation of heritage, the roots of which can be traced back to the origins of the modern museum. Andrzej Rottermund identifies them as being "ideas of progress and evolution current in the second half of the nineteenth century, their strong relationship with nationalistic ideals, and with the methodology of exact and natural sciences current at the time [...] some museum objects [became] a kind of relic, and museum tourism a modern form of pilgrimage."³ The idea of the museum as essentially a centre for specialised scholarship, to which a respectful public is admitted almost on sufferance, has been challenged in recent years by a more people-oriented approach, which sees the heritage as a flexible means of exploring the multicultural nature of contemporary society. According to this view a museum is a resource to help people come to terms with changing social values. "A museum of the future must pay greater attention to the differences between

1. Quoted in Munoz, Marie-Claude, Conclusions and recommendations of an international seminar on *The cultural heritage and its educational implications: A factor for tolerance, good citizenship and social integration* (Brussels, 28-30 August 1995). Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

2. This chapter is indebted to Patrick Boylan's background papers, "Europe's built environment and movable heritage", and "The heritage dimension in late 20th century culture", commissioned by the European Task Force. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1994.

3. Rottermund, Andrzej, "Museums – Questions about their future". *International Cultural Centre*, No. 4, June 1994 – May 1995, Cracow.

4. Ibid.

visitor groups. Museum 'services' should be more diversified than they are, mainly by broadening the range of subjects and by taking account of the variety of demands, level of knowledge and interests of different groups."⁴

9.2.3 Every year millions of people visit Europe's historic cities, ancient monuments and living history museums. From being a pastime for the educated, cultural tourism has become a satisfying and absorbing component of mass culture. However, in some parts of Europe there is another side to the story. We live in an expanding historically-bound culture in which tradition and the past have become a commercialised plaything of the future. The late twentieth century physical heritage "explosion" is the product of new ways of commodifying our origins, which some welcome as making heritage more accessible and others deride on the grounds that it is "vulgarising" the past and turning it into "tourist kitsch". History, or at least what is marketed as history, has thus become one of the most important products on sale in the late twentieth century world. An industry has emerged which absorbs considerable public and private resources; "Instead of manufacturing goods, we are manufacturing heritage, a commodity which nobody seems able to define, but everybody is eager to sell."¹ Entrepreneurs, it is argued, have appropriated from the museums sector the role of selling us a "packaged" version of the past: why settle for historical accuracy when you can have an "experience"? This popularisation of heritage has attracted its critics for whom it reflects disenchantment with the present and a symptom of national decay and "the exhaustion of heritage's grand narratives"².

9.2.4 Not everyone feels this way. Raphael Samuel considers "heritage baiting" a form of social condescension. "It is a favourite conceit of the aesthete that the masses, if left to their own devices, are moronic; that their pleasures are unthinking and their tastes cheap and nasty. Theme parks – doubly offensive because they seem to us to come from America and because they link history to the holiday industry – are a particular bugbear for the critics."³ A more constructive and optimistic view is that such developments represent something more fundamental than the result of new ways of marketing heritage and more related to new perceptions, images and meanings of European history. They help communities to refine their collective sense of themselves, enabling them to reinterpret the past in order to come to terms with the bewildering changes of the present and a vertigo-inducing future. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the renewal of heritage and cultural tourism gives citizens in democratic societies the chance to educate themselves about their ancestors' achievements and errors from which they derive contemporary benefits (or, sometimes, detriment). Education and pleasure need not be incompatible.

9.2.5 There are concerns of a different scale about the way in which false and potentially dangerous histories and heritage myths have, if not actually

1. Samuel, Raphael, *Theatres of memory*. Virgo. London, 1995.

2. Hewison, Robert, *The heritage industry*. Methuen. London, 1987.

3. Samuel, Raphael, "Theme parks – why not?", the *Independent on Sunday* newspaper. London, 12 February 1995. Adapted from *Theatres of memory*, op. cit.

created, then at least contributed significantly to, the promotion and transmission of aggressive nationalism in many parts of the world this century. Professor Milena Dragicević-Sesić of Belgrade has drawn attention to the role of what she terms “kitsch history” and heritage myths in the conflicts which have devastated much of the former Yugoslavia, paralleling the role that culture played in the promotion among the general public of Nazi values in Germany. Criticisms are also voiced of the negative gender and class stereotyping in much of the commercial heritage sector, and indeed in some of the non-commercial facilities. Few museums or “heritage centres” in former imperial states have much to say about their region’s or country’s role in the seventeenth to nineteenth century slave trade and its fundamental social, economic and political consequences.

9.2.6 The idea of conservation has its prehistory, stretching back to debates during the French Revolution about the possible preservation of historic monuments and collections and to the medievalism of social reformers, such as John Ruskin and William Morris. Public enthusiasm for heritage grew with the arrival of mass transportation in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, with steamships and long distance railways.

9.2.7 The international community has taken an interest in the impact of military action on heritage from the end of the last century: two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 offered a measure of protection during times of war.¹ A more recent stimulus was the destruction caused by the twentieth century world wars. Town centres and individual buildings have been replaced with replicas as in the ancient core of Warsaw, Buda Castle in Budapest, the medieval Guildhall and many historic churches and Livery Halls in the City of London and the painstaking recreation of the Semper Opera House in Dresden.

9.2.8 It is ironic that some of the demolitions caused by post-war commercial redevelopment are already being corrected. A remarkable instance is the construction of an accurate replica of important Roman fortifications which were removed in 1968 to make way for a modern tourist resort in Lloret de Mar in Catalonia. On a larger scale, environmental degradation in the historic centre of Prague is now being remedied by major restoration works.

9.2.9 Much of Europe’s heritage is rural and many thousands of archaeological sites in the countryside are recognised to be highly important parts of the cultural economy. Obvious examples include the myriad classical sites in Italy and Greece, Hadrian’s great Roman wall in England, prehistoric caves in France and Spain and the neolithic stone circles of Stonehenge and Avebury in England, the standing stones of France, Ireland, Scotland and the Scandinavian countries and medieval ruined churches and castles across the continent.

1. Hague Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 1899, and the Fourth Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907.

9.2.10 An interesting development has been the recreation of ancient lifestyles, as in the Iron Age “living history” villages of Denmark and England, and even their contemporary preservation, as in the remarkable Hortobágy National Park in Hungary where a social system (large-scale cattle ranching and animal breeding) as well as an environment is being preserved. In a similar vein, “living” museums attempt to recreate old industrial ways of life. Industrial heritage is being preserved and celebrated as part of economic regeneration schemes. Projects can be found in many European countries, especially in areas of urban decline following the closure or contraction of traditional industries

9.2.11 Unesco has played a major role in advising on the restoration and preservation of major heritage sites and encouraging member states to adopt international standards for their protection, and also assisting countries to promote and monitor the sites on its World Heritage list. Similarly, the European Union has provided some financial underpinning for European heritage, museums and related training.

9.2.12 Some serious policy issues arise from the irresistible march of the heritage industry. First, Europe’s cultural heritage is not spread evenly across the continent nor are the resources to maintain it. Greece and Italy shoulder unique burdens; the report on Cultural policy in Italy comments: “Virtually anywhere you dig or build in Italy, you are liable to disturb the remains of past civilisation, usually in strata of continuous occupation. A survey carried out in 1972 on a sample of 8 000 towns revealed that 87% of them predated the fourteenth century [...]. Given the scope and unique scale of Italy’s *patrimonio* and the difficulties which attend its protection and management towards the end of the second millennium, it is immediately obvious that the available resources could never be fully adequate [...]. The specially dedicated *soprintendenza*, which was established in Rome to deal with the devastating earthquake damage to the archaeological, artistic and built heritage in Campania and Basilicata in 1981, is being wound up, having achieved barely 18% of its specific tasks over fourteen years, the resources allocated having been wholly unequal to the job.”¹

9.2.13 Secondly, planning new museum and heritage facilities as part of economic development or tourism proposals calls for much realistic museological and marketing research before their viability can be forecast with any degree of accuracy. For example, the growth in the number of maritime museums in some parts of Europe as a result of financial assistance for tourism infrastructure projects from the European Union’s European Regional Development Fund and Community Initiatives programmes have little relationship to demand.

9.2.14 Thirdly, there are well-documented examples of even modest, economically motivated museum initiatives facing strong opposition from the populations they serve. For instance, there have been objections to the

1. *Cultural policy in Italy*, Report of a European panel of examiners by Christopher Gordon, European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

preservation of an abandoned historic industrial enterprise from the former workers themselves. Planners must work closely with the local community at all levels, in order to reflect as far as possible its hopes and aspirations. For many years the Council of Europe has been promoting the concept of integrated conservation, not only to bring the principles of heritage protection and management to bear on town and country planning by incorporating them in the decision making process, but also to encourage a multidisciplinary approach based on co-operation between all relevant interests.

9.2.15 Fourthly, the accurate recreation of the past is more easily said than done: reconstructions are often a useful way of finding out how a built environment functioned in the past and they satisfy a legitimate need to present history in an understandable way. However, there are cases where it is bowdlerised and sentimentalised. How are the dangerous past working conditions, pollution, dirt and noise of a preserved, "living" coal mine to be evoked? If they are not, the visitor will be experiencing a lie.

9.2.16 The rate of expansion in the number and range of preserved buildings and sites has grown exponentially in many countries during recent years. For instance, in the United Kingdom the number of historic and natural sites, monuments and buildings with some form of special legal or planning protection has risen from about 1 000 in 1945, and perhaps 10 000 in the 1960s, to something approaching a million at present. This is partly the result of more concerted action, but it is also attributable to a broadening of the definition of what constitutes "heritage" (which has been one of the Council of Europe's policies since the European Conference of Ministers for Architectural Heritage met in Granada in 1985). However, though the preservation of historic built heritage should clearly be a priority both for public authorities and for private and public owners, and wholesale deregulation or removal of protection is highly undesirable, there is a need, nevertheless, for a proper balance between the past thirty years' insistence on preserving almost every conceivable element of a perhaps newly invented "heritage" and the need to avoid fossilising (and possibly thereby destroying) historic city centres and other built environments perhaps some hundreds of years old. Moreover, questions are already being asked about the viability of the present number of heritage attractions; new facilities in already well-provided areas may simply redistribute a level of attendances that is near or at saturation point.

9.2.17 Problems are exacerbated for governments by the damage caused to heritage by pollution and the often large investments that are required to address this. Most countries have national, regional or local strategies to combat aspects of pollution of their cultural heritage, though this is sometimes an adjunct to general environmental or health policies. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe approved a recommendation on the control of the physical deterioration of the architectural heritage in 1988¹ and subsequently the Swedish delegation proposed "model cities" as a basis for devel-

1. Recommendation (88) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on the control of physical deterioration of architectural heritage accelerated by pollution. Strasbourg, 1988.

oping methods of concerted actions aimed at reducing air pollution and other factors causing damage. Although there was general interest in the idea the potential financial implications for participating countries dissuaded the Council of Europe from pursuing it.

9.2.18 There has been an explosion of museum development; up to 90% of the total number of the world's museums were founded after 1945. Numbers of museums in Germany and France have grown rapidly. Finland now has more than 900 museums for a population of about 5 million. One new museum is established every two weeks in the United Kingdom. The reasons for this phenomenon are complex and not yet fully understood. One factor has certainly been the ever-accelerating pace of social and (especially) industrial change, prompting the establishment of museums and newly preserved monuments illustrating comparatively modern social and industrial history. Also, the processes of decolonisation, decentralisation and regionalism have led to the creation of many museums as overt symbols of national and regional identities.

9.2.19 Many new museums are private in origin and have been founded by groups of enthusiasts and volunteers. This points to the fact that the heritage culture has not been imposed from above, but represents a genuine surge of public interest. One of the major achievements of recent decades has been the democratisation of access to the "heritage experience" compared with the traditionally very narrow spectrum of society to which heritage used to be restricted. The Council of Europe initiated European Heritage Classes and the European Heritage Days programmes have helped to promote greater public awareness especially among younger people: "This new approach has considerable social significance, since it opens the way to putting the general public in touch, or back in touch, with the heritage [...]. It helps to democratise cultural assets and makes for social integration by giving people a sense of being part of a community and a tradition."¹

9.2.20 The new medium of the moving image has already established a history and a past. The approach, and then the celebration, of the centenary of the invention of the cinema in 1995 stimulated a new awareness that audiovisual products were part of the heritage in peril. The fragility of film and videotape and their lack of cultural respectability outside small circles of film archivists and film enthusiasts (followed in the 1970s by American, but not European, universities) meant destruction at the moment when the product lost its immediate commercial value (until the 1980s nobody predicted that this value would return with the arrival of the new technologies). Little has survived of the massive output of television broadcasters until the fairly recent past. In western Europe the issue has largely been one of neglect of the audiovisual heritage; the resources to preserve it are available in principle if there is a will to do so. In central and eastern Europe, where many of the masterpieces of cinema were made, economic crisis often means that the money is simply not there. The use of digitilisation in safeguarding and even recreating old masterpieces has proved very expensive, as has the global

1. Munoz, Marie-Claude, *op. cit.*

preservation of the ever-growing quantity of television production. New problems concerning the legal deposit of audiovisual material (which only exists at present in a few countries) and the future of film and video archives have yet to be solved.

9.2.21 At the time of writing the Council of Europe is working on a draft convention which seeks to ensure the protection of audiovisual heritage, both for artistic reasons and its value as historical record. A compulsory legal deposit system to designated national archives (on the analogy of the printed publications deposits in libraries) is the only way to ensure comprehensive preservation. But it raises two practical issues: the first is one of cost. Film prints are more expensive than books and require continuing care and attention to keep them in mint condition. Audiovisual archives are costly enterprises and small countries may hesitate before making them a policy priority. Secondly, television and radio broadcasters transmit vast quantities of national, regional and local programmes, which it would be impractical to collect and archive *in toto*. The solution to this problem is presumably some kind of sampling system. There is much to be said, for economic as well as for cultural reasons, for national archives to co-operate with one another, for there to be a Europe-wide cataloguing system and for the establishment of common identification and other technical procedures.

9.2.22 The exploitation of the contents of an audiovisual archive for purposes other than academic research will entail contractual arrangements with copyright holders (a more complicated task than may appear at first sight). Until such questions are resolved it will be impossible to open them to public access, although in principle this may soon be easy to achieve from a technical point of view.

9.2.23 *Rape of the heritage.* In many respects the growth of the heritage "industry" has been a success story. However, there is a tragic downside.¹ In parts of central and eastern Europe looting of churches, homes and museums, and the unauthorised sale and destruction of artefacts and heritage sites or monuments has reached epidemic proportions. In 1991 the Prague government estimated that 15 000 items had been stolen from public collections, at an suggested total value of US\$ 36 million; a year later the estimate had risen to 20 000 stolen items. In 1992 Vukovar, the palace of the Eltz family in the former Yugoslavia, was looted, shelled and finally destroyed. It has been estimated that two-thirds of the cultural property of Croatia has been damaged or mistreated as a result of hostilities. Massive looting in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to an estimate that 95% of the country's cultural heritage has been destroyed or damaged. Sometimes, despoliation is simply theft or philistinism, but on occasion a more sinister motive can be detected among the

1. This section draws on Eric-Christian V. Henriksen's "The plunder of eastern European artefacts and their sale in the west: a cultural haemorrhage beyond recovery?", a paper for the Circle symposium, "Harmony or confusion for culture and communication in Europe", in association with the Italian Government and the Cini Foundation. The Prime Minister's Office, the Italian Government. Rome, 1996.

perpetrators – namely a conscious intention to extinguish an enemy's identity, which has a long, melancholy tradition in Europe and world-wide.

9.2.24 It is hard to know how reliable this information is, but it is generally agreed that much harm has been done, some of it irretrievable, to the Balkan and, by extension, European heritage. More generally in eastern Europe, it appears that states, through de-accession or euphemistically "rationalisation", are disposing of valuable national property. Quasi-autonomous bodies (museums, etc.) are not controlled by existing legislation and are also engaging in "rationalisation" for ready money. Para-state or semi-legal agencies (for example former party administrations) are divesting themselves of their assets, cultural goods amassed during the decades of communist power, on an uncontrolled black market.

9.2.25 Bearing in mind the difficult economic situation in central and eastern Europe there is a case for establishing an arrangement for external investment to ensure effective conservation and restoration. The most efficient and equitable approach would be to establish a European heritage bank, perhaps administered or supervised by the Council of Europe, with the support of the European Union, to which all member states would contribute according to their means. Such a bank could also attract private contributions and would finance capital investment and provide loans. Were such a proposal to be adopted, it would be possible for assistance to be offered additionally to those western European countries where the burden of heritage conservation is exceptionally heavy. Meanwhile the Cultural Heritage Committee of the Council for Cultural Co-operation has prepared a Specific Action Plan and Concerted Action Plan to restore the heritage of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for consideration by European Ministers responsible for Heritage at their conference in Helsinki at the end of May 1996. The aim is to establish synergy between initiatives taken bilaterally and to help the co-ordination of measures taken by other governmental and non-governmental agencies working in the two war-torn countries. This is an opportunity for member states to demonstrate their solidarity by whole-hearted commitment to the initiative.

9.2.26 We should not delude ourselves into thinking that the problems of theft and destruction are confined to one part of Europe. The Church of the Suffragio in Lucca, Tuscany, for example, was completely robbed of its contents worth thousands of millions of lire. Attempts to address the general situation in the European Union have been made by the European Commission and, in 1992, member states adopted the regulation on the Export of Cultural Goods and the Commission Directive on the Return of Cultural Goods Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a member state. The principle of the free movement of goods and services has been balanced by member states' right to protect their national treasures "possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value". A system of export licences has been installed (despite some British fears that the rights of *bona fide* private owners to dispose of their property might be threatened and that the thriving art market may be imperilled). States have a right of restitution of goods unlawfully removed from their territories. It remains to be seen whether governments will co-operate

effectively to implement these regulations. A number of practical difficulties present themselves in policing these regulations, including the abolition of internal frontiers and the absence of comprehensive Europe-wide inventories. These matters require early resolution, especially in the light of the proposed extension of the European Union's membership and, in consequence, of the Community's external frontiers.

9.2.27 In the wider Europe, Unidroit has been working on the rules of private law applicable to the illicit trade in cultural objects to complement the 1970 Unesco Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. Unesco has been concerned that although the convention has raised awareness of the issues and brought about some attitudinal change in "receiving" countries, it had not eliminated the problem. Any attempt to unify the law in this area faces formidable legal and political difficulties, not least from the fact that continental and "Anglo-Saxon" law systems adopt very different approaches to ownership.

9.2.28 A controversial issue of the moment concerns what some see as the rape of heritage in past centuries and during the second world war. There are increasing calls for the return of artefacts with a high cultural value to their countries of origin. Former imperial countries are being pressed from outside Europe by their one-time colonies; in the last three hundred years travellers from North Europe acquired many items from Mediterranean countries (for example, the Parthenon marbles in the British Museum which Greece wants back in Athens and many examples in French and German museums). There are major policy implications here – not only related to national and cultural identity, but also to the nature of museum collections throughout Europe. Moreover, as a delayed aftermath of the second world war, the negotiations under way to resolve the ownership of objects seized during the fighting by the Germans and the Russians raise important dilemmas which go beyond the usual scope of contemporary cultural policies.

9.2.29 *An ethical approach.* There is an obvious paradox between the obligation to protect and conserve the heritage, while at the same time developing its social and economic potential (for example in the tourism-related industries). The development of heritage has to be sustainable and a multi-disciplinary strategy is essential to assess the desirability and impact of potential change. The creation of jobs is important, but so too is respect for what remains of the past. There is little point in gaining economic benefit at the expense of cultural impoverishment. We have seen how closely heritage is bound up with identity, especially when it is associated with minority communities. Unfortunately, this symbolic dimension of heritage also makes it particularly vulnerable. A new ethical approach to these matters is required – underpinned by educational measures – in which competing interests are balanced and where, above all, it is recognised that the destruction of any community's heritage is a loss for us all.

9.3 Managing and financing culture

9.3.1 The publicly funded arts world is facing new challenges. Cultural policy is at a watershed. Questions of finance are forcing governments to focus resources more precisely; at the same time there is a perception that it is important to define objectives more explicitly than in the past and to find ways of measuring outcomes; even in those countries that have established a clear policy framework, there has been a realisation that a reappraisal is called for. Many states have instituted or completed comprehensive policy and structural reviews (sometimes prompted by the Council of Europe's Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews and sometimes by political imperatives).

9.3.2 Policies of decentralisation and the slimming down of the public sector have had major consequences. Ministries of culture and arts councils are placing their emphasis on strategic guidance rather than day-to-day management. In central and eastern Europe there is growing interest in the establishment of independent or quasi-independent foundations to handle arts funding. It is possible that innovative new models for governance will emerge from the current debates. The old ministries once committed to central planning are expected to divest themselves of many of their powers in favour of municipalities and regional governments (although not all are doing so with enthusiasm). In west European countries, power has often been handed down to smaller units of administration (not always with the necessary resources). Many arts organisations which have been publicly owned and managed have been, if not privatised, then made administratively independent. Performing companies, art galleries and museums are increasingly being cut loose from direct government control.

9.3.3 This process has been accompanied by the introduction of new management systems. The apparatus of the private sector – strategic plans, performance indicators, staff appraisals, performance related pay – has been applied to cultural institutions in some countries, partly to make them more efficient and offer better value for money and partly to tighten accountability to government. The assessment of arts organisations, both financial and artistic, is becoming more detailed and more interventionist. In a democracy, accountability for the use of public money is an essential condition of its availability, but it is sometimes suspected that politicians and civil servants exploit their influence over what is supported and produced.

9.3.4 In the past, attempts to monitor the arts and culture and establish mechanisms for evaluation have suffered from self-imposed isolation. They were valued for their intrinsic worth and links with the wider social context were disregarded. Recent studies have usefully emphasised the economic importance of the arts, but there is now a danger that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. It is more than a pity that new forms of measurement tend to be inflexibly quantitative and focus on economic and financial outturns. This is a reflection of the depressing fact that the larger and "softer" contributions of culture are still not fully recognised and that few reliable indicators of the subjective or qualitative dimensions of culture in devel-

opment have been established. Indicators linked to targets are also a useful means of ensuring that cultural institutions give appropriate weight to social aims concerning gender, race and social exclusion, but as yet are insufficiently exploited in this respect.

9.3.5 The way forward is to broaden our understanding of the function of the arts as a source of creativity and "human capital". We recognise the important work carried out by the United Nations Development Programme in establishing new methods of assessing economic development from the perspective of empowerment and the enlargement of people's choices. The Human Development Reports have also taken up important social issues, most recently (1995) gender inequality. Yet we feel that their instruments, the Human Development Index (HDI) and its variants, should be made more sensitive to the expansion of human choice through enhanced creativity and aesthetic awareness by devising indicators which measure people's access to culture and self-expression. Also, HDIs are not capable of measuring the basic value changes which technological and economic development, the related trend towards globalisation and the political turmoil since 1989 have brought about. It would seem to follow that European cultural research and work on developing cultural indicators should be intensified and that, in this connection, the experience gained from the European Programme of National Policy Reviews, including the ones concerning eastern and central European countries, should be taken into account.

9.3.6 One new model borrowed from the United States has been the notion of "challenge" funding; a condition of grant is often the raising of matching finance through business sponsorship and corporate donations as well as box-office or attendance targets. However, this has not been replicated widely so far in Europe.

9.3.7 In one important sense, the subsidised arts remain self-governing. In some European countries, decisions on grant aid and artistic policy are in the hands of experts and representatives of the arts communities, who sit on voluntary specialist committees, rather than paid officials. The peer group system, as it is sometimes called, has the twin advantage of keeping politicians at a distance and so reducing the risk of censorship and of saving them from the potentially awkward publicity that can flow from support for controversial new art. Also, it has usually meant that arts policy is well informed and sensitive to artists' needs. However, both the arm's length principle and peer group evaluation can be undermined by political or other pressures, not least by artists themselves. Our attention has been drawn to instances where groups of artists are considered to have "closed off" access to decision-makers through a virtual monopoly of influence. Self-perpetuating cliques are no less dangerous if they are made up of artists rather than bureaucrats subject to political jockeying and lobbying.

9.3.8 Moreover, the democratic process can also be bypassed and public involvement in cultural planning prevented, leading to the protection of existing institutions at the expense of demands from new and as yet unrecognised

groups. In some countries such disadvantages are reduced by separating policy, which remains the preserve of government, from implementation.

9.3.9 To search for a structural model that would be universally applicable would be a fruitless endeavour, needlessly conflicting with individual societies' own traditions and constraints. But it may be possible to agree on a few basic principles; in particular, provided that there is effective monitoring, the peer group system of decision-making, at least so far as the practical implementation of funding programmes are concerned, seems to be the least worst mechanism that has been devised and has distinct advantages over allowing officials or politicians to intervene directly in grant making. The key issue is not so much a structural one, but the need to establish clear objectives and an agreed division of responsibilities between the different tiers of government and other interested parties.

Summary

There has been a massive expansion of arts and media production in post-war Europe, but sustaining this, and especially the infrastructure of arts venues, libraries and museums, has put increasing pressure on government budgets. Economic readjustment in central and eastern Europe has meant that the overriding concern for the traditional arts is survival, but television, film, video and radio have become universal purveyors of cultural goods and services as well as powerful economic players. There remains a disjunction or estrangement between the traditional arts and the mass media. European film and television are being swamped by American audiovisual products. The heritage industry is undergoing a phase of exponential growth. However, success has been accompanied by serious problems that call for urgent address. The heritage ideal is being exploited by commercialism and, while there is greater access than before, it is sometimes to inaccurate and fictional recreations of the past. In central and eastern Europe the heritage has suffered from theft and destructive military action in some places and is generally at risk because of economic crisis. The multiplication of the means of cultural production and continued piracy is complicating the situation of authors' rights.

Points for consideration

Contribution to human knowledge and understanding

i. A new ethical approach to heritage is needed, which acknowledges its role in identity-building for Europe, states, area-based and minority cultures. Appropriate educational measures will be necessary to enhance awareness and respect for heritage.

Economic and social outcomes

ii. There needs to be increased investment, especially in central and eastern Europe, in preserving the audiovisual heritage and the establishment of co-operative networks among national archives.

iii. To provide urgent resources for countries with severe problems of restoration and conservation, consideration should be given to the creation of a European Heritage Bank, funded by public and private contributions and devoted to financing capital investments and providing loans.

iv. When considering ways of encouraging audiovisual production, national governments and supranational agencies should pay particular attention to distribution, marketing and the establishment of film studios. Local and regional production should receive special support and, bearing in mind its importance as a “nursery” for creative talents and in the promotion of regional and local identities and culture, should be targeted by the European Union’s Media II Programme.

v. To safeguard authors’ rights in an increasingly complex technological environment and to tackle infringement and piracy of copyright, the competent international bodies should continue the process of legal harmonisation and establishing internationally agreed conventions which set out clearly the principles of international transmission and distribution; should simplify administrative procedures by increasing the role of representative collection societies, but at the same time ensuring transparency and responsible management; and should encourage closer national and international co-operation and dissemination of information on good practice in reinvestment of copyright royalties for young creators.

vi. National governments, with the support of supranational agencies, should seek to ensure that systems for assessing the work of arts organisations should take qualitative as well as quantitative factors adequately into account; cultural indicators linked to targets are a useful means of ensuring that cultural and heritage institutions give due weight to social aims concerning gender, race and exclusion.

vii. Where national governments use peer group systems to guide cultural policy and implementation, they should consider separating policy-making powers from individual grant decisions, to reduce the risk of self-

interested decisions. Participation in the peer group process needs to be transparent and democratic.

viii. New museum and heritage facilities as part of economic or tourism development should undergo careful museological and marketing research as well as appropriate local consultation before approval. There should be careful monitoring of historical accuracy. Attention should be paid to questions of over-supply and the risk that uncontrolled access to heritage sites may threaten their preservation.

ix. Heritage policies ought not to be developed in isolation, but as part of a multidisciplinary approach to cultural, planning, environmental and economic strategies.

x. The rise of independent producers has been one of the successes of the deregulation of broadcasting where it has been applied. There is a danger that it will now be squandered by further demands for commercial efficiency and success in the global marketplace. Independent producers are a source of European creativity and, as such, should be supported by governments, regulatory authorities and public broadcasters.

Harnessing human resources

xi. In the past attempts to monitor the arts and culture and establish mechanisms for evaluation have suffered from self-imposed isolation. They were valued for their intrinsic worth and links with the wider social context were disregarded. Recent studies have usefully emphasised importance of the arts, but there is now a danger that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. The way forward is to broaden our understanding of the function of the arts as a source of creativity and "human capital". We recommend that European cultural research and work on developing cultural indicators be intensified and that, in this connection, the experience gained from the European Programme of National Policy Reviews be taken into account.

xii. The Council of Europe could follow new developments in the amateur arts, volunteering and support pilot projects which enhance networking.

Part three: Setting a new course

10 Is there a future for European culture?

“Differences between societies and their social problems are going to manifest themselves on a cultural level, not on the level of states and public policy.”

Francis Fukuyama

“Reflection has come to an end – the future belongs to the arts.”

Heiner Müller

10.1 Beyond the year 2000

10.1.1 There is no sign at all that the general pace of change in Europe is slowing down. We are witnessing the metamorphosis of culture and society at an accelerating rate and in unexpected ways. Policy makers already have the difficult task of responding effectively to things as they are, but their efforts are likely to be abortive if they cannot map out the likely course of future developments. Unfortunately, long term forecasting, like clairvoyance, is an art, not a science. There is, of course, a future for European culture, but what shape will it take? What factors – economic, political, social and global – could have a bearing on the cultural sector up to the turn of the century and beyond?

10.1.2 What follows is an attempt to outline a range of possible outcomes in a series of tables. Some are more probable than others. These “option” tables are based on two or three compound dimensions. From this menu, the scenarios in the text pick up, combine and condense the most likely future directions for culture and development on the basis of the descriptive analyses between Chapters 5 and 9. They are not, of course, the only permutations possible. There are five sets of scenarios, each comprising two major interrelated and interactive sectors of development (discussed in Chapters 5 to 9). In each set of scenarios, the description of these two sectors is condensed into two major compound divisions, comprising two or three alternative trends; the dimensions and alternative routes of development are cross-tabulated in order to note their potential interactions. In the ensuing cells, a considerable degree of interaction can be identified in some cases, in others not. Some cells ensuing from the cross-tabulation are, therefore, more relevant than others in reflecting integrated overall development. The scenarios and the wider vista they open up suggest alternative future conditions for artistic and cultural activities in Europe.

10.1.3 The analysis is coloured by four great themes which permeate the complexities of the European scene. The first of them concerns cultural identity as the peoples of the continent come to terms with the project for European integration and the rise of local and regional aspirations. Secondly, the cultural landscape of European society has become more diverse, but this has

been accompanied by social, cultural and economic fragmentation and exclusion reinforced by policies unable to accommodate diversity. Thirdly, the relation between the state and the individual is changing. Government expenditures on welfare provision are under pressure and the cultural role of the state is undergoing change. The maintenance of thriving civil societies depends on a proper balance between the public, private and voluntary sectors. Fourthly, a global culture, riding high on the back of the information revolution, and newly invigorated regional and local cultures are set on a collision course, so creating the possibility of a so-called "glocal" squeeze.

10.1.4 If we look at the future of European and world cultures, we find ourselves confronting several contradictory trends. The present stage of post-industrial development encourages the processes of globalisation, movements of population and new kinds of cultural encounter as well as new modes of decentralisation, administration and management. The characteristics of this flux are acceleration and instability. Changes are multiplying at an exponential rate, their directions vary and their patterns are transient. All the actors in this drama – public authorities, business and industry, individuals and indeed society as a whole – are finding it more and more difficult to understand and cope with everything that is happening. Information exchange and networking are catchwords for getting to grips with change, but the mechanisms of communication are themselves subject to acceleration and instability.

10.1.5 There are two possible basic reactions to this new dynamic. The first is denial – a desperate effort to keep the lid on change, ignoring the future and retaining as much as possible of the past. It involves protectionist measures, an emphasis on conservation, rather than tourism-led development, of the heritage, the "assimilation" of new minorities rather than tolerance of diversity and the official or unofficial closure of frontiers with the rest of the world. Outsiders variously include (among others) Europeans who are not members of the European Union, Americans (North and South, but with different emphases), Islamic communities, Africans, Afro-Caribbeans and South and South-east Asians. Europe, and the European Union, becomes a fortress and a museum, where the new and the radical are seen as threats. Creativity is confined to working within established traditions. This response to change is purely cultural (in the broad anthropological sense) in that economic, technological and industrial factors all point in the opposite direction to the abolition of frontiers and the creation of a global environment.

10.1.6 The second reaction is to abandon any hope of controlling the uncontrollable. There is less evidence of this point of view and as yet it represents no public authority's official policy, although references to the "invisible hand" of market forces echo a pervasive despondency. However, if we look ahead, it represents a greater cultural threat than anti-technological Ludditism because once people believe they have no control over their circumstances they tend to sink into apathy. Although history suggests that the sense of being in charge of events is often an illusion, it has helped people to cope with their day-to-day problems. The presumption of helplessness is (as yet) most clearly realised in the anti-utopias of twentieth century fiction. It could be argued that video games, adventures on-line and multimedia cyber-

space are a kind of anticipatory antidote in that they create controllable artificial worlds. Yet, as recent studies indicate, such games are only a safe refuge for those with strong psyches. As the Sci-fi imagery of the “revolt of the robots” suggests, the shadows of reality fall across the most far-away fantasy landscapes.¹

10.1.7 There is another possible response, of course: to embrace and manage change - not simply to “go with the flow”, but to revel in it and, wherever possible, exploit it. This is fairly uncommon, it has to be admitted, especially at a political level, where short term considerations tend to take precedence over risk strategies. It is more evident in industry and commerce, but in the context of commercial opportunism to enhance profitability and market share.

10.1.8 So, unless there is a new awareness and will to intervene, the future seems to offer a choice between a rejection of the future or an uncritical embrace of change. In either case, culture will play a key role. In the first view, there could be a strengthening of religious convictions, assertions of ethnic identity and local loyalties against the outside world. In the second, we can envisage people escaping into media fiction and the virtual realities of cyberspace, leaving the real world to be run by a few committed, hegemonic groups. One way or the other, then, either aggressive rejection of the “other” or the atomisation of society at the hands of mass entertainment and its derivatives will remain a major cultural issue. If a third way is to welcome the future constructively, there is no hiding the fact that this will entail discarding many valued assumptions.

10.1.9 In our new, fluid condition humaine, these issues appear chameleon-like in a variety of guises, deceiving policy makers as well as the “innocent” citizens who embody and energise them. After recent tragic events in parts of Europe, we now know that the violation of cultural rights, the mindless pursuit of ethnic cleansing and intolerance, together with a more general despondency and alienation, cannot be overcome by well-intentioned information campaigns, regulations and education strategies alone. These are often adopted as placebos or surrogates that only serve to conceal acquiescence. There is a deeper need to assess and debate the realities of contemporary Europe, something to which the arts and culture are well placed in principle to make a fundamental contribution. But, as the following scenarios suggest, this will remain an aspiration unless certain social and political conditions are met, ranging from the question of European integration to problems of finance. Only then will it be possible to determine the extent to which the arts and culture can contribute to Europe’s future development.

10.2 Fortress Europe or common European home?

10.2.1 *Isolationist Europe.* In the closing years of the cold war, there was no room in Europe for a solidarity based on cultural fellow-feeling. In the east, the last remnants of ideological commitment to socialist ideals was vanishing

1. See Turkle, Sherry, *Life on the screen: identity in the age of the Internet.* Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1996.

and the integration process in western Europe laid most emphasis on rational economic principles. So it is understandable that ten years ago the continent warmed to Gorbachev's vision of a "common European home". But it soon transpired that the home was not big enough or rich enough to accommodate everyone. In the Russian folk tale, *Teremok*, or "Little home", some small animals found a house and kept on inviting all their friends to come and join them; the big bear arrived and, upset that he was unable to fit inside, broke the house down. Fears of various kinds of big bear (whether as a threat from inside or outside Europe) have created a fortress Europe mentality. Many small curtains have replaced the old iron one. The guardians of this fortress are selective about whom they let in and whom they will acknowledge, for the walls are not just there to keep people out, but their cultures as well. For many Europeans, the pursuit of happiness means, to all intents and purposes, steering clear of strangers.

10.2.2 All the fine words of European Union Commissioners and politicians about a single, cohesive, frontier-free continent have to be seen in the context of national governments, either individually or collectively, erecting new barriers to close access to citizens from outside. Towards the end of 1995, in moves to strengthen external boundaries and limit successful asylum applicants, EU interior ministers agreed tight new definitions of refugee status. From now on it appears that victims of civil war or those seeking refuge from non-state violence (for example in the former Yugoslavia) will no longer be classed as refugees, in direct contravention of the Geneva Convention.

10.2.3 It is unlikely that harmony will prevail inside the walls of the fortress. Europe is not, and never has been, a homogenous community. The continent is divided by history into many different parcels, languages, traditions and cultures. The loss of external and internal systems to control this diversity leads to an accumulation of tensions which, under new political conditions, have rekindled ancient military conflicts. Recent experience indicates that Europe has not mustered a sufficient consensus to solve them without external help from across the Atlantic. It may be a bitter truth that the Americans will be allowed to dominate European culture economically and through their entertainment industries so long as they continue to guarantee the collective security of the continent.

10.2.4 At the same time, leading members of the European Union are aspiring to integration, both in terms of intensity and extension. After the *annus mirabilis* of 1989, a wider Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals has again become a desirable symbolic space, albeit one where cultural and political frontiers seldom coincide. The advocates of unity, especially those working inside the European Union, face cross-pressures from the east and the south: from the post-communist belt of central and eastern Europe and from the Mediterranean rim. The former are seeking security guarantees and markets, the latter, embodying (as it is seen) the historic core of European civilisation, are pursuing the benefits of deeper integration. In this turbulent atmosphere, the wider geopolitical conditions and cultural consequences of integration are often neglected. They can be illustrated by four simple scenarios (see Table 10.2).

Table 10.2: Geopolitical conditions for culture

	<i>Speed and direction of European Integration:</i>		
Competition and dominance in international trade relations	<i>No major geographical expansion of integration in the future; the internal economic, political and social integration of the EU progresses as planned.</i>	<i>The expansion of the EU eastward takes place faster than expected, both in terms of new member countries and a tighter economic and political association incorporating the entire European "common home" .</i>	<i>The integration process is reversed; the national sovereignty of EU members is regained; the Union Treaty is cancelled (literally or in practice) and the Union returns to a primarily free-trade community.</i>
<i>The current major trade blocs, the USA/Nafta, Japan, and the EU with its associates, ward off the challenge of the newly industrialised countries (NICs). The US maintains or strengthens its leading position.</i>	Cell I The success of Europe depends increasingly on the harmonisation and control of its internal markets and the effective pooling of intellectual resources (research and development, education, artistic creativity).	Cell II Europe takes a leading role because of the expansion of its internal markets and the injection of new human capital (educated labour, creative talents in science, technology and the arts) from the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.	Cell III The success of a " confederate Europe " and its trade associates depends on the capacity of its members to maintain the benefits of close economic co-operation and to compensate for the loss of the benefits of closer integration by a more effective utilisation of human capital
<i>The NICs, including China, continue to increase their share of world economic output and trade through the effective application of high- tech, cheap labour and flexible trade agreements.</i>	Cell IV The same as in Cell I, but all European countries, even the member countries of the EU, labour under the increased pressure of economic stagnation, structural unemployment, and tensions induced by mutual competition.	Cell V The wider integrated Europe successfully confronts the challenge of the NICs with enhanced internal integration and effective utilisation of its creative capacity and vast intellectual resources.	Cell VI Keener international competition enhances differences in economic performance, not only between but within national states. Wealthier regions and urban areas, net payers for the common cause, may rebel and demand greater autonomy, thus weakening and perhaps splintering nation states.
<i>Aggravated and often unfair competition induces further use of non-tariff and "grey area " restrictions, especially in trade between integrated regions; this gradually undermines the multilateral liberalisation of world trade.</i>	Cell VII The same as in Cell I, but Europe gains an advantage because of its well-established and deepening integration and extensive optimally protected internal markets.	Cell VIII The wider Europe maintains a global leadership because of its intellectual resources and wide protected internal markets; its member states and regions reap a surplus from new types of innovative economic co-operation and free cultural exchange and networking.	Cell IX The " confederate Europe " may dwindle into a collection of mutually competing nations; only the larger, economically effective and technologically advanced countries prevail in the face of international competition.

10.2.5 *Still an exclusive club?* (Cells I, IV and VII) Irrespective of global economic developments, the European Union may decide to see its destiny as continent-bound, with a focus on one particular part of that continent, effectively isolating itself from non-EU states that fail to meet its rigorous membership criteria. If this limited Europe is to succeed against international competition it will need to excel in science, the new technologies and technical and managerial skills. This will entail the harmonisation and control of internal markets and the pooling of intellectual resources; but even if such efforts are successful, the growth and influence of the newly industrialised countries (NICs) in world trade may continue to rise. For Europe the outcome could be economic stagnation, continuing structural unemployment and internal tensions and rivalries. Exclusivity can be catching and European isolationism could add to the pressures on global free trade; in turn, international protectionism is likely to deepen European integration and further strengthen its internal markets. If this scenario materialises, there is a danger that European arts and culture will become insular and provincial with an emphasis on the promotion of cultural identity. It may not be possible fully to develop cultural and educational links with non-EU countries nor to capitalise on the new touring opportunities for the performing arts and other exchanges which are becoming available as countries in the Far East and South-east Asia expand their cultural infrastructure.

10.2.6 *Enlargement to the east.* (Cells II, V and VIII) This scenario presupposes the expansion of the European Union eastwards at a quicker than expected rate. The continent will be able to take a leading world role by virtue of the enlargement of its internal markets and the injection of new human capital (an educated labour force with creative talents in science, technology and the arts) from the new democracies of central and eastern Europe. It will be in a position to confront the challenge of the Newly Industrialised Countries with enhanced internal integration and the exploitation of its creative capacity and intellectual resources. In a word, we can foresee the emergence of the wider Europe as an economic leader or superpower. However, the integration of so many different countries and cultures will be a difficult task. If it is to be more than a tariff-free trading area, the continent's internal cohesion and "creative diversity" will only be maintained by close cultural co-operation and the continuous free flow of ideas, cultural products and intellectual resources between its countries and regions.

10.2.7 *A league of nations once more.* (Cells III, VI and IX) Here we posit the reversal of continental integration and a return to *l'Europe des patries*. Its success will rely heavily on the ability of its members to maintain the advantages of close economic co-operation and to compensate for the loss of the benefits of closer integration by a more effective utilisation of their respective stores of human capital. The impulse to reassert national cultural identities will be strong. Keener international competition will exacerbate internal divisions, endangering community ties and undermining the effective use of common resources. The notion of a European "common home" will carry few attractions. Outcomes may include an even greater emphasis on science, high-tech, technical and managerial skills and less visibility for the arts and humanities as proponents of international exchange and diversity. A bleaker version of

this scenario would be to envisage a Europe that has disintegrated into a cockpit of battling rivals; only the larger, economically effective and technologically advanced would make their way in the global marketplace.

10.2.8 *Europe de- and reconstructed.* (Cells III, V and VI) It is possible that a new balance will be found which accommodates the interests of nation states and regions with different levels of wealth, development and political aspiration. This would presuppose, first, that the formation of comparatively small, but self-confident and vigorous communities, regions and cities counterbalances the traditional and rigid interests of nation states. Secondly, "different speed" solutions will be found for the integration process and to enable the establishment of new joint European institutions that will allow nation states and regions to choose flexibly the sectors where they wish to proceed beyond simple free trade arrangements; this would, at the same time, enable the direction and co-ordination of the use of "surplus benefits" accruing from gradual integration to the benefit of Europe as a whole. In looking for and consolidating such solutions, international cultural co-operation will play a role. Europe-wide policies to encourage networks that foster the exchange of people and information will reveal the unifying force of a common cultural heritage as the overall framework for all national, regional and local cultures. To this end the creation of new, and the strengthening of existing, pan-European institutions and modes of co-operation will be a necessity. This in turn will presuppose increased funds for cultural co-operation.

10.2.9 Of course, European Union member states and other European countries may not see the alternatives for European geopolitical so starkly as these scenarios. Conceivably a two-speed European Union, for example, might involve a combination of more than one of them. It may be that, if the extension and intensification of integration is postponed or slowed down, a new and more comprehensive alternative may present itself in the course of time. While it is extremely difficult to predict what the consequences will be for culture, it seems evident that a part of Europe which closes in on itself, that excludes the peoples and cultures of the rest of Europe and the wider world, will be the poorer for it, both in terms of economic power and cultural vigour. That said, the arts, which traditionally do not recognise boundaries in the way governments do, will doubtless continue to operate in a European and international arena almost regardless of what collections of states may elect to do. Governments can either help or hinder that process.

10.3 Towards a civil or non-civil society?

10.3.1 Culture and language have been the main sources of cohesion in European societies; yet, where there have been cultural and linguistic cleavages, the actual forces that have kept them together have been the political and administrative machinery of the state and, after the advent of modern democracies, the mobilisation by "civil society" of citizens for collective political and social action. Civil society is customarily defined, as we have seen, as a nexus of voluntary associations, interest groups and political parties, on the one hand stimulating political interest and activity and, on the other, allow-

ing citizens to shoulder moral responsibilities themselves, through charitable work and the activity of non-profit organisations. Additional cohesion has been provided by a variety of formal and informal representational ties linking the state and civil society – for example, institutionalised lobbying, civic consultation, the representation of professional groups on quasi-governmental bodies and political appointment to public office.

10.3.2 Cultural activity is a bulwark of civil society in that it sensitises citizens to the value of individual creativity, not simply in the arts but across the range of social and economic life, and promotes individual self-confidence and self-awareness. It stimulates the establishment of voluntary associations and clubs, so creating vigorous institutions that are independent of public authority.

10.3.3 It is widely accepted that the basic structure of civil society and its ties to the state have been undermined by a number of social and economic trends: first, by a public corporatism which under the Welfare State has clogged the relations between the voluntary sector and citizens, and then by the rise of neo-liberal policies which have emphasised market-style management and blocked old channels of influence to public administration and policy making. In recent years, the processes of regionalisation, internationalisation and globalisation have gradually diminished the importance of civil society as the democratic state's power base. Closer examination of these trends suggests the following three lines of development (see Table 10.3).

10.3.4 If many European countries are being forced to cut back, or at least restrain, the size of their public cultural budgets, one side effect of this contraction of their role may be a strengthening of civil society and the voluntary sector. In this way they seek to encourage non-governmental social agents to take the initiative in all fields of public life from the economy to education or welfare. Normally, freely competing social agents require a strong, but self-denying, state to mediate and arbitrate their rivalries, the epitome being the United States. But if the state pulls back too far, the notion of a balanced "commonwealth" runs the risk of becoming redundant, at least in contemporary Europe. Beyond a certain point there is a threat both to social cohesion and to economic goals and public disorientation may lead to a moral vacuum and a crisis of self-confidence.

10.3.5 If the neo-liberal, "night watchman" or minimalist state becomes dominant, market mechanisms and doctrines of efficient management could be adopted in most European countries to enhance the efficiency of a dwindling public sector, not only at national but also regional and local levels. If the European Union's role is strengthened, it is possible that federal issues and regional and local autonomy will gain ground. The nation state will make less use of its coercive powers and will tend to act as a leader, negotiator and mediator. Thirdly, but less plausibly, the Welfare State will revive with a return of its financial and regulatory powers. In that case, we will see a new expansion of welfare safety nets and the state will regain its control of the public in regions and municipalities.

Table 10.3: The state and civil society

	<i>The role of the state and public sector:</i>		
Development of civil society:	<i>Dominance of the neo-liberal "night watchman" or minimalist state which uses "free market mechanisms" to enhance public sector efficiency, not only at national but also regional and local levels.</i>	<i>Supremacy of supra- and transnational bodies; federalism and regional and local autonomy gain ground. The state is less confident of its sovereign authority and acts increasingly as a leader, negotiator and mediator.</i>	<i>Revival of the Welfare State, with a strengthening of its financial and regulatory powers; new expansion of welfare safety nets, governments regain their leadership of public sector over regions and municipalities.</i>
<i>Traditional individual liberalism emphasising liberty and rights gains ground; civil society consists of people working actively in voluntary organisations.</i>	Cell I Society is characterised by extreme individualism and competition; collective responsibilities, that is "common causes", are increasingly taken care of by charity, non-profit organisations.	Cell II Major economic, cultural and social projects are increasingly planned and implemented through the autonomous co-operation of regional and local organisations and institutions. The state maintains its basic functions, but trans- and supranational financing directs policies.	Cell III The state legitimates its dominant position by investing in the media, and civic education; it champions citizen's "positive" liberty (opportunities to participate) and active political debate. Civil society is based on informed, tolerant albeit acquiescent citizens.
<i>Communitarianism emphasising traditional professional, local and family values gains ground; civil society consists of people working for specific collective objectives; pressures on individuals to adhere to group values increase.</i>	Cell IV Society is fragmented into smaller regional and local communities with an emphasis on specific group values and group autonomy; there are increased pressures on individuals to adopt group values, sometimes extreme in character; censorship and bars on freedom of expression could increase.	Cell V Society is fragmented into movements extolling specific political, cultural, etc. values. There is an increased possibility of new transnationally linked ideological, religious, populist and extremist or terrorist movements.	Cell VI There are increased tensions between the state and civic groups or movements. The former defend "progressive" liberal values, the latter specific, often traditional or religious values.
<i>Organisations defending particularistic economic interests gain ground; civil society is characterised by interest group activities and the dominance of labour unions, employers federations, and professional associations.</i>	Cell VII Society is characterised by continuous tensions which often manifest themselves as demonstrations against the state and national and international financial/business interests. Importance of experts and strategic professional and managerial groups increases.	Cell VIII National corporatist organisations mediate the interests of citizens, regions and communities to international forums, where transnational interest organisations lobby for funds and shape international agreements and supranational legislation.	Cell IX Re-emergence of a neo-corporatist society where national policies are determined by negotiations and agreements on benefit trade-offs between major interest groups. Such groups also represent and defend national interests in international forums

10.3.6 The development of European civil society may be inflected in different ways. It may revert to its intellectual origins, to traditional individual liberalism, which emphasises liberties and rights in terms of freedom from unnecessary controls. The focus will be placed on people working actively in voluntary associations. Another line of development may lead to a socially responsible communitarianism; local, professional and family values will gain ground and civil society will consist of separate groups each working for their own objectives. The pressure on individuals to adhere to group values will intensify. A third line of development could lead back to the conception of civil society as a nexus of organisations defending particularist economic interests. In that case civil society would be characterised by interest group lobbying and campaigning and the dominance of trade unions, employers' associations and other professional bodies.

10.3.7 Civil society, as a voluntary system of cultural, social and political organisation, can reduce escapism, despondency and alienation. However, global trends exist which seem to erode the social fabric in most European societies irrespective of the vigour of their civil institutions. Whatever their causation (and this will vary from one country to another), they take the same two forms – violence and crime. These twin riders of the postmodern Apocalypse should not be seen as random or disparate phenomena; they are the obverse of the same coin and in large part derive from the way civil society manages its affairs. Violence appears as a continuous “molecular civil war” fought out at every social level, from the gender debate to tribal wars in urban ghettos.¹ Criminals, conducting a brisk trade in illicit products (drugs, prostitution, protection rackets, industrial espionage, pornography, a “slave trade” in refugees and adoptive children and even assassination) have refined old fashioned mafia forms of organisation into modern networks, which link them to legitimate business through money laundering.

10.3.8 The arts and culture – and, for that matter, science and technology – have no immunity, as the case of Salman Rushdie and the murders of media personalities and journalists bears witness. However, they are the only forces which hold up a mirror to society and show it for what it is. They can reinforce political and economic reform by helping people, whether as individuals, families or educational and other peer groups, to internalise values and make them their own. This is the context for our next set of scenarios.

10.3.9 *Individualism, atomisation and fragmentation.* (Cells I, IV and VII) European societies will be characterised by an atomised, individualistic and often unpredictable civil society, functioning alongside a neo-liberal state. There will be a high degree of competitiveness and collective responsibilities and “common causes” – including the promotion of the arts and culture – will be increasingly shouldered by people working in charitable organisations, private foundations and non-profit agencies. Communitarian ideas may also become influential: but social responsibility and common causes will often only be perceived from the perspective of closed environments with little sense of a wider solidarity. Parochial calls for censorship and infringements of

1. Cf. Keane, John, *Reflections on violence*. Verso. London, 1996.

freedom of expression may become more frequent. Political parties and trade unions will lose (or, in post-communist societies, not gain) influence and political and social tensions will increasingly find expression in nationalist action against the state and populist hostility to international organisations, financial and business interests.

10.3.10 *An emerging pan-European society.* (Cells II and VIII) The interests of citizens will be expressed and maintained within the context of an emerging pan-European civil society. Major economic, cultural and social projects will be planned and implemented through the autonomous co-operation of regional and local organisations and institutions. The state will maintain its basic functions, but trans- and supranational financing will direct policies. National interest groups and corporatist organisations may find new functions in mediating the interests of citizens, regions and communities to international fora where transnational interest groups will lobby for funds and shape international agreements and supranational legislation. In this evolving nexus of organisations, the arts and culture may find themselves more impartially and efficiently served by decentralised civic structures led by regional and local bodies than by lobbying national and transnational interest groups. At the same time, with their internationalist traditions they will be well placed to foster a Europe-wide commitment to shared values.

10.3.11 *Civil volatility.* (Cells V, VI and IX) Cultural globalisation, migration and a wide range of international economic, environmental and political pressures will contribute to the decay of shared values and weaken individual self-confidence. Civil societies will become increasingly volatile, oscillating between the values of communitarianism and economic corporatism; in post-communist societies they will appear as, at best, disparate protest or reform campaigns against political corruption or as vigilante groups fighting decadence and crime. Both in the west and the east, they will be traversed by social movements extolling specific political or cultural values, often through transnational networking and making the most of the new communications technologies. There is a possibility that some of these transnationally linked movements will serve populist and extremist causes – even fascism or terrorism. Although often driven by fierce moral commitment, they will tend to collide with the old public service values which promote political and social change through orderly statist administration.

10.3.12 *The return of the Welfare State.* (Cell III) The revival of the Nordic type of Welfare State and its neo-corporatist civil society cannot be excluded, but should be considered as a potential, if somewhat unlikely, scenario. It would mean that the state, supported by the institutions of collective bargaining, will be ready to raise public spending and to extend the scope of public policy intervention. It will legitimate its restoration by exerting greater control over the media and promoting civic values. It will champion active political debate and the freedoms of an “open society” as well as affirmative action to secure equal opportunities and social participation. The protection of individual rights may benefit at the expense of individualistic behaviour. Major professional bodies and interest-led organisations will have a hold over civil society, whose citizens will be well informed, tolerant, disciplined, but, per-

haps, acquiescent. In this scenario the arts and culture will largely remain in, or return to, the care of the public sector.

10.4 The ghosts of Europe yet to come: consensus, control or tribal conflict?

10.4.1 The implicit contradictions between decentralisation and cohesion can be approached in a number of ways and it is hard to predict the dominant trends in future years (see Table 10.4). Regionalisation may gather further momentum: but, if this means that the state is weakened without a corresponding rise in the authority of supranational and international institutions, economic and social inequalities within and between regions and cities may not be adequately addressed. Alternatively, European economic regional policies will succeed, in the sense that the principle of subsidiarity will be implemented on a fair and equal basis through new forms of co-operation in national and transnational governance. On the other hand, regionalisation may lose ground if the authority and financial powers of states and supranational bodies increase and self-government is strictly local.

10.4.2 It is conceivable that Europe faces an accelerating process of fragmentation and polarisation, especially if permanent structural unemployment is not checked, if the population growth of minorities is perceived as being disproportionate to that of host communities, and current racial, ethnic and cultural tensions are not addressed. It is possible that ethnic fragmentation will continue in central and eastern Europe and that tensions due to racial, religious and cultural intolerance will deepen in western Europe and the Mediterranean countries. Of course, it may be that such conflicts will be permanently arrested at the instance of international opinion and concerted peace efforts and through the work of human rights organisations, but such an outcome is hugely optimistic. It is, at least, reasonable to suppose that, in the event of a less polarised Europe, a degree of *ad hoc* control and balance could be achieved through negotiation and agreements between national interests and ethnic, religious, cultural or racist forces. There are at least four potential scenarios.

10.4.3 *Europe in turmoil.* (Cells I and VII) The continent will continue to be beset by internal conflicts, tensions and inter- and intra-regional economic and social inequalities. There will be increased unrest. Further decentralisation will be achieved, but without consensus between regional and national authorities and reconciliation between neighbouring communities. In some cases new autonomous units will be formed which are not economically viable or strong enough to safeguard the welfare of their citizens. Attempts by cultural means to reduce the tensions that flow from fragmentation in education and a failure to respect pluralistic values may be thwarted.

10.4.4 *Recall to order.* (Cells III, VI and IX) Nation states may reassert their authority in a *Europe des patries*. Day-to-day stability will rest on powerful internal state controls and on sensitively negotiated international agreements and conventions. Ethnic, religious, cultural and racial conflicts and tensions will be suppressed rather than resolved. International dissent will be pacified

by means of diplomatic activity and strict systems of conflict management. At its most extreme, the atmosphere will recall the stasis of the cold war which is not conducive to free cultural co-operation and exchange.

Table 10.4: Decentralisation, cultural tensions and conflict resolution

The drive for territorial autonomy (and balance between levels and tiers of government):			
Ethnic, racial, religious and cultural tensions and conflicts:	<i>The drive for territorial autonomy gathers further momentum, but economic and social inequality between and within regions and cities is not addressed and so increases.</i>	<i>European regional development policies are transformed and bear fruit; the principle of subsidiarity prevails, but pan-European policy co-ordination is enhanced by increased networking and new federalist institutions in national and transnational regional governance.</i>	<i>Regionalisation loses momentum, the authority and financial responsibilities of states (and possibly the European Union) increase and local self-government gains in strength.</i>
<i>Ethnic fragmentation and conflicts continue in eastern and central Europe; tensions due to racial, religious and cultural intolerance deepen in western Europe and Mediterranean countries.</i>	Cell I A Europe of conflicts and inequalities: there is increased unrest, conflicts and violence and, at the same time, intra- and interregional inequalities become more pronounced.	Cell II Peace and balance are bought with economic and political concessions, religious, ethnic and racial tensions remain latent and flare up especially during times of economic recession.	Cell III An administratively stabilised Europe, where control policy and hierarchical administrative structures are used to suppress ethnic, religious, cultural and racial conflicts and tensions.
<i>Ethnic conflicts and racial, religious, and cultural tensions are arrested by international opinion, innovative peace efforts and through the work of human rights organisations.</i>	Cell IV European internal security is regained, yet regional economic and social inequalities prevail or gain momentum, giving rise to increased migration and breeding new tensions.	Cell V There is steady progress towards an economically more just, multicultural and secure Europe, based on purposive co-operation and new, flexible forms of management and organisation.	Cell VI A newly stabilised Europe, based on international agreements and conventions respected and implemented by nation states.
<i>Ad hoc control and balance is gained in most hotbeds of ethnic and religious conflicts through negotiations and agreements between national interests and ethnic, religious, cultural forces.</i>	Cell VII Accelerated regionalisation and formation of new autonomous units, which seldom have the economic viability or capacity to safeguard welfare of their citizens.	Cell VIII Stabilised regionalisation; however, regional and local political aspirations and lack of co-operation tend to undermine regional policy efforts.	Cell IX A politically and administratively stabilised Europe, where diplomatic efforts, control policies and hierarchical, administrative arrangements maintain day-to-day stability and peace.

10.4.5 *“Band Aid” solutions.* (Cells II, IV and VIII) Security and peace will be obtained through pragmatic political, economic and social concessions to strategic groups and geographical units. Religious, ethnic and racial tensions will be latent, flaring up occasionally during periods of economic recession. While a degree of European internal security will be regained, regional economic and social inequalities will remain as they are or grow, giving rise to increased migration and new tensions. The regional situation will be stabilised, but regional and local aspirations may compete rather than co-operate, thus undermining long term strategic planning in culture.

10.4.6 *Towards a Europe of networks.* (Cell V) Bureaucratically administered structural regional policies will be substituted with new flexibly funded network-based co-operation, which will level regional inequalities and alleviate inter-ethnic tensions and social exclusion. Regionalisation will be balanced by a new federalisation; namely, the invention and adoption of institutional structures for inter- and intra-regional co-operation in general and for the maintenance of democratic processes and the protection of the human and cultural rights of minorities. Security and peace will be based on profound value changes and increased living standards.

10.5 **Morals and lifestyles: continuity, postmodern melange or a new global ethics?**

10.5.1 Much of the uncertainty and unpredictability of European life today does not stem simply from political, ethnic and cultural conflicts, but from people’s basic values, as seen (a) in the morality of politics, business and daily life, and (b) in consumer behaviour, as embodied in the choice of lifestyles. Stability and change in these two spheres vary so erratically that researchers have been hard put to find consistent overall patterns. Recent surveys of basic European values indicate that there are cleavages which divide southern, central and northern countries of Europe along two basic value dimensions:

– traditionalism (respect for norms, authority and hierarchy) versus modernism (liberal education, free exchange of ideas, contractual relations);

– social integration (acceptance of society, respect for others) versus disintegration (dissatisfaction with society, moral double standards).

Although some levelling of differences presumably took place in Europe in the 1980s, recent political and economic changes may have opened, and could perpetuate, cleavages along these lines (see Table 10.5). On the other hand, these disparities could diminish and “moral markets” – namely, value choices based on social assumptions determined by the marketplace – will gain ground. Thirdly, new values may emerge which combine liberalism and a socially aware global ethic.

10.5.2 In the second sphere, global, commercially driven lifestyles, controlled from the “top down”, may become dominant, with people being

increasingly divided into information-rich, selective consumers and information-poor, unselective mass consumers. Alternatively, in the general context of globalisation, new and diverse lifestyles may be generated from the “bottom up” by well informed and creative consumers and a variety of sub- and counter-cultures. A further kind of lifestyle diversity could also establish itself, anchored in the plurality of national, regional, urban and local cultures. This variety of options in the moral and consumer spheres can be condensed into three main scenarios.

10.5.3 *Old divisions and the new consumerism.* (Cells I, IV, V and VII) Lifestyles will be shaped (whether diversified or homogenised) by consumer markets and new applications of the information and communication technologies, but moral values as well as traditional value cleavages may become even more sharply differentiated and in extreme cases this may cause resentment and even conflict. Fundamental distinctions between European countries as to basic values will be perpetuated, or even accentuated, depending on the tempo and direction of European integration. This may also be reflected in varying lifestyles on the basis of regional and local diversity. An apparent conformity of behaviour will conceal variations in consumer attitudes (some of which may be subversive or oppositional) and ambivalences or double standards in moral judgements will grow. Conversely, the absorption of fast-changing and often global fads and fashions could leave basic values and their national or regional variations largely unaffected. Finally, it is possible that both the diversity of European lifestyles and value systems will be maintained or even multiply. One way or another, an apparently postmodern eclecticism will conceal a range of traditional values, often opposed to innovation in the arts or the attitudes of other communities and cultures and resistant to change.

10.5.4 *A new postmodern melange.* (Cells II, VI and VIII) Europe will remain for decades a disordered melange, combining new, commercially driven and old, traditional lifestyles with value orientations that are either based on traditional liberalism or a global, ethical relativism. The free market and increased access to education and information may reduce differences in moral attitudes. Some people will tend to legitimate their consumer interests and varying global lifestyles by displaying liberal attitudes and an interest in major global issues such as the environment, gender equality and so on. Diverse, community-based lifestyles will often be maintained, but in the context of a universal morality of convenience based on the principle of “moral markets”. This could favour hybrid art forms and audiences that move freely across the boundaries of cultural genres.

10.5.5 *The dawn of a global conscience.* (Cells III, IX) Lifestyles and social orientations will become increasingly diversified, but under the umbrella of a new global ethic of solidarity and responsibility. Better education and equal access to global information will foster progressive moral values and attitudes, even if they do not change day-to-day lifestyles and practices. The economic, social and politico-moral importance of the arts and culture will be recognised and they will be “brought in from the margins” to the centre of politics and policy making.

Table 10.5: European lifestyles and basic values

	<i>Development of basic values and morals:</i>		
Development of lifestyles:	<i>Value cleavages dividing European countries into "traditionalist " and "modernist " and "socially integrated " and "less integrated " prevail unchanged.</i>	<i>Value cleavages diminish because "moral markets " gain ground, viz value choices are based on what generally is deemed to be "morally and politically correct ".</i>	<i>Value cleavages diminish because new basic values embracing and combining liberalism and "post-materialist " global ethics emerge and gain ground.</i>
<i>Global "top down " commercial lifestyles gain ground in Europe; people are increasingly divided into "information-rich " selective consumers and "mass consumers ".</i>	Cell I Apparent uniformity of lifestyles conceals variations in the "creative capacity " to consume; ambivalences and double standards in moral judgments increase.	Cell II Moral markets flourish and there is more equal access to global information. A deterioration of moral values and attitudes is perceived.	Cell III Progressive moral standards based on better education and access to global information gain ground, but tend to remain the preserve of intellectual and "information rich " strata.
<i>Within the process of globalisation a diversity of lifestyles is generated from the "bottom up " by better informed and intellectually interested consumers and a variety of sub- and countercultures.</i>	Cell IV European lifestyles are marked by fast-changing fads and fashions, but the basic values and their regional and country variations remain largely unaffected.	Cell V "Postmodern " European citizens, especially in urban environments, adopt a rapid succession of new fads and fashions, both in terms of consumer behaviour and morals.	Cell VI People tend to legitimate their consumer interests and varying global lifestyles by displaying liberal attitudes and an interest in important global issues (for example the environment, gender equality, etc.).
<i>Increased diversity of lifestyles is generated from the "bottom up "; it is anchored in the plurality of European national, regional, urban and local cultures.</i>	Cell VII The diversity of European lifestyles is maintained, perhaps even increased; the same holds true as to basic values and their variations.	Cell VIII The diversity of community-based lifestyles is maintained, but universal ideas of the "morality of convenience " gain ground.	Cell IX A modern Europe of diversified lifestyles is united by a generally accepted ethic of universal solidarity and responsibility.

10.6 European culture: corner shop, independent trader or global super-market?

10.6.1 The old world order of empires was established on the basis of the dominance of certain countries. The process of globalisation, on the other hand, driven as it is by multinational industries, precludes the dominance, either politically or culturally, of any one country. That is the theory, of course; in practice, although globalisation has undermined the structures that help define nation states, the dissemination of global consumer products is por-

trayed as the “Americanisation” of culture. This overlooks the influence of the Japanese (walkmans, CD players, *karaoke*, etc.) and European-owned multinational corporations. Globalised markets are both international and local and, in recent years, the debate on the homogenisation of national, regional and local cultures have given way to another debate centring on the concept of the “glocal squeeze”. It is feared that national and regional cultures may disappear because of the simultaneous acceleration of globalisation and the increased appeal of local cultures. While it is true that the impact of globalisation is unevenly distributed in Europe, some generalisations can be ventured.

10.6.2 A number of potentially contradictory developments are at work (see Table 10.6). There is a high level of demand for globally disseminated and readily accessible media contents and other cultural products and services; at the same time, local media and cultural supply, supported by local interaction and practices, is stimulating interest in ideas, images and values which celebrate community and a sense of place. Because the images and values transmitted by the international media and cultural industries derive from a limited number of countries, in particular the United States, their contents and appeal reflect a single set of cultural attitudes. On the other hand, diversity is maintained by state support of the “high arts” and through the stubborn survival of many national, ethnic, regional and local cultures. In the light of the fact that global cultural development is almost certainly irreversible, we see three main scenarios for the future.

10.6.3 *Cultural islands.* (Cells I and IV) Great world cultures (Europe, China, the Asian subcontinent, etc.), each consisting of nationally, regionally and locally maintained subordinate cultures, will seek to survive as self-contained cultural islands. There will be attempts through protectionist measures, subsidy and education to counter the effects of globalisation. Deploying traditional, autochthonous criteria and conventional notions of excellence, these cultures will, in a sense, become “museums” impervious to external influence. This may have the effect of creating two cultures, one official, ubiquitous and remote from popular concerns, the other unofficial, unacknowledged and sometimes subversive. It is possible that Europe may be tempted to move, consciously or otherwise, down this path of development.

10.6.4 *The seduction of the global.* (Cell II) European culture will be economically successful and globally and commercially oriented. Cultural industries will join energetically in the battle to win global markets. Local cultures will survive for the benefit of elites and for civic celebration, but will have little mass appeal. The arts of the past will be disregarded or repackaged in new, easily assimilated ways. Cultural tastes will be standardised. We will live in a continent of fast changing fashions, fed into the mainstream of world culture by a multitude of competing firms in telecommunications, information, culture and entertainment industries and tourism. These firms will be located in all the major linguistic and cultural regions (major states, metropolises and urban conglomerates). English will become more and more dominant not only at the expense of minority languages, but also those of global significance, such as French, German, Spanish and Portuguese.

Table 10.6: Europe's culture: global or specific?

<i>Simultaneous globalisation and localisation as a "glocal squeeze" :</i>		
Homogenisation versus diversity:	Globalisation : there is world-wide dissemination of, and easy access to, media contents, cultural products and other expressions of values which have sufficient demand.	Localisation : increased importance is given to ideas, images and inherent values, stemming from local media and cultural supply and maintained by local interaction and practices.
Homogenisation : <i>ideas, images and inherent values, transmitted by the media, the cultural industries and the exchange of ideas and people, derive increasingly from a limited number of countries, mainly the US. Their contents and appeal are increasingly impoverished.</i>	Cell I Emergence of an increasingly homogeneous "world culture" : standardised ideas, themes, formats, and commercially induced audience expectations stem from a few dominant multinational cultural industry business conglomerates and communications and multimedia corporations.	Cell II A world of fast-changing fashions, fed to the mainstream of world culture by a multitude of competing firms in telecommunications, information, culture and the entertainment industries and tourism. These firms are located in all major linguistic and cultural regions (major states, metropolises, urban conglomerates).
Diversity : <i>a plurality of ideas, images, expressions and inherent values is maintained or increased, both as creative variety in the "high" arts and in the form of a great number of national, ethnic, regional, local, etc. cultures.</i>	Cell III A world of hybrid cultures which integrate ideas, images, themes and formats from different cultural heritages and feed new contents, often via the modern media and methods of transmission, into mainstream world culture, but which also function as independent "substreams" , supported by a variety of sub- and counter-cultures.	Cell IV A world of "cultural continents" (Europe, the Americas, Indian sub-continent, etc.), each consisting of nationally, regionally or locally defined and maintained self-contained cultural islands, using traditional autochthonous criteria of excellence/acceptance.

10.6.5 *Making sense of the mélange.* (Cell III) European culture will be economically competitive, internally diversified and innovative. Regional, local and minority cultures will thrive. Through networking, education and a commitment to interculturalism, Europe will make effective use of the *mélange* of its cultural heritages. Its multiform creativity will compete effectively with the forces of globalisation, and in fact contribute to enriching them and extending their range. New hybrid cultures will emerge, which integrate ideas, images, themes and formats from different sources and feed new contents, via the media and other electronic methods of transmission, into the mainstream of world culture. These hybrid forms will often also exist as independent "substreams" , supported by a range of sub- and counter-cultures.

10.6.6 If we accept the idea that all countries today have to think and act globally and that no culture, or nation, can function in isolation, policies will need to consider how best to safeguard domestic cultural production and diversity and the infrastructure that underpins it, especially in smaller domestic markets. It is not a stark choice between a more commercial or a more cultural orientation. If they seek to bring the third scenario to pass, public authorities will need to achieve a balance between regulatory and financial intervention and a free, competitive market.

10.7 Cultural financing: surviving Welfare State reforms

10.7.1 We have suggested in the text that sustaining current levels of culture is a concern for many European countries, especially in central and eastern Europe. Is the perception that the financial needs of the arts sector have outstripped available public resources merely a temporary phenomenon that will be adjusted as European economies emerge from recession, or does it presage a more fundamental shift away from the dependence of culture on the public purse? If the latter, how realistic is it to think that private and “third sector” moneys will fill the gap? It has been customary in recent policy debates to contrast the public and private financing of the arts and culture and also to emphasise the importance of a third, non-profit, voluntary sector (that is non-profit businesses, charitable clubs and societies, independent grant-making foundations). These three “sectors” inevitably overlap in varying combinations and new, innovative, financing measures have been the result. Arguments that public support for the arts and culture should be set in a wide perspective, which takes in the full extent of governmental activity, has thrown new light on these debates. Examining more closely these lines of development provides us with options for the combination of different sources of income and modes of financing (see Table 10.7).

10.7.2 Despite the gloomy economic climate, some national governments may maintain or increase direct funding via culture ministries, public agencies and arm’s length bodies and they will often underpin the work of regions and municipalities to enable them to maintain higher and more equally distributed levels of supply. In any event, it is likely that economic and other factors (costs, benefits, performance criteria) will be increasingly emphasised as governments seek value for money. Regional and local authorities may increase their cultural investment, even if there is no central government compensation. In the eyes of policy makers at all levels, cultural funding may increasingly be seen as a long term economic, social and educational investment and financial support from non-cultural sources (unemployment subsidies, structural funds, etc.) may rise both at national and transnational levels.

10.7.3 So far as artistic and cultural institutions are concerned, market transactions could become a larger, and perhaps leading, source of revenue and income for many artists and arts bodies. There will be an increasing reliance on sponsorship, donations, foundations and income from voluntary work, charities and non-profit business activity, but with no guarantee of growth in

those areas. In some cases the share of revenue from special fees and earmarked taxes, lottery funds, copyright revenues, etc. will substantially increase. More resources could come from new, innovative kinds of joint public/private financing (tax reliefs, matching grants and business-to-business transfers). Four scenarios suggest the range of future options open to decision makers.

10.7.4 *The public sector sustained.* (Cells I, IV and VII) National governments and their cultural administrations will still play a central role in arts funding. The present dualism in financing and supply will be enhanced: public and private sectors will function separately, although some synergy may be possible in the event of fiscal incentives. The schism between “quality” culture and commercial culture will deepen. A tight financial situation will be mitigated by private and non-profit funding – the former providing additional resources for “excellence” and the latter for fringe activities and local arts and culture. Various new forms of finance will help to expand artists’ incomes, arts buildings, the audiovisual sector and the heritage. Some fields (arts in education and experimental or “fringe” arts) may be at risk.

10.7.5 *The retreat of subsidy.* (Cells II, V, VIII and XI) National governments and cultural administrations will reduce their expenditure on culture, setting ever more stringent, performance-related criteria in return for their money. The effects of this policy may be softened by business sponsorship, arrangements for joint public/private funding and a variety of new sources of revenue, but local and regional inequalities may ensue and strategic policy areas may be neglected. The arts will increasingly be left to fight their own way in the market place. Only the amateur arts and commercial popular culture together with a handful of elite national institutions are likely to survive intact. Private and non-profit financing will be used to fill holes left by stringent public sector financing, the former in high and popular culture and the latter in regional or local culture and the “fringe” arts.

10.7.6 *Arts and culture as a factor of production.* (Cells III, VI and IX) The arts and culture may profit from a new interest in their social and economic effects. They will be seen as important production factors which contribute to the entertainments industry, job creation and tax and export revenues. This may lead to an overall increase in public investment and an integration of the sources of financing. However, it could follow that investment will be specially directed to the creation of surplus value (for example the quality of the urban environment) and other utilitarian, or “instrumental”, objectives. There is a danger that long term considerations concerning future option values, intergenerational solidarity and the impact of the arts as generators of innovation and human capital will be neglected.

Table 10.7: Financing culture

	Public financing of the arts and culture:		
Private, joint public/private and non-profit financing of the arts and culture:	<i>Direct financing by national governments through cultural ministries, agencies and arm's length bodies will be maintained at present levels or increased; regions and municipalities are subsidised in order to maintain higher and more equally distributed supply.</i>	<i>Economic factors (costs, benefits, performance criteria) are increasingly emphasised in central government financing; the share of regional and local level will increase without central government compensation.</i>	<i>Financing is increasingly perceived to be a long term economic, social and educational investment and funding from "non-cultural" sources (unemployment subsidies, structural funds, etc.) increase both at national and transnational levels.</i>
<i>Market transactions (sales, royalties, box office, user fees, etc.) will increasingly become the main/sole source of artists' and arts institutions' incomes.</i>	Cell I The dualism in cultural financing and supply is enhanced: public and private sectors function separately and are less likely to complement each other. The division between "quality" and "commercial" culture deepens.	Cell II The arts and culture are increasingly left to fight their way in the market place. Only "quality" culture and popular culture survive intact; creativity and accumulation of heritage are endangered.	Cell III The arts and culture are financed mainly on economic grounds ¾ as an important factor of production contributing to the entertainment industries and creating jobs and tax and export revenues.
<i>There is an increasing reliance on sponsorship, donations and foundations and income from the "third sector".</i>	Cell IV Public sector financing is supplemented by private and non-profit financing, the former providing additional funds for "excellence", the latter for fringe activities and local art and culture.	Cell V Private and non-profit financing is used to fill the holes left by stringent public sector financing, the former in "high" and popular culture, the latter in local, regional and fringe culture.	Cell VI The arts and culture are financed as an important factor of production, but investments are especially directed to areas generating "surplus value" (art market, quality of urban environment, etc.).
<i>The share of revenues from special fees and earmarked taxes, lottery funds, copyright revenues, etc. will substantially increase.</i>	Cell VII Financing of the arts and culture is expanded, especially in the areas of artists' income, infrastructure, traditional audiovisual sectors and industries and heritage. Some strategic areas (arts education, new and fringe areas) benefit less from this expansion.	Cell VIII New sources substitute for the loss of traditional public financing, yet regional inequalities increase and many strategic areas (for example arts education, new and fringe areas of creativity) suffer.	Cell IX Economic and social interests tend to dictate the generation of new sources and the allocation of received revenues; basic creativity and some strategic areas (for example art education, fringe areas) are neglected.
<i>Increased funds are provided by innovative modes of joint public-private financing (tax reliefs, matched grant systems, from business-to-business transfer, etc.).</i>	Cell X There is increased synergy between public and private financing; support for new projects is provided, public money in regions and municipalities is strategically allocated and co-ordinated.	Cell XI Stringent criteria in public financing tend to limit the focus of joint public/private cultural activity, regional inequalities increase and some strategic areas (for example arts education) may suffer.	Cell XII The arts and culture are financed in an integrated manner from varied public and private sources; yet some core areas like creative work, basic service systems, art education, etc. may be neglected.

10.7.7 *Plural funding becomes the norm.* (Cells X and XII) An integrated and comprehensive system of arts funding will be established. This will not necessarily mean that more state funding will become available, but it will be more coherently applied. Direct, guaranteed subsidy by central governments and their cultural administrations will take care of the “core financing” of training, mainstream and new areas of creativity, national cultural institutions and services. Strategic policies will be adopted with the result that inter- and intra-regional differences can be levelled out. Public, private and non-profit financing will be effectively co-ordinated to exploit existing revenue streams and measures will be developed to find new income sources. The arts and culture will be perceived from a broad economic, social and educational perspective and the principle of co-ordinated intersectoral financing will be implemented.

10.8 Some concluding remarks

10.8.1 The purpose of these scenarios is not merely to offer a concentrated and simplified glance into the future, but to help to identify future challenges and obstacles and to point towards ways of responding to them. At the outset we noted that the arts and culture are no panacea for solving such problems as “[...] ethnic cleansing, alienation, despondency and escapism [...]”, but that necessary “cultural change cannot be effected without more fundamental reforms – or at least certain conditions will have to be met before culture can make a positive contribution”. Our scenarios have spelt out some crucial factors shaping the modern, global *condition humaine* and we believe that policy makers would be wise to take them into account.

10.8.2 It will have been noticed that these scenarios look at the future from a perspective that is limited in another very important respect. Their focus is on the independent development and competitive position of European culture in a globalising world. It omits the dimension of dialogue between all the world’s cultures. This dialogue has, of course, been going on over the centuries at political, economic, intellectual and artistic levels and has been responsible for some outstanding artistic achievements as well as the ambivalent consequences of imperialism. Globalisation is giving this process a new dimension. Somehow, cultural interaction among the continents needs to be synchronised with today’s political and international bargaining. It is interesting to observe that at the inaugural Asia-Europe (ASEM) meeting in Bangkok in March 1996 (attended by heads of state or government of ten Asian and fifteen European states, together with the Presidents of the European Council and Commission), touched on culture in two respects. Those attending made a joint commitment to international conventions¹ and endorsed proposals for exchange in the fields of education and science. It will take another report to do justice to the potential and the problems of global cultural co-operation and indeed these themes are comprehensively discussed in *Our creative diversity*, the report of the World Commission on Culture and Development.

1. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 1993 Vienna Declaration and the Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights; and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action for the Fourth World Conference on Women.

10.8.3 The first scenarios suggest that the systematic economic expansion of central and eastern Europe and its integration with western Europe would enhance diversity and foster innovation in the arts and culture. Conversely, if the Fortress Europe scenario were to be realised in any form, the arts and culture could be adversely affected by inward looking policy considerations. The scenarios are a reminder of the contribution the arts can make to bringing the post-communist countries under the roof of the common European home and of the importance of assessing the cultural impact of political, economic and social developments in those countries.

10.8.4 There are also limits to what cultural policy and action can be expected to achieve in contributing to a balanced relationship between the state and civil society (the second set of scenarios) or to the resolution of cultural tensions and conflicts (the third set of scenarios). However, enhanced competition and lobbying for pan-European resources, the widening of regional and local inequalities, and tensions and conflicts between hostile values and interests could endanger the financing and freedom of the arts and culture. Furthermore the arts and culture, as important elements of the "third" or voluntary sector, have a special role in encouraging social cohesion and the emergence of a more integrated, yet decentralised, civil society would be of great advantage to European cultural life.

10.8.5 Cultural policies and action have a major contribution to make to the shaping of European lifestyles and basic values. The fourth set of scenarios is a reminder that the arts and culture enrich and set the tone for moral debates and make people more aware of the ethical responsibilities both globally and nationally and in the immediate physical and cultural environments.

10.8.6 The last two groups of scenarios address the available alternatives for redirecting European and national cultural policies. Those which examine whether Europe's culture will be global or specific suggest that cultural policies find themselves at a crossroads. One option leads to the effective economic utilisation of the arts and culture in the context of a new homogenised world culture and the other to an economically competitive but innovative and diverse European culture. Delaying the crucial policy choices will only further its "museification". The discussion of financing culture illustrates the potential implications of maintaining or decreasing public sector budgets, or supporting culture solely to meet "instrumental" objectives. One potentially fruitful scenario envisages an integrated funding approach, where public, private and non-profit financing is co-ordinated to make the most of existing income flows and new sources of revenue are sought out.

10.8.7 It is clear that for those who seek stable, diverse, tolerant, creative and productive societies, some of the scenarios we have posited are more desirable than others. While it may be true that cultural policies have a limited influence on the future, an acknowledgement by policy makers of the interaction between culture, economic development and social change may create the conditions for a thriving Europe, at peace with itself. If the most unattractive scenarios materialise, at least it may be possible for culture, used in an instrumental way, to moderate their worst effects.

11 The transmission of cultural impacts into overall development

"The secret of the arts is to correct nature."

Voltaire, *Epîtres*

"... we have to agree that moral or political intentions do not guarantee the making of good painting or sculpture. On the contrary, history and above all the artistic experiences of avant-garde movements in the twentieth century prove that very often a greater deepening in thinking about the human condition, our place with regard to nature, and above all the drama of anguish and hope in today's societies is achieved in works of art where the subject or the symbolism seem to be absent or completely secondary, but the artists, playing with their own resources, have known how to impregnate them with a strange life which seduces and moves us."

Antoni Tapies ¹

11.1.1 *The social and economic impacts of culture.* The scenarios in the preceding chapter spelled out future options for Europe's arts and culture, both as an autonomous creative activity and as a contribution to overall development. What is the extent of this contribution and how does it express itself? Do the four key principles of cultural policy (that is the promotion of creativity, identity, participation and diversity) retain their validity in the wider developmental field?

11.1.2 In the course of this report we have said that the arts and culture add to the sum of human knowledge and understanding; produce certain economic and social outcomes; and are sources of human capital and of empowerment and entitlement. We have identified a host of potential impacts (see the following table), through different aspects of the cultural production process. Economic impacts accrue from the commercial merchandising of works of art; social impacts can be seen in the different ways people orient themselves to, and consume, cultural products; and ideological and political impacts appear as specific positive or negative interpretations of the "human condition" which are attached to the arts and culture or extracted from them. By "impacts", we do not so much mean final and definitive outcomes as general contexts which give opportunities to individuals and groups and help to shape their capacities.

1. Tapies, Antoni, "Message for the round table on human rights and cultural policies in a changing Europe; the right to participate in cultural life." in Fisher et al., op. cit.

Table 11.1.2

<i>Domain of impact</i>	<i>Role/contribution of the arts and culture:</i>
<i>Direct economic impacts:</i>	<p>The arts and culture serve as a main source of contents for the cultural industries, the media and value-added services of the telecommunications industries.</p> <p>They create jobs and contribute significantly to the Gross Domestic Product.</p> <p>Cultural institutions, events and activities create locally significant economic effects, both directly and through multipliers.</p> <p>Works of art and cultural products have their own autonomous “value-adding” markets (for example gallery sales and fine art auctions), which often gives them good investment potential.</p>
<i>Direct social impacts:</i>	<p>The arts and culture provide “socially valuable” leisure activities, “elevate” people’s thinking and contribute positively to their psychological and social wellbeing and enhance their sensitivity.</p> <p>They are sometimes accused of producing “high brow”; elitist culture, and decadent or antisocial material; and in the case of popular culture, stereotypes and “one-dimensional” conceptions of the world.</p>
<i>Direct ideological and political impacts:</i>	<p>The arts stimulate open, critical thinking.</p> <p>However, they can also be material for propaganda ¾ that is to say, carriers of explicit political messages.</p> <p>Mass culture is accused of creating homogenised publics or audiences subservient to prevailing orthodoxies.</p>
<i>Indirect economic impacts:</i>	<p>The arts are “socially profitable” in that they offer cultural credit or esteem for people and institutions (for example financiers, sponsors, collectors or connoisseurs).</p> <p>Works of art and cultural products create national and international stocks of ideas or images which can be exploited by the cultural industries (for example in advertising or cultural tourism).</p> <p>Works of art can enhance and so add value to the built environment (for example by adorning buildings and in urban design).</p>
<i>Indirect social impacts:</i>	<p>The arts enrich the social environment with stimulating or pleasing public amenities.</p> <p>They are a source of “civilising” impacts and of social organisation (for example the amateur arts).</p> <p>Artistic activity, by stimulating creativity and a disregard of established modes of thinking, enhances innovation.</p> <p>Works of art and cultural products are a collective memory for a community and serve as a reservoir of creative and intellectual ideas for future generations.</p> <p>Arts and cultural institutions improve the quality of life and so in urban areas enhance personal security and reduce the incidence of street crime and hooliganism.</p>
<i>Indirect ideological and political impacts:</i>	<p>The arts and culture confer cultural credit in the form of status or distinction on individuals and groups.</p> <p>They function as a means of defining people’s identity and create or dissolve barriers between social groups and different cultures.</p> <p>The arts can be an antidote to the dominance of other basic cultures – that is, science and technology, religion and popular culture.</p>

11.1.3 The scenarios in Chapter 10 revealed a conflict between the commercial exploitation of the arts and their profounder role in maintaining pluralist creativity and cultural diversity. They also pointed to some negative outcomes – the rise of extremist values in art, social despondency and alienation, the disruption of civil society and alleged distortions of morality and basic values. It followed that the arts and culture should not be assessed from a short term perspective of “immediate instrumentality”, but as a long term means of maintaining diversity and building up a stock of future intellectual resources. In a word, they should be treated as a sustainable source for sustainable development.

11.1.4 A reverse side of the coin of instrumentality is a fear among political elites of the potentially disturbing consequences of the arts and culture. This can lead to attempts at restraint through regulation and censorship, whether direct or indirect. Furthermore, the administration of public cultural policy can exploit regulations and administrative procedures to suppress what is felt to be socially or politically undesirable. These factors are condensed in Table 11.1.5, which describes in aggregate the cultural policy orientations of public authorities, commerce and industry and the non-profit sector.

11.1.5 The table outlines different roles for the arts and culture and their users in development. They can be that of an independent, active participant (Cell I), a semi-autonomous instrument (Cell III), a passive feature of market forces (Cell II), and an agent of social planning (Cell IV). In western societies the inherent tension between Cells I, II and III is a major dynamic force in artistic and cultural development. The arts and culture have received their share of the benefits of economic and social development, but, at the same time, have maintained their autonomy, which, since the nineteenth century, has been a major premise of western art and especially the “project of modernism”. However, this autonomy has been in part illusory, both under the pressure of market forces (Cell II) and the heavy hand of public authorities, especially in the former socialist societies of central and eastern Europe.

11.1.6 In the 1980s, the dynamics of artistic and cultural development gradually shifted to the other axis of the table, which runs between Cells II and III. The tension between these cells was already apparent in earlier years; for example, in the regular disputes between proponents of the “high arts” and “popular culture”, attacks on commercialisation of the arts and conservative critiques of public subsidies for “useless” experimental art. In these debates, the independent social function of the arts and culture has usually been acknowledged.

11.1.7 Since 1989 most traces of culture as a means for building a planned society have vanished alongside the collapse of communism. The issue of the hour is its developmental role and discussion has focused on getting the balance right between the free play of the market and strategic public intervention.

11.1.8 This, then, is the key question which this report seeks to address: to what extent should the development of the arts and culture, and especially

the transmission of their impacts into overall development, be left to market forces and, if and when public intervention is deemed to be necessary, on which areas should it focus and what forms should it take? In other words, what should be the criteria for assessing the proper role of public intervention?

Table 11.1.5

<i>Perceptions of the role of the arts and culture in development:</i>		
<i>Perception of the autonomy/regulation and control of the arts and culture:</i>	<i>The arts and culture are a main source of long term creativity and innovation in society.</i>	<i>Artists and cultural activities provide important immediate economic, social and political benefits.</i>
<i>Autonomy should be maintained as extensively as possible.</i>	Cell I The arts and culture have the right to remain an autonomous and active sector of society, supported by the public authorities.	Cell II The arts and culture are an “open” factor of production, supported by economic interests and market demand.
<i>Autonomy should be limited to enhance positive, and suppress negative, impacts.</i>	Cell III The arts and culture are “strategic” factors in long term economic, social and political development.	Cell IV The arts and culture are an important instrument in general planning and social construction.

11.1.9 A practical way of addressing these issues is to apply the four key principles, which we see, in broad terms, as the unique contributions of the arts and culture to development. But how useful are they in practice, especially in the context of sustainability? We have already suggested that their relevance has been weakened by current world conditions. Do they offer a sufficient counterbalance to powerful economic interests and market forces for which the arts and culture are, solely or primarily, “open factors” of production?

11.1.10 Within the framework of the present report, it has not been feasible to do justice to the full list of developmental issues already outlined. What follows is a selective evaluation of three of the most significant areas of sustainable development:

1. *Economic and social outcomes*
 - the impacts of creative work, arts and cultural institutions and the cultural industries on the economy and employment;
 - the role of the arts and culture in the new communications society.

2. *Contribution to human knowledge and understanding*
 - the contributions of the arts and culture to leisure and tourism;
 - the role of the arts and culture in regional and city planning, in rural areas and in environmental issues.

3. *Harnessing human resources*
 - the role of the arts and culture in education and in the formation of human capital;
 - arts and culture as a factor in the protection of cultural rights.

11.2 Economic and social outcomes

11.2.1 *Impacts of culture on the economy and employment.* Traditionally, cultural policy and parallel private sector cultural initiatives have drawn a distinction between the commercial arts and the cultural industries, which are “economically important”, and the “purely cultural” and experimental arts. The former are pigeonholed as entertainment without too much thought being given to their creative contents; the latter are declared to be important mainly for their “intrinsic” aesthetic worth and economics only come into play in so far as they require subsidy from the public purse or support from non-profit sources. The questions to be resolved mainly concern the social costs of creativity: the right level and manner of financial support and the balance of funding between public, non-profit and private sources. It is worth noting, in passing, that the amateur arts do not fall comfortably into either camp, although their economic impact both in terms of local multiplier effects and their use or consumption of artistic facilities and material should not be underestimated.

11.2.2 The result has been two different approaches to the pursuit of creative talent. For example, while book publishers know very well that they depend on the arrival of new generations of fiction writers, the cultivation of talent for purely economic reasons is generally felt to be futile, risky and rather disreputable. Editors do not try to “create” a new Thomas Mann or Solzhenitsyn, they wait for them to turn up. By contrast, in pop and rock, feature films and television, successful artists are first and foremost commercial properties. They are hunted, exploited and, even, invented. This duality is mirrored in copyright legislation: on the one hand, a mainly European tradition recognises and defends an author’s intellectual rights and, on the other, a mainly “Anglo Saxon” tradition sees rights as an instrument which motivates creators to produce and an army of intermediaries (retailers, record producers, booksellers, etc.) to disseminate their work in a way which generates profits.

11.2.3 A range of factors – for example, the evolution of the mass media, global competition and the new technologies – have tended to support the second approach. Bankable talents flourish at the expense of other artists whose work does not lend itself to financial exploitation. In the United States

it has been estimated that only fifteen star actors can “open” a movie in the American domestic markets – that is, attract sufficiently spectacular box office receipts to guarantee its ultimate success in other markets and in media distribution (television, video, etc.). Similarly, international best sellers and their spinoffs dominate fiction sales in the book trade; and an analogy can be drawn with the “high” arts where (say) even the most highly subsidised opera house depends on a catalogue of some fifty classic operas, interpreted by celebrated directors, conductors and singers, to attract full houses, *cachet* and substantial box office earnings.

11.2.4 The arts and culture are “labour intensive” activities and generate economic multiplier effects in other service and manufacturing sectors. The importance of the “core” areas of artistic creativity to employment in the “outer rings” of cultural production has been generally recognised, but little attention has been paid to structural changes in labour demand and their long term effects.

11.2.5 The history of most artists’ careers shows that success as judged by employment and material rewards has tended to fall to a limited number of stars who managed to make a “break through” to the attention of larger audiences. It seems that since the late 1970s these rewards have become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. In some countries – especially where subsidy promotes a different kind of “excellence” from that promoted by the market – an artist has to make two or three breakthroughs before he/she reaches a mass audience. No doubt the growth of unemployment in most artistic fields in western Europe in the late 1980s and the 1990s is mainly due to economic stagnation, but the situation has not been made any easier by the commercial exploitation of a handful of key artists and their work at the expense of other artists. An additional factor has been the rapid decline of public support for the arts in the ex-communist societies and an exodus of artists to other European markets.

11.2.6 There are at least three countertrends which go some way to mitigating these difficulties. First, improved copyright and neighbouring rights legislation has given additional material rewards to artists and creators. Here too the benefits mainly go to an “inner circle” of established and popular figures, but in some countries collectively directed compensation systems have levelled income differences to a certain degree. Secondly, the exploitation of megastars creates spin-off employment opportunities: there are usually extensive supporting activities in sales and promotion, advertising and sales of imitations, souvenirs and other paraphernalia. Thirdly, an expansion of production and distribution in the new technologies has set new standards of technical flexibility and product quality. One consequence is increased employment in audiovisual culture industries.

11.2.7 How are these developments to be judged in the light of two of the key principles, creativity and diversity? It is easy enough to see some internal contradictions and insufficiencies. Creativity may flourish in terms of well-promoted mainstream “excellence” and high production values for the benefit of mass audiences. However, those engaged in artistic experiment or innova-

tion, which offers a training ground for new ideas and artists, suffer from a “ghetto effect” deriving from isolation and the continuous fight for survival. The massive supply of high quality performances, productions and events all over the world may bear witness to diversity, yet the “glocal squeeze” discussed in Chapter 10 could well lead to a situation where small linguistic and cultural areas are in danger of being left out in the cold. Creative production is concentrated in the major western European metropolitan areas – and, as a result, southern, central and eastern Europe suffer from a “brain drain”.

11.2.8 Similar ambiguities can be detected when we review the other two policy principles, the promotion of participation and identity. In many European countries there is evidence of some slackening of demand (for example in theatre and music), but this has been counterbalanced by a rising interest in the visual arts and the cultural heritage, massive audiences at festivals and special events and a huge expansion of the electronic media. There are also signs that diminished diversity of cultural supply in some countries and regions has stimulated people to take their own initiatives (for example the amateur arts, the multiplication of small theatre groups, computer graphics, small scale record and book production, etc.). These shifts have rendered most statistics and indicators of participation out of date. They also challenge old ideas of “access to the arts” in the face of new phenomena, such as “temporary” or “seasonal” mass consumption, computer-mediated interactivity, and variations of audience motivation and perceived meanings.

11.2.9 Cultural and arts institutions (performing arts companies, public broadcasters and organisations such as museums, art galleries and libraries) have largely shared the fortunes of individual artists. In most European countries they enjoyed an economic renaissance in the late 1970s and for most of the 1980s. By the beginning of the 1990s this had come to an end, partly because of the recession, and partly with the advent of neo-liberal economic and financial policies and new ideas of management. Although public subsidy did not necessarily decline or even stagnate, institutions in several countries were increasingly expected to legitimise their activities through performance indicators and sensitivity to audience demand. Public broadcasters and other service organisations had to face sharper competition as result of deregulation and decentralisation. In many cases this led to job losses and many cultural institutions have been unable to create new employment opportunities.

11.2.10 However, some favourable signs can be detected. First, the new technologies and the processes of globalisation and regional integration have created new jobs. Stagnation in the publicly subsidised sector and its inability to provide new diversified services has opened new niches to small-scale cultural entrepreneurs. Secondly, there has been a revival of non-profit activities, internationally as well as nationally (for example the activities of the European Foundation Centre) which has helped to create a new demand for technical, managerial and training expertise. Thus instead of greater concentration we encounter a new job-rich diversity which has knock-on effects for the training of professionals and in consumer education.

11.2.11 Institutional developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s can readily be criticised from the perspective of the key principles. Lack of funds and new managerial doctrines have limited freedom of expression and creativity, inhibited rich and diversified programming and limited audience choice; they have given too much room to costly cultural events and mass culture has undermined people's interests in, and loyalties to, national, regional and local cultures.

11.2.12 However, this may be to miss an important point. That the profound structural changes under way are simply not explicable according to the simple rubric of the four principles. Cultural organisations have become more sensitive to the need to please their clientele, public broadcasting companies are learning to devise new programme mixes to retain their share of viewers and listeners. The heritage renaissance, besides benefiting museums and archives, has helped to promote cultural identity at all levels, local, regional, national and pan-European. In the new democracies, interest in the cultural heritage has had pronounced political ramifications, with numerous attempts to rediscover national or ethnic pasts. The decentralisation of broadcasting and the expansion of commercial audiovisual media increased the supply of regional and local material. All of this has subverted the homogenisation which was assumed to flow from national and international media concentration, although regional and local media have still not found appropriate organisational models or programming policies, especially in central and eastern Europe, and their positive impact on the promotion of regional and local identities remains limited.

11.2.13 From the point of view of economic development and employment, the cultural industries have always featured more prominently in the eyes of policy-makers than creative talent (art and artists) or cultural and arts institutions. They have gained in status since the "second" communications revolution instigated by new applications of the information and communication technologies and the related deregulation of national telecommunication systems.

11.2.14 Of course the importance given to the cultural industries is understandable, for they provide jobs and are an important source of revenues from international trade. Recent American analyses show that, in comparison with the information systems industries (telecommunications, the manufacture of personal computers and programmes, and consumer electronics), the "content industries", especially film and television programme production, have remained labour intensive and productivity gains have been small. However, the expansion of international trade in cultural goods also opens new employment opportunities in the areas of subtitling, dubbing, adapting and interpreting audiovisual contents to audiences of other cultures.

11.2.15 So far as the balance of international trade has been concerned, Europe has always fared much better in the visual arts, book publishing and music recording than in the audiovisual industries. Publishing, public broadcasting and phonogramme manufacturing have been the foundation for an expansion of major European companies. The second communications revo-

lution promoted the audiovisual cultural industries, even in Europe, to the forefront of commercial activity – a position they had, of course, held in the United States for decades. The recognition of their economic importance came in two stages: first, competition between European companies and their American and Japanese rivals for new applications and standards; and, secondly, the formation of strategic alliances of transnational conglomerates in the fields of information processing, audiovisual production, broadcasting and telecommunications in order to reap the benefits of the emerging global information infrastructure. This has had two side effects in Europe: the reorganisation of public broadcasting and the defence of European film and television programme production. The latter, as we know, gave rise to serious conflicts in the GATT negotiations.

11.2.16 It is interesting that the key principles of cultural policy, mainly applied in the past to the promotion of the publicly subsidised arts, are now a rallying call to aid the European cultural industries. In recent years, vociferous policy statements have been made for the maintenance of creativity and diversity in European audiovisual film sectors. At the same time, and in direct contradiction, other voices at national and European levels have argued that these industries must be made more competitive by imitating American production, distribution and marketing techniques to enhance the audience appeal of their products.

11.2.17 Similar inconsistencies can be observed in the application of the other two principles to the cultural industries. Public broadcasting and national audiovisual industries have been defended in Europe also from the point of view of cultural participation and the maintenance of identities. Curiously, some other important areas, in particular book publishing and the music industries, tend to be left out of account in this debate. Yet, together with European visual arts, architecture and design, they play a leading role in the construction of European identities on every level: pan-European, national, regional and local. Their neglect may turn out to have more serious effects on diversity, cultural participation and identity formation than solving the problems of the audiovisual sector.

11.2.18 It is uncertain whether efforts to limit “foreign” supply through quotas and other restrictions will either improve Europe’s international trade position or fulfil cultural objectives. It is, of course, true that, when assessed merely in economic terms, European cultural and linguistic diversity is one of the major barriers in developing European internal markets for cultural products. But studies of international trade suggest that protection measures may not do much in the long run to overcome the American advantage, once gained. The competitive edge of European culture industries will only be fundamentally improved if basic failures of production and distribution are remedied. Above all, they should make the most of Europe’s strength in artistic creativity and cultural diversity – often sadly neglected in policy measures that aim too exclusively and counter-productively at economic gains.

11.2.19 *The role of culture in the new communications society.* Traditional communication has been the main link between culture and development.

Cultural impulses into society have always been more or less formally “communicated”, and the faster and more widely this is done the greater their impact. The need to communicate culture (especially audiovisual culture) has been one of the motive forces behind technological innovation and the arrival of the “information society”. Digitalisation and the development of computer-mediated (on-line) communication have been conditioned by cultural imperatives (the demand for tailor-made contents, available on demand, and for multimedia forms of expression) rather than a simple interest in information transmission.

11.2.20 What is taking place is a deal struck between providers of cultural contents, manufacturers of communication technologies and people at large with all their cultural assumptions and needs. It is possible to regard the mass media and cultural industries as no more than production processes, but the real vectors of use (and subsequent technological development) are dictated by people’s needs for certain types of communication. The frequent cases where technological predictions appear to have been proved wrong in the event are most convincingly explained by the proposition that “people just don’t want them”. Technological and commercial imperatives have had to give way to obstinate cultural realities – even if they are often present themselves as economic facts, such as a lack of demand in the marketplace.

11.2.21 Culture and the communications technologies are also closely linked to people’s education and their ability to “learn how to learn”. Throughout history, technocultural innovations have created stresses, inhibitions and refusals, which have sometimes been overcome with the passage of time. The uniqueness of the present situation is the speed with which new technical tools pass into daily and almost universal use, leaving less and less time for adaptation and habituation. The division of society – in western, as well as in central and eastern, Europe – into those who can adapt and those who cannot sets up conflicts which at first sight has nothing to do with communication and/or culture.

11.2.22 No simple policy principle can easily capture the multiple nexus linking culture and communication to development. This will become clear when we examine the nature of this ceaselessly interactive whole from the perspective of creativity and diversity. The advent of the new technologies and the mass media has always aroused hopes and fears as to their potential impacts. Hopes are usually expressed in terms of emergence of new tools for encouraging pluralist creative activity, fears in terms of further homogenisation and/or vulgarisation of the contents of cultural expression. In the long run, they seem to balance one another out.

11.2.23 At its present stage the revolution still seems to stimulate new forms of creativity and offer new channels for old. If new technological applications, although in some senses creative, seem essentially to be a function of engineering, some makers of software and producers of contents seem to be moving deliberately in the direction of avant-garde experimentation (for example Disney’s and Lucasfilm’s software games divisions and the joint venture on

which Bill Gates of Microsoft and producers Jeffrey Katzenberg and Steven Spielberg have embarked).

11.2.24 Artists using traditional means of expression have found new channels through which to transmit – or at least advertise – their work. Visual artists have their own home pages on Internet and there are thousands of references to theatre on the World Wide Web. Virtual reality models are used in theatre and concert hall architecture and stage design and CD-Roms are replacing videos in performance recording and in advertising. What seems to be occurring is a shift from the traditional arts to the large-scale creative use of interactive applications of the new information and communication technologies. What the eventual role of the individual artistic work will be in future and how it will shape the world of entertainment and mass audiences remains to be seen. What is certain is that the old connotations of creativity and diversity will scarcely be valid when a new balance has been found.

11.2.25 These structural changes in the world of communications, culture and the media cause similar problems in respect of identity and participation. Active participation, in the traditional sense of consciously chosen creative activity, lost much of its meaning after the advent of radio and television. Nowadays participation has become more or less compulsory and distinctly one-sided. It takes considerable effort to exclude oneself by not using a television set or a radio. The mass media are still by and large a one-way street with an “imposed” subject matter – and contact with it, thanks to a continuously changing stream of topics, discourages more than superficial engagement. Interaction in broadcasting (except by proxy, so to speak, through increasingly sophisticated audience research) is still a dream of the future. Herein lies its basic difference from the new electronic media.

11.2.26 It would appear that the technology of the conventional electronic media has turned against itself. It has increased the opportunities for participation as consumption to the point where participation as action seems unnecessary. When everything is available in a technically conditioned form, there seems little reason to engage in the activities of real life. This leads in due course to a reaction, but, interestingly, a desire to return to community involvement does not entail a rejection of the new technologies so much as of the “elitist” arts and of conventional ideas of economic growth.

11.2.27 Perhaps the new information technologies are a response to this fatigue? They offer possibilities for an individualistic and interactive manipulation of cultural contents. Participation can become less passive and more creative, as interactive video, computer and video games and the opportunity to surf on Internet bear witness. We have already registered concerns that some sections of society will find themselves excluded from the new information age, but, for the time being at least, technological investment in the formal education system, in western Europe at least, is making inequality more a distinction between the generations than between social strata or geographical centre-periphery divisions.

11.2.28 As regards individual and group identities, there are two views, apparently but not necessarily, contradictory. According to one line of thought, taste has been homogenised by television and the cinema. There is much truth in this, but the effect is being mitigated by the increasing variety of material on offer and by new “customising” habits of consumption. Also the mass media provide information (admittedly filtered and sometimes distorted) about the full range of world culture. In this sense, it seems that they have helped to diversify identities, making it possible for individuals and groups to maintain multiple identities. The multiplication of TV channels and radio stations is one the main factors – if not the main factor – in creating this phenomenon. Discovering the diversity of the world around them, viewers and listeners cease to relate only to their immediate environment (us and them – enemies and neighbours) and begin to find different loyalties each of which can be supported by the continuous availability of diverse sources of information. The range of choice (of channels and of identities) becomes important to the way people live their lives.

11.2.29 Multiple identities find new potential in interactivity, which seems to enhance the general social trend towards individualism. What is even more important, they are transforming work as well as leisure, by allowing out-working and so subverting the social controls of the workplace. They encourage communication between individuals without political or social intervention, and their internationalism breaks down national and local identities. They also, of course, permit extreme expressions of identity – as a glance at the numerous Internet “hate newsgroups” testifies. The new technologies have heightened the impacts of culture on social and personal values, but the benefits they bring are so closely intertwined with their negative consequences that it is too early to make a definitive judgement of their contribution to the welfare of humanity.

11.3 Contribution to human knowledge and understanding

11.3.1 *Contributions of culture to leisure and tourism.* Leisure is another important link between culture and development. Its transformations, which run in parallel with those of consumer behaviour, are more difficult to map than changes in the media, communications and cultural industries.

11.3.2 Sociologists have traditionally spoken of passive and active types of leisure activity. The arts and culture have been seen to contribute to both – that is, the active use of leisure as a cognitive and aesthetic catalyst and its passive use as a component of the entertainment industries. Recently, the arrival of the new interactive applications of communication and information technologies has blurred this distinction.

11.3.3 Until the late 1980s sociologists were beguiled by the idea of a “leisure society” which they saw as an inevitable consequence of the shortening of working hours. Structural changes in national and world economies and the high unemployment to which it has led in many European countries have given this notion an ironic twist. What is leisure for a person without a job? There is some empirical evidence that the active use of culture (for exam-

ple reading fiction and amateur art activities) has risen among unemployed people in western Europe, although the proposition that a "good" cultural life is a satisfactory substitute for a job brings Marie Antoinette's dictum to mind: *Qu'ils mangent de la brioche*. However, there are increased expectations that the arts and culture, as a part of the "leisure industries", can and should create new jobs. From this practical point of view, the distinction between "good" and "bad" leisure activities is irrelevant.

11.3.4 Researchers have also coined the term, "mobile privacy", to describe new patterns of social life and leisure activities. Both at work and leisure, people are less bound to time and place, although they like to spend many waking hours in the confines of their own home. This has radically shaped demand for the arts and cultural services: people are willing to travel long distances to enjoy the things they like; but the "home as arts and entertainment centre" (television, hi-fi, computer multimedia) provides an alternative to less interesting – or lower quality – live art.

11.3.5 The rise of the Welfare State brought leisure within the purview of the public sector, which saw its duty as being to provide leisure facilities for all social groups. These mainly centred on the arts, sports and youth activities, with local/municipal authorities carrying the financial brunt. New policies limiting public expenditure have created some difficult dilemmas: how will it be possible in future to maintain these facilities and support their use? At the same time, as Bennington and White have noted, the private sector has entered "[...] into areas of leisure need which have traditionally been met outside the market and [developed] products and services which then can be sold as commodities to supply that need [...]"¹ Bennington and White indicate that this "commodification of leisure" has been most marked in heritage theme parks and the development of all-weather leisure/sports complexes.

11.3.6 These trends are echoed in changing patterns of tourism and the exploitation of national and world heritages. They have led to an escalation in the segmentation of tourist flows, which has, in turn, increased the number of "cultural tourists" and stimulated interest in extending the supply of cultural services and attractions. This has been easiest for those countries and regions which are rich in cultural heritage sites. The old division between "tourist countries and regions" and those providing the tourists has deepened. Negative side-effects for the former include congestion, the commodification of culture and the destruction of natural and cultural sites. On the positive side, tourism in many countries and regions has revived traditional crafts and customs and increased artistic and cultural employment.

11.3.7 How, and to what extent, can these patterns of development be assessed against the four key principles? It is obvious, that, in the context of old value-loaded distinctions (for example active vs. passive leisure and mass

1. Bennington, John, and White, Judy, "Leisure services at the crossroads" in *The future of leisure services*, edited by the same authors. Longman. Harlow, England, 1988.

tourism vs. cultural tourism), it is difficult to apply them to activities which, in recent decades, have undergone a total structural transformation and now exploit culture and the heritage in market-led ways. The state is no longer in a position to pick and choose. In modern societies, the promotion of creativity and the conservation of physical cultural heritage is impossible without people with leisure and tourists with money. However, it is too easily forgotten that this dependence supports established artistic talent and heritage maintenance; unless investment is carefully targeted towards future needs (that is up-and-coming artistic talent and heritage renewal), the outcome may be an exhaustion of the industry's basic resources.

11.3.8 An analogous development can be detected so far as participation and diversity are concerned. New patterns of leisure and tourism – as well as of consumption and communication – tend to increase participation and diversity at the individual level. This takes the form of new consumer interests, leisure patterns, fashions for food and forms of artistic expression (for example “world musics”). Without sufficient intellectual and material resources, these developments can lead to deep social divisions. They are sometimes countered by defensive, protectionist measures; experience suggests that these can lead to the “petrification” of national or other cultures and, in the case of non-European or indigenous minorities, to the creation of cultural ghettos. On the other hand, cultural exchange through tourism can accelerate cultural reconciliation, reinforcing other globalising trends. Cultural diversity can be reinforced by well-planned educational and linguistic policies and interculturalist policies based on equality and decentralisation.

11.3.9 We have already referred to the role played by the mass media in the formation of multiple identities. Contemporary patterns of leisure, tourism and the exploitation of the heritage tend to have similar effects, although perhaps at a less conscious level. New identities, which flow from new cultural practices, only emerge gradually, while old ones are not eliminated, but simply disappear from view. A Sami, who uses a snowmobile rather than reindeer in his work and visits Amsterdam or Paris for his holidays, inevitably has a different identity from that of his father or grandfather. Yet old attitudes retain their force and, under some economic, political or social conditions, can re-emerge with a vengeance, often in the form of racial and ethnic unrest.

11.3.10 *The role of culture in urban and regional planning, rural development and environmental protection.* Leisure, tourism and the exploitation of heritage have not evolved in quite so uncontrolled a way as the previous section may suggest. Although central governments have to some extent lost their grip, other actors in local and regional government have appeared with developmental alternatives. Urban regeneration, regional planning, city networks, strategies to revitalise the countryside and protect rural landscapes and other engendered human habitats are examples of these counterforces. All of them have, in some way, resorted to the arts and culture as a source of intellectual ideas and reflection. They have often evolved in opposition to dominant ideologies and centres of power.

11.3.11 Culturally sensitive urban planning enriched the economic and social motives which guided regeneration policies during the late 1970s and 1980s. The planners' first priority was to revive city centres, their aims being to abolish slums, reduce poverty and criminality – and also to create more secure environments for business, leisure and tourism. In due course, this utilitarian strategy was challenged by new approaches to cultural planning and cultural preservation. Two different schools of thought emerged according to the intended “uses” of city environments and culture. Although these uses overlap in time and planning orientation, we can speak schematically about “politico-symbolic” beautification (for example *les grands projets* of Paris) and of culture as a community “resource”. In the latter case, the arts and culture were seen not as fibres, but as weavers of the urban fabric: culture was the basis of every citizen's identity and was sometimes a weapon in a struggle for self-determination. It had a pro-active function which went beyond “city imaging.” For example, culture-oriented planning has a beneficial impact on urban planning: well-designed and strategically located arts facilities generate night-time activity and create an atmosphere less conducive to criminality. The “living culture” approach to urban planning has two political and administrative prerequisites: the enhancement of the powers of city administrations *vis-à-vis* those of the state (and sometimes regional authorities) and the simultaneous co-ordination and democratisation of planning functions and processes.

11.3.12 Although, of course, outcomes will vary city by city, it is possible to assess urban planning from the perspective of the four key principles of cultural policy. Interestingly, although originally conceived and applied by nation states, they are a closer fit at the local level, although it is important to remember that they should not be considered separately, but as elements of an integrated whole.

11.3.13 If we contrast the two alternative modes of culture-oriented urban planning, the arts and culture can be incorporated functionally into the social and material infrastructure of cities as passive (if decorative) components; or they can form an autonomous living core of artistic institutions, artists' communities and citizens who have a strong community spirit and a clear conception of what their social and cultural environment should be. In other words, the key principles, when applied to cultural development and planning, can have a scale of meanings, ranging from economic material subjugation through more or less active and autonomous instrumentality to self-conscious reflectivity.

11.3.14 Regional planning displays the same main forms and strands as urban regeneration. But due to greatly varying geographical profiles, degrees of political and administrative autonomy and internal ethnic, linguistic and cultural composition, it is not possible to identify the same developmental lines as in urban planning. Furthermore, at this level, different planning functions are often separated from each other and operate within varying, overlapping or interlinked regional or administrative territorial divisions. In modern nation states it is perhaps no accident that these divisions inhibit regional integration and aspirations to autonomy.

11.3.15 Like cities, regions are able to carry out culture-oriented planning strategies, often showing an interest in their more sophisticated participatory forms, but only if they have sufficient degree of political and/or administrative autonomy from the centre. Under certain conditions, the arts and culture are recruited to serve the cause of enhanced political and/or administrative autonomy. This is especially evident in policies for the mass media and the promotion of, and support for, regional press, radio and television. Generally cultural planning by Europe's regions has an instrumental character: the arts and culture are seen as important resources for economic and social development, which can be best promoted by the provision of high quality institutions and an efficient communications infrastructure.

11.3.16 There are unavoidable tensions between regional and urban planners, especially in the case of large metropolitan conglomerates that dominate the cultural life of a region. Regions often have limited resources at their disposal and have to take account of, and rely on, the cultural policies and resources of local authorities. So it is not surprising that regional planning and co-ordination has often turned out to be less effective than that of cities. Thus, the last two or three decades have witnessed an exponential growth in the number of museums, contemporary art institutions, theatres, concert halls and congress centres, which have more often than not been financed by local authorities without much involvement by regional and national authorities. In the Nordic welfare states this boom took place in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, in other western European countries between 1960 and 1990, and in central and eastern Europe expansion preceded the watershed of 1989. As yet, there is no thorough assessment of the effectiveness of these investments, although spectacular short term results have given some local and city authorities international celebrity – or notoriety.

11.3.17 The rise of regionalism and related cultural planning has been accompanied by two developments: new interregional associational or federalist structures and interregional or inter-urban networking. These operate both within national territories and transnationally. Examples include the formation of new "regions" for channelling support from the European Union, transnational cultural co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region (Ars Baltica), the Barents Sea Region (Circumpolar Cultural Co-operation) and the Black Sea Region, transnational city networks and attempts to create new kinds of federalist structure in multi-ethnic states (for example, in the Russian Federation). Their success or failure in appeasing linguistic, religious and cultural tensions will be crucial for the future of Europe. City networks are already managing to shape transborder cultural development and cultural planning in constructive ways, so contributing to European cultural integration.

11.3.18 The origins of European city networks can be traced to the tradition of twinning. Cities have learned how to strike effective deals across the continent for the production and dissemination of arts goods and events. In many cases they have also set up support systems for planning and policy making. Technical expertise is regularly exchanged and observatories have emerged that offer a useful means of making cultural information available transnationally.

11.3.19 City networks also lobby national governments and supranational agencies; the creation of the European Union's Committee of the Regions is in part a response to this kind of pressure. On a political and moral front, cities claim to be the closest and most direct representatives of their constituents – a rationale that makes it easy for them to organise significant relief operations, as has been the case with the Balkan wars. Even if nations are at war, cities say, perhaps not always realistically, that they do not have to follow suit.

11.3.20 The ethic of intercity collaboration has been greatly assisted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. The largest network of area-based authorities is the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), which is the European section of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA). The CEMR comprises fifty inter-territorial organisations in thirty countries, with a total of 30 000 affiliates. Among its activities is a standing committee on culture. There are other European federations and networks, which formally include cultural affairs in their briefs; they include Eurocities; Les Rencontres, the Association of European Cities and Regions of Culture; the Agency for Trans-Mediterranean Networks (ARTM), Medcités; United Towns Development (UDTA), a network for medium-sized cities; C6 Network; Neighbourhoods in Crisis and the Elaine network on policies for minorities. On a more specifically cultural level, there are networks concerned with castles and the heritage and the "Discovery Cities". As a result of a Council of Europe project on culture and neighbourhoods, a network of cultural projects is emerging, inspired by the work of *Banlieues d'Europe*. The Twinned Cities network now involves 8 000 European cities and towns.

11.3.21 Regional cultural planning is inevitably more amorphous than urban planning and its role is more difficult to assess. It makes sense to speak of enhancing overall creativity, diversity and cultural participation through regional planning and cultural policies, but less often of regional artists participating in regional cultural planning or of the inhabitants of a region defending their cultural habitat, as regionalists rather than local residents, against (say) the building of an airfield or a shopping mall. This is a kind of vicious circle. If regional cultural planning is anything more than co-ordination between central and local government, the precondition is the existence of a strong regional identity, uniting artists and inhabitants and motivating them to take part in cultural planning. This has important implications for the debate on the role of regions in Europe. True regionalism is based on cultural identity, which usually has its roots in history, language and ethnicity and cannot be summoned into being by planners. It is difficult to control through political or administrative mechanisms (for example cultural autonomy or federal structures); its underlying aim is to maintain internal regional cohesion and it can be hostile to subregional and local diversity.

11.3.22 The idea of rural development – in terms of the revival and protection of European rural areas – can be approached by enlarging definitions of the heritage and the environment. Between 1960 and 1990, the rural population declined in Europe by about 65% and rural forms of social life (for example relics of the great *latifundia*, and the "European village" in its multifarious forms) travelled the same road to extinction that collectivisation

brought about in the communist countries. The intensification of agriculture and food processing continues and contributes to the social and cultural crisis of the European countryside. The population exodus and the break-up of rural communities have destroyed traditional social ties and micro-cultures often beyond the point of recovery. In many European regions, the defence of ways of life associated with small-scale farming and fishing has led to the rise of social and political movements which challenge the rationale of further European integration.

11.3.23 The social disorganisation of rural areas is equally acute in western and eastern Europe, although for different reasons. The crisis in the former is economic and managerial and is the result of technological progress, whereas in the latter decollectivisation and return of private property is breaking up the social fibre which collective farms, fisheries and related industries used to hold in place.

11.3.24 Most economic and political analysts agree that the European Union is unable and/or unwilling to slow down the process in western Europe. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has sustained agriculture and helped to make some farmers rich; but, especially in the light of European expansion eastwards, it may no longer be able to afford its present financial commitment to the economic development of the countryside. In some ways its operations have militated against rural culture and the natural habitat.

11.3.25 Some steps have been taken to maintain or revive a vigorous social life and save something of old rural ways. Cultural means have been used for this purpose (for example support for local arts and crafts), but the emphasis has been on preservation and protection and comparatively little has been done to encourage new forms of cultural expression. However, the initiatives taken by the Council of Europe's Steering Committee for the Conservation and Management of the Environment and Natural Habitats for "creating and managing" rural landscapes offer a more proactive approach. These include:

- protecting and consolidating the enduring landscape structures;
- restoring and reviving minor rural heritage items, gardens and vernacular architecture, and making those responsible for managing these assets aware of their importance.
- compiling an inventory of representations: paintings, etchings, literary descriptions, photographs;
- reducing visual pollution that degrades the landscape (hoardings and signboards, overhead networks, messy building development, etc.);
- promoting the development of an art form that expresses contemporary landscape trends.¹

1. Giorgis, Sébastien, *Rural landscapes in Europe: principles for creation and management*, Council of Europe's Steering Committee for the Conservation and Management of the Environment and Natural Habitats, Planning and Management, Series No. 3. Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1995.

11.3.26 If we use the four key principles to assess the role of culture in rural areas, the conclusions are much the same as for regional cultural planning. The arts and culture can, and have been, put to instrumental use in rural development; however, little has yet been done to promote the active role of artists and cultural action in planning and development. Nevertheless, as the example set by the Council of Europe indicates, the arts and culture can actively and effectively contribute to the preservation and protection of rural identity and diversity.

11.3.27 Urban and regional planning and rural regeneration have strong environmental links and implications. They have revealed the relationship between physical and cultural habitats and laid the ground for a more comprehensive, integrated environmental policy. Some of the most creative instances of integrated policy, making effective use of the arts and culture, can be found in areas where damage to the physical environment threatens every aspect of the human habitat: in the circum-polar region of northern Europe, in Siberia, in the Austrian and Swiss Alps, on the Mediterranean islands and among Greek and Baltic archipelagos. The cultural dimension of development in these regions is all too often perceived in ethnic or folk terms (folk dance, folk music, aboriginal art, etc.). Nevertheless they have produced more creative talent than we have perhaps realised and introduced new themes into the mainstream of European arts and literature (for example innovative theatre and literature in Siberia).

11.3.28 If we look at this “extended” environmental movement from the perspective of the four key principles, we can see the relevance of artistic creativity and participation, especially in the peripheral, environmentally endangered regions of Europe, which, together with – and also through – immigration, have made a valuable contribution to European interculturalism. This contribution owes a good deal to the stringent and often dangerous ways of life and strong cultural identities of the peoples living in those parts of the world. Policy makers should take into account the strong bonds between cultural and physical environments and the historical and geopolitical factors which make up today’s cultural context. It is regrettable that, although individual agencies and campaigning groups have co-operated in various ways from time to time, their shared interests have rarely persuaded cultural and environmentalist movements to join forces.

11.4 Harnessing human resources

11.4.1 *The role of culture in education and the formation of human capital.* In recent decades, the arts have expanded their input into all kinds of educational activity: managerial training, education in the media and design, adult education, open universities and in international exchange programmes. All this has enhanced the axis between the creative arts and their dissemination, reception and understanding. But while the arts and culture are recognised as a source of human capital, specialisation and professionalisation has tended to fragment arts education and training inside the educational system and to separate them from the society at large.

11.4.2 Primary and secondary education and professional training are supposed to provide people with the knowledge and skills which will enable them to earn a living in their adult lives. Yet many European countries share a wider ambition to create versatile, “cultured” and well-balanced personalities. This is especially the case in societies where primary and secondary education is based on explicit national curricula. These usually incorporate arts education as an articulated component of general studies which aims to familiarise pupils with the role of the arts in society and teaches them the techniques and skills of creative expression and artistic practice. Of course, the arts are not the only subjects of the curricula where cultural values and knowledge are imparted or where creativity is stimulated. Many school subjects play a part in shaping the ideas of young people and introducing them to notions of other cultures, if not always broadening their understanding of them.

11.4.3 In recent years, the notion that the arts in schools makes a decisive contribution to the intellectual and emotional development of individual students, and to the formation of human capital in general, has become more widely accepted than in the past. Moreover we can be confident of asserting some basic facts:

- first, every individual spends his/her most formative years at school and it matters whether or not he/she likes or dislikes the experience;

- secondly, children’s time at school leaves an imprint on their future lives by determining their social skills and their capacity for making relationships;

- thirdly, the school as a facility for independent activity and as a cultural environment is at least as important as the role of teachers and teaching, though the quality of that cultural environment, including the provision of adequate facilities, may leave a lot to be desired; linking directly to artists and arts institutions and making use of new technologies, it can become a focus for the life of local communities;

- fourthly, economic and social pressures and expectations, mediated by parents, relatives and friends, influence students’ attitudes to learning and their ability to respond constructively to the curriculum;

- fifthly, many of those involved in teaching arts and related subjects are not qualified.¹

11.4.4 In recent years, sociological studies of school and education have repeatedly pointed out that European schools and tertiary education institutions are under pressure to improve student performance results: performance indicators (hours taught, students’ examination marks, drop-out rates, graduation rates) are being used to target financial resources and parents see

1. A study by Rick Rogers, *Guaranteeing an entitlement to the arts in schools*, published by the Royal Society of Arts, London, 1995, revealed that in England one-quarter of those teaching art or English, one in five of those teaching music and half of those teaching crafts, design and technology were unqualified in those subjects.

education as giving their children a competitive edge in their adult lives. School managers and teachers bear the brunt, with inevitable consequences for the school or college environment and atmosphere. The same studies suggest that these performance pressures, which have built up since the 1980s, have had damaging effects in terms of excessive competitiveness, the erosion of social life in schools, impatience towards minorities, and a lack of aesthetic and other civilising impulses in the educational environment.

11.4.5 These problems are well known to educational planners and designers of curricula. Experiments and projects have been set up in search of solutions in which the arts and culture often feature as a leading component. They are often carried out with the support of – and are sometimes initiated by – cultural and arts institutions: museums, opera houses, theatres, cultural centres, radio and television companies and the media, and companies from the cultural industries. The school environment has also been radically affected by the new technologies and experiments with different forms of CBET (computer-based education and training) are being used to introduce the arts and culture to students. Yet, these positive initiatives do not alter the basic premises of the educational system and the economic and social conditions under which it works. There is a need for a clear vision of the ways in which the arts and culture can modify or temper these premises and mitigate negative consequences of competitive pressures.

11.4.6 Are these factors given due weight in educational practice and do the educational system as a whole, and school managements and teachers in particular, acknowledge the role of the arts in realising them? Recent research tends to give both questions negative answers. In practice, the arts are a Cinderella of the curriculum with more attention being given to practical or instrumental class subjects. It would seem that a fundamental reform of European educational systems is necessary.

11.4.7 An effective and balanced education in which the arts play an appropriate part is essentially concerned to promote children's present and future individual well being and, from an instrumental perspective, helps to improve the calibre of human capital and to enhance the intellectual resources required for economic, technological and social development. Human capital should be understood, not only as knowledge, information, expertise, organisational skills and physical health, but also as psychological and emotional maturity, mental health and well-developed social skills. The arts can contribute to most if not all these elements and more besides, including moral development (because the arts are deeply concerned with questions of values), aesthetic development (because the arts can engage with the sensibilities of those who come into contact with them) and personal development (for example in such areas as observation and evaluation).¹

11.4.8 The achievement of the full potential of human capital will depend on the application of the key principles of cultural policy, *creativity, diversity,*

1. Robinson, Ken, "Arts education in Europe: a survey". (*Culture, creativity and the young project*). Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 1997.

participation and identity, to the education and development of the young person. Some argue that an education and training in the arts promote “ordered creativity”, make it easy to accept “new visions” and unorthodox working methods and improve skills of communication, and encourages people to open up “new perspectives” on a diverse and changing world. This may well be the case, but recent research¹ into the relationship between artists’ training and their success in “labour markets” suggests that the link between education and training and these different talents is not as simple as may appear.

11.4.9 Recent British case studies² indicate that the majority of artists have undergone formal training and won appropriate qualifications. Interestingly, though, this training does not bring its due reward, for artists with formal educational and training qualifications earn less on average than those without. There is, however, an important caveat: for non-artistic employment, earnings are raised by training and higher education in the arts.

11.4.10 These observations seem to suggest that the arts and culture produce at least two different types of human capital. The development of basic creativity with a view to professional arts practice is less susceptible to formal education and training than might be thought. However, those people may gain an advantage who (perhaps with humbler motives or talents) aspire to artistic careers, but end up in other neighbouring occupations (teaching, research and planning, managerial positions, etc.). This may be because training in an arts discipline sensitises an individual when they work in other sectors. In such cases, the links to artistic creativity provide a “surplus” value for their human capital. However, though many arts graduates leave the arts to work in other fields, it is still insufficiently clear why they do so (a serious mismatch between training provision and employment opportunities is evidently a key factor), what skills are transferable and in what ways they are transferable.

11.4.11 A similar assessment of the “arts-induced surplus” to human capital can be made in respect of other established principles of cultural policy. Artists’ professional associations do not always offer model examples of the democratic process or participation, tending to limit diversity and the formation of multiple identities among their members. In this respect, they are quite different from the more open networks of professionals in arts markets, gate keepers (curators, art critics, directors, managers) and cultural and arts institutions.

11.4.12 Attempts, such the European Commission’s Arts Education and Training Initiative, have begun to map the terrain of training needs and educational responses in European Union countries to such issues as the growth in significance of the arts and cultural industries, changing work patterns and the utilisation of new technologies. Elsewhere, research and training experi-

1. Cf. Ruth Towse, “The economics of artists’ labour markets”, Arts Council of England Research report No. 3. London, 1996.

2. Towse, *ibid.*

ments have substantially increased our understanding of the issues involved in the effective – and also democratic and participatory – use of human capital which the arts and culture can encourage. It seems, however, that this work has only reached its first stage. So far as preparation for creative employment is concerned, practical applications in cultural policy planning, arts administration and management of arts institutions and organisations have yet to be fully developed.

11.4.13 *Contributions of culture to minority rights, interculturalism and combating exclusion.* The parameters of cultural rights in their totality were defined at the Helsinki Round Table in 1993 and have been concisely summarised by Prakash Daswani.¹ Cultural rights include the rights of individuals to:

- i. choose their own culture (including the right *not* to belong);
- ii. command other people's respect for their own culture, its integrity and its nature as a dynamic reality (including the rights of indigenous peoples, other groups with distinct cultures, linguistic communities and regions with effective cultural autonomy or legitimate aspirations to autonomy);
- iii. to have equality of access to cultural supply, the cultural heritage and other cultural resources (including legal rights and sufficient financial and educational resources);
- iv. to have equality of opportunity for active cultural participation in majority and minority cultures, both as opportunities for creative work and for enjoyment of its results;
- v. to have the freedoms essential to creative activity, including freedom of expression, privacy and intellectual property rights;
- vi. to participate in the planning of cultural policy, decision making and implementation, including access by disadvantaged groups through "affirmative action" endorsed by democratic legislation;
- vii. to benefit from the protection and development of cultures.

11.4.14 These principles depend on the concept of *neminem nocet* – that is, the right to exercise one's rights should in no way harm or restrict those of others. However, it is this concept which is one of several reasons why cultural rights are considered "non-justiciable", or inexpressible and unenforceable in law. A cultural right may cause symbolic harm in that it may offend moral or religious convictions, which may be protected by national or religious laws, so that no international convention could overturn them without in turn being accused of cultural discrimination.

1. Daswani, Prakash, "Management of cultural pluralism in Europe", a discussion document prepared for Circle for a seminar organised by the Swedish National Commission for Unesco, 1995.

11.4.15 Besides their relativity, it is impossible to judge individual claims of infringement of cultural rights without a complex assessment of their significance in terms of inter- and intra-group relations. In practice, it is hard to imagine a court being willing to shoulder this burden.

11.4.16 This, then, is the context for an examination of the potential contribution which the arts and culture make to the protection of cultural rights as well as to more practical issues of empowerment and entitlement. We can see that creative work should be protected by the application of certain “inalienable” rights – freedom of expression, access to resources, intellectual property protection and so forth. However, artists, in search of new ideas and images, frequently trespass against prevailing laws and customs. In other words, they set out future moral options which expose the provisionality of today’s standards and so undermine efforts to “legislate” on cultural rights. Works of art (even when created by members of oppressed groups) can subvert contemporary attempts to expand participation and rights to identity in much the same way. Creative diversity is often diversity for the future, not for the present.

11.4.17 This is not to contradict the concept of cultural rights, nor the capacity of the arts to entitle and empower people. It merely lifts the responsibility for implementing them from artists’ shoulders and extends their rights beyond the limits set by prevailing social standards. The task of dealing with contemporary obligations – including the additional obligation to understand the “special” role of the arts and culture – belongs to those groups which assert the values of different cultures and their related rights in international debate and which take protective action through national legislation and international agreements and conventions.

11.4.18 The fact that it is difficult, or even impossible, to legislate for the protection of cultural rights nationally or internationally does not absolve European authorities from the duty to take urgent action. Earlier in this chapter, we reviewed the importance of the environment – physical and cultural, historical and contemporary. The capacity of individuals and groups to create, participate, be different and develop multiple identities does not only depend on the resources at their disposal, but also on their cultural roots and today’s conditions. Efforts to empower and entitle those who are disenfranchised will surely fail if they do not take into account the complex interactions between individual and group needs, the context in which they operate and alternative ways of providing access to cultural resources and supply. And, as we can see in relation to the cultural problems of the Sami people, modern society brings its own consequences which make empowering and entitling more difficult: “The Sami people and society have become more self-confident and the dimensions of the social problems witnessed in other regions are not there [...] there are [however] byproducts of this process of change which the Sami haven’t fully recognised. [Among these are] new mechanisms of social and cultural differentiations. Gender, generation and socio-economic status have greater impact nowadays on individuals [...] and there is no longer one set of norms that can serve as a guide in their striving for the ‘good life’. There are many competing ones. The question of lifestyle choices [has] become linked to a debate over what kind of lifestyle elements you can combine with the

fact that you are a Sami. Nobody asks a punk or rocker their Norwegian identity, but you can be sure that they'll do that with one from a Sami township." ¹

11.4.19 We have emphasised the value of minority groups as a source of new and exceptional human capital, although it is often untapped or unscrupulously exploited for ideological or commercial purposes by dominant, mainstream interests. The quotation above illustrates the fact that minority groups have their own difficulties in adjusting to old traditions, values and social and occupational practices to the demands of life today, changing work patterns and transformed lifestyles. Cultural autonomy and financial support from national or supranational authorities are important, but experience in central, eastern and western Europe suggest that they do not suffice, nor are these problems solved by lip service to internal democracy and open debate. External intervention, however well meaning, unless well designed and sensitively handled, can corrode the intricate mechanisms which all cultures have for adjusting to outside pressures and for explaining these adjustments to its members so that they can transmit renewed traditions and practices to future generations. A deep understanding of one's own language and the artistic value of one's own culture lie at the heart of these mechanisms and it seems imperative that the group itself, not external experts or anthropologists, takes on the task of generating this reflexive understanding.

11.5 Conclusions

11.5.1 In this chapter we have examined in selected policy areas the extent and the manner in which the arts and culture contribute to development. We have looked at their different roles, which can vary from independent active participation to that of a semi-autonomous instrument or passive resource at the hand of market forces or social planning. A key issue has been whether the use of the arts and culture has been motivated mainly by a short term view of "immediate instrumentality" or whether their legacy value, their contribution to the heritage and the intellectual resources of future generations, has been sufficiently taken into account.

11.5.2 The long standing opinion that the arts and culture have an important role to play in overall economic, social and political development has been amply confirmed by our analysis. The developmentalist starting point and the application of the four key principles of cultural policy have refined it and given it new multiple meanings.

11.5.3 Our examination of the aggregate economic and employment effects and the contribution to the information society has indicated the extent to which the arts and culture are seen as a "free factor of production" in modern economic processes. Artists and creators in related professions have an active role as independent producers, product designers and experimenters and highly trained employees or managers of cultural, arts and other institutions.

1. Stordahl, Vigdis, "Identity and Saminess, expressing world view and nation", *Dieduet* No. 1, 1994. Quoted by Daswani, op. cit.

11.5.4 The principles of creativity, diversity, participation and identity proved to be somewhat weak criteria of assessment in these areas; however, they offer a counterbalance to purely economic considerations and provide a basis for overall policy planning. They are chiefly useful for suggesting general policy directions when setting objectives and organising public subsidy, but less so when determining tightly targeted policies or in organising intersectoral policy co-ordination. Even more problematically, the principles, especially in difficult economic circumstances, can lead to a bifurcation of policy and development. Popular and economically significant artistic and cultural production receives special treatment as part and parcel of economic and trade policies. Those which are less so can suffer from a “ghetto effect”, due to isolation and the everyday struggle for survival. To avoid these dangers, we need to add two additional principles:

- public policy should always give a high priority to the core areas of artistic creativity;

- intersectoral policy co-ordination should be enhanced with a view to maintaining cultural diversity in the long term.

11.5.5 We found that leisure and tourism are fields where powerful structural changes are taking place and our assessment of their role in terms of the four principles produces predictable results. The arts and culture – and, more especially, cultural heritage – are seen mainly in an instrumental, commercial role. However, the picture changed when the analysis focused on some critical counterforces: culture-oriented city planning, the defence of rural areas and the need for a new “expanded environmentalism”.

11.5.6 In the case of urban planning, the application of the four principles provided some clear results. The instrumental use of the arts and culture for economic and social purposes was in contrast with initiatives set in motion by autonomous artists’ communities and the voluntary activities of citizens protecting their own cities and neighbourhoods as their own “closed” cultural environments. So far as the protection of cultural environments in general are concerned, and rural areas in particular, it was clear that identity and creativity depend largely on the interaction between the historical physical, and the modern cultural environment – as well as access to appropriate artistic and cultural means.

11.5.7 In all these fields, there are new ways by which people can use the arts and culture to enhance their knowledge and understanding of their environment, conditions, interests and values. The key principles could usefully be augmented by the following:

- the promotion of autonomous reflective action by artists, their communities and citizens in favour of the living cultural environment;

- the advocacy of a new integrated perception of the physical and cultural environment as a source of creativity and cultural action.

11.5.8 The next assessment supported the idea that the arts and culture encourage the formation of human capital. However, the contribution of arts education was by no means self-evident. Its successful delivery is sensitive to pressures caused by economic and social expectations and the school environment, which can reinforce or undermine its effects. Further analysis suggested that the much advertised “arts-induced surplus” to human capital does not stem from core creative activities, but is a result of the interaction between this core and people learning from, and working for, the arts and culture.

11.5.9 The question of empowering and entitling minority and other disadvantaged groups was examined in the context of cultural rights. The familiar problem of cultural relativity in developing instruments to protect cultural rights was duly noted and we hinted at limits to what the arts and culture can contribute to their development. The arts, as an activity which creates future options, tends to expose the relativity of contemporary moral standards and may even undermine attempts to legislate cultural rights. This does not, of course, diminish the importance of cultural rights and the practical work which artists and cultural and arts institutions can do to entitle and empower disadvantaged groups. It was also noted that this work (as is the case with all work in this field) has to be based on a thorough analysis of the complex interactive effects of individual and group needs, the context (the cultural and physical environment) and alternative ways of providing access to cultural resources and supply.

11.5.10 What can be said then, on the basis of these findings, of the responsibility for “managing” the various roles of the arts and culture in developmental processes in general, and how do we determine the legitimate role of public intervention in particular? The task of artists and the arts communities cannot easily be overstated. Creators do not need external standards and limits – except as challenges to overcome. However, a responsibility does attach to those who are in close contact with the arts world and benefit from it in terms of accumulating understanding and knowledge as “personal human capital” and are in a position to mediate creative ideas and new visions to society at large. This responsibility can be realised in different arenas – the non-profit sector, small cultural industry enterprises, the media, cultural and arts networks and the management of cultural and arts institutions.

11.5.11 An integrated approach to the protection of the cultural environment and cultural rights, inspired by a broad idea of “human ecology”, sets new obligations for cultural researchers and statisticians. There is an urgent need to monitor and comprehend the complex and ephemeral phenomena involved.

11.5.12 All these considerations, which reach beyond the traditional confines of cultural policy and a narrow interpretation of the four key principles, leads us to question the role of central authorities and the hierarchical structures of public intervention. The desirability of intersectoral co-ordination, bringing together the different policies of ministries and agencies, has been stressed a number of times during this report. But, by itself, that is not enough, for there

is a danger that the state, together with economic interests, while apparently giving a high priority to the arts and culture, will in practice continue to leave them in a marginal position, as no more than a factor of production or as emblematic events to encourage the ideals of cohesion and identity.

11.5.13 We have identified fields where well-planned public intervention can bring the arts and culture to the forefront of human development. As such, we have singled out urban planning, the maintenance and defence of the cultural environment, arts education, the formation of human capital and the promotion of cultural rights. We have observed that the efforts of national and international authorities “to take into account the cultural dimension of development” tend to fail if they are not supported by the work of independent agencies in the field of urban and regional cultural planning, the activities of “third sector” associations and the active involvement of artistic communities and individual citizens.

11.5.14 This is not to say that governments should abdicate their role in the interaction between culture and development. On the contrary, in fact, they should no longer seek to control the details of policy implementation, but to superintend strategic planning inside a flexible and generally accepted framework. Such a framework can still rest, but with the modifications indicated above, on the traditional pillars of cultural policy – the promotion of creativity, diversity, identity and participation.

12 Towards a new policy agenda

“When I first attended the Council of Culture Ministers in 1993 [...] people were saying that when economic growth came back we could talk about cultural projects again. I said that it is precisely when you have stagnation in the economy, when you can’t create jobs in the old way, when people are being attacked by racism – that is the time when you should be investing in culture because you are then investing in tolerance, you’re investing in diversity, you’re investing in creativity and in imagination.”

Michael D. Higgins, Minister for Arts, Culture and Gaeltacht, Eire¹

12.1 Cultural policy: an imprecise art

12.1.1 We are approaching the end of our journey, which opened with a discussion of the four key principles which have guided cultural policy – support for cultural identity, for cultural diversity, for creativity and for participation in cultural life – and gave an account of how they been applied in the post-war decades (Chapters 3 and 4). We went on to describe the changing context in which cultural policies functioned (Chapters 5 to 8) and the transformations which the arts and media have undergone (Chapter 9). Through different scenarios, we continued our narrative into the future and attempted to chart some of the options and challenges facing policy makers (Chapter 10). Our next step in Chapter 11 was to venture on the difficult task of showing, in practical ways, how culture can impact on development. Even here, we adhered to the four key principles as a framework for debate and in the context of sustainable development.

12.1.2 However, as we wrote the report, it began to look as if the principles, in the light of their patchy record, were not altogether reliable guides to policy. How successfully have they been put into practice and how appropriate are they to today’s circumstances? Important as they may be, they leave an impression, in their basic formulation, that cultural planning is more straightforward than it really is. In practice, policy makers are confronted with a range of dilemmas and contradictions. If one desirable objective is to be attained, it may be at the expense of another. Awkward choices have to be made, not in the sense that they are necessarily contentious or unpopular – but simply that there may be no “correct” solution at all to any given problem.

12.1.3 The application of the four principles at national, regional and local levels has met with mixed fortunes. There is no question that state-support-

1. Higgins, Michael D., quoted in Naughton, John, “A breath of fresh air”, the *Observer* newspaper, London, December 1995.

ed culture has been a powerful promoter of cultural identity; Finland is a *locus classicus*, having used the arts, and especially architecture, design, opera and contemporary music, from the 1950s onwards in an ambitious project to rebuild a national consciousness after the war. Similar attempts have been made in more recent years by some of the new democracies, though lack of resources and other factors appear to have rendered these less successful. Resurgent regions and cities across the continent have invested heavily in culture and the heritage as an effective means of advancing their interests. But it is not so certain that Europe-wide and national attempts to protect audio-visual industries have attained their objects.

12.1.4 More to the point, events have moved on. Today's new individualism means that many people move at will among a wide variety of identities, finding themselves more at ease with global culture than pleases national policy makers and, at the same time, but without any sense of contradiction, delighting in the satisfactions of locality and regionality. An exclusive and monolithic approach to cultural identity no longer reflects (if it ever really did) the values of modern European society, which is more accurately seen as a "culture of cultures", both in terms of the composition of its population and its openness to international influences.

12.1.5 The picture as regards cultural diversity is also uneven. While Scandinavia has done a great deal to foster the cultural interests of its indigenous minorities, the situation in central and eastern Europe is not nearly so positive. Policies of decentralisation and the protection of minorities, to the extent that they exist, are not being implemented with conviction. In western Europe, the encouragement of indigenous cultures is less of an issue (with notable exceptions) than that of non-European cultures, where appropriate policies have come late in the day and have tended to offer access to "white" arts structures rather than to enable the creation of self-governing, fully empowered non-European ones.

12.1.6 Moreover, there is a contradiction at the heart of the concept of diversity and its celebration should mean more than the tolerant, or even enthusiastic, acceptance of multicultural variousness. It is true that communities have the right to express their own particularities without discrimination and that much more remains to be done if that right is to be freely expressed. But no community is an island; the gathering consensus on individual rights – to democracy, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity – necessarily takes precedence over cultural, social and political traditions if they conflict with them. Diversity is a quality which marks out individuals, as they engage with the multiple, often conflicting values on offer in today's moral markets and with the kaleidoscope of information now available to most people, rather than it does groups. The management of information and censorship has become a burning question as some politicians and social groups seek to protect their traditional moral standards in the face of the apparently indefeasible anarchy of the Internet. Controls are inevitable and will attract popular consent, but must be applied with a light touch if they are to have a chance of being implemented.

12.1.7 The proliferation of state-supported arts infrastructures has contributed to an expansion of opportunity for artists (whether interpreters, such as actors or singers, or original creators). The growth of mass electronic culture has brought similar benefits. However, in some countries support for the production of new work in the subsidised sector is weak and certain groups still suffer disadvantage (women in the performing and visual arts, for example, or disabled people).

12.1.8 Creativity is not just the prerogative of the professional artist. Through mechanical and electronic reproduction most Europeans live in a daily world permeated by cultural representations of one kind or another – books, music, broadcasting, lifestyle-creating fashion and graphic design. There has been a massive increase in the number of cultural producers. Public policy makers are faced with a number of dilemmas: first, how to prioritise effectively the arts and related activities in formal and adult education in a way that would enable everyone to use mass culture creatively and to train those who will enter the cultural professions; secondly, how to design new communications infrastructures, both nationally and internationally, in a way that ensures for all creators and independent audiovisual producers a fair access to traditional “broadcast” and modern digitised and interactive “narrowcast” distribution, and to ensure the protection of their intellectual property rights as well as the “nursing” of new generations of creative talent.

12.1.9 In addition, the act of consumption – not just of cultural, but of all goods and services – is rightly seen to be more of an active than a passive process. It often approaches being a creative act in itself. The encouragement of participation was once understood only to entail people’s direct involvement in the artistic process, conventionally defined, and the expansion of audiences for the performing arts and for art exhibitions. However, new methods are called for in today’s consumer society, dominated as it is by a mass electronic media which is being transformed by the advent of interactive digitised and computer-mediated communications and the multimedia. This opens new avenues for popular participation, but also calls for new methods for maintaining pluralism both in supply and demand. Inevitably, the steady flow of new applications and products reinforces inequalities, which public policy measures will need to address. Key issues for the future are universal access to the equipment and skills needed to make the most of the new technologies and participation in what one might call the political life of culture, not only through elected representatives but by individuals and self-governing associations and interest groups; secondly, to involve young people in the selective and reflective use of the information provided.

12.1.10 Public investment in the arts has not significantly extended the social reach of consumers or participants, although it has increased their number in absolute terms. However, the amateur arts continue to attract many millions of practitioners without much state intervention, although the impact of multimedia in the home seems likely to reduce involvement in such participatory activities too (though it may lead to enhanced participation in new audiovisual processes). The uneven spread of direct cultural participation is a serious failure of public policy.

12.1.11 Overarching and underpinning the principles is the issue of cultural rights. The relentless escalation of ethnic conflicts, increased intolerance and discrimination, the re-emergence of extremist political movements and senseless terrorism, and the persecution of writers and intellectuals reinforce the urgency of an effective policy response. Unfortunately it is not at all clear that the labours of the international agencies to assert cultural rights have been fruitful. Indeed it could be argued that national governments only act when they wish to do so and not in response to general resolutions passed in Strasbourg or New York. True, progress has been made in expanding the traditional concept of freedoms, including cultural rights, yet this has little correspondence in political and legal practice. Unlike the extensive corpus of conventions and agreements on human rights, cultural rights are still in the casting mould. Cultural rights and the value commitments their implementation presupposes have remained in the European *realpolitik* for too long as empty words. The proposal of the World Report on Culture and Development to create a system to monitor, implement and adjudicate on cultural rights is admirable, though it will not be easy to deal with culture-bound interpretations of cultural rights in different parts of the globe. From the European perspective the development of effective instruments and better co-ordination of the present valiant, but often disparate, efforts in this field by the Council of Europe, Unesco, OSCE and the European Union calls for address.

12.1.12 If we are to update or refine the four principles, it would be worth bearing in mind the suggestions made in the previous chapter which sought to explore the dynamics of the relation between culture and overall development. That is, public policy should always give a high priority to the core areas of artistic creativity; intersectoral policy co-ordination should be enhanced with a view to maintaining cultural diversity in the long term; the promotion of autonomous reflective action by artists, their communities and citizens in favour of the living cultural environment and the advocacy of a new integrated perception of the physical and cultural environment as a source of creativity and cultural action should be encouraged. In other words, closer attention should be paid to energising the interface between cultural (and especially creative and artistic) activity and the larger world of social and economic movements. We must refocus the four principles so that, rather than being stand-alone aspirations, they are translated into the practical "politics" of interdependence.

12.1.13 Although as ideals they are admirable and few would argue that they are not worth pursuing, they do not explicitly recognise the intimate connections, charted by this report, between larger social, economic and political activity and the arts and culture. This recognition should not be understood to reduce the arts to a purely instrumental role. Indeed there is a need for a consistent theory of cultural policy which accepts the limits to which the instrumental uses of culture can be applied without endangering it. It is, in fact, their intrinsic value as sources of creativity and intellectual resources that allows them so powerful an effect on the world they recreate, comment on or criticise.

12.1.14 Unless and until this is recognised, it is questionable whether cultural policies will be capable of addressing the major challenges which confront policy makers as they plan for the next century, which include:

- reforming the governance of culture;
- achieving a social consensus;
- mobilising human resources;
- managing the cultural dimension and impact of the communications revolution;
- ensuring opportunities for creative employment;
- recognising the new dynamics of international exchange and cooperation;
- using culture as a lever for greater social cohesion in Europe.

12.1.15 *Refocusing cultural policies.* To begin to respond to these challenges will call for a fundamental review of cultural policies at all levels. Yet all too often, insufficient attention is paid by governments or their agencies to a clear definition of basic policy premises, the grounds for public intervention and the subsequent setting of clearly defined policy directions and strategies for their implementation. Policies in some European countries may be characterised by the absence of clearly articulated goals. They often give the impression of being governed by custom and practice or are unnecessarily obtuse. Elsewhere they may be locked into a rigid legislative straitjacket which discourages flexibility and makes their reorientation more difficult. Sometimes cultural responsibilities are insufficiently delineated between the different tiers of policy making and policies are fragmented as a result, as well as artificially isolated from other sectors (ironically, in one sense, the perfectly sound concept of subsidiarity has tended to work against the best interests of culture by limiting the introduction of systematic and integrated policy programmes and measures).

12.1.16 In instances where goals are set, they are often less explicit than is desirable or the means to their attainment are vague, the resources for their realisation quite inadequate and mechanisms for evaluation weak. Where policies do focus on means, they may be a substitute for real action. Some countries focus on fulfilling short-term political goals, lacking deeper insights into the complex and multiple role of the arts and culture in development. Moreover, the imperative to achieve rapid solutions to issues has led to a situation where policies are not given enough time to be tested by the event before they are changed.

12.1.17 Of course, cultural goals cannot be devised in isolation. They must take into account the wider context in which they are set. They must address the power of the media and communications industries, acknowledging the

relative impotence of governments and supranational authorities to reverse the general trend of development. They should come to terms with the widespread questioning of what used to be common values in ways that will offer an ethical framework and promote a consensus of tolerance. Media, heritage and arts policies need to be considered in an integrated manner and be closely linked to educational policies. This requires a fundamental re-examination of delivery mechanisms, for although national and regional civil servants and their international agency counterparts may labour with the utmost dedication, they often work in hierarchical departments and are neither encouraged nor equipped to think and work in new horizontal or cross-departmental ways.

12.1.18 Expressing the need in general terms for more rational, coherent and comprehensive approaches to cultural policy making should not blind us to a crucial issue: what policy makers at all levels consider to be the extent and appropriate form of public intervention. This is a political decision. However, ultimately it is political will that will determine objective setting, resource allocation and the desired effects. Of course, this does not prevent the assessment of the real impacts of policy and the extent to which it advances culture and development.

12.1.19 It has been put to us that there is a crisis of policies in Europe today. There may be some truth in this, but it may be equally, if not more, true that there is a crisis of solutions. Politicians and policy makers are in a unique position to provide a sense of direction and a vision for the future, elaborating cultural values at a time of fundamental change. All too often, though, it is vision which is lacking. In some instances there is also an absence of what might be termed “collective memory”, the effect of which is a tendency to “reinvent the wheel” or to “rediscover” and repackage failed policies of the past as “new” ideas.

12.1.20 It is essential to address these issues and to build models for new, more focused, and better co-ordinated policies, not least to respond to the requests of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, which are searching for guidance on how best to reconstruct their cultural policy-making and administrative structures. Policy makers would do well to remember that this is a learning exercise for all countries.

12.2 New foundations for cultural policy

12.2.1 At the outset we indicated that the task force was under no illusion about the difficult challenge it had been given. We were asked to produce an analysis based on trend data which in many areas is not readily available. We were asked to produce a policy-oriented report which would resolve policy dilemmas that had frustrated policy makers for decades. We were asked to look for European solutions when there is not a single Europe. But perhaps the thinking at intergovernmental level is flawed. We *can* identify some broad trends, but the impact these trends will have will differ from country to country. The way transformation processes are experienced and policy responses developed will reflect national, regional and even local circumstances. It is

much easier to speak of clusters of countries in Europe. There are disparities between Nordic and Mediterranean countries and between eastern and western Europe, but even here it is easy to lapse into generalisations that recognise the convergence of policy approaches – but not the differences that exist. All we can do is identify some signposts derived from an analysis of the current and potential situation of arts and development in their European and global context.

12.2.2 The enduring vitality of the arts in Europe makes us more confident of asserting that if we want artists and cultural institutions to stand at the crossroads of a vibrant, culturally diverse life, we need a new development paradigm that places culture at its *heart*. Cultural issues, as the World Commission argued, must be realigned within the mainstream development discourse. This will entail a fundamental shift in the political and public consciousness of what culture and development mean. It will necessitate the mobilisation of the creative energies within society as a whole to gain the political high ground. We can make a start by fully involving culture in the planning process at different levels of government. Cultural policy makers need to influence decisions taken nationally, regionally and locally in today's complex decision-making environment. A cultural planning approach would enable policy makers to think strategically about the application of cultural resources to a wide range of public authority responsibilities and thereby exploit potential synergies and development opportunities. Inevitably, such an approach would necessitate a reassessment of many of the assumptions on which the policy process is driven currently. Of course, there is nothing new in this idea. However, it is rarely acted on. Moreover, the debate on cultural planning has primarily focused on its contribution to urban regeneration at local level, whereas it is equally relevant, surely, to regional, national and supranational policies. Cultural policies do not connect. Until they are integrated, culture will continue to risk marginalisation.

12.2.3 An overall strategy for cultural development will necessarily be couched in broad terms. Policy makers will need to translate it into specialist plans for the individual art forms and heritage industries. The state of music, drama, dance, museums, the visual arts and the rest varies from country to country. It is beyond the scope of this report, which can attempt no more than an overview of European culture, to accommodate these inevitable specificities in its pages, but the work needs to be done.

12.2.4 There is no question in our minds that public policies should contribute to freedom of expression, not simply in theory but in daily life, in ways that will guarantee and make feasible imaginative explorations of contemporary social conditions, facilitate European diversity, create opportunities for the media, arts and cultural institutions and individuals to express themselves creatively and to participate openly and without hindrance in public debate. Any policy framework, therefore, has to ensure that artists and their works flourish as a dynamic, challenging and independent force in society, stimulating a lively interplay between the arts, sciences and technology and enabling culture to set its mark on all sections of society. We cannot imagine a Europe without culture and without the contribution of the artist.

12.2.5 We welcome the approach used by the World Commission to broaden the policy debate on culture through an analysis of its relationship to development. The title of our report reflects the fact that cultural policies in Europe today and tomorrow need to be considered from a new point of departure. We have attempted to analyse cultural policies to establish whether public intervention, currently, is sufficiently responsive to cultural and developmental needs and trends. We have attempted to chart the context for cultural development and to assess whether the widely accepted key principles of cultural policies take sufficient account of sustainable development and whether they will stand us in good stead for future years. We believe they can, but only if they are refocussed to acknowledge their interconnectedness with other policy domains. Given the time and resources at our disposal we do not pretend that our assessment is either comprehensive or infallible. Nevertheless, we hope that this report, and the suggestions for a new policy agenda that follow, will be a useful contribution to a debate that we believe should continue.

12.3 Cultural governance: in from the margins

12.3.1 Although culture appears to have been ascending the political agenda in some countries, cultural policy remains obstinately in the sphere of low priority politics in others and this is often reflected both in the level of resources it is accorded and in the status of the ministers, ministries and civil servants who oversee it. To the extent that culture has gained in visibility in recent years, it is due more to its perceived contribution to the economy and employment and to identity building or image creation than it is for its considerable importance as a vector for human capital, creativity, empowerment and confidence building. We need to adjust the balance and find an appropriate place for the arts and culture in governance. This is not simply an issue of structural mechanisms that are applied, but a fundamental review of the principles that drive policies and the reformulation of objectives. Sustainable development presupposes that optimal use and regeneration of intellectual resources and human capital provided by the arts will be the focus of attention.

12.3.2 *Repositioning culture at the heart of decision-making.* Bearing in mind the intricate inter-relationship between culture and other aspects of social and economic life, we believe that ministers and policy makers will remain largely powerless to influence cultural change until culture is repositioned at the heart of the decision-making process. This implies a fundamental shift in the prevailing priorities and ethos of political and administrative practices. Nevertheless, in our view, practical arrangements for interministerial and intersectoral collaboration will be necessary at all levels if governments are to take account of the cultural implications of decisions and give some priority to the cultural dimension and quality of life. This becomes increasingly important as the interfaces between the arts and culture and areas such as communications expand the traditional scope of cultural policy. But this may not be enough. There is also a need for "diagonal" co-operation, especially interactive planning processes involving artists and others.

12.3.3 *Respecting subsidiarity and ensuring coherence in decision-making.* Acknowledging the need to take decisions as close as possible to those who

will be affected by them, it is especially important that the principle of subsidiarity gains more concrete recognition in defining the relationship between national and supranational decision making on the one hand and national, regional and local tiers of government on the other. Regional and local authorities should be given the responsibility to establish comprehensive cultural strategies linked to their programmes of planning, economic, social, and educational development. However, as a matter of principle, the delegation of cultural responsibilities by governments should be accompanied by the transfer of appropriate financial resources. Obviously, care needs to be taken to ensure coherence and balance between national priorities and regional and local concerns. Where there are overlapping competencies, there may also be advantage in national governments restricting themselves to a high level strategic role. Moreover, national cultural strategies should only be prepared after comprehensive discussion with lower tiers of government and the arts communities. An important principle is at stake here. Subsidiarity is not conceived as the administrative delegation of power only; it must also be seen as a principle of self-determination, which presupposes the active participation of citizens at all levels of decision making.

12.3.4 *Monitoring culture and development.* Cultural studies and information systems for analysing and monitoring the development of the arts and culture have traditionally suffered from self-imposed isolation. Culture was seen as a unique sector, mainly supported by society and public authorities for its intrinsic value. Recent studies have usefully emphasised the economic importance of the arts, but there is now a danger that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction and the specificity, aesthetics and role of the arts in society will be neglected. The way forward is to broaden our understanding of the function of the arts as a source of creativity, empowerment and “human capital” and devise monitoring systems which more accurately register this, so that it would be possible to achieve more effective targeting of public financing and investment; at the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that the arts and culture have their own values which do not always serve other purposes. We recommend that European cultural research and work on developing cultural indicators be intensified and that, in this connection, the model offered by the *UNDP Human development reports* and the experience gained from the European Programme of National Policy Reviews – including those emerging from eastern and central Europe – be taken into account. The World Commission’s proposals to produce an Annual Report on Culture and Development (or one on a regular basis) may also prove to be helpful in this respect.

12.3.5 *The case for public expenditure.* We recognise that public expenditure budgets are likely to be under severe pressure for the foreseeable future. However, we believe that cultural subsidies are socially and economically useful and that spending levels should rise, or at least remain stable. Indeed, we argue that culture is even more important at times of economic difficulty. While we acknowledge the financial constraints under which governments operate, it may be cheaper in the long run to invest in culture as a means of underpinning the quality of life of Europe’s citizens than to have to spend large amounts of money later to redress societal ills that flow from unem-

ployment, urban and rural decline and social exclusion. Instead of “special” pleading for culture in the competition for funds with other government spending departments, we need a new climate of understanding in which cultural goals are seen as an integral part of the common objectives of governance. At the same time, it behoves cultural decision makers and administrators to make sure that such moneys as are available are carefully focused and flexibly deployed to achieve maximum value for money. This suggests the need for periodic review of cultural policies by governments to assess the extent to which the objectives they have (or should have) set are being met.

12.3.6 *Rebalancing support for institutional and non-institutional creativity.* Support for culture is invariably wedded to history: the legacy of arts institutions and buildings which have been inherited by post-war governments or encouraged and developed by them in the years since. The infrastructure of buildings and building-based institutions now absorbs most of the resources set aside by governments or their agencies for culture, and the ability of governments to sustain this is seriously in question, not only in central and eastern Europe where the problems are acute, but in much of western Europe as well. Inevitably, individual creativity and innovation suffers. Not all creativity goes on in institutions, even though many creative people end up working for them. If the intention is to leave a creative legacy for the future, governments would be wise to review the balance between resource allocations for cultural institutions and the infrastructure and that for non-institutional creativity.

12.3.7 *New sources of funding.* The economic recession is making it more difficult to obtain business sponsorship than a few years ago, although there are some exceptions to the general picture. Other avenues will have to be explored. Policy makers and administrators will have to think creatively about fund raising. We consider that they could include: first, finding “new” forms of public support – for example, through hypothecated tourism taxes or through “planning gain” (that is where public authorities give planning rights for commercial building developments on condition that the developer offers something in return, such as an art gallery, museum or theatre as part of a shopping complex); secondly, through strategic alliances between the public and private sectors (for example the shopping arcade/restaurant complex at the Louvre Museum in Paris).

12.3.8 *Peer group evaluation without circularity of advantage.* The autonomy of culture, especially of artistic activity, is a precondition for creativity, innovation and the steady growth of knowledge. Some countries administer culture “at arm’s length” by delegating their authority to intermediary bodies, such as arts councils, and many use peer groups of fellow artists and experts to assess standards and results. In recent years this approach has been questioned. It has been pointed out to us that both the arm’s length principle and peer group evaluation can be undermined by political or other pressures. Such pressures are not confined to governments. Our attention has been drawn to instances where groups of artists are considered to have “closed off” access to decision makers through a virtual monopoly of influence. Self-perpetuating cliques are no less dangerous if they are made up of artists rather

than bureaucrats subject to political pressure and lobbying. Nevertheless, for all its faults, we believe that peer group assessment remains the best of the available options to ensure well informed and artistically sound decisions. However, governments, or their chosen intermediaries, should ensure that decision making processes are regularly reviewed to ensure there is no circularity of advantage. The post-communist countries would be wise to develop their own arm's length mechanisms to suit their own traditions and circumstances, rather than copy western models. However, it is important to understand that arm's length mechanisms presuppose active arts organisations and associations, and policies in these countries need to focus on promoting their creation.

12.3.9 *Independence and accountability.* We consider that arts institutions should be given as much artistic, managerial and financial independence from governmental control as is consistent with public accountability. Our attention has been drawn to instances where governments or funding authorities exercise controls too rigidly, leaving little scope or incentive for arts institutions to manage their affairs effectively as well as efficiently. Public accountability and control is best exercised *ex ante* and *ex post* rather than by intervention in the details of day-to-day management. Aims and means should be properly defined and agreed in advance between funding authorities and subsidised organisations; evaluation criteria should be adopted, and the level of public subsidy should be related to the extent to which the subsidised organisations meet their objectives. We recognise that, to avoid goal conflicts, a balance needs to be struck between artistic ambitions and the legitimate demands of funders. The essential point is that the rules of accountability should not dictate an organisation's artistic objectives, but enable them to be expressed freely.

12.3.10 *A new basis for partnerships with commerce.* The greater involvement of the business sector in sponsoring the arts in recent years has provided a useful additional source of income for the cultural sector, though not one that is likely to replace the need for public subventions. At the risk of appearing to be patronising, there is some indication of attitudinal change in the business sector, which perhaps reflects greater sensitivity and understanding of the role industry and commerce can play in meeting cultural concerns and community aspirations, rather than being driven solely by marketing opportunities. It is uncertain whether this heralds a significant shift in the relationship between sponsor and recipient, but it is encouraging to note that while circumstances have forced the arts sector in many parts of Europe to learn business culture, industry and commerce may be beginning to recognise that it, in turn, can learn from the creative skills of the cultural sector. This deserves to be monitored.

12.4 A social and civil contract with Europe's citizens

12.4.1 Civil society is an intrinsic component of today's democratic, market-driven societies. To prevent infringements of human rights, the balance between the state and the individual needs to be carefully set and the role of major corporations monitored and controlled; the laws and regulations which

define these matters are what we mean by a "social contract". Culture can make a major contribution to a tolerant and diverse community, partly through the intrinsic value of creative activity and partly through the independent voluntary associations to which it gives rise and which are the building blocks of civil society.

12.4.2 *Safeguarding cultural rights and freedoms.* Xenophobia and intolerance are the greatest threats to stability in Europe today and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The preconditions for a democratic and civilised Europe in the twenty first century must include freedom to identify with the cultural and linguistic communities of one's choice, to have the freedom to engage in cultural activity and the right to be taught one's own culture and language, while respecting the diversity of other cultures. Some of these rights are already enshrined in conventions, but need to be fully applied. There is also a strong case in our opinion for the addition of a protocol on the recognition of cultural rights to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, we recognise the difficulties some governments have in agreeing standard-setting instruments in this sector and for this reason we commend the work being undertaken on preparing a European Declaration on Cultural Rights. The obligations of such a declaration should be promoted and publicised widely by the Council of Europe so that the people of Europe are fully aware of the principles to which their governments subscribe and can judge how far they are transformed into specific policies. Without concrete action such declarations are rendered meaningless.

12.4.3 *Ensuring linguistic diversity.* The protection and promotion of linguistic heritage is common to many cultural policies in Europe. Language learning is an asset for professional development and international exchange, and a key to achieving a social bond in multilingual communities and the integration of migrants and refugees. The implications of language policies can be found in most fields of arts production, including electronic communications. However, if only a few major languages are available through the messages beamed by satellite, this will exclude a large number of Europeans from access to the new communications technology. The role of language in cultural policy should be fully recognised at supranational, national and regional levels and action may need to be taken to further encourage high quality translation; to use resources or policies in a way that promotes the creative arts; and to support the teaching of other languages. Governments which have not already done so should seriously consider ratifying and enforcing the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Serious consideration should also be given to the addition of a protocol that would recognise the inherited languages of European communities of non-European origin.

12.4.4 *Model creative cities as liveable spaces.* The arts can make a major contribution to the urban environment through the provision of arts facilities in deprived inner city areas and peripheral urban neighbourhoods and through the application of sensitive architecture, design and lighting to create a comfortable urban landscape on a human scale. Artists also have a cru-

cial role to play both in fostering intercultural understanding and integrating groups in society that are most at risk. Municipal authorities should incorporate the arts, media and heritage in their programmes of town planning, transport, the environment, and economic, social and tourism development and involve artists in decision-making processes from the earliest possible stage. We would like to see “model creative cities” or “cities of culture” appointed in different countries in which such initiatives are piloted and to test integrated policies that derive from a cultural perspective on city development.

12.4.5 *The contribution of the arts to a secure environment.* An environment that is cared for and respected is often a secure environment. Yet the role of the arts in this respect is hardly acknowledged in Europe today. Governments spend huge sums on providing security for citizens and their property. We consider (but would like to have more evidence) that confidence-building measures, such as opportunities to participate in culture, might help to reduce this expenditure – for example, by transforming the environments in which crime can breed (through the conversion of derelict buildings for cultural use, enhanced street lighting, the provision of late night transport, etc.) and helping to reduce the level of re-offending, especially by young people caught up in criminal activity. Good practice would need to be monitored by governments. In particular, the feasibility of obtaining financial contributions towards the cost of model projects from domestic security budgets should be actively explored.

12.4.6 *Culture as an aspect of civil awareness.* The need to make decision makers in the public and private sector sensitive to the importance of culture in society is self evident, yet policies pay far too little attention to working towards a consensus beyond the cultural community. Culture has a major role in encouraging a creative response to social and economic issues. We have been attracted to models in a few countries which seek to influence and encourage potential decision makers in mid-career outside the cultural sector, through seminars and debates, to recognise the role of culture as a cohesive force in society. We believe these to be worthy of emulation, and suggest that the Council of Europe monitor such initiatives and promote them to national governments.

12.4.7 *Partnerships with the “third sector”.* Voluntary associations and foundations have an important role to play as intermediaries between government and the cultural sector. Government encouragement of their development – through fiscal means and subsidy – would help to foster a thriving civil society and would be an acknowledgement that the voluntary sector can sometimes be a more appropriate vector for cultural action than governments themselves.

12.4.8 *Culture in rural areas.* If contemporary rural life is to flourish, the competing claims of people and the need to protect the natural habitat should be brought into a harmonious and interactive balance. Policies in rural areas should integrate plans for ecological conservation with those for the arts and heritage and the arts should be used to help revive an interest in the coun-

tryside. Investment in cultural tourism in rural areas should be sensitive to local ways of life and should only be formulated after consultation with relevant communities. Artists and craftspeople have a cultural, social and economic contribution to make and should be encouraged through support mechanisms (such as money from European Union Structural Funds) to live and work in the countryside. This will require the closer integration of cultural decision makers in the use of structural funds. If local agencies, such as schools, libraries, churches and voluntary associations, were linked to wider national and regional cultures through the new communications technologies, a full range of cultural services would be readily available to those living in marginalised rural areas and act as a brake on the exodus from the countryside, especially by young people.

12.5 Culture to mobilise human resources

12.5.1 It is to Europe's shame that the resources and talents of so many of its citizens are not fully utilised : the growing band of elderly people; adults in their forties and fifties who are made redundant and may never work again; those facing social exclusion through disability, race, faith, gender or poverty; those in institutional care (for example in hospitals), or in custody (for example in prisons or reform centres); and, above all, young people. Innovative ways should be found of enabling all of Europe's citizens to engage with culture, whether as active participants or as consumers. Much good work has already been done, though much of it has been *ad hoc*, unco-ordinated and unrecognised.

12.5.2 *Towards a new social ethic.* A culture of ignorance all too often excludes whole sections of the community from cultural policies and the opportunity to contribute to the cultural development of our societies. The denial of opportunity impoverishes us all. It should be countered by the adoption of policies of inclusion. A key priority for the future should be to identify and disseminate good practice as it occurs. A prerequisite is more information and research and there is an important role here for the Council of Europe, the European Union and Unesco in implementing or supporting initiatives that will facilitate this process and the sharing of transnational experience. But this will not be enough. The time has come for a new social ethic to be established which would oblige cultural organisations, as part of their conditions of subsidy, to adopt policies and codes of practice aimed at eliminating exclusion, extending cultural democracy and participation, and promoting equal opportunities for all. It is in the context of this new concordat between the state, the citizen and the arts that the following proposals for marginalised or disadvantaged groups are set.

i. *Europe's "third agers"*. Cultural and leisure policies should cater for the growing number of elderly people in Europe, whether they are independent, dependent on family and friends or institutionalised in special homes. This will be a major challenge in the years ahead and innovative ideas are needed. "Reminiscence networks", theatre with elderly people, creative workshops in music and the visual arts all have their place. Policies must also recognise that the tastes of older people are not static and homogeneous.

Above all, cultural policies will need to reflect the fact that not all elderly people want to be passive consumers and that they have much to give back to society if given the chance.

ii. *Minorities of non-European origin.* Europe has become the home of communities drawn from many of the world's non-European cultures – an unlooked for, and perhaps unmerited, benefit. But many are unable either to gain equal access to European culture or to celebrate their own. Cultural policies should aim to ensure equality of cultural opportunity; this means opening up mainstream art forms and institutions to non-European artists and audiences and also making sufficient funds available to allow them to establish and manage their own institutions and so celebrate and share their own cultural forms on their own terms.

iii. *Indigenous peoples and sense of place.* The indigenous peoples of Europe (and in this context we include the large number of Roma) have a collective memory marked by hundreds of years of oppression. Fortunately in contemporary Europe there has been greater acknowledgement of their right to lead their lives and enjoy their cultures, stories and customs without harassment by majority populations. There is increased recognition too that the attitudes of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples towards custodianship of the environment may differ and that this needs to be managed sensitively. However, we have evidence that further progress in reaffirming the position of indigenous peoples is being undermined, and that established mechanisms – conventions, legislation, methods of representation and appeal – are being severely tested. Although there have been studies and reviews of such mechanisms in the past, the authorities should re-examine their operation under these new pressures, identify and monitor conflicts and utilise the information obtained as a possible basis for problems with cultural rights in other contexts.

iv. *The culture of poverty.* Culture enables people to find reference points in society, yet is completely overlooked in humanitarian aid. Food and shelter are prerequisites for the large number of people living in poverty in Europe today, but access to culture can contribute significantly to their psychological well being and self-respect. We believe that links should be forged between policy makers in the cultural sector on the one hand, and development aid agencies and the social welfare sectors on the other, to provide access to cultural experiences as confidence-building measures for the growing number of people in Europe marginalised by poverty.

v. *Able people, disabled by society.* Inclusive cultural policies should reflect the need for disabled people to have access to the arts, whether as consumers or practitioners. This is not simply an issue of the physical accessibility of buildings – important as that is – but entails a wider appreciation by cultural decision makers of the attitudinal barriers which the cultural sector, as a microcosm of society in general, have tended to set in the way of disabled people. Governments should put support mechanisms in place to ensure talented young disabled people have access to training in artistic skills and cultural management. Moreover, the emergence of “disability arts”, as a

cultural form in its own right and with its own distinctive aesthetic, is still insufficiently recognised in policies.

vi. *Arts in health care.* Governments should consider promoting and supporting networks for the arts in hospitals and hospices (where they do not already exist) to bring together artists, specialist arts organisations, medical staff, arts therapists, etc. to share experiences, organise workshops and training and promote the inclusion of the arts as an integral component of health care by demonstrating the valuable role the arts can play in the healing process or in the welfare of terminally ill patients. To facilitate this governments will need to ensure co-operation between health authorities and cultural agencies on issues such as resourcing.

vii. *People in closed institutions.* Prison authorities are becoming aware of the value both educationally and (in broad terms) therapeutically of the arts in penal institutions. Closed institutions should be encouraged to incorporate access to culture and the arts in their regimes and prison authorities might usefully consider appointing individuals with responsibility for developing and monitoring artwork in correctional establishments to assess its impact on behaviour and rehabilitation. Governments and cultural agencies should support the training of those who work with the arts in prison environments.

viii. *Inclusive policies for gays and lesbians.* Although understanding and tolerance of homosexuality has generally risen in the last quarter of a century, there remain ingrained bastions of prejudice; indeed, homosexual acts between consenting adults are still criminalised in some European countries and the age of consent often varies for heterosexual and homosexual activity. The Aids crisis has simultaneously reinforced some people's prejudices and politicised the gay communities. In common with other minorities which face discrimination, gays wish to celebrate the right to the free expression of their sexuality through culture and inclusive policies should acknowledge this.

ix. *Arts for those without work.* The arts should be an element in the social integration of unemployed people – for example, in retraining schemes. Access to cultural institutions for unemployed people should be free or at concessionary rates, and such institutions should make special efforts to promote these opportunities.

12.5.3 *Engaging with young people.* Policy makers have found it difficult to attract young people to traditional arts facilities. Some of the more successful initiatives have been those which reach young people "where they are". We commend any innovative ways of engaging with young people; one possible example, is the idea of "drop-in" arts opportunity shops where young people can learn more about how to confront the arts. Such shops, strategically sited in shopping centres and malls (sometimes taking advantage of short lease opportunities in commercial property) could provide a new way to introduce the arts and creative activities to disaffected young people in urban environments. More generally, public authorities should seek to make facilities available for creation and performance which would enable young peo-

ple to pursue their own cultural concerns independently (for example music recording studios, access to the new technologies outside school and university and rock and pop performance venues).

12.5.4 *Equality in parity for women.* Although women are generally well represented in cultural employment, too few reach senior management positions despite their preponderance during training. This is partly because too little account is given to the fact that personal and social gender expectations differ. Cultural policies and employment and training practices should explicitly take these factors into account and cultural institutions in receipt of public funds should be required to adopt appropriate development programmes aimed at ensuring the greater involvement of women, whether as artists and cultural producers or as managers. For example, thought should be given by governments or other agencies on how opportunities for women artists could be extended to enable them to exhibit their work in mainstream galleries or for women composers to have their music performed. More broadly, greater gender sensitivity by policy makers will not only improve the recognition and status of women in the cultural sector, but enable society as a whole to benefit from the female aesthetic.

12.5.5 *Towards a culture-centred school environment.* In many European countries, the arts and creative activities have usually taken a subordinate place in educational curricula, which have prioritised the transmission of cognitive knowledge, with academic achievement as a focus. Since the mid-1980s more emphasis has been placed in many countries on equipping students for competitive jobs markets, and enhanced opportunities for specialisation have pushed the arts and other creative activities into an ever more peripheral position. We believe that a more holistic approach to education is called for, which emphasises the stimulation of creativity, the acquisition of interpersonal skills and a capacity to apply knowledge flexibly. Early specialisation and streaming (for example separating the arts from science subjects) should be avoided and a higher priority given to the creative arts and the media in the curriculum. The arts are important both intrinsically and for their instrumental value in motivating students, deepening their understanding of other disciplines and preparing them for adult life. But if we are to heal the cleavage – both philosophical and organisational – which so often divides the arts and education, we will need to take more radical measures and transform schools into culture-centred environments. This presupposes better facilities (including the new technologies) and direct links to artists and arts institutions, so enabling schools to become focuses of cultural life in their local communities. A feasibility study/studies by the Council of Europe into the potential for such changes could be an important first step.

12.5.6 *Retraining the teachers.* If the arts are to be embedded firmly into the basic educational curricula and directed to the many rather than the few, there will be inevitable consequences for teacher training. Teachers of the arts, at whatever level, including the primary phase, need to be trained and qualified in the particular arts discipline or disciplines they teach and to receive adequate pedagogical training. This suggests that governments should

undertake fundamental reviews of current training policies and practices, including the need to secure the place of the arts in initial teacher education.

12.5.7 *Community cultural service for young adults.* We are convinced that many young people of both sexes would be willing to contribute their energy and enthusiasm for the good of the community, but often the opportunities are not readily available. We consider that where military service for young adults is compulsory, there should be an option to undertake volunteerism or community work with a strong cultural component; similar arrangements could be on offer in other countries where there is no conscription. This approach could help to build inter-generational solidarity. Voluntary work in the arts and cultural development should be promoted not only as a complement to welfare and education, but as a source of self-expression and creative production.

12.6 The drive for creative employment

12.6.1 High levels of unemployment are leading public authorities across Europe to devise new, strategic policies. The cultural sector cannot stand apart from these developments, because its importance as a factor in social life is growing and, from an economic point of view, culture is a potential niche market for jobs.

12.6.2 *Employment strategies for cultural industries.* The cultural industries are important generators of employment and, in recent years, the number of small and often under-capitalised enterprises (SMEs), both creative and technological, has mushroomed, especially in the audiovisual and music industries. We have been impressed by the growth of “cultural quarters” in cities, as identified, for example, in the Council of Europe’s Culture and Neighbourhoods project. We consider that there is a role for local and regional authorities, within a national framework, to establish development strategies for cultural industries that build alliances between business and culture to their mutual benefit. These strategies should promote productive relationships between the cultural and corporate sectors and the cross fertilisation of skills and resources, in particular the strengthening of business acumen, the promotion of export marketing opportunities and integration of the arts and cultural industries more closely with trade and business development. Practical measures should be adopted, such as the use for cultural purposes of redundant or empty premises. It is especially important to preserve and transform traditional businesses (bookshops, record shops, independent cinemas, etc.) whose disappearance impoverishes cities, as well as stimulating the development of new ones (for example recording studios, crafts and design workshops, multimedia, etc.), which create employment for young cultural workers. Care should be taken to shield artists and cultural workers from the worst effects of the escalation of property prices that generally follows the creation of cultural industry quarters.

12.6.3 *An internal market for the cultural industries.* Although there is evidence of growing intra-European trade in cultural goods within the European Economic Area, it seems that the cultural industries elsewhere in Europe (and

smaller companies everywhere) remain at a disadvantage. We believe there is a case for research into the feasibility of establishing a Europe-wide market for the products of small and medium-sized cultural industries. It is also important to encourage co-operation among the large European corporations to enable them to compete effectively with their international rivals. We note that all forecasts indicate that the telecommunications industries will be major beneficiaries of the information and communications "revolution". We believe the European Union should explore the feasibility of levying a special tax on telecommunications profits which could be reinvested in Europe's audiovisual products and developments. It could also look at ways in which the Structural Funds budget could give greater priority to the development of the cultural industries.

12.6.4 Partnerships between ministries of employment and culture. Strategic relationships between government departments responsible for employment and cultural affairs seem to us essential if the full potential of cultural jobs creation is to be realised, especially in the audiovisual industries. They would enable long term planning of human resources (for example forecasting manpower needs in relation both to the cultural sector directly and to higher education and training). National and transnational "observatories" for cultural employment should be created (as is the case in France), which would analyse and predict trends, changes in artistic and cultural production and related forecasts of general movements in the economic climate. Governments should also consider establishing specific cultural employment strategies. There should be targeted job creation schemes in the cultural sector (for example services for the elderly, "animation" of the built heritage, cultural tourism, heritage conservation, youth services, nursery schools, etc.). They should be accompanied by training and retraining schemes and should be open to unemployed people in general as well as those with specialised arts and cultural skills. Studies by the international agencies of good practice would be useful in focusing attention on the potential.

12.6.5 Creative approaches to unemployment budgets. State unemployment budgets should accommodate new policy approaches which take artists into account: firstly, in countries where there are no benefits schemes for artists, social security arrangements should be adapted to reflect the special conditions of employment in the arts, notably its intermittence; secondly benefits funds should be "recycled" to stimulate employment – for example, by helping arts and cultural institutions to create new jobs.

12.7 The communication society: creativity in a new creative age

12.7.1 The new technologies are transforming cultural production and consumption and, in principle, are placing the sum of human knowledge at the disposal of all, but the cultural content risks being as shallow as it is broad. They have the potential radically to transform the dissemination of culture, but, at the same time, they are challenging traditional attitudes to artistic creativity and the intellectual rights of creators, and risk bringing an underclass into being, excluded from effective access to the new communications systems.

12.7.2 *Islands of innovation.* The institutional structure of the arts in Europe is much less developed and co-ordinated than that of science and technology. This disparity is probably one reason for the decline of fruitful interaction between the two fields. Consequently, there is a need to re-establish relations between the arts and science and technology. The Council for Cultural Co-operation of the Council of Europe has launched a pilot programme – Culture, Communication and New Technologies – which aims to define the role of the new technologies in defence of cultural diversity and as tools for contemporary artistic production. It also seeks to promote a richer dialogue between artists, scientists and cultural decision makers. If not already planned, this important pilot project should be accompanied or followed by another one mapping the European institutional situation in selected artistic fields (for example theatre, visual arts, photography, contemporary music, modern dance) and identifying European “islands of innovation” (that is institutions for advanced research or experiment) analogous to those in the field of scientific research, technology and development. Communication and co-operation between leading centres and institutions within and between the “islands” could then be explored. One possibility would be to establish culture, science and technology centres, where artists, researchers and product planners and designers could carry out joint experimental projects.

12.7.3 *Effective use of on-line nets in the arts.* Many artists already routinely use the new information and communications technologies in their creative work and on-line nets provide an effective means of communication in many aspects of their work – discussion, promotion, the recruitment of partners for joint projects and the retrieval of professional information about instruments, techniques, trends, etc. However, interest in, and the potential for, exploiting these opportunities are unevenly distributed and some traditional stakeholders are left out of these developments. It is especially important for cultural institutions, arts organisations and cultural networks to make use of the new technologies and on-line nets to disseminate information in traditional and multimedia forms. We believe that there is a need, first, for an overall mapping of the situation, supported by the international agencies, and then for systematic monitoring of the extent to which European artists use the new technologies and on-line nets and any special needs there may for investment, training, information systems or archive links. Many artists in mid-career would benefit from an introduction to the new technologies and the chance to work creatively with them and training opportunities should be made available.

12.7.4 *Equipping media consumers.* There is a commonly held view that young Europeans are growing up to be computer-literate and at home with screen-based text and visual imagery. There is some truth in this, especially in comparison with older generations, but in point of fact many young people have little or no access to the new media or skills in its manipulation and interpretation. Education in the uses of the new media seems to us not only a vital task to combat the emergence of a permanently excluded information underclass, but also is a precondition for creating a generation of critical and sophisticated consumers. Governments should seek to make the new technologies

available to all through education and vocational training. Choice is meaningless if many young Europeans are not given the skills to use it.

12.7.5 *Intellectual rights for the new information age.* The European Union Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society is an important initiative to assess the need for measures at Community level in relation to digitalisation, on-line services and the acquisition and protection of rights not covered by other European Commission directives on copyright. The desirability of strengthening the intellectual property rights systems, ensuring greater consistency between countries on “moral rights” and extending authors’ rights legislation in and beyond EU countries to central and eastern Europe seems self-evident in the light of new technological developments. We suggest that the competent administrative bodies should: continue the process of legal harmonisation of intellectual rights and establishing internationally agreed conventions which set out clearly the principles of international transmission and distribution; simplify administrative procedures by increasing the role of representative collection societies while at the same time ensuring their responsible management and transparency; and establish the technical means to identify those who have rights in works and to control their use. Furthermore, we consider that, where they have not done so, national governments should explore with collecting societies imaginative ways in which a percentage of rights money could be reinvested in support of contemporary creation. Artists would benefit from training which would help them to master the new complexities of copyright.

12.7.6 *Relocalising cultural consumption.* The new information and communications technologies are rapidly changing our perception of locale by compressing distance and timescales. Yet while they provide a window on the world, they also offer the potential to re-energise cultural production and consumption at the local level. Cultural policies need to be devised to facilitate this process and reinforce a sense of place to counter centralising tendencies.

12.8 Bridging the global gap

12.8.1 The political changes in central and eastern Europe, the impulse of the Single Market, the communications revolution and a healthy curiosity in cultures beyond Europe have combined to transform the dynamics of international cultural exchange. The intellectual frame of reference for many artists dispensed with frontiers many years ago, of course, yet barriers remain: the international policies of governments, lack of resources, insufficient acknowledgement of the benefits of networking and transnational funding programmes impede rather than promote exchange.

12.8.2 *A sea of change in international cultural co-operation.* The dynamics of international cultural interaction and co-operation are undergoing fundamental change. Joint explorations and co-productions produce tangible economic benefits including cost sharing and access to new international markets, and these complement sound artistic justifications: the exchange of creative ideas, the stimulation of creative growth and professional develop-

ment, the enriching of audience experience and greater programme variety at venues and festivals. These kinds of cultural exchange are occurring patchily across the continent with the concomitant danger of a two-speed Europe emerging in the arts. Moreover, it is doubtful whether cultural policies in most European countries recognise this sea change in international practice. The international cultural policies of most governments in Europe remain inextricably linked to cultural diplomacy, more appropriate to a different age and political climate. If real mobility of arts practitioners is to be achieved, we believe governments will need to re-examine their international cultural policies to reflect more adequately contemporary arts practice and the new political environment in Europe. The Council of Europe could promote a conference or seminar at which these issues could be debated.

12.8.3 *Networking for all.* The mushrooming of training, research and collaborative opportunities through international workshops and the growth of transfrontier networking is one of the most highly valued activities of practitioners. It is also consistently the most difficult to resource, whether at the national, regional or local level. Insufficient recognition is given to networks as catalysts for cultural action and carriers of a shared sense of values. If there is one thing the intergovernmental and supranational agencies could do more than anything else that would further the cause of international cultural co-operation, it would be to develop strategic support mechanisms that would facilitate contact between artists, administrators, curators, etc. Local and regional authorities could help European networks with administration costs by adopting a network for a period. At the same time, we believe that networking in Europe today has become somewhat incestuous. It is often the same people who are most prominent, whether lobbying Strasbourg or Brussels. This may be an inevitable consequence of their energy and commitment to the cause of culture in Europe. But it may also reflect the lack of opportunities and resources for others to participate in the process. Ways of broadening access should be examined, including structures that are open and assistance with travel for participants in central and eastern Europe.

12.8.4 *The lottery of transnational funding.* Moreover, cultural co-operation policies and initiatives at a national, supranational and intergovernmental level have failed to a great extent to meet the new demands for cultural exchange that have emerged in Europe. The emphasis on project funding and the relatively small amounts of money available, as illustrated by the European Union's revised Kaleidoscope programme, unwittingly tend to have the reverse effect to what was intended by prolonging the process of international collaboration, making it difficult for partnerships to be developed and sustained or creating projects driven by funding need rather than artistic imperative. This suggests to us that the funding programmes of the supranational and intergovernmental agencies in Europe should be reoriented from one-off projects towards schemes which promote the establishment of more permanent cultural relationships between arts organisations in Europe and which are based on clear and appropriate criteria.

12.8.5 *The global and local squeeze.* The globalisation of products, markets and messages is creating disparities between nations. There is also a clearly

identifiable resurgence of interest in local cultures and identities and policies are needed to nurture and sustain this “celebration of the local”. At the same time, this is leading to what is commonly referred to in Europe and beyond as a “global-local squeeze” in which the cultural products and even policies of nation states are put at risk. This squeeze has a number of potential consequences; they include the possible decline of middle-scale cultural production and performing arts institutions which are neither glamorous enough to have a universal appeal nor sufficiently relevant to local aspirations; and a developing role for major cities. This could in turn affect employment opportunities, training needs and national arts policies, but at this stage we cannot be sure exactly in what ways. We consider research needs to be conducted into the potential implications of the global-local squeeze and suggest this be initiated with the support of the intergovernmental and supranational agencies.

12.9 European cultural cohesion

12.9.1 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in their Resolution 95 (38), stressed three strategic goals for cultural support at intergovernmental level: fostering democratic values and human rights, building confidence and mutual respect; and promoting awareness of the cultural community of the new Europe and its diversity. These are the prerequisites for cultural cohesion in Europe today and tomorrow. Of course, cohesion means something more than co-operation, although the latter is an essential ingredient of the former. It also means solidarity in a Europe that appears to be ending the century much as it began it: in turmoil. It is sometimes feared that closer European contact may threaten national cultural autonomy, but this is by no means necessarily the case. Indeed global media developments are far more likely to have an impact on national and regional cultural specificity. It is perfectly possible, and indeed desirable, to find solutions to what are perceived as European problems without limiting or infringing the principles of subsidiarity and the specificities of national and regional cultures.

12.9.2 *The promise of Maastricht.* Article 128, which legitimises European Union action in the cultural sector, has aroused a great deal of interest. However, although it promises much, on present experience it is delivering very little. Clause 3, which encourages co-operation between the European Union and other international organisations such as the Council of Europe, makes all the right gestures, but the premises and means of co-operation have never been adequately defined. Clause 4 – arguably the most important part of the article in that it requires the Community to take account of the cultural impact of its actions – has not been put to the test at the time of our research. However, we welcome the publication of the *First report on the consideration of cultural aspects of European Community action* (COM (96) 160 final), the long awaited draft European Commission Communication on the ways in which Community policies and texts have taken account of culture, as a useful attempt to marshal existing information and chart European Court of Justice decisions. The report’s acknowledgement that a great majority of the policies and actions implemented by the Community now include a cultural dimension or have an impact on culture is important. That said, it is no more than a first step and only deals in a tangential way with the question of mech-

anisms to ensure compliance with the principle of Clause 4. This needs to be addressed at the next stage. Moreover, we note that “new” programme areas have encountered difficulty in achieving consensus within the Council of Ministers. Indeed, it seems to us that the spirit of the article’s provisions has not been realised in practice. One of the reasons for this is the requirement for unanimity in voting, which acts as a break on the article’s potential. We realise that some governments would have difficulty in agreeing to any relaxation of this requirement, not least on grounds of subsidiarity, but consider that unless this is changed, there is a danger that the article will remain largely ineffectual.

12.9.3 *A systematic approach to trend data and information collection.* The absence of reliable, comparable and comprehensive statistics and indicators has been the greatest single obstacle in our survey of European culture and development. It has prevented us from charting the intricate links between culture and the wider social developments which this report has tried to identify, as well as being a general hindrance to European cultural exchange and co-operation. Consequently, we feel the need to accelerate the process of creating a coherent framework and operating system for European cultural statistics. Although we understand that expert groups have done important work to pave the way for such a system, it has been slow in becoming operational. We also fear that the conceptual frameworks suggested so far look at cultural statistics from too narrow and traditional a perspective and that our proposals (above) for the establishment of effective cultural indicators should be taken into account. We recognise that the recent EU Council of Ministers’ Resolution on developing statistics on culture and economic development provides a good starting point for co-ordinated work in this field and note that much will depend on the enhanced efforts of Eurostat and its skills in co-ordinating national statistics. The Council of Europe, which supported the establishment of European and regional observatories and is continuing its efforts to enhance the effectiveness of its own information, via attempts to establish a European Resource Centre for Cultural Policies, and the accumulated expertise of member states, has an interest in encouraging this co-operation as it will ultimately serve its programme objectives.

12.9.4 *A new heritage ethics.* A new ethical approach to Europe’s heritage is called for, which balances an obligation to protect and conserve it while recognising the social and economic benefits that may accrue from their careful exploitation. Policies for the heritage need to be sustainable and multidisciplinary. They need to acknowledge the role of the heritage in identity-building for Europe, nation states, area-based and minority cultures, and to recognise that the destruction of any community’s heritage is a loss for us all. Appropriate information and educational measures will be necessary to enhance awareness and respect, and the Council of Europe could fulfil an important role in identifying models of good practice.

12.9.5 *Using new technologies to inculcate respect for Europe’s peoples and heritage.* We consider that it is vital to instill in young people an understanding that respect for other races, creeds, heritage and the environment is a precondition for building a civilised and harmonious Europe. The new tech-

nologies provide exciting opportunities for introducing young people to European values. For example the European Union and Council of Europe jointly – with support from the private sector and foundations – could explore the feasibility of financing the production and distribution of a series of CD-Roms on culture and development for schools throughout Europe. The subjects covered could include culture and identity, culture and human rights, a multicultural/multifaith Europe, culture and the environment, Europe's cultural heritage, and the role of the artist in Europe today. Major European creators could be involved in the production process. Not all schools in Europe have access to multimedia technology. For this reason the role of private and voluntary sectors will be crucial in supporting the costs of distribution including the donation of CD-Rom technology to schools in those countries – especially central and eastern Europe – which are unable to afford it.

12.9.6 *A European "Open" University.* Building on experience in several countries of the Open University model, the Council of Europe and the European Union should explore the feasibility of establishing a Europewide further education system for people of all ages, using the opportunities offered by the new technologies. Initially, links would be established among the existing Open Universities. The eventual aim should be to create a Europewide Open University across the Continent. Such an initiative would stimulate mutual understanding of the history, culture and science of Europe. A further possibility would be to introduce the museums and archives of Europe into this network. If they were all linked together in a system to which the general public could subscribe, and backed by an intergovernmentally funded audiovisual production company, much of human knowledge, both in textual and audiovisual form, would become readily available to all. It could be a complement to the cultural provision offered by commercial satellite broadcasters.

12.9.7 *A European heritage "bank".* There is a catastrophic shortage of resources at present in central and eastern Europe to deal with the huge problems of preserving the built and moveable cultural heritage – problems which have been exacerbated by destruction and theft. In parts of western Europe, the scale of the conservation challenge is almost beyond the capacity of national governments to handle. Investment in the preservation and restoration of historic monuments and the built heritage needs to be increased, whether from public budgets or the private sector. We consider that one way forward would be the creation of a European Heritage Bank, devoted to financing capital investments and providing loans – where possible in association with commerce and industry. This would help countries where the burden is greatest. It would be financed by European institutions and deposits from its citizens and by self-generated income.

12.9.8 *Solidarity in Europe through joint action.* In recent years the need to reinforce the values of civil society in Europe has been emphasised in studies and political discussion. The role of single-issue movements promoting international reform, environmental protection, feminism, civil rights and cultural networks is crucial alongside the work of non-governmental organisations and grass roots associations. Although they often share common or related objectives, there is little co-operation among these bodies. Individually they

are less effective than if they worked together. A recent meeting in New York brought representatives of these movements and NGOs to discuss the possibility of joint action and other kinds of collaboration. We believe that a similar gathering, focusing on the role of the arts and culture in the development of European and global civil society, on cultural rights and on cultural ecology should be organised under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

12.9.9 Solidarity in Europe through effective co-operation. Enhancing solidarity and co-ordination of cultural action at grass roots level is also a necessary condition for the construction of a new cultural organisational infrastructure and the fostering of civil society in the new democracies of central and eastern Europe. The Council of Europe's Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews has revealed that the assistance given by western European governments is fragmentary and often based on insufficient information and expertise. The real problems and their cures can be addressed only by enhancing systematic interaction through improved cultural co-operation between regions and municipalities, networking of experts, artistic exchange, promoting new ideas and talents and a concerted effort on the part of all citizens' organisations for the joint defence of the cultural environment.

12.9.10 Solidarity in Europe through reconstruction and reconciliation. The Dayton Peace Accord notwithstanding, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not over, it has just been halted. The peace is fragile. Vukovar, Mostar and Sarajevo are in ruins. The human cost is incalculable. Artists and cultural workers should lend their support in any way they can to the Council of Europe, the United Nations, Unesco, the European Union and aid agencies to recreate a multicultural environment. Civil engineers and construction workers can rebuild bridges, hospitals, schools and homes; perhaps only artists can rebuild minds.

12.10 Numerical summary of recommendations by addressee

12.10.1 Note that the following lists are intended as a quick guide to recommendations where courses of action are implied or addressed specifically to particular institutions. They should not be regarded as the only recommendations of relevance to the international agencies, national, regional and local governments, etc. Many of the recommendations in Chapter 12 and the comments in the preceding chapters provide opportunities for reflection and action by all the institutions.

12.10.2 Principal recommendations addressed to the Council of Europe

12.3.2, 12.3.4, 12.4.2, 12.4.3, 12.4.6, 12.5.2, 12.5.5, 12.6.4, 12.7.2, 12.7.3, 12.8.2, 12.8.3, 12.8.4, 12.8.5, 12.9.3, 12.9.4, 12.9.5, 12.9.6, 12.9.7, 12.9.8, 12.9.9, 12.9.10.

12.10.3 Principal recommendations addressed to the European Union

12.3.3, 12.4.3, 12.4.8, 12.5.2, 12.6.3, 12.6.4, 12.7.3, 12.7.5, 12.8.3, 12.8.4, 12.8.5, 12.9.2, 12.9.3, 12.9.4, 12.9.5, 12.9.6, 12.9.7, 12.9.10.

12.10.4 *Principal recommendations addressed to Unesco*

12.3.2, 12.3.4, 12.5.2, 12.6.4, 12.7.3, 12.8.3, 12.8.4, 12.8.5, 12.9.7, 12.9.10.

12.10.5 *Principal recommendations addressed to national governments*

12.3.2, 12.3.3, 12.3.5, 12.3.6, 12.3.7, 12.3.8, 12.3.9, 12.4.2, 12.4.3, 12.4.5, 12.4.6, 12.4.7, 12.5.2, 12.5.3, 12.5.4, 12.5.5, 12.5.6, 12.5.7, 12.6.2, 12.6.3, 12.6.4, 12.6.5, 12.7.4, 12.7.5, 12.8.2, 12.8.5, 12.9.2, 12.9.4.

12.10.6 *Principal recommendations addressed to regional and local governments*

12.3.2, 12.3.3, 12.3.5, 12.3.7, 12.3.9, 12.4.3, 12.4.4, 12.4.5, 12.4.8, 12.5.2, 12.5.3, 12.5.4, 12.5.5, 12.5.6, 12.6.2, 12.7.4, 12.7.6, 12.8.3, 12.9.4, 12.9.9.

13 Follow up: the case for urgent action

13.1 This report complements *Our creative diversity*, the World Commission's global survey of culture and development. Both of them are the work of independent groups and, we believe, raise major issues that require urgent address. They formulate problems and suggest ways of overcoming them. A common theme is to see culture as an essential topic for global – and, so far as the European Task Force is concerned, European – debate. The authors of neither text are in a position to change anything directly. Rather, their intention is to stimulate discussion at both national and international levels that might lead to some of the policy changes both reports consider desirable. If the ideas set out in the two reports are to be realised in a coherent and comprehensive way, follow-up at international level will be of particular importance.

13.2 *In from the margins* is addressed to the Council of Europe and the Culture Committee of the Council for Cultural Co-operation. It is a stand-alone document on the situation as the task force sees it in Europe and, at the same time, a continuation of a wider debate at a world level. Therefore, it seems logical that some attempt be made to co-ordinate the follow-up of the two reports in Europe. We hope this can be taken on board in joint discussions between the Council of Europe and Unesco – as well as the United Nations, which also has a stake in the World Commission Report. But the European Union, which has supported the work of this report, must be involved too, not least because it is in line with the spirit of international co-operation expressed in Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty.

13.3 The Director General of Unesco has sent the World Commission's report to all member governments to seek their responses and suggestions for the future so far as national and regional authorities are concerned, as well as the incorporation into Unesco's own programmes and policies of ideas from the report. He hopes for reactions not only to the ten proposed actions in the *International agenda*, but also to other ideas and recommendations which can be found in the main body of the text. The Director General has urged governments to engage in a broad process of consultation themselves with universities, non-governmental institutions, voluntary associations, private foundations and other appropriate bodies together with eminent scholars, artists and cultural figures. Although replies were sought by the end of August 1996, we are aware that many governments have asked for more time and intend to present submissions by the end of 1996.

13.4 Such an extension would have the advantage of enabling simultaneous discussion of the two reports if the Council of Europe were minded to send *In from the margins* to member governments on a similar consultative mission. This is a course of action we commend to the Council of Europe. This would be consistent with the original intentions of those who presented the

proposal for a European report to the World Commission's European hearing in 1993, namely that it would support and complement the Commission's work from a European perspective. A summary of member state responses to *In from the margins* would give a useful basis for further action both at national and international levels and indicate the extent to which the task force has correctly interpreted the complex European situation.

13.5 After consultation with governments, we suggest that follow-up programmes could take the form of working groups, with representation from member states and incorporating a wide range of expertise, which would look in greater detail at the themes raised both by the World Commission and the European Task Force. This would take account of the fact that some of our suggestions extend into areas which are outside the competence of the Culture Committee.

13.6 The Council of Europe is uniquely placed, within the framework of the Council for Cultural Co-operation, to develop programmes where policy ideas can be tested. Naturally, the extent to which it wishes to pursue some of the suggestions in this report will depend on political consensus and the resources at its disposal. So far we have deliberately refrained from commenting directly on the resource constraints within which the Cultural Committee and the Secretariat, in partnership with member governments and other agencies, operate. However, as an independent group of individuals who have worked for national governments or their agencies and, in most cases, as advisers to programme areas of the Council of Europe, we consider it would be remiss of us not to make one comment. We find it both surprising and depressing that the Council of Europe's resources for work in the cultural sector has diminished in real terms at a time when the breadth of its membership has significantly expanded. If the level of contributions by member states reflects the extent of their commitment, it is difficult to avoid the impression that there is a serious lack of confidence in some quarters in the value of international co-operation in general and the Council of Europe's programmes in particular. We hope our impression is mistaken.

13.7 We understand that *In from the margins* is the first sectoral report covering the entire continent on which the Council of Europe has engaged. It provides one of the first opportunities for the Council of Europe to reflect on the importance it attaches to culture since the signing of the European Cultural Convention in 1954. More than that, it offers an opportunity to look at culture in the context of other development areas with which the Council of Europe is concerned. Such an opportunity may not arise again for years. We hope that the Council of Europe will wish to give a lead to national governments when they consider, as we argue, placing greater weight on the cultural dimension of their own work. In addition, the recommendations in *Towards a new policy agenda* contain policy suggestions which we feel the Council of Europe and other international bodies are best placed to undertake.

13.8 We have observed that over the years ministers responsible for culture have agreed a number of intergovernmental declarations and conventions. However, while they contain many honourable ideas and good inten-

tions, most of them have soon been forgotten and so have failed to achieve what we assume to have been ministers' intentions – to influence and improve the quality of cultural life in Europe. To a large extent this has been the result of a failure to work out concrete plans for implementation and follow up.

13.9 The World Commission Report proposes (Action 10) that the follow up should culminate in a World Summit at which heads of state agree a Cultural Development Agenda, on the same lines as Agenda 21 for the Environment endorsed by heads of state at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 – a programme of action which has been a success in the sense that debate on the issues continues in many countries at national and local levels. It is still unclear if the idea of a world summit will be realised. However, the follow-up work on the World Report has started. The Director General of Unesco – in consultation with the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the World Commission – has set up an international Culture and Development Steering Committee to make recommendations as to practical measures to be taken, on the basis of responses to the report by member states and other partners, and to monitor the implementation of follow-up measures. One follow-up measure, though, is already decided. The Swedish Government has been invited to host an international conference on cultural policies in Stockholm in 1998 with the participation of ministers of culture and representatives of the cultural and research worlds. The aim is to discuss and develop, with the emphasis on policy action plans, questions of importance for national cultural policy, international co-operation, and Unesco's future tasks and co-operation with the Council of Europe and the European Union on the basis of the World Report and the reactions received to it.

13.10 As the European report and any follow-up work initiated by the Council of Europe will be considered in the preparations for the Stockholm conference, perhaps we might indicate, on the basis of our proposals for a new policy agenda, some studies that the Council of Europe could consider undertaking, either in partnership with other international bodies or of its own volition:

- A comparative study on the extent of interministerial and intersectoral co-operation in Europe, which we argue in our report is a precondition for bringing culture into the heart of decision making (12.3.2). Co-operation with Unesco on such research would seem to be logical.

- Research into the changing nature of relationships between the state, regions and local authorities *vis-à-vis* culture and how to ensure coherence in strategic policies (12.3.3).

- Research on the development of cultural indicators as well as acceleration of the process of establishing a coherent framework for cultural statistics, preferably in conjunction with the European Union's recent work in the field of cultural statistics (EU *Council Resolution of 20 November 1995 on the promotion of statistics on culture and economic growth*). We believe the Council of Europe could make a useful contribution here, not least on policy

input (with due respect to statisticians, cultural statistics should not be left to them alone!) (12.3.4 and 12.9.3).

– Any follow up arising from the review being conducted by John Myerscough on the programme of evaluations of national cultural policies (12.3.4).

– A study/studies, co-financed by the European Union and Unesco, on good practice in the development of cultural policies that are inclusive rather than exclusive, to address the needs of those European citizens who are currently marginalised in society (12.5.2).

– Studies and reflection on the implications of our call for a culture-oriented school environment (12.5.5) and the ways and means such a process of change might be achieved – perhaps such reflection could begin within the framework of the Culture Committee's exploratory programme on Culture, Creativity and Artistic Education?

– Reflection on the potential implications of our suggestion for the development of strategic relationships between government departments responsible for employment and cultural affairs (12.6.3).

– Reflection and/or a conference on the need for a reassessment by governments of their international cultural policies (12.8.2).

Of course, the foregoing represent suggestions only in relation to the preparation of an intergovernmental conference on cultural policies. We hope that the Council of Europe will be so minded to consider the gamut of ideas put forward by the task force in its new policy agenda, especially those suggestions directed specifically to it.

13.11 This is not the report we wanted to write. It is the report we were able to write, given the time, resources and information at our disposal. It should be seen as the beginning of a process and others should be invited to research issues we were not able to cover. However, the proposals in this report are ambitious and the European Task Force is well aware that it could take many years before governments feel able to accept the consequences of the new qualitative approach to development and its cultural dimension which it recommends. It has taken two decades or more for environmental concerns to be accepted as key issues in the national and international arenas. It may be that a widespread commitment to culture in development will only be achieved on a similar timetable. Nevertheless, we hope for speedier progress when we bear in mind the urgency of many of the issues which both the European and the world reports have identified. If policy makers agree the desirability of long term change, they would be well advised to start the process now. We are not advocating change for change's sake, and most certainly caution against moves that will damage, albeit unintentionally, policies and practices that are valued. That is why it is crucial for policy makers to have a clear long term vision of what is needed. But first there must be awareness of the need for a new point of departure as we set our sights on bringing culture in from the margins.

Appendices

Appendix I: Cultural statistics and indicators in Europe: a search for a developmental perspective

1. Introduction

The Council of Europe, when defining the mandate of the European Task Force, instructed it “to contribute to the production of cultural policy indicators matched to specific concerns of the developmental process, as a guide to interventions by governments”.

To start with, the work of the task force focused on overall European cultural development and utilised documentary information and background papers. The purpose was to develop first a general analytical frame for the main report and then proceed to fill it with more detailed and development-oriented information. This latter work was to test also the quality, relevance and applicability of the available cultural statistics and indicators.

The observations and illustrations of this appendix present the results of this testing. They serve two purposes. They assess the quality and relevance of the available European cultural statistics and indicators, and, at the same time, present a series of tables and figures which illustrate and support the arguments of the report.

Some preliminary considerations

While assessing and presenting cultural information in quantitative terms, we must be aware of some important terminological distinctions. First, it is customary to make a distinction between cultural statistics and data on the one hand and indicators on the other. Statistics and data refer to “multi-purpose” quantitative information; in the case of indicators the information has been processed to correspond to the specific needs of the users.

Another distinction should be made between individual indicators extracted out of statistics and survey data for specific evaluative or policy planning purposes and systems of indicators used for continuous monitoring of development in a given policy area.

A system of indicators can be conceived and maintained only if there is a corresponding system of analytically organised and systematically collected basic statistics, where certain logical relations prevail between different categories. A model for this is offered by the System of National Accounts (SNA), upon which specific sets of economic indicators, for example the time series of the UN, OECD, EU, World Bank and International Monetary Fund, are based. The developers of cultural statistics and indicators have had as their ultimate goal to develop a similar dual system for the cultural sector, that is first an analytically sound framework of statistics and then a system of indicators serving

cultural policy decision-making. Because cultural policy problems are perceived to centre around the issues of financing and economics, the systems of cultural statistics and indicators are, at least partially, conceived as an extension and specification of the SNA system (see for example Hofecker, 1995).

The international standardisation of economic statistics and indicators has been motivated by the increasing mutual dependency of world economies. However, these efforts and dominant systems of statistics and indicators have in recent years become a target of criticism. They have been considered too materialist and too oriented towards serving economic growth only. Alternative systems, like the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Programme have been designed (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, 1995). These efforts will be discussed and illustrated later.

There are two basic reasons to believe that the unification and standardisation of cultural statistics and systems of indicators will be extremely difficult and, if objectives are set too high, perchance impossible. The crucial problem is that the very concept of culture (especially when linked to art) is itself culture-bound both in respect of its scope and contents, and the same tends to apply to cultural statistics and indicators. Decision-making systems and policy orientations also vary greatly from one country to another even within western Europe, and so do the motives for developing cultural statistics and indicators. All this results in a great number of concepts used and complexity of categories which makes it difficult to develop consistent and comparable systems.

Yet, if several countries pursue approximately the same set of clearly defined cultural policy objectives, it is possible to aim at systematic comparisons within a system of unified indicators. This has been the starting point for evaluative comparisons, where the evaluating body defines the objectives. Thus, for example, the Council of Europe's Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews assumes that public cultural policies pursue – or are supposed to pursue – three main objectives: promoting creativity, enhancing cultural democracy, and enabling greater access to culture; and also presuppose that their implementation is carried out effectively and efficiently. Yet, the very persons responsible for this programme have pointed out the great variety of concrete national cultural policy objectives and the need to understand their meanings in their historical contexts (Mitchell, 1995). Furthermore, there has been a clear conceptual gap between these objectives and the idea of sustainable development – a gap that our report has not succeeded in bridging, but hopefully has made at least more comprehensible.

2. Present situation in Europe

Extensive work has been carried out under the auspices of Unesco, the Council of Europe and other international organisations to establish an appropriate international statistical framework for the arts and culture. The task force

embraces the statement made by Harold Horowitz (1981) about the main criteria for such a system:

- i. In order to maintain comparability, clear limits must be defined as to what extent statistical categories can be changed or redefined to coincide with cultural practices and preferences of a given country;
- ii. In order to ensure that statistical categories are understandable and check their reliability, they must be unified by a logically coherent set of rules governing their mutual interrelations (cf. the above comments on accounting for financial transfers);
- iii. There must be clear rules of data collection in respect of relating statistics and indicators to the reality of cultural activities and practices on the one hand and to the main categorisations (the "statistical framework") on the other.

It is easy to agree from a purely technical perspective with these criteria. Yet Horowitz probably underestimates the strength of "[...] cultural practices and preferences of a given country". As will become clear later on, national interests tend to overrule the interest in international comparisons. But these varying interests are not the only reason for international incommensurability of cultural statistics and indicators. Cultural policy objectives may vary, not only between countries but even within the same country, where statistics and indicators can also be collected and processed to serve different purposes. Different policy emphases lead to variations in what information is being collected and how it is being interpreted. This point has been forcefully made by Schuster (1990) in the case of performance indicators. These different emphases do not necessarily bias the information presented, but only limit its use. This becomes apparent when we examine the tables and figures of this appendix, which are classified according to their policy orientations.

It seems that although all the above problems are recognised and controlled as far as possible, it is still difficult to follow the rules suggested by Horowitz. This becomes apparent when we examine the descriptions of national cultural statistics presented at the European Union Meeting on European Cultural Statistics, Paris, 1995. Although progress has no doubt been made, the following assessment of the present German situation is probably still valid in many European countries.

"It can be said that the data material generally available in the areas of the arts and culture is unsatisfactory. Although there is a multitude of materials such as statistics, polls, studies, documentation, reports, there is hardly any linkage between these materials. Moreover, they are often based on different approaches, definitions and classifications. There is no general overview, so that the handling and practical use of these materials meet with difficulties [...]"

(Conference documents for the European Union Meeting on European Cultural Statistics, 1995, Staatliche Bundesamt VII C, 2-3).

Even in the case of the Netherlands, a country renowned for its effective use of statistics and indicators, a systematic approach is but emerging:

“The cultural statistics do not yet form a system in the sense of a well integrated whole of shared concepts and units of measurement. Yet, the contours of such a system are developed and can be observed in the year-book of cultural statistics that is published by Statistics Netherlands.”

(Conference documents for the meeting on European Cultural Statistics... 1995, Statistics Netherlands).

The overall comparison of the situation in the EU member countries suggests that efforts are still mainly national, aiming at informing public authorities, media and the population at large by publishing statistical year-books, trend reports, reports by committees and task forces. More modern approaches, the barometer approach, on-line databases, etc., are still very few. The present orientation in the United Kingdom displays most distinctly a wish to scrap the traditional approach. This is reflected for example by the withdrawal of public support from the publication of Cultural Trends and by the initiation of a new and customer-focused system of statistics (Csardas) covering cultural statistics, analysis, research and database services (Conference documents for the European Union Meeting on European Cultural Statistics, 1995, United Kingdom, Department of National Heritage, Annex).

In the country reports presented at the above meeting no special attention was paid to the developmental role of the arts and culture. A note should however be made of the British attempt to develop indicators to measure sustainable development in the United Kingdom. The publication of the first set of these indicators has been scheduled for the spring of 1996. The task force has not therefore been able to ascertain whether the arts and culture are included in some way in these indicators.

As to the basic conceptual approach, delineation and categorisation, the European approaches to cultural statistics and indicators seem to linger somewhere between two poles: the attempts to establish a comprehensive statistical scheme modelled after the Unesco Framework for Cultural Statistics (FCS, Unesco, ST-83/WS/8, 193, STC/Q/833, 1984, CES/AC.44/11, 1986) and developing well-focused sets of strategically important indicators for cultural policy decision-making (cf. for example Girard, 1994). Yet, it is increasingly recognised that it is well-nigh impossible to create and update comprehensive statistics along the lines of the Unesco FCS or to establish clear guidelines for universally relevant systems of cultural indicators. On both fronts, there is a need for a more selective and dynamic approach taking the wider economic, social and political conditions of the arts and culture into account.

The search for such an approach is reflected in enhanced interest in research on the economics and management of the arts and culture. Besides academic studies we have such comprehensive efforts as those in Ireland and the

United Kingdom to map out the contribution of the cultural sector to the national economy (Employment and Economic Significance of the Cultural Industries in Ireland, Coopers & Lybrand Corporate Finance, 1994, Contributions of the Cultural Sector in the United Kingdom Economy, Policy Studies Institute, 1996). The conditioning of the management of cultural and arts institutions by wider national and world development has been explored through some comparative studies (cf. Dupuis, 1986) and comparisons reported in the national reports of the European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews of the Council of Europe (see Mitchell, 1995).

The increasing interest in the economic importance of the arts and culture has gained strength also on a pan-European level. Here, the concerns have first and foremost been with the development of European cultural industries, modern communication infrastructure and cultural tourism, with the main focuses on economic and employment effects and on the balance of payment in the import/export of cultural goods and in tourism. These concerns and focuses have found expression in the GATT negotiations and two European Commission initiatives incorporated first in two reports, the "Pineiro Report" and the "Bangemann report", and then in subsequent EU documents and political processes. They also seem to have inspired the recent EU Council resolution on developing cultural statistics (European Union, Council Resolution 95/C 372/01). At the time this report was nearing completion, an important survey of cultural financing and infrastructure was being conducted in the EU member countries. It was commissioned by the DG X of the European Commission and the French and Spanish ministries of culture and was carried out by Eries/Dafsa, but only very preliminary results have been presented to serve as a basis for further analyses.

From the pan-European perspective, some statistics provided by Eurostat (especially those on tourism, international trade in services) provide important information on cultural development and cultural policies. Of even greater importance for the present report have been the efforts of such bodies as Screen Digest and the European Audiovisual Observatory to provide policy-relevant statistics and indicators in the field of the media and audiovisual industries.

Besides the economy, the political relevance of culture seems to play a major role in the efforts of developing pan-European cultural statistics and indicators. These interests are displayed in surveys and barometers mapping the basic values, political orientations, and consumer behaviour of Europeans, for which Euro-Barometer has provided an efficient instrument. It should be noted that very few survey items relate directly to the role and development of the European arts and culture. Yet, the items probing basic values reflect the orientation of Europeans to civil society, cultural rights and intergenerational solidarity issues which feature prominently in our report.

To conclude: although there has been a plethora of attempts to develop systems of cultural statistics in Europe, the results from the point of view of standardisation and comparability are still rather limited. A more dynamic approach can be found in analyses of the economic impact of the arts and

culture, but more comprehensive ideas of sustainable development have so far made little headway – or actually none at all.

3. Major sources used

Recognising the importance of public financing as a major overall factor in European cultural development, the task force commissioned at an early stage of its work a statistical overview of the financing of the arts and culture in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Hofecker, 1995). In order to obtain insights into the global economic position of the European arts and culture, the Task Force also commissioned a report on the role of European cultural industries in the international flow of cultural goods and services (von Euler, 1995).

Furthermore, from the outset the task force was well aware of the valuable information provided by the reports written within the framework of the European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews. To start with, the task force had at its disposal six reports, those of France, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and Italy; later on it could begin to utilise information provided by the national reports of Estonia and the Russian Federation. An analytical starting point for utilising this information was provided by the document "Cultural indicators: a few examples", prepared by Augustin Girard (Girard, 1992).

The task force also realised that it had to deal with complex policy problems in two important policy areas: the economics of culture and the effects of new applications of information and communication technologies on cultural development. It was well aware that there would be little reliable comparative European data in the former area, especially in respect of the management of cultural institutions and the economic impact and importance of culture. The task force commissioned a background study on the economics of culture (Dupuis, 1995), and background papers written by the members of the task force tried to organise and systematise the available fragmentary statistics and data (Heiskanen, 1995).

The same strategy was used in acquiring and utilising statistics and data pertaining to international trade in cultural goods and the development of information and communication technologies (von Euler, 1995; Heiskanen, 1995). The report on the flow of cultural goods and services provided a good starting point for analyses; and later on information provided by the Eurostat Panorama (1994, 27/1-21, based on information from Screen Digest) together with the Statistical yearbooks (1994-95 and 1996) of the European Audio-visual Observatory turned out to be excellent complementary sources.

At an early stage of its work, the task force noticed that a deeper understanding of European cultural development and successes and failures of national cultural policies presupposed information on changes which are presently taking place in three interrelated areas: ethical, moral and political values, the cultural rights of minorities and the role of civil society. In this area, gathering new primary data was impossible because of a lack of time and resources. Instead, some secondary data from the European Values Study

(1990-91) could be re-worked and utilised (*Futuribles*, Numéro spécial, "L'évolution des valeurs....", July-August 1995). Some data from the Eurobarometer surveys pertaining to the changes in European values were also used (Eurobarometer, 42, 1994, Räsänen 1996). Similarly, the surveys of Eurostat contributed greatly to the analyses of value changes in Europe.

The recent issues of the *Human development report* by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proved to be an invaluable model for the task force in its aspiration to open up a new European developmental perspective to cultural policy issues and evaluation (UNDP 1994, 1995). It was obvious that this approach, emphasising the ability of nations to empower and entitle their people, should be made central also in developing cultural statistics and indicators. Yet, as our illustrations later on will indicate, there is still a long road ahead before appropriate cultural components are identified and incorporated in the systems of the human development reports.

Despite all these valuable sources, the task force had great difficulties in finding comparative data and statistics in many important areas such as, for example, artists' economic status, non-profit financing and sponsorship, the number of artistic and cultural institutions and networks of cultural services. In these and many other areas it had to resort to a multitude of different materials such as articles and polls reported in journals and newspapers, various studies, and the reports of *ad hoc* committees and task forces.

All in all, the statistics and indicators reported here provide a comprehensive, albeit fragmentary, overview of the recent development of the arts, culture and value changes in Europe. It is to be hoped that they also help to illustrate the main theme of the European report: the interaction between culture and development. Because of the novelty of the developmental perspective, it is no great surprise that it was well-nigh impossible to find direct statistical evidence of the effects of economic and social policy measures on the arts and on culture or measures for their direct "empowering" and "entitling" capacity. This appendix attempts to indicate that a systematic presentation of cultural statistics and indicators, starting with the problems of supply and demand and ending with those of value changes can also address, as an inter-linked whole, these fundamental issues.

4. Five perspectives to cultural statistics and indicators

The following analyses and illustrations of the available cultural statistics and indicators are classified into five main groups ranging from established public policy perspectives to more dynamic and development oriented approaches:

1. *Public policy perspective: Statistics and indicators on financial responsibility, cultural infrastructure and participation*

Public financing: financial responsibility and sectoral priorities.

Statistics and indicators on private financing of the arts and culture.

The development of institutional infrastructure and participation.

II. Economics of culture perspective I: Statistics and indicators on profitability and competitive edge

The economic profitability of cultural investments.

Private consumption of cultural goods and services.

The competitive edge of European cultural industries.

Tourism and culture.

III. Economics of culture perspective II: Statistics and indicators on sectoral importance, employment effects and developmental problems

The growth potential of different branches of cultural industries.

The employment effects of cultural industries and artistic activities.

Emigration, labour markets and gender inequality.

IV. "Politics of culture" perspective: Statistics and indicators on European values

Basic values and orientations to life and moral issues.

Identity and attitudes towards foreigners.

V. Policy perspective on human development: Statistics and indicators on the role of culture as a means for empowering and entitling

Empowering people.

Entitling future generations.

The above order corresponds broadly to the overall logic of the report, which starts with an analysis and assessment of the principles of traditional public cultural policies (Chapters 2-4), indicates the interactive relation between technological and economic factors and the development of the arts and culture (Chapters 5-9, condensed and projected to the future in Chapter 10), and assesses in greater detail some major developmental impacts and "the empowering capacity" of the arts and culture in some major policy areas (Chapter 11).

5. Public financing: financing responsibility and sectoral priorities

Tables 1 to 3 provide information on the level and sectoral priorities of public financing in some European countries at the beginning of the 1990s. They are based on the data from the survey carried out by Hofecker (1995).

The processing of the data revealed all too well-known problems of reliability, validity and comparability. Although the data was obtained with a ques-

tionnaire from more than thirty European countries, complete, reliable and comparable figures were obtained for any given set of indicators for less than half of them.

The main problem in maintaining comparability in respect of overall public financing seems to have been that of delineating the "cultural sector". It is symptomatic that a recent Swedish government committee report on national cultural policy decided to use in its statistical analyses both a narrower and a wider definition of culture, the former being rather exclusively arts-centred, the latter including a wider range of youth activities and the system of adult education. Some country responses in the present survey are obviously based on a very wide definition. This seems, for example, to be the case with Germany, where the figure for socio-cultural activities probably includes a wide variety of municipal educational and leisure services – or – alternatively also capital investments.

The survey respondents also seem to have been rather unsystematic in accounting for financial transfers, especially central government subsidies to regional and/or municipal governments. In the aggregate statistics, transfers are usually attributed to the "original financier" (for example the state); in the statistics on their final use (for example for the support of artists, theatres, orchestras, libraries, etc.) they are presented as part of the total expenditures of the "end user" (for example municipalities). Although the mistake of counting transfers twice has probably been avoided in the following tables, it seems by no means sure that in the case of all countries they have been systematically attributed to "the original financier" (central government) or "end-user" (regional/ municipal governments and institutions).

The second problem of comparison is that of transforming national statistical information into comparable policy indicators. The main technical problem here is the standardisation of statistical figures in two respects: stabilising nominal values' fluctuation in time (controlling inflation and changes in relative costs) and relating them to such factors as the size of population, economy, and the size of public budgets.

Because our tables pertain only to two years, 1990 and 1992, no control of inflation is provided. The figures can best be read by comparing absolute growth of cultural financing (in Table 1) with the changes in its relative share of total public budgets (Table 2). They reflect jointly the inflation rates and elasticity/inelasticity of cultural expenditures to overall budget growth or cuts. Examining the relative share alone easily leads to misinterpretations. Its rise may reflect either the relative increase in public spending on the arts and culture or overall budget cuts in the aggregate expenditures. The same, of course, holds true if the gross domestic product (GDP) is used as the base of standardising. Thus, for example, during the recession of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the share of cultural expenditure rose in some European countries up to 1% of the GDP, because the GDP actually fell and stringency measures in public financing made themselves felt in cultural budgets some two to three years later.

As to the changes in relative costs, they tend, according to the well-known argument by Baumol, to rise faster in the performing arts (theatre, opera, orchestras) than in other service sectors. Consequently, in order to maintain the same level of activities, the relative share of public cultural expenditures used for them should also grow. This is especially important when the expenditure figures of central and eastern European countries are interpreted. In these countries, even a strong nominal rise of overall public cultural expenditures and the maintenance of the relative share of public budgets (cf. the Bulgarian figures) does not mean that the financial position of the artists and arts institutions have remained the same: for example in the case of theatres and libraries, maintenance of the old overall level has not been sufficient to beat the costs of the new "market economy" in respect of heating and renovation of buildings or new costs of advertising and the rising costs of equipment, material and technical services.

Per capita figures would provide the best indicators for cross-national comparisons. This presupposes the use of the exchange rates, not only nominally but in respect of purchase parity power. The problems of per capita comparisons have been repeatedly pointed out, for example in the context of the European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews (see for example Cultural policy in Finland, 1994-95, 139). Because of the extreme nominal fluctuations of exchange rates and the purchasing power of European currencies in the early 1990s, no such comparison is attempted here.

After all these precautions we can look at the substantive information provided by Tables 1 to 2. In western European countries, the changes in the overall level of financing show stagnation, and, at worst, only a mild downward turn, which in turn is much stronger in the case of central and eastern European countries, where reductions are drastic when the special cost increases are taken into account.

As to financing responsibility, there is a clear distinction between the federal states (Austria, Germany and Switzerland) and other countries. In the former group, the Länder/cantons are an important level of independent cultural policy decision-making, while in the latter, the regions seem to be a co-ordinating level of central government policies or a lever between central and local level financing.

The figures pertaining to the central and eastern European countries reflect random administrative reforms searching for an organisational design, balancing rights and obligations between different levels of government. All in all, the data reflect the well-known problem of optimising the results of public financing in respect of three objectives: maintaining cultural diversity, enhancing equal access to culture and supporting regional cultural activities and identities. In modern societies, this problem cannot be solved by financial transfers alone; additional institutional solutions, for example, new models of federalism/regionalism, effective planning, information and networking and enhanced co-ordination of sectoral policies, are needed.

Table 3 uses the same survey data to illustrate cross-national variations in sectoral priorities in public financing of the arts and culture. Cultural expenditures are classified into three categories: protection of material cultural heritage, support for libraries and socio-cultural activities and support for artistic creativity, literature and the performing arts. The classification responds roughly to three objectives of public cultural policies: enhancing identity, promoting wider access to culture and supporting creativity. In this respect, the categories, however, overlap: for example, support for regional and local performing arts institutions often also contributes to regional identity and more equal geographical access to culture.

Cultural policy planners often assume, at least implicitly, that the protection of heritage and support for artistic work should be mainly the task of central government and – in the case of truly federalist states – of *Länder/cantons*, the promotion of wider access to the arts and culture being that of municipal governments. There are some weak indications that this pattern may prevail in small welfare countries.

Table 3 shows no systematic patterns for overall preference of the “objectives” implied by its three categories of activities. However, one can point out interesting country profiles like that of Austria where, at all levels, more money is spent on the arts than on heritage or participation, or such as Germany, where interest in socio-cultural activities seems to be most prominent and the Czech Republic, where the maintenance of heritage now seems to receive the lion’s share of reduced public financing.

The lack of more distinctive patterns in the division of labour between different levels of government can be due to some further technical weaknesses of the data: some countries may have included capital costs, which others have omitted. Sectoral financial data also reflect very strongly unique national geographical, geopolitical and historical features which cannot be easily controlled and easily blur all common patterns. Such factors, for example, are the size of geographical area and population, the distribution of cities, towns and villages, and the type and amount of immovable heritage. The effects of such factors on the financing structure can be illustrated by a comparison between the Netherlands and Finland:

“Because of the population difference (14.9 million in the Netherlands, 5 million in Finland in 1990) and geographical factors (Finland’s area is much larger and more sparsely populated), Dutch per capita financing and expenditures could be expected to be lower than those of Finland. The difference, however, between the aggregate expenditure per capita for the arts and culture was rather small. If the wider concept of culture (including adult education centres in Finland, and similar facilities and activities in the Netherlands) is considered, the per capita expenditure in Finland was only some 3% higher. If the wider concept is not used, the aggregate expenditure per capita is about 20% higher in Finland than in the Netherlands.

Aggregate comparisons are, however, rather meaningless, because the structures of financing in the two countries differ radically from each other. The

main difference is that about five times more money per capita is used for cultural heritage in the Netherlands than in Finland. On the other hand, the Finnish problems with geography and economies of scale are also clearly apparent in some areas. Thus Finland used about 80% more money per capita for its public library system than the Netherlands, and in the case of the performing arts (theatre, opera, orchestras) the difference is even more glaring: the Finnish per capita figure is three times larger than that of the Netherlands. On the other hand, the per capita expenditures for the support of literature and book publishing are about equal, and the Dutch per capita expenditure for the visual arts is about eight times higher than that of Finland." (Council of Europe, Cultural Policy in Finland, National Report, 1995).

Table 1: Public expenditure on the arts and culture in some European countries (in millions of local currency, current prices) in 1992, by tier of government, and growth (%) in 1990-92

Source: Hofecker, 1995, tables 8.A.90, 8.A.92.

Country	Tier	Central government	Regions/ <i>Länder</i>	Municipal/ local self-government	Total	Growth (%) of the total 1990-92
Austria		7 097	3 797	2 283	13 172	19.7
Bulgaria		989	15	651	1 655	233.0
Czech Republic		1 991	*	3 380	5 371	-16.6
Denmark		2 355	322	2 675	5 352	6.4
Finland		2 975	*	2 187	5 162	8.3
Germany		4 272	7 274	13 769	25 315	15.9
Netherlands		880	180	1 957	3 017	19.4
Poland		1 168 439	1 937 840	2 416 628	5 522 907	-1.5
Sweden		5 370	916	6 222	12 508	6.2
Switzerland		215	663	748	1 626	5.0
* Insignificant public allocation or no allocation at all on this tier.						

Table 2: The share (%) of cultural expenditure in total public expenditure, by spending tier of government, in some European countries in 1980, 1990 and 1992

Source: Hofecker, 1995, tables 8.A.80, 8.A.90, 8.A.92.

Country	Tier	Year	Central/ federal	Regional/ <i>Länder</i>	Municipal/ local	Total
Austria		1980	1.03	1.73	0.68	1.07
		1990	0.94	2.09	0.92	1.12
		1992	0.98	2.02	0.87	1.12
Switzerland		1980	0.35	1.70	3.52	1.53
		1990	0.63	2.56	4.61	2.28
		1992	0.70	2.42	4.15	2.14
Germany		1980	0.66	1.97	5.97	2.47
		1990	0.87	2.16	5.87	2.48
		1992	0.70	2.20	5.77	2.39
Finland		1980	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
		1990	1.31	*	2.54	1.67
		1992	1.20	*	2.56	1.46
France		1980 (81)	1.07	0.25	6.86	1.95
		1990	1.44	0.52	7.09	2.38
		1992	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Italy		1980	1.08	2.01	0.84	1.07
		1990	0.99	2.68	1.10	1.12
		1992	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Denmark		1980	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
		1990	0.93	0.61	2.46	1.32
		1992	0.90	0.67	2.43	1.27
Sweden		1980	1.48	1.08	2.41	1.73
		1990	1.09	0.71	2.32	1.41
		1992	1.12	0.66	2.78	1.49
Bulgaria		1980	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
		1990	1.89	*	1.47	1.84
		1992	2.52	*	1.23	1.79
Czech Republic		1980	0.89	*	5.04	2.74
		1990	1.87	*	3.43	2.55
		1992	0.83	*	4.41	1.69
Poland		1980	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
		1990	2.63	3.33	*	2.89
		1992	0.38	2.62	3.72	1.24
* Insignificant public allocation or no allocation at all on this tier.						

Table 3: Public expenditure (in thousands of local currency, current prices) on the arts and culture in some European countries in 1992, by field of activity and tier of government

Source: Hofecker, 1995, tables 10.A.90, 11.A.90, 12.A.90.

Country	Tier	A. Protection of heritage, museums, archives	B. Support for public libraries, socio-cultural activities	C. Support for literature, music, visual & performing arts	Ratio B/A (participation v. heritage)	Ratio C/A (art v. heritage)	Ratio C/B (art v. participation)
Austria	Federal	1 056 220	534 109	3 592 956	0.5	3.4	6.7
	<i>Länder</i>	808 595	847 454	947 913	1.0	1.2	1.1
	Local	232 784	716 970	1 077 521	3.1	4.6	1.5
Bulgaria	Central	44 000	24 000	7 000	0.5	5.3	6.1
	Regional	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Local	89 587	318 734	41 391	3.6	0.5	0.1
Czech Republic	Central	1 085 225	518 393	299 188	0.5	0.3	0.6
	Regional	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Local	1 119 130	631 709	817 544	0.6	0.7	1.3
Denmark	Central	487 000	623 000	678 000	1.3	1.4	1.1
	Regional	73 000	78 000	169 000	1.1	2.3	2.2
	Local	260 000	2 086 000	310 000	8.0	1.2	0.1
Finland	Central	181 368	1 117 636	262 734	6.1	1.4	0.2
	Regional	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Local	241 400	502 455	861 915	2.1	3.6	1.7
Germany	Federal	88 642	3 652 080	29 892	41.2	0.3	0.0
	<i>Länder</i>	1 434 374	3 894 347	1 621 293	2.7	1.1	0.4
	Local	1 003 311	9 631 129	2 850 715	9.6	2.8	0.3
Netherlands	Central	340 000	78 000	381 000	0.2	1.1	4.9
	Regional	51 000	75 000	28 000	1.5	0.5	0.4
	Local	393 000	780 000	494 000	2.0	1.2	0.6
Poland	Central	634 324	183 358	307 765	0.3	0.5	1.7
	Regional	461 168	644 875	861 697	1.4	1.9	1.3
	Local	150 984	2 191 485	73 760	14.5	0.5	0.0
Sweden	Central	981 000	1 665 000	1 643 000	1.7	1.6	1.0
	Regional	160 200	414 800	292 000	2.6	1.8	0.7
	Local	*	5 255 000	967 000	*	*	0.2
Switzerland	Central	82 938	13 957	*	0.2	*	*
	Regional	174 742	87 096	214 313	0.5	1.2	2.5
	Local	133 511	107 301	263 373	0.8	1.9	2.5
* Insignificant public allocation or no allocation at all on this tier.							

6. Statistics and indicators on private financing of the arts and culture

Of course, we cannot equate the economic health of the arts and culture with the level of public financing only. Even in the Nordic social welfare countries, individuals and households provide as “consumers” at least twice as much revenue to the arts and culture as they do as tax-payers; and thus the marketplace has a central role as “a cultural policy decision-taker” in shaping prices and consumer interest. Since the mid-1980s, European cultural policy planning and debates have paid increasing attention to private and non-profit funding of the arts and culture. The main issues have been the legitimate role of private sponsorship and foundations and the appropriate legislation encouraging private and non-profit financing. On a more technical level, the “innovative” use of joint public-private financing and the channelling of copyright, neighbouring rights and *droit de suite* revenues have been main concerns of policy planning and legislation (see for example Mitchell, 1989).

No sources provide comprehensive comparative statistical information on private and non-profit financing in Europe. We limit our illustrations here to a comparison of the recent development of business sponsorship in two countries, the United Kingdom and Finland. More comprehensive comparisons can be found in publications based on survey data, legal information and administrative documents (see for example Mitchell, 1989 or Circle, Budapest Round Table, 1994).

In the United Kingdom, business support is a well-established form of financing with a wide corporate base. In Finland, the base is much narrower and corporate financing has often been considered less wished-for and at best only complementary to public funding. The two cases (see Tables 4a and 4b) are chosen to illustrate first how deeply ingrained the concepts and modes of corporate financing are in the national cultural and business environment, and how impossible it is to try to carry out direct comparisons of the amounts of financing. On the other hand, the two cases also illustrate that comparisons are possible from a wider developmental perspective. First, the effects of the economic stagnation of the early 1990s can be detected in both tables. In the United Kingdom, it appears as the decrease of cash sponsorship, in Finland as a practical collapse of all forms of business support. Second, if we have a closer look at the Finnish data, we notice that direct sponsorship declined considerably before the drastic stagnation of 1990-93. The decline of direct sponsorship in both countries may indicate a long term developmental trend: arts sponsorship is increasingly considered by the business community less as an effective means of image creation and more as a means of small-scale advertising. It would be useful to carry out a comparative study of recent sponsorship trends in both the arts and sport.

Table 4a: Business support for the arts in the United Kingdom in 1991-92, 1993-94, by the type of support (current prices)

Source: ABSA, Business Support for the Arts ... Summary, London 1994, 3.

	1993/1994	Increase/decrease 93-94/ 92-93	1992/1993	1991/1992
1. Sponsorship (*)	£48 761 762	- 2.15%	£49 834 657	£57 577 317
(% of total cash sponsorship)	(86.49%)		(86.38%)	(88.26%)
2. Corporate sponsorship	£7 616 936	-3.07%	£7 858 415	£7 882 577
(% of total cash sponsorship)	(13.51%)		(13.62%)	(12.04%)
1.+2.: Total cash sponsorship	£56 378 698	- 2.28%	£57 693 072	£65 459 894
3. Sponsorship "in kind "	£6 164 658	+98.25%	£3 109 398	£1 710 900
4. Corporate donations	£6 979 096	+50.90%	£4 624 764	£7 456 478
Total business support for the arts	£69 522 452	+ 6.26%	£65 427 234	£74 627 272
<p>NB: Sponsorship (*) includes event sponsorship, sponsorship of capital projects and awards and prizes.</p> <p>In the case of total cash sponsorship, the value of 1993/1994, £56 378 693, represents a decrease of 3.91%, in real terms, on the previous year's figure and the total business support, £69 522 452, represents an increase of 4.48%, in real terms, on the previous year's figure.</p>				

Table 4b: Business support for the arts and culture in Finland in 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1993, by the type of support (thousands of FIM, in current prices)*

Source: Pekka Oesch, 1995, English Summary, 14.

Type of support	1984		1987		1990		1993	
	'000 FIM	%	'000 FIM	%	'000 FIM	%	'000 FIM	%
Purchases of works of art	14 768	51	16 809	32	25 212	49	11 130	48
Sponsoring	7 528	26	21 622	41	12 008	24	5 964	26
Donations	1 410	5	3 447	7	4 685	9	2 358	10
Other support	5 338	18	10 760	20	9 273	18	3 615	16
Total	29 044	100	52 638	100	51 179	100	23 068	100
* Based on a survey of a sample of approximately 300 of the largest financial, industrial and service corporations in Finland.								

7. The development of institutional infrastructure and participation

Statisticians and researchers have pointed out that the best and often the only available measure of the effectiveness and efficiency of public financing can be derived from the institutional activities the money creates or maintains. Thus, for example, Augustin Girard (1992, 44-45) in his case study analyses of France and Sweden compares the performing arts in terms of indexed

time series of financing, institutional structure and levels of staff. He comes to the conclusion that financing, especially in Sweden, has actually expanded regional and local access to the performing arts (effectiveness) and this has happened under rather strict cost control (efficiency). One retort, of course, to these analyses is that the final measure of effectiveness and efficiency is the use, which does not automatically ensue from a good infrastructure and expanded supply. Furthermore, data on infrastructure is never sufficient alone: analyses of efficiency require parallel data on expenditure and analyses of effectiveness require data on the use of facilities provided.

Irrespective of these counter-arguments, it is easy to agree that the level of cultural infrastructure can be used, with certain reservations, as a measure of "cultural development". Unfortunately, comparative data on the extent of national cultural infrastructure in Europe is practically non-existent. The European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews provides as yet only eight case studies and various handbooks of cultural life provide some documentary data.

There is somewhat more information on regions and cities, and, for our illustrations here, we can avail ourselves of recent data collected in a mail questionnaire by the Helsinki City Information Management Centre in summer 1994. Because this data contains some information on the use of facilities, some exploratory remarks about effectiveness and "development" can be attempted. The main results of this survey are condensed in Table 5.

Even in this survey addressed to a rather homogeneous sample of European cities, the definitional problems appear to rule supreme. It seems rather likely that the persons who responded to the questionnaire on behalf of the cities might have, despite all instructions, had rather different conceptions as to what is to be counted as a "museum", a "cinema" or a "theatre"; this becomes obvious when one compares for example the number of cinemas in Edinburgh and Frankfurt. It also seems that some responses pertain only to the inner city area, while the others cover the wider metropolitan area including suburbs and nearby autonomous townships.

A closer examination of the data revealed that in order to understand both these definitional and real differences in infrastructure they must be related to participation data. To do that, per inhabitant figures of cultural participation (use) were rank-ordered and the city rankings summed to make up one indicator only (last column of Table 5). Although this type of condensation often hides the diversity, it also helps, together with background data, to distil some general patterns of supply and demand.

It is easy to see that quantitative measures of infrastructure (the number of cultural workers or facilities) in Table 5 provide rather poor predictors of inhabitants' level of cultural participation. The discrepancy between the number of facilities and their use is most apparent in the case of the cities of eastern and central Europe (Budapest, Tallinn), while the facilities seem to be most effective in the capitals of small welfare states (Edinburgh, Stockholm, Copen-

hagen, Zurich). The table also reflects the effects of summer festivals and events (for example in the case of Edinburgh) and several cities have certainly benefited from their status as the "European City of Culture" (Antwerp 1993, Glasgow 1990, and Lisbon 1994). In more general terms, the table also suggests that the competition between European cities for tourists and other economic benefits of cultural investments is rather severe and has led, on the one hand, to the modernisation of cultural facilities and city image, but probably also to the subordination of artistic and cultural activities to serve economic and political interests.

It can be argued that, because of totally different economies of scale, per capita measures do not do justice to big cities (Barcelona, Frankfurt, Vienna, Hamburg), where in addition a high proportion of refugees and immigrants may affect the participation ratios. In general, the cultural administration and arts institutions of the major cosmopolitan metropolises are probably more oriented to providing cultural offerings to well-established audiences (educated social strata, tourists) than to expand the participation to cover better the whole population. This is also possible for them because of economies of scale: in theory with an appropriate programme it is easier to fill the large renowned theatres and concert halls with lesser per capita costs than in smaller and more "provincial" cities.

Table 5: Cultural infrastructure and participation in some European cities in the early 1990s

Source: Statistics from the City of Helsinki Information Management Centre, 1995, 7, 60-61, 66-69.

{(PRIVAT)}City	Population	Foreign- as % of total popu- lation	Share (%) of labour force em- ployed in culture, sports and re- creation	Cultural workers employed by the city per 1000 in- habitants	A Num- ber of museums and rank order in per capita visits	B. Num- ber of libraries and rank order in per capita loans	C. Num- ber of cinemas and rank order in per capita visits	D. Num- ber of symphony orchestras and rank order in per capita visits	E. Num- ber of theatres and rank order in per capita visits	Sum of four best "user" rankings of (A)-(E) and sub- sequent overall ranking
Antwerp	462 336	12.8	1.4	1.9	20 (4)	33 (5)	16 (3)	2 (4)	5 (17)	16 (5)
Barcelona	1 643 542	1.4	2.4	0.3	35 (14)	83 (15)	63 (10)	1 (10)	24 (16)	49 (13)
Budapest	1 995 696	..	2.4	1.3	89 (15)	84 (13)	61 (16)	.. (.)	25 (13)	57 (14)
Brussels	951 217	29.1	39 (6)	.. (.)	70 (7)	.. (.)	.. (.)	.. (.)
Copenhagen	467 258	12.7	3.7	1.7	40 (7)	22 (4)	14 (4)	4 (11)	11 (7)	22 (6)
Dublin	478 380	6.4	2.0	0.5	4 (13)	27 (9)	33 (1)	.. (2)	16 (1)	13 (3)
Edinburgh	418 914	5.2	2.7	7.9	27 (2)	23 (1)	6 (2)	2 (8)	7 (2)	7 (1)
Frankfurt	658 815	28.3	27 (3)	21 (11)	56 (14)	.. (.)	9 (15)	44 (10)
Glasgow	662 853	3.9	3.3	1.8	14 (8)	44 (6)	6 (9)	4 (6)	20 (7)	27 (7)
Hamburg	1 688 785	14.2	2.3	2.6	47 (16)	60 (10)	96 (15)	3 (13)	40 (9)	47 (12)
Helsinki	508 659	4.6	4.3	3.8	63 (11)	56 (3)	42 (12)	4 (7)	21 (11)	32 (8)
Lisbon	663 404	7.9	2.4	10.6	38 (5)	19 (8)	23 (11)	3 (9)	18 (18)	33 (9)
Luxembourg	75 833	45.1	1.6	..	3 (.)	2 (16)	3 (3)	1 (.)	.. (4)	.. (.)
Milan	1 383 381	3.8	5.0	..	13 (18)	.. (.)	107 (8)	4 (.)	21 (5)	.. (.)
Prague	1 217 023	1.9	3.2	16.1	55 (12)	.. (.)	.. (.)	3 (5)	24 (12)	.. (.)
Stockholm	692 954	18.2	5.1	1.2	40 (1)	43 (7)	77 (5)	2 (3)	37 (3)	12 (2)
Tallinn	442 679	..	2.1	2.5	24 (17)	30 (12)	12 (18)	.. (.)	10 (14)	61 (15)
Vienna	1 642 391	17.9	0.4	0.4	90 (9)	62 (14)	97 (17)	3 (12)	13 (10)	45 (11)
Zurich	360 898	26.8	2.2	2.7	39 (10)	40 (2)	39 (3)	4 (1)	12 (8)	14 (4)

Yet cultural investments, facilities, public subsidies and private sponsorship reflect often also “the status interests” of metropolitan municipal authorities and, in the case of metropolitan capitals, also those of a nation. The next two tables bear witness to these interests. Table 6a reflects well the difference between the financing structure of European and American institutions of the performing arts.

Table 6a: Public subventions and private support to opera and ballet houses in some world metropolises in 1989/90

Source: X. Dupuis, 1991, 8-11.

Opera/ballet	Public subvention (*)	Share of total budget (%)	Donations and sponsoring (*)	Share of total budget (%)	Total budget (*)
– L'Opéra de Paris-Bastille	478	71.4	6.0	0.9	669
– Wiener Staatsoper	310	69.0	n.a.	n.a.	450
– Bayerische Staatsoper	283	75.3	1.8	0.5	377
– Hamburgische Staatsoper	231	73.7	2.7	0.9	314
– Deutsche Oper Berlin	269	84.7	2.6	0.8	318
– Royal Opera House, Covent Garden	140	34.3	62.9	15.4	408
– Teatro alla Scala, Milan	323	65.0	27	5.4	497
– Le Grand Théâtre de Genève	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	74
– Théâtre Royal de la Monnaie, Brussels	131	72.8	5.5	3.0	180
– Metropolitan Opera, New York	13	2.1	267	42.8	623

(*) In million French francs.

Table 6b: The “Grands Projets” of Paris in the 1980s and 1990s (construction costs in thousands of millions of French francs)

Source: F. Benhamou, 1996, 60.

Building	Architect	Construction costs	Year of inauguration
– Musée d'Orsay	Gae Aulenti	1.3	1986
– Parc de la Villette	Bernard Tshumi	1.3	1986
– Musée des Sciences	Adrien Fainsilber	5.4	1986
– Institut du monde arabe	Jean Nouvel	0.4	1987
– Opéra Bastille	Carlos Ott	2.8	1989
– Arche de la Défense	Paul Andreu, Otto von Spreckelsen	3.7	1989
– Ministère des Finances	Paul Chemetov, Borja Huidobro	3.7	1989
– Cité de la Musique	Christian de Portzamparc	1.1	1994
– Museum	Paul Chemetov, Borja Huidobro	1.0	1994
– Grand Louvre	leoh Ming Pei	5.7	1995
– Bibliothèque de France	Dominique Perrault	7.8	1995

In Table 7, a number of selected European countries have been organised according to their rank order in consumption of “commercial culture” on the one hand and the level of arts audiences and the use of cultural services on the other. The information has been gathered from different sources and pertains to the situation of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Due to the conceptual and co-ordination problems already discussed and the failure of statistical offices to update data at regular intervals, the compilation of this information was an exercise in the art rather than the science of statistics.

Table 7: Cultural consumption and participation in selected European countries (rank-order classification: 1=high, 2=medium, 3=low)

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, 1995, 23, 32, 148; Cronholm, M., 1994; Circle & the Council of Europe, 1993, 43-85.

Country	Consumption of “commercial culture”					Level of audiences / Readership					
	1. Household cultural expenditure	2. Watching TV	3. Households with 2 VCRs	4. Households with video-games	SUM of 1-4	5. Classic music	6. Theatre	7. Museums	8. Cinema	9. Libraries, reading	SUM of 5-9
Austria	2	3	3	2	10	2	2	1	3	2	10
Switzerland	1	2	1	2	6	1	1	2	1	2	7
Germany	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	2	2	2	8
Denmark	1	2	1	2	6	1	2	2	2	1	8
Spain	3	1	1	1	6	1
France	2	1	2	1	6	2	2	2	1	2	9
Finland	1	2	2	3	8	2	1	1	3	1	8
Greece	3	1	2	3	9	-	-	-	3	-	-
Italy	1	1	2	3	7	3	3	2	2	3	13
Ireland	2	1	2	1	6	2	1	-	1	-	-
Norway	2	3	2	2	9	2	2	2	1	2	9
Netherlands	1	1	1	2	5	1	2	2	3	2	10
Portugal	3	1	3	3	10	3
Sweden	2	3	2	2	9	2	1	1	2	1	7
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	4	2	2	2	2	3	11

The division line between these two types of activities in the table coincides with the much-maligned dichotomy of “mass culture” versus “high culture”. In this respect, the two categories of the table are by no means mutually exclusive. Cultural consumption for instance includes household expenditure on theatre and concerts; and “cinema” covers all attendance irrespective of the type of film.

Typology 1 helps us to understand the core-substantive contents of the table. Its simple classification clusters the countries in a meaningful way. The three core “cultural industries” countries (United Kingdom, France and Germany) and the nodes of trans-border communication (Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands) are high in consumption, while the countries with extensive networks of cultural institutions (Switzerland, Germany and the Nordic countries) have a high level of participation.

Typology 1: Participation and cultural consumption: country clusters

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, 1995, 23, 32, 148; Cronholm, M., 1994; Circle & the Council of Europe, 1993, 43-85.

Level of "commercial" cultural consumption	Level of "high culture" participation		
	High (7-8)	Medium (9-10)	Low (11-13)
High (4-6)	I. Switzerland, Germany, Denmark	IV. France, Netherlands	VII. Italy, United Kingdom
Medium (7-8)	II. Finland	V.	VIII.
Low (9-10)	III. Sweden	VI. Austria, Norway	IX.

It should be pointed out that Table 7 is based on information from the end of the 1980s, and the constellations depicted in Typology 1 have certainly radically changed during the first half of the 1990s. This has been the case with the new democracies of eastern and central Europe, where economic problems and the onslaught of "commercial culture" have undermined earlier active cultural participation. These countries could be located in Cells VI, VIII and IX of the typology. More recent statistics indicating a decline in cultural participation and amateur art activities in younger age groups may bear witness that the pattern of high level participation of the Nordic countries is at present also being eroded.

Irrespective of repeatedly expressed interest during the last two decades, the progress towards establishing a standard system of data acquisition, processing and systematisation on cultural participation has been slow. National questionnaires used to collect data on arts interests and cultural participation still vary greatly from one European country to another; furthermore the suggested statistical frameworks do not seem to be able to deal with the problem of relating audience statistics (for example recorded visits to libraries, concerts, theatres), statistics on household expenditures (for example money spent on theatre and concert tickets) and survey data on the participation of individuals, groups and the population at large (obtained in a representative sample by "how often do you visit/go to..." questions).

Radio and television also transmit the arts and culture to millions of listeners and viewers. But it is a well-established fact that arts programmes cannot compete on public broadcast channels with mass entertainment programmes (see Table 8), and, in order to maintain audiences, special channels have been established (for example Arte in television and classical music stations in radio broadcasting).

Table 8: Viewers of television arts programmes in the United Kingdom in 1993-94 (in millions)

Source: L. Weston, 1994, 8.

– <i>South Bank Show</i> (ITV)	>2
– <i>The Late Show</i> (BBC2)	0.5
– <i>Without Walls</i> (Channel 4)	1.3
– <i>The Royal Collection</i> (Channel 4)	0.8
– <i>Civilisation</i> (BBC2):	
* original showing in 1969	0.7
* repeat in 1983	1.2
* in 1993-94	0.7
– <i>Omnibus</i> (BBC)	2.1
– <i>Arena</i> (BBC2)	0.9
– <i>Sister Wendy's Grand Tour</i> (BBC2)	2.1
– <i>One Foot in the Past</i> (BBC2)	2.0
– <i>Bookmark</i> (BBC2)	0.9
– <i>Off the Wall</i> (BBC2)	0.8
NB. At the same time, by comparison, BBC's twice-weekly serial <i>Eastenders</i> gained an audience of 20 million, and the <i>Nine o'clock News</i> 7 million viewers.	

8 Economic profitability of cultural investments

Table 9 summarises the results of some of the most reliable studies which have explored the “pure” economic profitability of investments in culture (Malm, 1994). The studies cover a whole range of case illustrations ranging from aggregate investments of a public sector as a whole (German theatre sector) and a city (cultural institutions of the city of Bremen) to individual arts institutions, to public support of events and festivals and finally to a commercial gig (Bruce Springsteen's Gala), with no public financial input. The table presents only indicators of “the public balance sheet”, that is, the absolute and relative economic returns (columns 4 and 5) of public investments.

If we deal with such simple statistics as aggregate investments by one sole investor and with such indicators as direct absolute and relative tax returns, the technical problems of reliability, validity and comparability remain manageable. Yet, if there are many investors, that is, several different levels and units of government and, especially, public-private joint financing, the problems of assessing each partner's profits and overall profitability demands much more sophisticated indicators. Furthermore, if the analyses of profitability wish to take into account indirect profits – positive second order consequences – there is a need for a totally new type of statistics and for a whole host of new complex sets of indicators.

Table 9: Case analyses of the economic profitability of public spending on the performing arts and arts events (all figures in millions, in local currency) *

Source: P. Malm, 1994. See this review paper for the assessment of the validity of the original sources.

Sector/event (<i>Source of Information</i>)	Sales effects to local firms	Tax effect (T) to public authorities	Public spending (PS)	Economic profitability: (EP = T-PS)	Relative profitability: (EP/PS)
1. German theatre sector (<i>Hummel & Berger 1988</i>)	..	DM 42	DM 80	DM -38	- 47%
2. Cultural institutions in Bremen, Germany (<i>Taubmann & Behrens 1986</i>)	DM 37.2	DM 4.35	DM 32.5	DM -28.15	- 87%
3. Music Centre of Arhus (<i>Framke & Jensen 1987</i>)	..	Dkr 4.6	Dkr 6.65	Dkr -2.05	- 31%
4. The Theatre of Rovaniemi (<i>Malmi 1994</i>)	FIM 2.17	FIM 1.01	FIM 5.0	FIM -3.7	- 74%
5. Edinburgh Opera Festival (<i>Vaughan 1983</i>)	£ 3.7	£ 0.15	£ 0.21	£ +0.06	+ 29%
6. Savonlinna Opera Festival 1992 (<i>Piirainen 1993</i>)	FIM 72.2	FIM 3.9	FIM 1.2	FIM +2.7	+ 225%
7. Sorinasteen-Gala in Göteborg (<i>Andersson 1985</i>)	Skr 8.9	Skr 17.1	Skr 0	Skr 17.1	about ∞
* Economic profitability refers to the profitability of the investment or spending to the investor. Savings in social welfare costs are not taken into account. The investor/profit-earner in the two first sectoral studies is the public sector as a whole, in the rest the local municipality. The figures within parentheses are rough estimates.					

As to the substantive contents, the message of the table is clear – and very much according to the standard arguments of the economics of culture. Support for the arts and culture as a social infrastructure (presented by aggregate sectoral indicators of the table) is expensive and non-profitable both for the state and municipalities and the same can be said of supporting major institutions. Public investments in festivals and events by contrast are profitable in general, and commercial cultural events bring returns without any specific investments.

Malm (1994, 4) has suggested an equation, which lists the main components which are needed for an all-encompassing combined indicator of the economic and social profitability of an investment in the arts and culture. This combined indicator should sum up the following five groups of component indicators:

1. *public "fiscal" net benefit*

- + public tax benefits (direct, indirect and induced)
- + other public gains and costs (savings in welfare costs, etc.)
- public spending or investment

2. *employee related net benefit*

- + net wage effects to citizens due to the direct, indirect and induced employment effects
- value of free time which is lost due to employment effects
- + intrinsic rewards of employment
- loss of welfare benefits to the employed

3. *property related net benefit*

- + net benefit to the owners of companies and rented property
- economic loss to the renters

4. *subjective consumer effects and externalities*

- + subjective consumer effects (consumer surplus, etc.)
- + subjective externalities (pride, opportunity benefit, environmental costs)

5. *strategic net benefit to public sector*

- + strategic marketing effects to the State and communities
- + savings in outbound recruitment costs
- + implicit savings to sectoral organisations (education etc.)

unweighted social net benefits = absolute social profitability

If data for all the indicators of the equation could be gathered, the "pure" economics of culture would take a long stride towards more general developmental analysis. For the time being, this is still a distant dream. Although some case studies of cultural events or festivals have managed to find reasonably valid indicators for several components of 2 and 5 above, cultural statistics at present can contribute precious little to the development of such relevant combined indicators as the equation proposes – even less so if asked to provide data for more comprehensive international comparisons or for time series analyses of profitability and net benefit changes.

9. **Private consumption of culture**

The importance of cultural consumption and market revenues for financing the arts and culture was already referred to above; and Table 7 and Typology 1 provided a starting point for a more detailed analysis of the impact of cultural consumption on lifestyles in different European countries. Tables 10, 11, 12a and 12b bear further witness to the fact that variations in cultural consumption also provide important indicators of long term changes in lifestyles – and reveal factors causing them.

Table 10 includes a general category of “entertainment” and does not make a distinction between expenditure on so-called “commercial” cultural consumption and expenditure on the arts. Yet the high level of expenditure is related to economic development – with the exception of small welfare countries where slower penetration of new media and more equal public art provision and facilities for amateur activities seem to have curbed the boost of consumption of culture and “entertainment”.

Table 10: Household expenditure on leisure, entertainment, private instruction and culture in the EEA countries in 1991 in ECU per inhabitant

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, *Statistical yearbook*, 1994-95, 23.

Country	Total expenditure	Leisure, entertainment, private instruction and culture	Share (%) of leisure, entertainment, teaching, culture
Austria	8 771	640	7.30
Belgium	9 936	652	6.56
Switzerland	11 463	1 181	10.30
Germany	9 494	855	9.01
Denmark	10 546	1 079	10.23
Spain	7 134	469	6.57
France	10 415	784	7.53
Finland	8 080	889	11.00
Greece	4 058	230	5.67
Italy	10 063	916	9.10
Ireland	5 453	605	11.09
Iceland	9 851	1 162	11.80
Luxembourg	11 503	480	4.17
Norway	7 875	740	9.40
Netherlands	9 159	965	10.54
Portugal (1986)	2 162	124	5.74
Sweden	8 326	766	9.20
United Kingdom	8 326	864	9.87
Europe (average)	8 989	752	8.4
USA (1989)	12 364	1 242	10.1
Japan	9 941	1 030	10.4

Table 11 gives some indications as to how this consumption boost is based on the development of new applications of communication and information technologies. The development has not been accumulative, that is a particular type of application may start to gain ground and undermine the popularity of others. Thus new interactive multimedia and computer-mediated communications have in the 1990s pushed aside console video games and the use of VCR for postponed television watching and viewing of rented video films. On the other hand, television, especially satellite/cable and pay-TV systems, have maintained their position and secured growth for television advertising revenues. All in all, the expenditure on audiovisual and multimedia goods and services have been growing in the 1990s in the EU countries at a faster rate than GDP and overall consumption expenditure.

Table 11: Consumers' direct and indirect expenditure for audiovisual and multimedia goods and services in 1992-94 in the EU countries (aggregate figures for 15 member countries, in millions of ecus, in current prices)

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, *Statistical yearbook*, 1996, 18.

Consumer items	1992	1993	1994	1994/1993
<i>Film industry</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Box-office	2 576	2 926	2 989	2%
Grants	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Television</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
TV advertising expenditure	13 662	13 183	15 117	14.7%
Grants	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
TV licence fees	6 854	7 121	7 430	4.3%
Pay-TV subscriptions	2 025	2 379	2 974	25.0%
Cable	2 416	3 032	3 382	11.0%
TV-sets	10 844	10 086	10 123	0.4%
Dishes and other TV equipment	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Home video</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Pre-recorded cassettes	4 066	4 434	5 040	13.7%
VCR	6 811	5 299	4 682	-11.6%
Blank tapes	2 058	2 140	1 884	-12.0%
Camcorders	2 821	2 704	2 269	-16.1%
LaserDisc players	61	82	49	-40.2%
LaserDiscs	43	42	n.a.	n.a.
Grants	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Multimedia</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
CD-I players	27	70	110	57.1%
CD-I's	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Pcs	1 741	2 855	4 830	69.2%
CD-Rom drives	15	59	134	127.1%
Multimedia software/CD-Roms		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Videogame consoles	1 588	1 047	505	-51.8%
Videogame cartridges	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Grants	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total (without grants, multimedia and videogame software)	57 607	57 459	61 939	8%
GDP	5 835 000	5 716 000	5 985 000	5%
Audiovisual expenditure/GDP	0.99	1.01	1.03	

The two country cases of Tables 12a and 12b provide a closer look at consumer expenditure on the arts and culture. The Italian figures indicate how total the re-structuring of the field has been during the last fifteen years. Although they include some items of electronic media (television, video), the hardware purchases are excluded and the ratio of "art" expenditure (in 1988) is fairly low, only 0.7% of total consumer expenditure. This is in glaring contrast with the Italian figure of "broader" cultural consumption, which three years later (see Table 10) was thirteen times higher. Even taking the time dif-

ference into account, the supremacy of audiovisual and multimedia goods and services is now already a fact. The Finnish figures support this observation: the share of the arts in total consumer expenditure (1.1%, see the footnote of the table) is not much higher than in Italy, and the Finnish figure for "broader" cultural consumption in Table 10 is eleven times higher.

Table 12a: Private expenditure on the arts in Italy in 1970 and 1988 (thousands of millions of lire in current prices)

Source: G. Brosio & W. Santagata, 1992, 28.

Consumer items:	1970		1988		Ratio 1988/1970
	Total amounts	%	Total amounts	%	
Drama	7.9	1.7	141	3.0	17.8
Opera & ballet	3.7	0.8	78.9	1.7	21.3
Music	1.5	0.3	43.2	0.9	28.8
Pop music	3.1	0.7	115	2.5	37.1
Records	90	19.2	1 000	21.4	11.1
Videocassettes	0	0.0	500	10.7	n.a.
Books	38.6	8.2	492	10.5	12.7
TV licence fees, subscriptions	182	38.8	516	11.0	2.8
Movies	41.6	8.9	556	11.9	13.4
Art galleries & museums	0.9	0.2	36.9	0.8	41.0
Visual arts	100	21.3	1 200	25.6	12.0
Total expenditure *	469.2	100.0	4 679	100.0	10.0
* Expenditure on the arts as a proportion of total consumption expenditure in 1970, 1.4% and in 1988, 0.7%.					

Table 12b: Cultural and mass media expenditure of Finnish households in 1985 and 1990, FIM/household, in current prices

Source: Council of Europe, *Cultural Policy in Finland*, 1995, 43.

Consumer items:	1985	1990	Change (%)
Television sets, repairs, VCRs, licence fees, cable charges	1 171	1 308	12
Record and CD -players, recorders, cassette players	559	539	-4
Records, CDs and cassettes	120	113	-6
Theatre, opera and concert tickets	81	151	86
Admission fees to museums (including art museums)	35	13	-63
Cinema tickets	73	71	-3
Music lessons, instruments, etc.	238	257	8
Photography	324	473	46
Writing, drawing, amateur arts	147	184	25
Books, fiction	129	214	66
Books, non-fiction and others	207	302	46
Books, total	336	516	54
Newspapers, periodicals, comics, etc.	1 144	1 617	41
Total	4 228	5 242	24
NB. In 1990, expenditure on culture (all items) was about 4.6% of total consumption expenditure, on the arts (excluding audiovisual equipment, photography, newspapers and periodicals) about 1.1%, or about the same as in 1985.			

The long-term downward trend in the relative share of the arts in total consumption seems to contradict the general perception that the number of artists and arts offerings expanded quickly in the 1970s and 1980s. The fact is that other opportunities for culture and entertainment have expanded much faster – especially when consumer expenditure on home entertainment centres is taken into account. It must also be noted that the relative prices of “live productions” have risen faster than those of “reproduced” culture. A major difference in price dynamics is also that a new media usually generates a new cycle of consumption, where the initial high price of successful products and services fall fast, but the increased volume of purchases maintains their high share of total consumer expenditure – or even boosts it. The share of live performances and divisible cultural products is maintained – or at least kept reasonably high – by increase of relative price (of which Tables 12a and 12b give some indications).

If the above conjectures are right, original arts products and live performances are increasingly surrounded by a vast ocean of products of culture and entertainment industries, in which they themselves may appear in different reproduced forms. An important issue – or probably even the main issue – of cultural development and cultural policies is how to prevent this particular island of creativity being swallowed by the ocean. It is important to get to the heart of this issue – as well as other issues pertaining to the changing nature of cultural consumption – to go beyond conjectures. This, however, requires new efforts and new approaches to statistics and indicators on cultural participation and consumption.

The position of the arts and culture have been often defended in economic arguments going beyond those presented in the context of Table 9. In organisational theory and evaluation studies, it is customary to make a distinction between effectiveness and efficiency, between achieving the objectives and achieving them with the least possible (or at least “reasonable”) cost. A similar distinction prevails between profitability indicators discussed above and the more general indicators used to assess the contribution of culture to overall national development.

There have been definite attempts to develop statistics and indicators for the latter purpose. Thus in several European countries, copyright organisations have financed studies assessing the contribution of the arts and culture to the GDP as a percentage share of the total value added in order to prove the economic significance of creative activities. Similarly, some pan-European organisations have published trade statistics on cultural goods in order to prove the need for subsidies or trade regulation. These analyses are certainly of value for lobbying purposes; their value from any more comprehensive economic and social perspective is less clear.

In some studies assessing the value-added contribution of the arts and related activities, the share has been estimated as high as 3% of the GDP. These high estimates are, however, a product of the very comprehensive definition of “copyright industries” including, for example, publishing and printing, computer design and software, advertising design and planning, etc. If we

include only the arts and closely related activities, the share drops to 0.80% to 1.2% (Cultural Policy in Finland, National Report, 1995, 135; Scheucht & Holzmüller, 1989, 64-66).

To conclude: there is a need to recognise the important role of the arts and artistic creativity in the development of our societies. There is a need to develop a statistical frame and a system of indicators to serve this purpose; objective research and analysis, however, serve these efforts better than limited partisan interests.

10. The competitive edge of European culture industries

New media and globalisation processes have brought the issues of world trade into the centre of cultural development and policy decision-making. This is also reflected in a new interest in statistics and indicators on the international flows of cultural goods and services. In the 1970s, similar information was gathered to prove the need to establish a new world information order; the present statistics and indicators focus more on the relative competitive edge of nations and/or world regions and/or trade blocs. Table 13 provides an illustrative compendium of these statistics and indicators; Table 14 complements this information on a company level.

Table 13: Indicators of the world and European trade on cultural goods in the early 1990s

Sources: von Euler, 1995; Panorama, 1994, 27, 1-19; European Audiovisual Observatory, 1995, 61-65; D. Biltreyst, Cultural Policy, 2, 1, 3-24.

Traded cultural goods and/or services	World trade indicators	European world trade indicators	Intra-European trade indicators
<i>Visual arts:</i> Paintings, drawings and pastels, (comprise about 85% of the total "visual art" trade), sculptures, engravings lithograph and prints	<i>Trade in visual arts in 1993:</i> total world imports about 5.0 thousand million US, exports about 4.6 thousand million US dollars	<i>European imports:</i> about 51% of the world total <i>European exports:</i> about 59% of the world total	<i>Of total European imports:</i> – intra-European imports about 60%; – imports from outside countries about 40% <i>Of total European exports:</i> – intra-European exports about 45% – export to outside countries 55%
<i>Books:</i> All books in printed form; translation industry not included	<i>Trade in books in 1993:</i> total world imports and exports both about 8.0 thousand million US dollars	<i>European imports:</i> about 50% of the world total <i>European exports:</i> about 58.5% of the world total	<i>Of total European imports:</i> – intra-European imports about 71% – imports from outside countries about 29% <i>Of total European exports:</i> – intra-European exports 67% – export to countries outside Europe about 33%

Traded cultural goods and and/or services	World trade indicators	European world trade indicators	Intra-European trade indicators
<i>Musical instruments:</i> Classical instruments like pianos, harpsichords, harps, pipe and reed organs, etc.; electronic musical instruments	<i>Trade in musical instrument in 1993:</i> total world imports about 20 thousand million US dollars, exports about 21 thousand million US dollars	<i>European imports:</i> about 40% of the world total <i>European exports:</i> about 26% of the world total	<i>Of total European imports:</i> – intra-European imports 33% – imports from outside countries 67% <i>Of total European exports:</i> – intra-European exports 63% – export from countries outside Europe 37%
<i>Phonogrammes:</i> Records, CDs and tapes, excluding music videos	<i>Trade in phonogrammes:</i> total world imports 20.7 thousand million US dollars; exports 21 thousand million US dollars	<i>European imports:</i> about 55% of the world total <i>European exports:</i> about 43% of the world total	<i>Of total European imports:</i> – intra-European imports 35% – imports from outside countries 65% <i>Of total European exports:</i> – intra-European exports 80% – export to the countries outside Europe 20%
<i>Phonogramme equipment:</i> Record/CD players, cassette players, etc.)	<i>World trade on phonogramme equipment in 1993:</i> total world exports and imports both about 25 thousand million US dollars	<i>European imports:</i> about 30% of the world total <i>European exports:</i> about 16% of the world total	No information about the breakdown to intra-European and outside trade
<i>Audiovisual products and services:</i> An aggregate category including radio and TV, cable and satellite distribution, film and programme production and distribution, phonogramme production and distribution, video film and games production and distribution	The turnover of 50 largest audiovisual companies world-wide is about 118 thousand million US dollars (in 1993). In 1991 the share of different branches of the world-wide sales of 100 biggest companies was: – broadcasting: 68% – music: 4% – cinema; cinema & broadcasting; multimedia: 28%	Geographical breakdown of the turnover of 50 largest companies world-wide in 1993: – the EU: 33% – the US: 36% – Japan: 26% – the rest: 5% (see also Table 14 below)	Geographical breakdown of the turnover of Europe's 100 largest audiovisual companies: – Germany: 26% – United Kingdom: 25% – France: 12% – Netherlands: 9% – Italy: 9% – Luxembourg: 4% – Spain: 4% – the rest: 11%
<i>Film and video industry:</i> Part of the previous category: production and distribution of full length feature films produced and distributed through cinemas, home video and television	Number of feature films produced: – the US: 450 – Japan: 238 – the EU of the 12: 433 – Western Europe of the 19 countries: 546 – “Greater Europe” of the 33 countries: 598	Audiovisual trade balance (in million US dollars) between the EC (12) and the US in 1992: – Cinema: – 860 – Television: – 1 716 – Video: – 1 153 <i>Total: – 3 729</i>	Audiovisual intra-European trade: about 150 million US dollars (in 1992)

Traded cultural goods and/or services	World trade indicators	European world trade indicators	Intra-European trade indicators																																	
<i>Television programme production:</i> Overlapping with the previous category	Level of saturation in established "new" distribution: Cable TV penetration, % of TV household: – USA (1994): 62.4 – Europe of the 16 (1994): 4.3 Pay-TV subscriptions, % of TV households – USA (1991): 45.0 – Europe of the 16 (1994): 10.2	Deficit of fiction programme production in Europe in the 1990s: – Annual growth of demand: 35-40% – Annual growth of programme production: 12 -20%	<i>Share of European programmes on selected European channels:</i> <table border="0"> <tr> <td></td> <td>1988</td> <td>1992</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– ARD:</td> <td>80%</td> <td>90%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– Sat 1:</td> <td>44%</td> <td>53%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– BBC1:</td> <td>75%</td> <td>72%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– Channel 4:</td> <td>65%</td> <td>67%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– Danish BC:</td> <td>86%</td> <td>79%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– Danish TV2:</td> <td>62%</td> <td>53%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– France 2:</td> <td>74%</td> <td>75%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– Canal Plus:</td> <td>55%</td> <td>58%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– Rai 1:</td> <td>80%</td> <td>73%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>– Canale 5:</td> <td>30%</td> <td>72%</td> </tr> </table> Average share of European fiction on 9 public channels of small European countries: – in 1990: 39.4% – in 1993: 42.1%		1988	1992	– ARD:	80%	90%	– Sat 1:	44%	53%	– BBC1:	75%	72%	– Channel 4:	65%	67%	– Danish BC:	86%	79%	– Danish TV2:	62%	53%	– France 2:	74%	75%	– Canal Plus:	55%	58%	– Rai 1:	80%	73%	– Canale 5:	30%	72%
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– Canale 5:	30%	72%																																		

Table 14: Turnover (in 1994, in millions of US dollars) of the 15 leading world communications companies with a significant role in audiovisual production and distribution*

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, *Statistical yearbook 96*: 52-57; Statistics Finland, 1995, 2, 228.

Enterprise	Country	(A) Turnover in audiovisual industries	(B) Turnover in communications**	The ratio (A/B) (%)
1. Time Warner/ Turner Broadcasting***	US	12 450	15 163	82.1
2. Walt Disney/ Capital Cities/ABC***	US	9 131	10 070	90.1
3. Sony	Japan	7 230	7 815	92.5
4. Viacom/Paramount***	US	7 378	9 982	73.9
5. Bertelsmann	Germany	3 863	9 429	41.0
6. News Corporation	Austria	3 802	8 416	45.2
7. Seagram/MCA*** – Matsushita/MCA	Japan	6 163	6 293	97.9
8. Fujisankei	Japan	4 926	7 849	62.6
9. NHK	Japan	5 744	5 744	100
10. ARD	Germany	5 650	5 650	100
11. Westinghouse/CBS Inc.	US	4 785	4 785	100
12. PolyGram	Netherlands	4 725	4 725	100
13. Dun & Bradstreet	US	4 180	4 180	100
14. Kirch Gruppe	Germany	4 200	4 200	100
15. Nintendo	Japan	4 183	4 183	100

* More than 40% of the communications turnover.
 ** Including press and book publishing.
 *** Recent (1994-95) mergers/sales of companies taken into account by simply adding the 1994 turnovers of the merging/merged companies.

Most of the debates on the international trade in cultural goods in Europe – especially within the European Union – have focused on the audiovisual sector, especially on feature film and television fiction programme production;

and the lack of competitive edge of the European production and distribution systems have been repeatedly pointed out. The three bottom rows of Table 13 provide information which is used to illustrate these problems.

They tell a well-known story. Major European audiovisual companies are actually doing well economically according to the geographical breakdown of the turnover of the fifty largest companies world-wide in 1993. European quota regulations and the enhanced production efforts of public national broadcasting companies have maintained the share of European programmes relatively high, even in fiction. On the other hand, the diversification of distribution channels has created a deficit of audiovisual products (especially films and TV fiction) which European production and distribution cannot fill – at least not as effectively in terms of production costs and audience appeal – as is done by US imports. Consequently, the total volume and value of American imports and the European trade deficit has been growing steadily.

Further information on the successes and failures of European culture industries at corporate level is provided by Table 14. There are four European companies among the top fifteen companies for audiovisual production and communications services. It should be pointed out that none of these can yet be compared with the US gigantic entertainment companies (like Walt Disney/Capital Cities or Time/Warner) or true multinational enterprises (for example Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation) in respect of global production and distribution strategies or aggressiveness in policies for acquisition and strategic alliances. Often the strategic alliance of the European companies, like a recent one of the Kirch Gruppe with Viacom/Paramount have been initiated to fill the European programme deficit from American stocks of films and other audiovisual products.

The information in Table 13 is, however, not limited to the story of the European audiovisual industries only. It sketches out the comparative profile of the world and European cultural trade from a more comprehensive perspective. Although the total value of audiovisual products overshadows all other sectors of commercial cultural production and services, both in terms of turnover and the value of international trade, the leading role of European products in several other sectors should be noted. Such areas are for example visual arts and books, and, to a minor extent, records (especially classical music) and musical instruments (classical instruments). In general, the failures of European audiovisual production and services in the global marketplace are counterbalanced by the strong European presence in literature, music and the visual arts, and this should be taken into account in designing pan-European cultural policies.

To conclude: as Tables 13 and 14 bear witness, there is no dearth of information on world and European production and trade. Yet there is a lack of systematic and regularly updated statistics and indicators for the whole range of production and trade in the main areas listed in the first column of Table 13. Such information at corporate level as is provided by Table 14 is too general to serve as a basis for the effective targeting of European policies relating to public subsidies and trade negotiations; and it should be complement-

ed with more systematic information on the profitability of European firms in different subsectors of cultural production, distribution and trade.

11. Tourism and culture

In addition to trade, many of the discussions and analyses of the overall economic effects of the arts and culture have focused on a specific area: tourism. From a narrower perspective, they have focused on "cultural tourism", that is, on the capacity of the arts and culture (especially heritage) to attract tourists to countries and cities and thus advance economic growth. From a broader perspective the focus has been on the one hand on the cultural effects of tourism, and, even more broadly on cultural transformation caused by the flow of tourists.

There are scarcely any reliable comparative statistics or indicators which would really support discussions and analyses of cultural tourism from any of these perspectives. However, Tables 15a and 15b can be used to illustrate these perspectives and related policy issues.

Information in Table 15a has been used to suggest that the weight of world tourism might be gradually moving from Europe to other regions of the world, especially to the Far East. Yet, according to the forecast, the share for the whole of Europe will decrease by less than 2% (from 40% to 38.4%) of the world total by the year 2005. It goes without saying that European cultural diversity and its cities with cultural monuments, art and architecture are still the main attractions for tourists. The growth potentials in the new democracies of central and eastern Europe are probably greater than the forecast suggests.

Table 15a: Revenues from tourism (in thousands of millions of US dollars) in different regions of the world in 1995; and a forecast for 2005

Source: The World Travel and Tourism Council, 1995, The World Travel and Tourism Council, Reports, as presented by M. Pandya, 1995.

Region	Revenues from travel and tourism 1995	Share (%) of the world total in 1995	Forecast for the growth 1995-2005 (%)	Forecast for the revenues in 2005	Share (%) of the world total in 2005
- European Union	1 008	29.9	37	1 381	26.5
- Other western Europe	138	4.1	45	200.1	3.8
- Central and eastern Europe	205	6.0	106	422.3	8.1
- North America	956	28.4	30	1 242.8	23.8
- Caribbean	28	0.8	36	38.1	0.7
- Latin America	125	3.8	60	200.0	3.8
- Africa	58	1.7	75	101.5	1.9
- Middle East	58	1.7	235	194.3	3.7
- China, South Asia	127	3.8	141	306.1	5.8
- Australia, Japan, New Zealand	534	15.8	33	710.0	13.6
- Other Pacific	143	4.0	194	420.0	8.1
Total	3 380	100	54.5	5 216	99.9

Table 15b can be used to identify the major problems of European tourism. If we look at the national per capita figures, we notice that the highest ones (figures in bold) are those of small countries at the nodal points of tourist traffic (Luxembourg, Austria) or the ones with a special geographical or cultural appeal (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Iceland). It is not difficult to understand that these countries – and their original patterns of culture – are also the most vulnerable to mass tourism. The same problem is faced by many smaller European cities with special cultural appeal (Venice, Salzburg, Avignon, etc.). Although these problems are well known, the negative effects of tourism on culture and the cultural habitat are much less well documented than its positive economic returns.

Table 15b: Foreign tourists in western Europe in 1983-93 – Nights spent by non-resident aliens in pay accommodations per 100 000 inhabitants

Source: Eurostat, *Yearbook*, 1995, 398.

Country	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	Rank
Belgium	91	95	100	99	102	107	123	129	122	128	129	13
Denmark	186	178	175	166	160	156	167	182	202	225	n.a.	9
Germany	35	43	46	46	48	49	54	55	58	59	53	17
Greece	277	332	359	356	358	348	344	365	301	365	n.a.	5
Spain	219	242	215	238	251	239	214	176	202	208	226	8
France	128	n.a.	148	145	171	125	146	152	150	161	n.a.	11
Ireland	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	609	n.a.	2
Italy	140	138	140	152	160	161	151	147	150	144	147	12
Luxembourg	630	598	598	576	585	572	653	636	660	594	637	3
Netherlands	86	96	96	96	..	86	96	110	114	119	112	14
Portugal	121	129	151	167	171	178	183	196	223	203	183	10
UK	257	274	295	279	313	303	326	342	314	n.a.	n.a.	6
Austria	835	839	831	822	833	850	916	914	935	925	883	1
Finland	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	47	50	53	57	57	52	51	58	16
Iceland	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	193	215	211	232	259	261	256	n.a.	7
Sweden	n.a.	n.a.	90	86	84	84	89	77	65	67	70	15
Switzerland	555	537	539	531	522	516	541	550	545	536	n.a.	4

12. The growth potential of culture industries

Although previous tables have illustrated the changes in European cultural consumption and in the state of its culture industries, it is worthwhile looking at the available information on the more specific sectoral dynamics shaping their future.

First, Table 16a gives the 1993 situation in Europe with respect to the sectoral distribution of the media and their uses. The weight of the table still lies in the cells relating to the printed media and their use in advertising; the share of radio and television is a modest 14%. The table also indicates that two new areas, computer-mediated on-line services and digital off-line media have made successful inroads into media markets, both having already a higher turnover than the cinema or the phonogramme industry.

Table 16a: European media markets – Estimated distribution of turnover by the media and type of useSource, Statistics Finland, *Culture and the Media*, 1995, 2, 227.

MEDIA Type of use	Printed media	Radio and TV	Cinema and video	On-line information service	Digital off- line media	Phono- grammes	Total	%
Transactions	2 066	-	-	350	-	-	2 416	1.3
Advertising	52 576	18 139	568	4 047	100	-	75 430	40.4
Information	35 700	95	-	2 408	5 646	-	43 849	23.5
Education	4 800	480	280	753	2 664	-	8 977	4.8
Entertainment	35 000	7 437	4 756	275	1 230	7 351	56 049	30.0
Total	130 142	26 151	5 604	7 832	9 640	7 351	186 720	100
%	69.7	14.0	3.0	4.2	5.2	3.9	100.0	

Tables 16b, 16c and 16d give some recent growth figures for these areas. Although high growth rates may be partially due to the escalation stage of new successful applications, the figures open two interesting perspectives on cultural development. First, the greatest growth potentials and the highest growth rates of computer-mediated communication (exemplified by the Internet) are in the post-communist and in the developing countries, where it can obviously substitute for the lack of a more traditional communication and educational infrastructure. Secondly, as Table 16d indicates, arts, humanities, language and linguistics are among the high growth potential areas for CD-Rom and multimedia CD titles; and as Table 16c suggests, demand in these areas will with all likelihood escalate in the future.

Table 16b: Expansion of computer-mediated communications: Increase (%) of the number of Internet host computers in 1993-94 and by world regions in the third quarter of 1994

Sources: Kelly, 1994: 597-598; Third World Network Features, presented in Spybe, 1996, 116-117.

Region	August 1993	1 July 1994	1 Oct. 1994	Growth (%)
North America	n.a.	2 172 232	2 678 288	23
Latin America and Caribbean	n.a.	16 619	22 535	36
Western Europe	n.a.	730 429	850 993	17
Eastern Europe and CIS	n.a.	27 800	32 951	19
Middle East	n.a.	8 871	10 383	17
Africa	n.a.	15 595	21 041	35
Asia	n.a.	111 278	127 569	15
South Pacific and Australia	n.a.	142 353	154 473	9
Totals	about 1 700 000	3 225 177	3 898 233	21

NB Numbers refer to points linked to Internet.

Table 16c: The present and expected growth of the world-wide markets for CD-Rom drives

Source: Computer News, Focus, 34, 1995, 112.

Year	Number of installed CD-Rom drives (in millions)	Purchases of CD-Rom drives (in millions)
1994	33.2	22.6
1995	59.5	33.2
1996	86.3	40.8
1998	129.9	52.2
2000	161.1	61.1

Table 16d: Theme-by-theme breakdown of CD-Rom and Multimedia CD titles published in Europe in 1993-94Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, *Statistical yearbook, 1994-95*, 120.

Subject heading 1993	1993		1994		93/94
	No.	%	No.	%	Increase %
General interest, entertainment and games	600	16.7	1 043	19	73.8
Arts & humanities	447	12.4	724	13.2	61.9
Education, training & careers	424	11.8	631	11.5	48.8
Computers & computer programs	345	9.6	510	9.3	47.8
Advertising, design & marketing	280	7.8	429	7.8	53.2
Business & company information	265	7.4	426	7.7	60.7
Languages & linguistics	258	7.2	417	7.6	61.6
Crime, law & legislation	297	8.3	399	7.3	34.3
Science & technology	280	7.8	386	7	37.8
Maps, map data & geography	262	7.3	332	6	26.7
Government information & census data	266	7.4	320	5.8	20.3
Banking, finance & economics	249	6.9	302	5.5	21.3
Biomedicine, health & nursing	252	7	289	5.3	14.7
Earth science	188	5.2	270	4.9	43.6
Library & information science	194	5.4	240	4.4	23.7
News, media & publishing	171	4.8	237	4.3	38.6
Life sciences	146	4.1	202	3.7	38.3
Chemicals, drugs & pharmaceuticals	165	4.7	201	3.7	21.8
Transport & transportation systems	168	4.7	191	3.5	13.7
Social & political sciences	157	4.6	189	3.4	20.4
Directories	106	2.9	131	2.4	23.6
Agriculture, horticulture & fisheries	96	2.7	101	1.8	5.2
Architecture, construction & housing	86	2.4	81	1.5	-5.8
Military information & weapons	71	2	78	1.4	9.8
Intellectual property	46	1.3	50	0.9	8.7
Total of available titles	3 597		5 379		

The availability of statistical information in the complex and fast-growing areas of the new media suggest that enterprises are responsive to the needs of information and its advertising value. On the other hand, the new media, especially the applications of computer-mediated communications, have already radically altered the dissemination of information on the arts and culture and will continue to do that in the future. As an example one can mention that, using the Netscape, one could (in 1995) find some 15 000 to 20 000 references on the Internet to sites containing information on theatre.

13. The employment effects of culture industries and artistic activities

The positive employment effects of culture industries and artistic and cultural activities have in recent years been increasingly used in Europe to justify their public subsidies as well as trade restrictions and quotas limiting the import of foreign, especially American films, and television programmes. Tables 17a, 17b and 19 provide examples of statistics and indicators gathered with this motive; and Table 18, in turn, provides an American perspective for assessing their own culture industries.

Table 17a: Employment/turnover coefficients for estimating employment effects in the European Union at the beginning of the 1990s (employment per turnover, in millions of ecus)

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, 1995, 73.

Sector	Coefficients
Television broadcasting	5.7
Feature film production	24.7
Production of commercials	11.4
Cinema	14.0
Video retail	19.9
Facilities & laboratories, film and TV	3.3
Actors, musicians, writers, film and TV	2.7
Consumer audiovisual hardware retail	12.6

Table 17b: Estimates of employment effects of audiovisual industries in the European Union ("Europe of the 12") in 1985-88 and 1990-92, by subsector

Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, 1995, 72.

Sub-sector	1985	1986	1987	1988	1990	1991	1992
- Broadcast	117 384	121 651	126 752	133 038	142 097	148 126	154 474
- Feature film production	25 171	17 649	17 568	20 942	19 958	20 801	24 435
- Film and TV distribution	2 335	2 318	2 453	2 932	3 498	3 756	4 033
- Commercials production	12 819	13 965	13 543	14 614	15 362	15 753	16 069
- Corporate production	19 955	20854	21 842	24 323	26 335	25 846	26 624
- Cable television companies	10 392	11 767	12 955	16 604	24 317	28 649	32 424
- Exhibition	36 257	36 769	34 507	33 375	34 035	34 173	33 300
- Video retail	29 390	37 409	44 323	54 018	60 133	65 500	71 007
- Facilities and laboratories	8 025	6 918	7 372	9 659	11 121	11 958	13 007
- Actors, musicians, writers	17 938	17 805	18 845	22 469	26 828	28 852	30 984
- Libraries	6 906	7 004	6 753	6 357	6 483	6 509	6 343
- Production hardware manufacture	7 091	7 550	8 165	9 213	11 253	12 197	12 996
- Cable construction	13 453	16 389	20 548	25 026	23 765	26 001	23 998
- Video manufacture and duplication	10 000	11 640	13 55	16 556	18 541	20 334	22 042
- Consumer hardware manufacture	40 450	43 467	47 224	52 770	60 102	62 873	66 000
- Consumer hardware retail	270 263	276 415	288 531	303 687	303 362	306 833	306 819
- Other	5 748	6 056	6 461	7 191	7 946	8 327	8 633
Total employment "software"	286 572	294 109	306 913	338 331	370167	389 923	412 700
Total employment "hardware"	341 257	355 461	378 025	407 252	417 023	428 238	431 855
Total employment: audiovisual sector(*)	633 577	655 626	691 399	752 774	795 136	826 488	853 188
Number of full-time equivalent jobs per turnover in million ecus	21,03	20,16	19,66	19,01	16,65	16,14	15,41
Total employment EUR 12 (thousands)	122 803	121 866	122 177	123 026	122 482	123 358	122 123
Employment in audiovisual sector as percentage of total EUR 12 employment	0.52	0.54	0.57	0.61	0.65	0.67	0.70

Special studies have been used to establish the employment coefficient of different sectors of audiovisual culture industries (Table 17b) and they have been used to calculate, on the basis of sectoral turnover estimates, the employment figures of Table 17b. Although the coefficients seem to correspond to common sense observations (a high coefficient for feature film production, cinema and video retail sales) the calculations give – as the compilers themselves admit – surprisingly low employment figures. Thus European audiovisual industries would have employed only about 833 000 persons, when American "programme industries", as Table 18 indicates, employed at the same time nearly 2 million persons.

Table 18: Output value and employment effects of information, communications and culture industries in the USA in 1990-95Source: *Business Week*, January 1995: 45-48, 57, 63.

	Computer hardware	Semiconductors	Computer software	Telecommunications	Programme industry	(Health care) *
<i>Output value in thousands of millions of '94 US dollars:</i>						
-in 1990	40.1	21.9	82.7	133.9	119.6	629.5
-in 1995	80.1	39.9	97.2	160.9	132.3	738.1
growth %	99.1	82.2	17.5	20.1	10.6	17.1
<i>Employment in millions of workers:</i>						
-in 1990	0.44	0.24	1.96	1.06	1.77	8.81
-in 1995	0.35	0.24	2.58	0.99	2.01	10.50
growth %	-20.5	0.0	31.6	-6.6	13.9	17.3
<i>Productivity in thousands of '94 US dollars per employee:</i>						
-in 1990	91.7	91.5	42.2	126.8	67.6	71.4
-in 1995	231.7	167.	37.7	162.2	65.8	70.3
growth %	152.7	83.4	-10.7	27.9	-2.7	-1.5
* "Health care" included for the sake of comparison.						

Table 18 and its turnover, productivity and employment figures for 1990 and estimates for 1995 are based on American industrial statistics and they are presented as a part of a more comprehensive analysis of twenty-five American key industries. The relationship between productivity and employment in any given branch is, of course, reversed; and the statistics allow for easy analysis of the dynamics of development. The falling tendency of productivity and increased employment can be noticed only in two branches, the computer software industry and the programme industry, where products diversify and production processes become increasingly complex and demand repeated "user testing" before the products are launched on the market.

Coopers and Lybrand Corporate Financing has carried out in Ireland an extensive, and at least procedurally, very reliable country analysis of employment in the arts and culture industries (Table 19). The employment coefficients of Table 17a have been calculated in the last column of the table; and they give expected results. The most labour intensive branches are "live dance and movement", "crafts", "art centres", "theatre, opera, mime and puppetry" and "libraries", and the Irish employment coefficient of the audiovisual media coincides rather well with the aggregate European coefficients of Table 17a and 17b. The high employment coefficients certainly indicate that the arts and cultural services can provide jobs, even considerably better than labour intensive audiovisual industries. However, they also remind us of the fact that the provision of these jobs presupposes, at least in a small country, substantial public subsidies.

Table 19: The arts and media activities in Ireland in 1993: Employment effects, sectoral output values (in millions of Irish pounds) and employment coefficients

Source: Coopers and Lybrand Corporate Finance, 1994, 7.

Field of activities	1. Employed		2. Freelance		Total 1+2	Total value			Employment coefficient*
	Number	Full-time equivalent	Number	Full-time equivalent	Full-time equivalent	Gross Irish £ m	Grants Irish £ m	Net Irish £ m	
<i>a) Performing arts:</i>									
– Theatre, opera, puppetry	925	750	500	220	970	19.00	5.50	13.50	40.8
– Live dance and movement	55	55	100	20	75	0.26	0.21	0.05	227.3
– Live and recorded music	3 475	2 475	13 050	6 550	9 025	67.70	1.20	66.50	106.7
<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>4 455</i>	<i>3 280</i>	<i>13 650</i>	<i>6 790</i>	<i>10 070</i>	<i>86.96</i>	<i>6.91</i>	<i>80.05</i>	<i>92.6</i>
<i>b) Media:</i>									
– Film, TV, video, animation	1 922	1 922	1 500	675	2 597	111.98	0.50	111.48	18.6
– Radio broadcasting	1 086	896	0	0	896	35.50	0	35.50	20.2
– Literature and book publishing	190	190	320	140	330	8.90	0.85	8.05	29.7
<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>3 198</i>	<i>3 008</i>	<i>1 820</i>	<i>815</i>	<i>3 823</i>	<i>156.38</i>	<i>1.35</i>	<i>155.03</i>	<i>19.6</i>
<i>c) Combined arts:</i>									
– Arts festivals	300	115	250	10	125	4.00	0.60	3.40	23.0
– Arts centres	180	150	160	17	167	2.50	1.38	1.12	52.5
<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>480</i>	<i>265</i>	<i>410</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>292</i>	<i>6.50</i>	<i>1.98</i>	<i>4.52</i>	<i>35.2</i>
<i>d) Visual arts and design:</i>									
– Visual arts, photography	0	0	1 610	677	677	15.05	0.20	14.85	36.0
– Art galleries	310	235	0	0	235	7.00	0.90	6.10	28.2
– Applied design	2 501	2 501	120	60	2 561	93.56	0	93.56	21.9
– Craft	1 523	1 269	0	0	1 269	8.65	0.22	8.43	117.5
<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>4 334</i>	<i>4 005</i>	<i>1 730</i>	<i>737</i>	<i>4 742</i>	<i>124.26</i>	<i>1.32</i>	<i>122.94</i>	<i>30.5</i>
<i>e) Heritage and libraries:</i>									
– Museums	850	560	0	0	560	17.00	11.90	5.10	26.3
– Heritage centres	1 540	618	0	0	618	212.2	1.94	19.08	23.5
– Libraries	1 411	1 409	0	0	1 409	29.15	28.23	0.92	38.7
<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>3 801</i>	<i>2 587</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2 587</i>	<i>67.17</i>	<i>42.07</i>	<i>25.1</i>	<i>30.8</i>
TOTAL	16 268	13 145	17 610	8 369	21 514	441.27	53.63	387.64	39.0
* For the calculation of the coefficient, see Table 17b above.									

The statistics and indicators in Tables 17 to 19 provide ample opportunities for policy relevant analyses and cross-national comparisons. From a developmental perspective, they firstly share the weakness of economic profitability and social net benefit analyses presented in the context of Table 9: data acquisition is difficult, and if the perspective is opened to become more development-oriented, presupposing trend and time series analyses, it becomes well-nigh impossible. Secondly, the employment analyses and indicators tend to treat different branches of the arts, cultural services and culture industries on an equal footing, without paying attention to their mutual interrelations. Thus writers maintain employment in publishing and printing industries, the work of a successful director or a film star guarantees investments for further films, etc. The existence of cumulative output value and employment chains from

artistic creativity to cultural industrial production and various distribution channels and windows are often pointed out, but less often studied – and they unfortunately seem to be outside the present horizon of the developers of cultural statistics and indicators.

14. Emigration, labour markets and gender inequality

The perspective of employment can easily be expanded into a wider one, that of human capital, or intellectual resources, which might be a more appropriate term in the case of the arts and culture. Tables 20, 21 and 22 provide some – rather randomly chosen – illustrations for this area. Table 20 certainly has some instant information value from the perspective of development in the post-communist societies. The loss, in terms of actual “permanent” emigration, of artists and cultural workers from the Russian Federation to other countries is at present somewhat more than a thousand adult members of the labour force annually. These figures hide the fact that about five times that many artists and cultural workers leave Russia for a temporary stay abroad (study, grants, longer temporary appointment, etc.) and about 25-30% of these persons emigrate or obtain the status of resident alien abroad, bringing the annual loss up to 2 400 to 2 600. The immediate policy concern seems to be how to improve the lot of artists in post-communist societies to stop this “brain drain” – which, of course, is a more drastic problem in science and technology.

The brain drain perspective is that of “a donor country” and the migration flow looks different from the perspective of the main receiving countries, in this case Germany, Israel and the United States. Although the arrival of immigrants may temporarily upset artists’ labour markets, it also implies a “free” input of well-trained and creative talents into these societies. It is also a well-known fact that, from the perspective of the donor country, emigrant colonies of artists can provide a good basis for effective and profitable cultural exchange relations with the receiving country. From a more general perspective, artists’ migration processes often give rise to interculturalism and new melange.

The problem of providing comparative statistical information on the economic and social status of artists has been discussed in several international meetings. International surveys have provided fairly solid comparative documentary information, but rather few examples of statistics or policy relevant indicators (see for example Finnish National Commission for Unesco, 1992). In 1991, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) tried to create comparative survey data for its tripartite meeting on the conditions and employment of performers. Table 21 presents the only valid comparative information on European performing artists the survey did produce.

Table 20: Emigration flow (persons in adult labour force) from Russia by sector and destination in 1992 and 1993

Source: Margareta Strepetove, 1995: 3.

Destination	Total flow	Sectors *							% art, culture
		1. Industry, etc.	2. Agriculture, etc.	3. Services	4. Science, education	5. Health, welfare	6. Art, culture	7. Other	
<i>To all countries:</i>									
1992	58 730	16 164	8 763	4 623	4 572	4 110	1 053	19 472	1.8
1993	67 775	19 668	9 813	4 765	5 876	4 180	1 135	22 341	1.7
<i>To eastern Europe, total:</i>									
1992	454	78	3	37	31	13	16	276	3.5
1993	355	67	3	17	38	30	9	231	2.5
<i>To the developed countries, total:</i>									
1992	58 276	16 086	8 733	4 586	4 541	4 097	1 037	19 196	1.8
1993	67 385	19 601	9 810	4 748	5 838	4 150	1 123	22 110	1.7
<i>Of the developed countries, to Germany:</i>									
1992	34 202	10 610	8 455	2 854	2 765	2 245	479	6 793	1.4
1993	43 457	13 866	9 358	3 162	3 536	2 508	542	10 485	1.7
<i>Of the developed countries, to Israel:</i>									
1992	13 972	3 355	171	1 217	1 163	1 299	392	6 375	2.8
1993	12 635	3 408	297	1 069	1 116	902	270	5 573	2.1
<i>Of the developed countries, to the US:</i>									
1992	7 964	1 569	82	341	477	445	138	4 912	1.7
1993	9 076	1 804	88	393	939	589	270	4 993	3.0
<i>Of the developed countries, to Greece:</i>									
1992	848	357	18	107	43	65	6	252	0.7
1993	743	258	49	61	74	58	7	286	0.9
<i>Of the developed countries, to Australia:</i>									
1992	514	83	2	21	50	17	9	332	1.8
1993	335	59	0	12	48	28	6	182	1.8
* Sectors in complete: 1) Industry, power engineering, transport, communications, logistics, construction; 2) Agriculture, forestry, procurement; 3) Trade, public catering, municipal infrastructure, insurance, management; 4) Science, public education; 5) Health, welfare, physical culture; 6) Art, culture; 7) Other.									

Table 21 conveys a rather limited amount of information about the economic position of artists. It tells the well-known story of the glaring differences in performers' earnings between western Europe and the post-communist

countries, which certainly do contribute to the emigration flows depicted in our previous table. It raises, however, two more important general issues: how should these differences in wages and other compensations for creative work be managed; and what role do they play in cultural and overall development? From the point of view of equality the answer to the first question is simple: equal remuneration should be paid for equal work.

Table 21: Monthly average earnings of a full-time rank-and-file musician in a provincial symphony orchestra (or nearest equivalent) in Europe and some other countries in 1991

Source: International Labour Organisation, TMP, 1992.

Country	Earnings in national currency	Equivalent in US dollars
Austria *	20 186 - 34356	1 602 - 2 727
Belgium	70 953	1 918
Czechoslovakia	3 300	107
Denmark	14 000 - 21 000	2 017 - 3026
Finland	10 000	2 347
France	12 000	1 967
Germany *	3 437 - 4 720	1 909 - 2622
Hungary **	9 000 - 20 000	122 - 270
Italy	2 000 000	1 498
Luxembourg	102 917	2 781
Poland ***	1 150 000	100
Romania	4 000	66
Spain	230 000	2 035
Sweden ****	15 263	2 348
Switzerland *	4 856 - 5 879	3 132 - 3 793
USSR	360	199
United Kingdom	949	1 548
Australia *	2 069 - 2 5631	1 592 - 1972
Japan	270 000	1 957
United States	2 032 - 4 160	2 032 - 4 160
* ** *** ****	Depending on years of service Depending on years of service and the status of the orchestra After ten years' service Minimum salaries in "average" orchestras	

The natural retort is that special excellence should also receive its due compensation; defining both the "excellence" and the "due" is more than difficult and should probably be left to be decided by the natural law of demand and supply – and the skills of arts managers and the staff of culture industry firms whose task it is to find bankable talents. Yet, it is also a well-known fact that there is a need for initial investments in artists' training by public authorities, and only nations with good "nurseries" for creativity can produce talents of international renown.


The second question raises the issue of how regional and international differences in artists' earnings shape the geographical distribution of talents and how this in turn influences cultural development in general. Some tentative

answers were given above in the discussion of the emigration of artists; more specific answers would require statistics and other information which as yet does not exist.

Figure 1 raises a parallel issue of gender equality in artists' career patterns. It illustrates with German data the well-known fact that the relative share of women decreases in the higher echelons of artistic work. From the point of view of equality we have an univocal answer: the opportunities for advancement and to receive benefits such as grants should be the same irrespective of gender; and if it cannot be otherwise guaranteed, quotas and positive discrimination should be used to make the playing ground more even. From the long term, developmental point of view this answer raises many additional issues pertaining to motivation of female artists, the maintenance of the special nature of female aesthetics. Much work has been carried out to provide statistical descriptions and evidence for gender inequality; more work would be needed to assess the actual long term effects of gender inequality on creativity and related cultural development.

Figure 1: Career pattern of female artists: the “pyramid of success” in Germany in 1995

Source: Zentrum für Kulturforschung (Hg./Ed.), *Frauen im Kultur- und Mediabetrieb* II., English summary, 198.



15. Basic values and orientations to life and moral issues

It is generally claimed that the creativity and special qualities of European culture are based on diversity. In more concrete terms, this diversity is defined as the presence of a great variety of linguistic, ethnic and religious differences, and differences in mores, lifestyles and cultural practices between different

European nations, regions, cities and local communities. This definition tends to omit deeper differences and similarities in European value systems, which divide and unite Europe. In recent years these differences have been mapped by several European value surveys. Most thorough mapping and analysis has been carried out under the auspices of the European value studies research group (surveys of 1981 and 1990), although similar studies in more limited value areas have been carried out under the auspices of Eurobarometer.

European values analyses – and related analyses of cultural differences – have probed European values along two axes: traditionalism versus modernity and social integration versus disintegration. The former axis pertains to differences in respect of morals, religious affiliation and beliefs, values relating to family life and sexuality; the latter axis to work satisfaction, reliance on norms or individual contacts in human relations, approval of deviant and minority groups, etc. Table 22, which ranks some European countries along the dimensions of “traditional double morals” and modern “liberal values”, offers an illustration of these analyses. By examining the simultaneous presence/absence of these values, Typology 2 clusters the same countries into country groups, which suggests that a profound interaction prevails between values, culture and social and political systems.

Table 22: Rank order of selected European countries along four value dimensions. Ranking according to the share (%) of approving responses in national samples to value items in a 1990 European survey*

Source: Schweisguth, E., 1995, 131-166.

Country	Rank order of a double moral in:			Rank order of liberalism in:		
	1) sexual life	2) citizen's duties	Sum 1-2	3) child rearing	4) sexual behaviour	Sum 3-4
Belgium	6	2	8	10	10	12
Denmark	12	13	25	1	3	6
France	5	1	6	12	6	18
Germany	2	3	15	3	5	8
Iceland	11	10	21	4	2	6
Ireland	9	9	18	8	13	21
Italy	8	8	16	9	9	18
Netherlands	3	6	9	6	1	7
Norway	13	12	25	2	7	9
Portugal	7	4	11	13	12	25
Spain	1	5	6	7	11	18
Sweden	10	11	21	5	4	9
United Kingdom	4	7	11	11	8	19

* Respondents were asked whether they approved of:
 1) prostitution, adultery;
 2) cheating in taxes, taking undue welfare payments, not paying due fees, if possible;
 3) non-authoritarian education for creativity and imagination;
 4) sexual rights for homosexuals, freedom to abort, divorce.

Typology 2: The basic values of Europeans: country clusters

Source: Schweisguth, E., 1995, 131-166.

Level of forfeiting social code	Level of defending liberal values		
	High (5-10)	Medium (11-20)	Low (21 +)
High (5-10)	Netherlands Germany	France Belgium Spain Great Britain	
Medium (11-20)		Italy	Ireland Portugal
Low (21+)	Denmark Iceland Norway Sweden		

The results of value studies are usually interpreted from the point of view of economic development and political unity: traditional values are seen as a hindrance to economic growth, socially integrative values as a source of national and European cohesion. Typology 2 suggests that "positive" and "negative" values can prevail simultaneously –at least in such aggregate communities as a nation, but probably also on an individual and group level. It also raises the questions of the developmental effects of the tensions between apparently conflicting values. Are these tensions only disruptive, or can they also function as a dynamic force? Has not the dilemma of religious salvation been identified as a "spiritual basis" of capitalism, and have not unsolvable moral problems provided the main themes for European drama and literature? It is, of course, too much to be asked for the compilers of statistics and indicators to provide information for the analysis of such profound issues. On the other hand, value studies remind them of the dangers of taking such values as "modernity" and "integration" for granted.

16. Identity and attitudes towards foreigners

The following illustrations also address value issues, yet this time within the more restricted areas of identity formation and attitudes towards foreigners. Table 23 probes the relationship between national/European identity and attitudes towards foreigners. There seems to be no systematic relationship between the attitudes towards foreigners and the strength of either European or national identity. As for example the comparison between Ireland and Greece, or Belgium and Luxembourg bears witness, totally opposite attitudes towards foreigners may prevail in countries with a similar aggregate identity structure.

The absence of a clear pattern in Table 23 suggests that attitudes may actually be determined by the situation, that is, the presence/absence of a significant community of foreigners. This idea is tested in Table 24 which also provides factual information on the number of non-EC aliens in thirteen European countries. The actual situation seems to predict attitudes somewhat better than felt identities, although there are also clear exceptions (Spain, Portugal).

Table 23: National/European affiliation and attitudes towards foreigners in 13 European countries in 1994:

Responses to survey questions: 1) What do you feel is your affiliation now and in the near future? (rows) 2) How do you feel about the number of foreigners in your country? (columns)

Source: Eurobarometer 42 (1994), Räsänen, Ilkka, 1996, 88.

Country	Too many	Plenty, but not too many	Not too many	Column
All 13 countries (weighted average)				
Only national affiliation	47	28	30	37%
National and European	43	54	52	49%
European and national	6	12	11	9%
Only European	4	6	8	6%
Row	43%	42%	15%	100%
France				
Only French	31	11	19	23%
French and European	49	62	41	53%
European and French	8	18	20	12%
Only European	12	9	20	11%
Row	57%	37%	6%	100%
Belgium				
Only Belgian	39	17	18*	31%
Belgian and European	43	48	33	44%
European and Belgian	11	20	24	14%
Only European	7	15	24	11%
Row	61%	34%	5%	100%
The Netherlands				
Only Dutch	44	23	19	33%
Dutch and European	45	60	56	52%
European and Dutch	8	11	10	9%
Only European	3	6	16	6%
Row	49%	41%	10%	100%
Germany				
Only German	47	21	21	32%
German and European	43	49	39	46%
European and German	6	19	24	14%
Only European	4	10	16	8%
Row	41%	51%	8%	100%
Italy				
Only Italian	34	19	18	26%
Italian and European	56	60	54	57%
European and Italian	7	15	19	12%
Only European	3	6	10	5%
Row	49%	43%	8%	100%

Table 23 continued...

Country	Too many	Plenty, but not too many	Not too many	Column
Luxembourg				
Only Luxembourgish	36	11	15*	17%
Luxemburgish and European	49	58	41	55%
European and Luxembourgish	9	17	22*	15%
Only European	6	14	22*	13%
Row	23%	71%	6%	100%
Denmark				
Only Danish	61	43	26	48%
Danish and European	34	51	55	45%
European and Danish	2*	4	11	4%
Only European	1	2	7	3%
Row	40%	44%	15%	100%
Ireland				
Only Irish	60	37	37	39%
Irish and European	35	54	54	53%
European and Irish	4*	6	6	6%
Only European	1*	2	3	3%
Row	8%	40%	52%	100%
United Kingdom				
Only British	68	41	22	51%
British and European	23	44	47	35%
European and British	4	9	17	8%
Only European	5	6	13	6%
Row	46%	43%	12%	100%
Greece				
Only Greek	45	43	40	45%
Greek and European	49	49	50	49%
European and British	4	3	10*	4%
Only European	2	4	0*	2%
Row	65%	33%	12%	100%
Spain				
Only Spanish	43	33	32	35%
Spanish and European	49	57	55	54%
European and Spanish	3	7	4	5%
Only European	5	3	10	5%
Row	28%	47%	25%	100%
Portugal				
Only Portuguese	57	36	34	43%
Portuguese and European	36	57	59	50%
European and Portuguese	3	4	5	4%
Only European	3	3	2	3%
Row	34%	39%	27%	100%
Norway				
Only Norwegian	58	37	23	45%
Norwegian and European	37	55	64	48%
European and Norwegian	4	6	12	6%
Only European	0*	2*	2*	1%
Row	48%	40%	12%	100%

Table 24: The size of Muslim population and number of registered non-EC aliens in thirteen European countries in 1990 (in thousands) and attitude towards foreigners in 1994

Source: Chesnais, 1995, 283.

Country	Size of Muslim population	Number of registered non-EC aliens	Registered non-EC aliens, % of population	% of 1994 survey respondents considering number of foreigners too high
Germany (West)	2 000	3 400	5.3	41
France	2 200	2 300	3.9	57
United Kingdom	1 300	1 400	2.2	49
Italy	700	1 000	1.7	49
Netherlands	500	600	2.5	49
Spain	400	400	1.0	28
Belgium	400	380	3.8	61
Portugal	100	150	1.5	34
Greece	700	120	1.2	65
Denmark	100	110	2.4	40
Ireland	n.a.	20	0.6	8
Luxembourg	n.a.	10	2.6	23
EC total	8 400	9 890	3.0	43

Estimated number of illegal aliens in the Mediterranean countries: Italy: 700 000, Spain: 105 000, Greece: 220 000, Portugal: 70 000-100 000.

Our illustrations suggest that the issue of a “fortress” – either national or European – against foreigners is a complex one, which in the long run may undermine both national and European cohesion. Although more general information in terms of statistics and surveys is needed, special attention should be paid to such deviant cases as were noted above, and the cultural conditions which give rise to them.

17. Empowering people

Analyses in the previous section have approached the search for a developmental perspective to cultural statistics and indicators in some major sectors in an indirect fashion: looking at how present viable statistical and survey information could be expanded to deal better with developmental issues. We may next address the issue from a more general perspective and ask whether it is feasible to try to develop statistics and indicators which would measure directly the impact of the arts and culture on development.

The best starting point for answering this question is provided by the Human Development index (HDI) contrived by the United Nations Development Programme. This Index contains three major components, life expectancy (representing a long and healthy life), educational attainment (representing knowledge) and real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (taken into account only to a certain “reasonably high” level, representing a decent standard of living). As the designers of the index state, it measures the capacity a given society provides to its citizens to avail themselves of opportunities

offered. The index has also been modified to account for inequalities due to social strata and gender.

Tables 25a and 25b illustrate the type of comparative analysis which can be carried out with the Human Development Index. For instance, they suggest that a major gap is opening between the main western industrialised countries and post-communist countries in the areas of health and education, while the latter still have an advantage in these areas with respect to the less developed countries.

Table 25a: Differences in human development: A comparison of three post-communist countries with five leading countries in respect of HDI components and indicators in 1992*

Source: United Nations Development Programme, *Human development report 1995*; see especially pages 14 and 74.

	Canada	USA	Japan	Nether-lands	Finland	Czech Repub.	Russian Feder.	Lithu-ania
World ranking in HDI (among 174 nations)	1	2	3	4	5	38	52	71
Life expectancy at birth	77.4	76.0	79.5	77.4	75.7	71.3	67.6	70.4
Adult literacy ratio	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	98.7	98.4
Gross education enrolment ratio	100	95	77	88	96	68	69	67
Real per capita GDP, (PPP\$)	20 520	23 760	20 520	17 780	16 270	7 690	6 140	3700
Adjusted real per capita GDP	5 359	5 374	5 359	5 343	5 337	5 221	5 184	3 700
Life expectancy index	0.87	0.85	0.91	0.87	0.85	0.77	0.71	0.76
Education index	0.99	0.98	0.92	0.95	0.98	0.89	0.89	0.88
GDP index	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.67
Human Development Index	0.950	0.937	0.937	0.936	0.934	0.872	0.849	0.769
GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus HDI rank **	7	-1	5	16	19	8	0	11
Gender-related development index (GDI) ***	0.891	0.901	0.896	0.851	0.918	0.858	0.822	0.750
World ranking in GDI (among 130 nations)	9	5	8	20	2	15	29	44
* ** ***	<p>The main indicator Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index containing three components: life expectancy (representing long and healthy life), educational attainment (representing knowledge) and real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity dollars (PP\$), (representing a decent standard of living).</p> <p>A positive figure shows that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank, a negative is the opposite.</p> <p>The gender related development index adjusts the HDI for gender equality by penalising for lower life expectancy, educational attainment and income for women.</p>							

Table 25b: Differences in human development: A comparison of four less developed countries with five leading countries in respect of HDI components and indicators in 1992 *

Source: United Nations Development Programme, *Human development report 1995*: see especially pages 14 and 74.

	Canada	USA	Japan	Nether-lands	Finland	Bots-wana	Nigeria	Bangla-desh	Sierra Leone
World ranking in HDI (among 174 nations)	1	2	3	4	5	74	141	145	173
Life expectancy at birth	77.4	76.0	79.5	77.4	75.7	64.9	50.4	55.6	39.0
Adult literacy ratio	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	67.2	52.5	36.4	28.7
Gross education enrolment ratio	100	95	77	88	96	71	51	38	28
Real per capita GDP, (PPP\$)	20,520	23,760	20,520	17,780	16,270	5,120	1,560	1,230	880
Adjusted real per capita GDP	5,359	5,374	5,359	5,343	5,337	5,120	1,560	1,230	880
Life expectancy index	0.87	0.85	0.91	0.87	0.85	0.67	0.42	0.51	0.23
Education index	0.99	0.98	0.92	0.95	0.98	0.68	0.52	0.37	0.28
GDP index	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.94	0.27	0.21	0.15
Human development index	0.950	0.937	0.937	0.936	0.934	0.763	0.406	0.364	0.221
GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank minus HDI rank **	7	-1	5	16	19	-7	-6	-5	-20
Gender-related development index (GDI) ***	0.891	0.901	0.896	0.851	0.918	0.696	0.383	0.334	0.195
World ranking in GDI (among 130 nations)	9	5	8	20	2	55	100	108	129
* ** ***	<p>The main indicator Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index containing three components: life expectancy (representing long and healthy life), educational attainment (representing knowledge) and real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity dollars, (representing a decent standard of living).</p> <p>A positive figure shows that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP\$) rank, a negative is the opposite.</p> <p>The gender related development index adjusts the HDI for gender equality by penalising for lower life expectancy, educational attainment and income for women.</p>								

It would be possible – and it also has been suggested – that culture could be introduced into the HDI as an additional component, measuring cultural rights and people's ability to understand and appreciate aesthetic values. Although this certainly would be possible, the problems of designing indicators for this component of “capacity for culture” and giving it an appropriate weight in respect of other components may open up most of the problems discussed earlier in this paper. Another problem is that, as our illustrations of participation and gender differences show, such indicators may measure “theoretical cultural capacity” only, rather than the opportunities available to use it.

These critical comments by no means belittle the value of the HDI measures or their contribution to developmental debates. They certainly set a standard which should be observed in developing cultural statistics and indicators from a developmental perspective.

18. Entitling future generations

We may end our foray into the complex world of cultural statistics and indicators by examining a crucial issue for all world regions and cultures: education and other transfers of values from one generation to another.

Recent policy debates have emphasised intergenerational solidarity in the provision of arts and the legacy values of works of art and cultural products, in other words, the cultural heritage that present generations accumulate and preserve for future generations. This is a major issue certainly in developmental debates concerning the effects of the arts and culture. However, we may have a look at the reverse side of the same coin and ask to what extent and how present generations prepare their children and youth to receive heritage and, in turn, to maintain it and add to its value.

Table 26 reports some main findings of the Eurostat survey of 1994 probing the educational attitudes of European citizens (a sample in different countries of citizens aged 16 or older). The country differences are surprisingly small, and the “main qualities” people wish to encourage in children are (in order of importance): sense of responsibility, tolerance and respect for others, good manners, and self-reliance. After these serious traits, “love of life” occupies a respectable fifth position, but the “artistic” qualities, imagination and creativity, taste for life's pleasures and appreciation of beauty, are placed in bottom ranks.

The survey may illustrate the concept of education in Europe: to develop good knowledgeable citizens. On the other hand, it also reflects a fact supported by any examination of school curricula: the arts and culture occupy formally an important position, they are emphasised as sources of innovations and flexible human capital, but they are as actual activities left to the care of voluntary interests of children and their parents. While developing cultural statistics and indicators it would be important to provide information on to what extent attitudes, educational practices and actual interests in artistic activities do correlate, and also how all these components separately and jointly contribute to balanced cultural and overall development.

Table 26: Qualities considered to be encouraged in children: results of a 1993 European survey

Source: Eurostat *Yearbook*, 1995, 156.

	Belgium	Denmark	Germany (West)	Germany (East)	Germany (both W&E)	Greece	Spain	Europe of the 12 (rank order)
Good manners	42	31	31	35	32	59	42	40 (3)
Self-reliance	19	59	60	71	62	16	15	29 (4)
Hard work	9	1	5	7	5	10	14	11 (8)
Sense of responsibility	52	59	60	53	59	48	64	56 (1)
Imagination and creativity	9	23	15	14	15	12	12	11 (8)
Tolerance and respect for others	47	59	45	29	42	21	56	50 (2)
Sense of thrift	15	4	13	21	15	8	14	11 (8)
Determination and perseverance	22	11	6	9	7	27	8	13 (6)
Religious faith	6	3	8	3	7	22	10	10 (11)
Generosity	6	1	3	1	2	2	10	8 (13)
Obedience	15	6	8	10	9	16	12	13 (6)
Love of life	22	36	34	30	33	26	26	28 (5)
Courage	12	3	5	5	5	15	4	9 (12)
Taste of life's pleasures	10	1	5	5	5	6	6	5 (14)
Appreciation of beauty	2	1	5	6	5	1	1	2 (15)

Table 26 continued...

	France	Ireland	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	United Kingdom	Europe of the 12
Good manners	32	54	43	49	50	48	50	40
Self-reliance	32	19	18	19	17	14	16	29
Hard work	14	17	11	7	7	37	14	11
Sense of responsibility	48	51	64	56	61	53	48	56
Imagination and creativity	14	8	5	11	6	10	10	11
Tolerance and respect for others	53	54	46	51	52	42	62	50
Sense of thrift	8	6	15	16	5	15	3	11
Determination and perseverance	20	14	12	18	23	10	15	13
Religious faith	6	19	17	5	10	11	9	10
Generosity	14	7	12	7	1	12	9	8
Obedience	17	12	10	12	13	17	18	13
Love of life	27	19	26	30	38	13	27	28
Courage	19	7	11	9	2	6	6	9
Taste of life's pleasures	7	2	4	2	7	3	2	5
Appreciation of beauty	2	3	1	1	1	0	3	2

19. Conclusions

This assessment started by pointing out some clear deficiencies in the "state of the art" in developing cultural statistics and systems of indicators. We concluded that although there has been a plethora of attempts to develop systems of cultural statistics in Europe, the results from the point of view of standardisation and comparability are rather limited. A more dynamic approach can be found in analyses of the economic impacts of the arts and culture, but more comprehensive ideas of sustainable development have so far made little headway, or actually none at all.

In the preceding thirteen sections we have step by step gradually opened up our review and assessment towards a more developmental approach and, at the same time, conceptualised some major issues facing both cultural policy decision makers and developers of cultural statistics and indicators. This strategy – which has also served to provide illustrations for the arguments of the European report – may not have been as constructive as it should; and certainly no synthesis or systematic frame has emerged as a result of the analyses and illustrations. The two lessons they may offer are that developers of cultural statistics and indicators should be fully aware of what interests their work serves, and one of these interests – if not the main one – should be that of sustainable development both in Europe and in the world.

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Appendix II: Some case studies and examples of cultural projects engaging with development issues

1. Introduction

During the course of its investigation the attention of the European Task Force was drawn to a number of imaginative examples of cultural initiatives which are engaging with development issues. There is much cultural activity in Europe today, some of it quite remarkable and the task force would have preferred to have provided illustrations from each of the member states that have signed the European Cultural Convention. As this was impossible, we have selected a handful of examples instead.

Some of the case studies that follow are original, but not unique – similar activities are springing up in various parts of Europe. Others are unique, but perhaps the concepts they employ are not entirely original. A few were at early stages of development. All of them fulfil at least one of the four key principles – creativity, identity, diversity and participation – which have occupied us in this report. We have grouped them here broadly in accordance with the extent to which they have the potential to meet one of the three major aspects of culture in sustainable development that are identified in our report (2.4.5):

- their contribution to the accumulation of knowledge and understanding;
- their economic and social outcomes;
- their function as human capital and as a means of empowerment and entitlement.

Of course, several of the examples fulfil more than one of these criteria.

We believe these brief case studies, and countless examples like them in Europe, speak more eloquently of the importance of culture in Europe today than we could hope to in our report.

2. The contribution of culture to the sum of knowledge and understanding

2.1 *Alliances between the arts and technological research and development*

2.1.1 *The desk top crucible for creativity.* Every month a growing number of interactive designers, film animators, film makers, artists, writers, lecturers, computer scientists and creative people in other disciplines rendezvous

at the Scientific Societies Lecture Theatre in London's West End. They are members of The Hub Club, a forum initiated by the Arts Council of England to promote the creative use of desktop computers and the production of interactive media. The Hub Club is a meeting place for people and ideas. A debate on film looked at the creation of interactive computer games (the UK is a leader in this sector with about 40% of the world market in research and development in new games), on the premise that if games can be combined with film to produce a satisfactory interactive experience there would be opportunities for artists to play a major role within a new medium. Another debate focused on digital media as a growing "cottage" (that is local) industry. The quality of interactive pieces was so high the Arts Council of England has initiated a commissioning scheme called "Emotional Computing" to attract new work for floppy disk. Launched in 1995 as a pilot scheme, there are now similar clubs in five other English cities and it is expected to develop nationally and internationally.

2.1.2 *Cybercafé culture.* If the Hub Club idea does prove successful, could it emulate the extraordinary success of the "cybercafés" that have sprung up across the globe? Since London's Cyberia opened as Europe's first "cybercafé" (the title is a generic term for any establishment that sells food and drink as well as providing access for customers to computers and the Internet), about five new "cybercafés" have opened in Europe every month.¹ Not all of them are like "Cyberia", which has many personal computers tied to an internet service provider with a private digital circuit and which offers training sessions and seminars. Some "cybercafés", for example in the village bar in Duisburg, Germany, or bars in Pavia, near Milan, Italy, are far more modest in scope, having simply installed one or two computers and a modem. According to Mark Dziecielewski, compiler of the Cybercafé Guide on the World Wide Web, there were only two Internet cafés listed outside the USA in 1994. By September 1995 there were more than sixty in Europe, in cities such as Barcelona, Copenhagen, Dublin, Hamburg and Helsinki. At Stenungsund in Sweden there is an Internet café combined with a personal computer museum. The Pompidou Centre in Paris has opened a "cybercafé" with fifteen terminals and video conferencing facilities, designed as a creative art centre to help traditional artists experience digital technology. It could be a model that demonstrates that the more successful "cybercafés" are those where there is already an exciting cultural environment.

2.1.3 *Art and technology: mutual impacts on creativity and production.* The Sibelius Academy Computer Music Studio (Sacmus), under the auspices of the Department of Composition and Music Theory, promotes the role of electro-acoustic music in the teaching of the academy and computer music activities in its research programmes. The studio was also established to become a nodal point in national and international co-operation between musical creation and technological research. It co-operates with the Acoustics Laboratory of the Helsinki University of Technology in the field of modern

1. The task force is indebted to the *European* newspaper and May, John, whose article "Keyboards with your coffee", published in the issue of 28 September-4 October 1995, was drawn on for this paragraph.

computer-based acoustics technology, and it has close ties with Ircam (Institut de Recherche et de Coordination Acoustique-Musique), Paris, which functions as a major force in Europe in developing modern electronic music.

The main areas of research and development of the Acoustics Laboratory are physical modelling (of acoustic instruments) and related model-based sound synthesis and virtual acoustics. In both areas its research benefits teaching within the Department of Composition and Music Theory of the Sibelius Academy and the work of personnel at Sacmus. The Laboratory also co-operates closely with the Luterie Department of the Ikaalinen Institute of Arts and Crafts. Its work in the long run will provide a new impetus to acoustic and electronic instrument production, virtual music production and concert hall designs in Finland and internationally. Co-operation between art and technology in this case has evolved in two ways: starting from the acoustics of classic music instruments and instrumentation to contemporary artistic creation (theory of modern music composition) it extends to computer-aided technological research; secondly, from trans-national experimental artistic co-operation to international enhancing of technological know-how.

The example of Sacmus and the Acoustics Laboratory at Helsinki University could provide an important model for the future of European creativity and cultural production, in that it acknowledges that units of art and technology need to enhance their interaction and mutual impacts on new creative initiatives. At the same time, the model also demonstrates the importance of maintaining links to traditional arts and crafts.

2.1.4 Interactive multimedia approaches to dance teaching and choreography. The development of video as a basis for innovative dance teaching, for choreographic notation of dance movements, and as an archive record of performance is now widespread in Europe – so much so, in fact, that video dance has become an art form in itself and international video dance festivals are held in several countries to demonstrate the creative use of video. New interactive multimedia techniques provide opportunities to take this educational process further. One of the interesting initiatives is spearheaded by Bedford Interactive, an independent company, run by a computer specialist, software consultant and dance teacher. It has invented a range of specially designed interactive tools, ultimately to provide users of multimedia/CDi resource packs with flexible creative and comprehensively layered dance/movement teaching and learning activities. Its development of multimedia techniques, together with maximum video control, provides teachers and learners with exciting new resources, for example its research includes work on a parametered figure – a technology for creating movement which can be edited from a live video source.

Bedford Interactive is developing new strategies for teaching and learning movement-based activities. An important characteristic of its resource-based teaching approach is the use of dance professionals as exemplars. This ensures the artistic and aesthetic quality in the composition and performance. The company is engaged in research of resource-based teaching through interactive video to explore how tasks at different levels provide starting

points for the student's own learning about dance – style, form, expression, accompaniment, stage, costume, lighting design and performance.

2.2 *Culture, quality of life and the environment*

2.2.1 *Common Ground: an uncommon organisation.* Common Ground is working to encourage new ways of looking at the world and so enthuse people into recalling “the richness of the commonplace and the value of the everyday, to savour the symbolisms with which we have endowed nature, to revalue our emotional engagement with places and all that they mean to us and to go on to become actively involved in their care”.¹ Considered by some to be the most original environmental organisation in the United Kingdom, it directs its attention to the complex inter-relationship of natural history, architecture, art, social history, legend and literature. In its work, whether projects, books or exhibitions, Common Ground has sought to bring arts and conservation together in new ways and to make people aware of their relationship to their surroundings.

In *Knowing Your Place*, Common Ground commissioned artists of national reputation to produce work which could excite people imaginatively with ideas for expressing their attachment to place. The exhibition that resulted was conceived as part of Common Ground's Parish Maps Project, which sought to encourage people to chart the things which they value in their environment as a starting point for conservation action. Since its launch, hundreds of local maps have been produced by women's groups, schools, local civic societies and parish councils in many forms (posters, newspapers, books, music and jigsaws) and many practical conservation initiatives have been started.

In 1990, Common Ground, conceived the idea of Apple Day as a celebration and warning of the variety that is being lost, not simply of apples, but in the richness and diversity of landscape, place and culture as well. In a large marquee erected in the Covent Garden Piazza in London, it mounted photographic exhibitions of orchards, together with a display of more than 100 varieties of apple from all over the UK.

Trees and woodlands have been an important symbol of the organisation. In conjunction with the South Bank Centre, in London, Common Ground commissioned twenty-eight artists to explore the contemporary relevance of the Tree of Life in an exhibition that attracted 30 000 people and then toured nationwide. A joint exhibition with the Crafts Council, called *Out of the Wood*, included works of sculpture, ceramics, glass, photography, silverware, ironwork, neon, jewellery and applique all inspired by trees. Its *Country Seats* project, organised in association with the Woodland Trust, encouraged the creation by sculptors of unusual and original seats in woodland sites to broaden public appreciation of the value of trees. In this, as with other projects involving writers and artists, the aim has been to demonstrate that the indi-

1. This case study draws on King, Angela & Clifford, Sue, *An introduction to the deeds and thoughts of Common Ground*, published by Common Ground, London.

vidual's relationship with the environment and the natural world are an essential part of their imaginative, social and cultural life.

2.2.2 *An environmentally friendly festival.* An environmental project on a different scale can be found in Stockholm in August each year when, for ten days, the centre of the city is transformed by the Stockholm Water Festival. Numerous stages, open air restaurants and shops appear in front of the Royal Castle, the Parliament building and the Royal Opera, where normally there is traffic. Eight stages present rock, pop, folk, jazz and opera in 1996 and one of these stages, floating in the sea, also acted as the rendezvous for the World Firework Championships. What is especially notable about the Festival, which attracts more than one million people, is its emphasis on the environment. An International Water Prize is awarded annually for contributions to the benefit of the world's water resources and for undertaking water environment projects in the Baltic Sea area. There is a water research corner and a museum corner focusing on environmental issues and thirty of Stockholm's best restaurants open annexes at the festival using recyclable, disposable dishes, etc.

2.2.3 *Pleasing to the eye? Art in public spaces.* The neglect of the urban and city space is not only an affront to the eyes it is an affront to the dignity of Europe's citizens. It is also, perhaps, the most telling indictment of the failures of both planning and the absence of planning at local level in post war Europe. As more and more people crowd together in cities (two-thirds of the world's population will live in cities by the year 2000)¹ it is hardly surprising that the concrete jungle of buildings, hostile in scale and design, and urban dereliction should breed resentment and hostility in those who have to live in them.

It need not be like this. Sensitive planning and design and creative partnerships with artists, including the commissioning of art in public spaces, is beginning to transform some of the worst city environments. Of course art in public spaces is not a new phenomenon. Many countries and cities have "percent for art" schemes, whereby a proportion – usually, 1% or 1.5% of the total costs of a project for a public sector building – is set aside for artistic embellishment. This has not in itself always produced "good" or critically acclaimed art. Neither has it necessarily engaged with the public. What is new, perhaps, is the realisation that such initiatives require inter-disciplinary and creative co-operation between local politicians, planners, developers, architects, artists, crafts people and arts funding agencies to maximise the aesthetic impact on the built environment. In this way artworks are not so much seen as decoration, but as integral elements in creating living public spaces that are enjoyed by their users.

In the United Kingdom the task of the Public Art Commissions Agency is to respond to opportunities for artists to make work that can be fully integrated within a public context, whether architectural, urban or landscape. It operates nationally and internationally, employing both established and younger artists and architects on commissions of both temporary and permanent works of

1. Figure quoted at the Habitat II conference on cities held in Istanbul, 1996.

art and craft, exhibitions, workshops, conferences and educational activities. The agency is an independent non-profit making company that advises government departments and other statutory bodies, professional organisations, local authorities and the private sector. Art is the agency's inspiration and its starting point, whether the project is urban or rural, in the health sector or housing, transport or communications. It has been the catalyst for a range of exciting visual artwork that has enhanced the townscape and rural environment.

2.2.4 *Art underground.* Of course, public art does not have to be above ground or adorning public and private sector buildings. The Stockholm Metro has one of the largest monumental art projects in Europe.¹ In the last forty years, fifty-eight artists have contributed to the artistic adornment of fifty-eight different underground stations. The aim has been to give an artistic quality to an environment through which a great number of people pass – in an ordinary weekday about 700 000 passengers. The artists have been chosen through competitions and some of the most important Swedish visual artists have contributed. They have been given the responsibility to create the whole station environment and entrance and not simply elements within the building. Thus, details such as name plates, waste-paper baskets, fire-alarm boxes are all subject to the artist's imagination and it is this which gives each station a unique profile. All types of artistic techniques have been used. Special effects have been achieved through keeping or using the rock through which the metro has been cut. The adornment is often connected with the place of the station and is used in many cases to dramatic effect. Thus, the subway stations function as a huge permanent art exhibition. Even if many of them represent an advanced form of modern art, they have been highly appreciated by public.

The whole project was based on a political decision in 1956 by the Stockholm City Council and has been realised through co-operation between politicians, directors of the metro, engineers, artists and construction workers.

3. The contribution of culture to economic and social outcomes

3.1 *Arts as a factor in urban regeneration and job creation*

3.1.1 *Building on consensus.* The Temple Bar urban pilot project is a catalyst that has transformed a once derelict part of Dublin into one of the city's most prominent features, an area of unique character and creative atmosphere where people live, work and go. Less than ten years ago this medieval part of the centre of Dublin was condemned to be redeveloped as a transport centre for the national transport system.² It would have become a lifeless part of the city, only acting as a transit point for citizens and, with the large move-

1. The task force is grateful to Söderström, Göran, whose book, *Art goes underground: art in the Stockholm Metro*, published in Stockholm in 1988, was a major source of this text.

2. This case study is based on the Recite Bulletin number 11 produced by DGXVI (the Directorate General for Regional Policy and Cohesion of the European Commission) and notes by Munnelly, Adrian.

ment of buses and other vehicles, a source of pollution with noise, visual intrusion and exhaust fumes. That this area was saved for the people of Dublin is a significant achievement on the part of Government both national, local and at supranational level in the European Union.

Launched in 1991, the objective of the Temple Bar scheme was to provide a public infrastructure for the area to open up access to pedestrians and improve tourist flows and to stimulate private sector interest and increase confidence in the long term viability of the area. A special development programme was established to develop Temple Bar as Dublin's cultural quarter. This programme has a number of features which include: a flexible framework plan establishing an overall architectural scheme for the area; the establishment of a dedicated company to develop the area – Temple Bar Properties Limited; close consultation with the residents and users of the area; and mixed use of the area – cultural, residential and commercial developments.

A clear objective of the project was to create employment. Ireland has a high percentage of unemployed people in its economy, particularly young people. Culture was seen as playing a crucial role in generating jobs and twelve cultural projects have been established or are being developed: the Irish Film Centre; Temple Bar Gallery and Studios; a print studio and galleries; Temple Bar Music Centre; a multi media centre for the arts; a children's cultural centre, a National Photographic Archive and School of Photography, a contemporary gallery of photography; contemporary applied design centre; a contemporary arts centre; a Viking Exhibition Centre and Archaeology Project.

Some ecu 120 million was secured for the Temple Bar development programme from national and European Union sources (Article 10, Recite, etc.). Private sector investment added a further ecu 70 million. The project represents a successful mixing and matching of culture and commerce. In four years approximately 1 200 jobs have been created in the cultural and service sectors, seventy-two new businesses have located in the Temple Bar area and 150 people have been trained in the cultural and environmental fields. Moreover, by acquiring studios and letting them to artists, the authorities have attempted to ensure that artists were not driven out as property prices increased due to the enhanced image of the area.

3.1.2 *A sweet approach to remedying inner city decay.* The job creation potential of another arts and media quarter – this time in Birmingham – is equally marked. However, what makes The Custard Factory especially remarkable is that it is the vision largely of one man, Benny Gray, an aeronautical engineer, musician, journalist and entrepreneur. The Custard Factory, so named because it was the site of a famous manufacturer of custard powder, is bringing about one of the largest single concentrations of creative activity in Europe, providing work space for approximately one thousand artists, crafts people, designers, film makers, musicians, dancers, actors, publishers. Moreover, one of the project aims is to provide space which is affordable for young adults at an early stage of their careers and, in this way, stem the annual talent exodus of arts and media graduates. Already in place are some two hundred artists' studios, art galleries, dance studios, restaurants,

shops and performance spaces in what was, previously a blighted inner city area. Soon there will be a jazz club, cinema, recording studios, a piazza, student flats, 15 000 square feet of arts and media exhibition space, and more studio work spaces and restaurants.

3.2 *Culture and industry in strategic policy partnerships*

3.2.1 *Horizontal co-operation through private and public alliances.* It is often remarked that there is no cultural policy at a national level in the Federal Republic of Germany, as this falls within the jurisdiction of the *Länder* (regions). Nevertheless, the federal political institutions have often expressed the need for concerted national efforts in the cultural sector. Several non-governmental initiatives, for example Deutscher Kulturrat (German Arts Council), have compensated for the limited jurisdiction of the federal government in the field of culture. The Cultural Circle for Economic Life operating within the framework of the Federation of German industry support for culture, is a recent addition to this group. It has established an alliance with a range of non-governmental organisations such as Deutscher Kulturrat (German Arts Council), Deutscher Musikrat (German Music Council), Deutscher Bühnenverein (German Theatre Association), Bundesverband Bildenderkünstler (Association of German Visual Artists); Deutscher Museumverband (German Museums Association) and the Arbeitskreis Deutscher Kunsthandelsverbände (Working Group of German Art Trade Associations), to provide a concerted public/private national voice on cultural issues. Their platform, Aktionskreis Kultur (Cultural Action Circle), was established in November 1994 to air concerns about uncertainties in public expenditure for culture to all levels of government – national, *Länder* and local – as well as the private and independent sector.

One of the first fruits of this collaboration is *Kulturförderung in Gemeinsamer Verantwortung – Weisbuch des Aktionskreise Kultur* (Cultural Funding as a Common Responsibility – White Paper of the Cultural Action Circle). This provides an action agenda identifying problems and proposing legislative and policy actions to safeguard culture. The recommendations include:

- improving public financing of the arts and culture by integrating different types of financing, by greater funding flexibility and improved management;
- the reform of the tax laws to encourage more corporate sponsorship;
- a reduced tax on visual arts and relaxation of the tax system to enable works of living artists to be purchased;
- improved copyright legislation;
- enhancing the position of artists within the social security system;
- suggestions for improving the position of the performing arts, especially the network of theatres.

The White Paper also emphasises the need for a new cultural policy orientation suggesting the importance of improved vertical co-operation between the levels of government, and horizontal co-operation through innovative public/private partnerships.

The Cultural Action Circle and its main host organisation, the Cultural Circle of the Economic Life, are by no means exceptional in Europe. In many European countries new forms of joint public-private co-operation have been initiated to enhance the financial and social position of the arts and culture. Yet, the German case introduced an important model of co-operation in three respects: first, its activities were started under the auspices of the influential corporate interest group, the Federal Association of German Industries; second, its platform and agenda were defined by the representatives of the main national non-governmental organisations in the arts and culture; and, third, its initial proposals form a coherent programme of financing and legislative reforms addressed to public authorities and presupposes their comprehensive co-operative action in solving major national cultural policy problems. It remains to be seen what the concrete results will be, but the activities of the Cultural Circle and the Cultural Action Circle have certainly enhanced the visibility of the arts and culture in the German overall national political agenda.

3.3 *Culture, identity, memory and place*

3.3.1 *LIFE enhancing.* A city is not characterised solely by its architecture and its surface appearance, but in a much deeper sense by the life experiences of people who have lived there and others who are living there now. With this in mind Eva Rotter, Managing Director of the Remise cultural centre in Vienna – a former tramway depot that has been used for cultural events since 1991 – set up LIFE stations, a topographical and acoustic installation, in July 1995.

This project consisted of interviews with people who are living in Vienna's Second District, Leopoldstadt, or who had lived there before. This is a district with a very high proportion of foreigners. The majority of the Jewish population lives in this part of town and many recent immigrants from Russia, Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Iran, etc. have settled there (of the 94 000 inhabitants, 22 400 are people from other countries). The development of the life of the city can be presented according to the various waves of immigration. The Second District is a truly European microcosm.

LIFE stations presented an extraordinary collage of impressions and experiences of the lives, living conditions and environment of ten individuals from the perspective of their different national and cultural backgrounds and belonging to different age groups. Coming from different countries – Austria, India, Bosnia, Turkey, Lithuania, Ukraine and Egypt – they enabled the audience who came to the installation to enter the inner circle of their personal memories. The different accents and the choice of vocabulary of the interviewees yield a semantic and emotional map of the district.

In the context of problematic current trends like the rise of religious fundamentalism, racism and xenophobia, continuing high levels of unemployment, the emergence of an "underclass" of a poorly adjusted foreign workforce in large European cities and the increasing distrust of the political process, particularly among young people, the importance of projects such as LIFE stations cannot be overstated. Any city lives with the recollection of past times and the transitoriness of life can be preserved with memories that can be communicated to future generations.

4. The role of culture as human capital and as a means of empowerment and entitlement

4.1 *Young people, creativity and participation*

4.1.1 *Making space for the arts.* How do you introduce young people to the arts and encourage them to be creative in a school environment, especially in poor or rural areas where there may be few facilities? One policy response is the PAIDEIA programme launched by Clube Portugues de Artes e Ideias, with the support of the Portuguese Secretary of State for Youth and Secretary of State for Elementary and Secondary Education. Every year, four tents, each 10 x 18 metres, are toured to cities and towns in Portugal, together with equipment specially conceived for the project. Staff are in charge of the co-ordination of the tents, accompanying them during the whole journey. In this way the project provides a rare opportunity for young people to have direct contact with professional artists of different disciplines, such as visual arts, dance, music, theatre and video and with the spaces created for them. For a period of eight to ten working days, the tents are set up in the school yards, as few of the schools have suitable spaces for cultural activities.

The principal ambition of PAIDEIA is: to contribute to making the arts a component of the day to day life of students; to introduce them to the contemporary arts and artists; to encourage young people to participate in creative activity; to stimulate critical judgement; and to enhance policies to create new audiences for the arts. At the same time, the intention is to encourage provincial or country towns to be independent and active in the process of developing creativity in school life. In 1994 the PAIDEIA programme was presented in twenty-four high schools for 30 000 students. A year later this was extended to fifty-six schools and 80 000 students.

One of the major difficulties, of course, is how the enthusiasm and expectation generated among the students can be sustained once the mobile cultural spaces move on to the next town. Although teachers are encouraged to build on the interest created, the ability to have a longer term impact on young people without resources for follow up is questionable and something the organisers recognise they need to address.

4.1.2 *"Culture is about having a future".* Young people face an uncertain future in Europe today, not least because of structural unemployment. The lack of opportunities for them to express their hopes, anxieties and opinions in meaningful ways also leads to alienation. The Phoenix Project is an intriguing

ing attempt to confront the lack of engagement between different peoples, cultures and groups in society by facilitating a dialogue between young people and artists, intellectuals, scientists and decision makers on problems younger generations face, such as the future of work and productive use of time. Initiated by Trans Europe Halles, a European network of twenty-six independent cultural centres, the Phoenix Project brings together constituencies of people whose paths rarely cross, in an attempt to create sustainable relationships and to explore the possibilities of change through the arts.

The first action research initiative, for example, takes place in Copenhagen in October 1996, during the Danish capital's celebrations as European City of Culture, when some 250 participants from all over Europe gather to exchange experiences and ideas with the local community on what they see as their future in a society that provides less and less opportunities for work. The sub-text of the project is that, for young people, "culture is about having a future". A range of complementary projects are taking place in Trans Europe Halles network centres across Europe. At the Noorderlicht, Tilburg, in the Netherlands, for example, a multidisciplinary artwork by dancers, musicians and video makers on the theme "Working overtime at the factory" will be created through workshops with students, teachers, factory workers and unemployed people. The City Art Centre, Dublin, is investigating the question "What's Work?" through the arts and changing nature of work practices in the South Inner City quarter of the Irish capital. "Time Sailors" is a workshop organised at the Wuk, Vienna, with a group of unemployed young people and senior citizens to promote intergenerational understanding. A musical environment, including mime and visual arts, based on the history of work and use of time is being created at The Junction, Cambridge, and in May 1997 in Retina, Ljubljana in Slovenia, within the framework of the City's European Cultural Month celebrations, a project on "TV – the drug of the nation" will examine the function of television and its multiple effects on society.

The aims of the Phoenix project are ambitious and include: the use of arts and artists as a catalyst to facilitate a genuine exchange of views and experiences on the problems facing young people; the provision of impulses for new ideas and actions in support of social integration; the encouragement of openness towards other peoples and cultures among young people; the enrichment of young people's own culture and the promotion of solidarity and tolerance; the creation of artistic projects at cultural centres across Europe involving young people that will lead, among other things, to new approaches to working with disadvantaged young people. The Phoenix project involves not only the cultural centres of Trans Europe Halles, but also a range of European cultural networks and co-operation with the Fondation pour le Progrès de l'Homme – the Paris-based group of philosophers and intellectuals – and Europe 99, Paris, a group involved in theoretical research headed by Edgar Morin.

4.2 *Culture and intergenerational solidarity*

4.2.1 *Shared experience.* Elderly people have often lost employment, income, respect and authority. Contact with the arts can help to restore some self-respect and interest in life. For twenty years or more there have been

interesting arts initiatives in Europe to engage with elderly people, but all too often this has been *ad hoc* and conducted in a vacuum. It is true there have been attempts to chart this activity at national level – for example the Carnegie Inquiry into the Third Age conducted in the UK in the early 1990s – but much activity goes unrecorded and, until recent years, little attempt was made to share this experience transnationally. The European Network on Older People and the Arts and European Reminiscence Network are two relatively recent attempts to address this.

The European Network on Older People and the Arts derives its existence from EuroLink Age – a network of organisations and individuals, which exists to promote the interests of older people in the European Union and to assess the implications of an ageing population – and ActiVAge – a programme organised by EuroLink Age and which co-ordinates four networks promoting the participation of older people, including one on older people and the arts. Three countries – France, Ireland and the UK – provided the founding membership of the network and they have been joined by arts organisations and artists in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. The network was effectively launched as a result of a European meeting on the issue of older people and the arts, which took place in September 1993 as part of EuroLink Age's contribution to the European Year of Older People and Solidarity between Generations. A follow-up conference was held at the Irish Museum of Modern Art in Dublin two years later. The network's aims are: to promote the contribution of older people to contemporary European culture; to visit and learn from models of good and innovative practice; to encourage partnerships between professional artists and arts organisations and older people; to facilitate transnational projects; and to establish national structures to support this work.

The European Reminiscence Network was established by Age Exchange Theatre Trust (UK) and others to increase the profile of reminiscence (that is recollection and memory) as a method of understanding, educating and stimulating creativity. It aims to link and share information with people working in the field of reminiscence in Europe through the development of a computerised database of projects, groups and individuals active in this area in health, social services, education, theatre and museums; publishing a journal featuring projects, courses and meetings in different countries; offering training for older people and for the professionals who work with them, in acquiring a range of new skills and approaches to reminiscence, and touring programmes of reminiscence theatre with older people, professionals and children.

Appendix III: The European Task Force on Culture and Development and its work

In October 1993, the Culture Committee of the Council for Cultural Co-operation endorsed a proposal put forward by its chairman at the time, Hans Sand, and the Director of Education, Culture and Sport of the Council of Europe, Raymond Weber, to prepare a report on culture and development in Europe as a contribution to the World Report on Culture and Development. The proposal was presented to, and welcomed by, the World Commission during its hearing for the European region in Stockholm in June 1993.

An allocation was set aside from the Culture Committee's budget, enhanced by contributions from member states, the European Union and from the World Commission on Culture and Development.

The Secretariat of the Council of Europe was ultimately responsible for the production of the report and it appointed Rod Fisher, Secretary General of the Circle network and Director of the International Arts Bureau in the United Kingdom, to manage the process and to co-ordinate a European Task Force. The task force comprised Eduard Delgado, Director of Observatory Interarts for Urban and Regional Cultural Policies, Barcelona, Spain, and President of Circle; Professor Ilkka Heiskanen of the University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science, Finland; Professor Carl-Johan Kleberg, then Deputy Director of the National Council for Cultural Affairs, Sweden; and Professor Kirill Razlogov, Director of the Institute of Cultural Research, Moscow, and professor of film studies at the All-Russian Institute for Film Art, Russian Federation. They were joined subsequently by Jacques Renard, Deputy Director of the Private Office of Mr Jack Lang when he was Minister for Culture in France. Ritva Mitchell, Programme Adviser in the Cultural Policy and Action Division of the Council of Europe, played a full part in the deliberations of the task force, which was assisted at the Council of Europe by Evelyne Porri and Caitlin Taylor. The task force received additional assistance for part of the time from Danielle Cliche, then on secondment from the Strategic Research and Analysis Division of the Department of Canadian Heritage, and Isabelle Schwarz, who had worked at the French Ministry of Culture and was also assisting the World Commission. Professor Anthony Everitt, a journalist and cultural commentator, Visiting Professor in the Visual and Performing Arts at Nottingham Trent University and former Secretary General of the Arts Council of Great Britain, drafted and edited the final report.

Difficulties in raising the necessary financial resources meant that the task force began work in the summer of 1994, much later than expected. In view of the shortage of time and resources to conduct original research, the task force drew on a wide range of other experience to inform its work:

– background papers commissioned from the following experts:

Professor Patrick Boylan, then Head of the Department of Arts Policy and Management, City University, London and Vice-President of the International Council of Museums;

Dr Franco Bianchini, Senior Lecturer, De Monfort University, Leicester

Suzanne Capiiau, lawyer, Brussels;

Dr Eric Corijn, Brussels University;

Xavier Dupuis, Senior Research Officer, CRNS, University of Paris/Panthéon Sorbonne;

Dr Otto Hofecker, Institute for Cultural Management, Vienna;

Dr Kazimierz Krzysztofek, Professor of Sociology, and Deputy Director, Institute of Culture, Warsaw;

Charles Landry, Director of Comedia, UK;

Dr Hans Mommaas, Senior Lecturer, Tilburg University, the Netherlands;

Dr Ken Robinson, Professor of Arts Education, University of Warwick, Coventry;

Dr Joost Smiers, Utrecht School of the Arts, the Netherlands; and

My von Euler, consultant on statistical research, Paris;

– documentation from relevant conferences and seminars and other literature;

– a round table encounter, organised by the Council of Europe, between the task force and artists and intellectuals on the future of the arts and artistic work in Europe, held in Strasbourg in February 1995;

– a “brainstorming” session linked to a European round table organised by the Circle network and the Region of Catalonia, held in Barcelona in April 1995;

– an informal meeting, organised by the Council of Europe, of European Ministers for Culture, held in Bratislava in June 1995;

– a conference convened by the Russian Ministry of Culture and the World Commission on Culture and Development, the Council of Europe and the task force, on “*Culture and development in the countries in transition*”, held in Moscow in June 1995.

The task force is grateful to all those individuals who offered views and regrets that it was not possible to consult as widely as the exercise really demanded.

A list of those attending these events follows (with a few minor exceptions, the spelling is in accordance with that in the official documentation).

Theodoor Adams, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Netherlands; Joan Guitart i Agell, Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain; Ylljet Aliçka, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, Albania; Dimitry Alisso, Russian Institute for Cultural Research, Siberian branch; Vicenç Altaió, Krtu Centre de Noves Tendències, Catalonia, Spain.

Els Baeten, Vlaams Theater Instituut, Belgium; Naima Balic, Ministry of Culture and Education, Croatia; Marat Baltabaev, Republican Scientific Centre for Cultural Problems, Kazakhstan; Claude Barbey, Département fédéral des Affaires Etrangères, Switzerland; Franco Bianchini, De Monfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom; Xavier Ballbé, Centre Europeu del Patrimoni, Catalonia, Spain; Carla Bodo, Istituto di Studi per la Programmazione Economica, Italy; Lluís Bonet, Universitat de Barcelona, Spain; Marie Bonnel, Association Française d'Action Artistique, France; Zoltán Borha, Ministry of Culture and Education, Hungary; Cristian Botez, Embassy of Romania to the Russian Federation; Anatoli Boutevich, Minister for Culture and for Print, Belarus; Alexei Bouzbetsky, Ministry of Culture, Russian Federation; Patrick Boylan, City University, London, United Kingdom; Teresa Bruguera, Departament de Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Vito Bruno, Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, Italy; Polad Bul-Bul Ogly, Minister for Culture, Azerbaijan; Nuria Bultà, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Spain; Roger Butt, Department of Canadian Heritage.

Pere Canturri Montanya, Ministère de la Culture et des Affaires Sociales, Andorre; Dusan Caplovic, Slovak Republic; Ion Caramitru, actor and theatre director, President of UNITER, Romania; Raimon Carrasco, Departament de Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Xavier Castanyé, economist, Catalonia, Spain; Andrej Cervenak, Slovenia; Yevgeny Chelyshev, Russian Academy of Science; Mihail Cibotaru, Ministry of Culture, Moldova; Soren Clausen, Kulturministeriet, Denmark; Jovan Cirilov, Belgrade, Serbia; Vesna Copic, Ministry of Culture, Slovenia; Eric Corijn, Free University of Brussels, Belgium; Daniel Courbe, Ministère de la Culture et des Affaires Sociales, Belgium; Joan Culla, Universitat de Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain; Jan Cuper, Slovak Republic.

Christiane Daleiden, Ministère des Affaires Culturelles, Luxembourg; Ladislav Deak, Slovak Republic; Pavol Dinka, Slovak Republic; Alexei Djukov, Commission of the Russian Federation at Unesco; Milena Dragicević-Sesić, Belgrade University, Serbia; Janis Dripe, Minister for Culture, Latvia; Hans van Dulken, Boeksmantichting, the Netherlands.

Sveinn Einarsson, Ministry of Culture and Education, Iceland; Epp Eelmaa, Ministry of Culture and Education, Estonia; Cemal Erbay, Embassy of Turkey to the Slovak Republic; François Euve, Roman Catholic priest, Russian Federation.

Yoro Fall, World Commission for Culture and Development; Bruno Favel, Ministère de la Culture, France; Jerkus Ferko, Slovak Republic; Milan Ferko, Slovak Republic; Marion Fischer, Centrum für Kulturforschung, Germany; Gabor Fodor, Ministry of Culture and Education, Hungary; Don Foresta, multi-media artist, France; Enric Fossas, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain; Pier Benedetto Francese, Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, Italy.

Josep Gifreu, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Spain; Yevgeny Goncharenko, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists in Russia; Sigve Gramstad, Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Norway; Joan Granados, formerly of Corporació Catalana de Radio i Televisió; Jean-Pierre Greff, Ecole Nationale des Arts Décoratifs, Strasbourg, France; Etienne Grosjean, Ministère de la Culture et des Affaires Sociales de la Communauté Française de Belgique.

Marjutka Hafner, Ministry of Culture, Slovenia; Henk M. Heikamp, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Netherlands; Hélène Herschel, Ministère de la Culture, France; Anton Hlinka, Slovak Republic; Otto Hoffecker, Institut für Kultur Management, Austria; Ivan Hudec, Minister of Culture, Slovak Republic.

Yuri Ivanov, Russian Institute for Cultural Research; Bourou Izaeva, Ministry of Culture, Kirghizstan.

Waclaw Janas, Ministry of Culture and Art, Poland; Gavin Jantjes, painter, United Kingdom; Valery Jeredhy, TRITE Studio, Russian Federation; Philip Johnsson, Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Sweden.

Galina Kachenya, Regional Programme of Cultural Development, Chelyabinsk, Russian Federation; Janna Khamdokhova, Ministry of Culture, Kabardino-Balkaria Russian Federation; Arnold Kind, Minister for Culture, Liechtenstein; Risto Kivelä, Department for Cultural Affairs, Finland; Dragan Klaić, Theater Instituut Nederland, the Netherlands; Anto Knezevic, Croatian Information and Culture Institute; Alexei Komec, Ministry of Culture, Russian Federation; Andrei Konchalovsky, Russian film maker; Georgi Konstantinov, Deputy Minister for Culture, Bulgaria; Vitaly Krikounenko, Embassy of the Ukraine to the Russian Federation; Kazimierz Krzysztofek, Instytut Kultury, Warsaw, Poland; Michael Kustow, television producer, United Kingdom.

Marta Lacambra, Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain; Teodor Laço, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, Albania; Ourania Lampsidou, Ministry of Culture, Greece; Antoni Laporte, economist, Catalonia, Spain; Turea Larissa, Ministry of Culture, Moldova; Egil Lejon, Slovak Republic; Nadja Leriche, Emplois Culturels Internationaux, France; Peter Leuprecht, Council of Europe; Dimitry Levchuk, Russian Fund for Culture; André Loechel, art historian, France.

Luis Machado, Embassy of Portugal to the Czech Republic; Drahoslav Machala, Slovak Republic; Jiri Malenovsky, Président du Comité des Délégués des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe; Eli Malka, Union des Théâtres de l'Europe, Paris, France; Isidor Marí, Departament de Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Josef

Markus, Slovak Republic; Aleksandr Marshak, S.Marshak Fund, Russian Federation; Javier Llovera Massana, Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Culture, Andorre; Sever Mesca, Ministry of Culture, Romania; Pavol Mestan, Slovak Republic; Matko Mestrovic, University of Zagreb, Croatia; Margaretha Mickwitz, Ministry of Education, Finland; Seadata Midzic, Vice-Minister for Culture, Croatia; Joseph Mifsud, Ministry for Youth and the Arts, Malta; Nikita Mikhalkov, Russian Fund for Culture; Vladimir Minac, Ministry of Culture, Slovak Republic; Eduard Miralles, Universitat de Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain; Ifrim Mircea, National Commission for Unesco, Romania; Josep Missé, Departament de Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Jaromira Mizerova, Ministry of Culture, Czech Republic; Maciej Mrozowski, Institute of Culture, Poland; Adrian Munnely, Arts Council of Ireland.

Jesper de Neergaard, artist, Denmark; Mr Nekolny, Ministry of Culture, Czech Republic; Marc Nicolas, Ministry of Culture, France; Anna Niewiadomska, Ministry of Culture and Art, Poland; Oskar Novotný, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovak Republic.

Ms B. Ona, artist, Austria; Tanja Orel-Sturm, Chairwoman, CDCC, Council of Europe and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovenia; Jose Osterman, State Secretary, Ministry of Culture, Slovenia.

Viktoria Paloczy, Ministry of Culture and Education, Hungary; Joy Parry, Department of National Heritage, United Kingdom; Jan Pauliny, Slovak Republic; Javier Pérez de Cuellar, World Commission for Culture and Development; Zrinja Perusko Culek, Institute of Development and International Relations, Croatia; Marta Pessarrodona, Comissió Internacional de Difusió de la Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Oriol Pi de Cabanyes, Institució de les Lletres Catalanes, Spain; Marie Ponchelet, craftsperson, France; Jordi Porta, Fundació Jaume Bofill, Catalonia, Spain; Michal Prokop, Vice-Minister for Culture, Czech Republic; Christos Psilogenis, Ambassador of Cyprus to Hungary.

Yudhishtir Raj Isar, World Commission for Culture and Development; Andrew Ramsay, Department of National Heritage, United Kingdom; Veronika Ratzenbock, Österr. Kulturdokumentation, Austria; Tatiana Razmoustova, Russian Institute for Cultural Research; Miquel Reniu, Departament de Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Josep Ribera, Fundació CIDOB, Spain; Michel Ricard, Ministère de la Culture, France; Norbert Riedl, Chairman, Culture Committee, Council of Europe and the Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst, Austria; Eija Ristimäki, Arts Council of Finland; Ken Robinson, University of Warwick, United Kingdom; M. Àngels Roque, Institut Català d'Estudis Mediaterranis, Spain; Alexander Rubinstein, All Union Arts Research Institute, Moscow, Russian Federation; Arne Ruth, Dagens Nyheter, Sweden.

Margarita Saenz de la Calzado, Ministry of Culture, Spain; Igumen Kirill (Sakharov), Russian Federation; Nikolai Sakharov, State Duma of the Russian Federation; Valentí Sallas, COPEC, Catalonia, Spain; Hans Sand, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union; Maite Sauquillo, Departament de Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Christian Schmid, Conférence Suisse des Directeurs Cantonaux de l'Instruction Publique, Switzerland; Konstantin

Selestovic, Ministry of Culture, Belarus; Jaume Serrats, Promoció Cultural, Catalonia, Spain; Olga Sevan, Russian Institute for Cultural Research; Pyotr Shtchedrovitsky, Russian Institute for Cultural Research; Mikhail Shvydkoi, Vice-Minister for Culture, Russian Federation; Sergei Shyshkin, Institute of Economic Problems of Transition, Russian Federation; Vladimir Skok, World Commission for Culture and Development; Alexander Slafkovsky, City Council of Liptovsky Mikulas, Slovak Republic; Dusan Slobodnik, Slovak Republic; Adrian van der Staay, Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, the Netherlands; Joost Smiers, Utrecht School of the Arts, Centre for Arts and Media Management, The Netherlands; Alfred Smudits, International Research Institute for Media Communication and Cultural Development, Austria; Jan Stevcek, Slovak Republic; Pavol Stevcek, Ministry of Culture, Slovak Republic; Viera Straznicka, Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the Council of Europe; David Streiff, Département Fédéral de l'Intérieur, Switzerland; Maxim Strikha, Ministry of Culture, Ukraine; Moquel Strubell, Institut de Sociolingüística Catalana, Spain; Joan Subirats, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain; Nada Svob-Dokic, Institute for Development and International Relations, Croatia.

Hans Temnitschka, Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst, Austria; Louise Terrillon-Mackay, Ministère du Patrimoine canadien; Walther Tjon Pian Gi, theatre/dance director, the Netherlands; Vladimir Tsybik-dorzhiyev, Asian Buddhists' Conference for Peace, Buryatia, Russian Federation; Erkki-Sven Tüür, composer, Estonia.

Mihai Ungheanu, Secretary of State, Ministry of Culture, Romania.

Anis Vafa, Russian Academy of Science; Anna Vášová, director, Czech Television; Estanislau Vidal-Folch, Departament de Cultura, Catalonia, Spain; Joan Vidal i Gayolà, Centre de Cultura Popular i Tradicional Catalana, Spain; Favi-la Vieira, Ambassador of Portugal to the Czech Republic; Margit Vildlyng, Ministry of Culture, Denmark; Via Virtmane, Ministry of Culture, Latvia; Ivan Vitanyi, Culture and Education Committee, Hungarian Parliament.

Raymond Weber, Council of Europe; Niki van der Wielen, Boekmanstichting, the Netherlands; Andreas Wiesand, Zentrum für Kulturforschung, Germany; Andrea Willi, Ministry of Culture, Liechtenstein; Edith Wolf-Perez, Osterreichische Kultur-dokumentation Int. Archiv für Kulturanalysen, Austria.

Aleksandr Yakovlev, ORT, President of Council, Russian Federation; Mr Yakovyna, Ministry of Culture, Ukraine.

Peter van Zaan, Ministry of Culture, Denmark; Mr Zalman, Ministry of Culture, Czech Republic; Reiner Zimmerman, Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wissenschaft und Kunst, Germany; Sergei Zujev, Russian Institute for Cultural Research.